1958 Lazo Il-12 crash

Aeroflot

Industry	Aviation
Founded	1932
Headquarters	Moscow , Soviet Union

The 1958 Lazo Il-12 crash was a fatal aviation incident involving an Ilyushin Il-12 model Il-12P operated by Aeroflot. On Friday, 19 September 1958, the aircraft crashed in the Lazo District of Khabarovsk Krai, resulting in the loss of all 28 individuals aboard.

Aircraft

The aircraft involved was an Il-12P bearing serial number 30073 and construction number 073, manufactured at the "Banner of Labor" factory in Moscow on 5 August 1947 (some sources suggest the production year as 1948). Initially registered as CCCP-Л1358, it was assigned to the Main Directorate of the Civil Air Fleet under the USSR Council of Ministers and allocated to the 185th (Magadan) Aviation Detachment within the Far Eastern Territorial Administration of the Civil Air Fleet. Subsequently, this detachment became part of the Magadan Unified Aviation Group. On 17 November 1954, its registration was updated to CCCP-Л3904. The total flight hours accumulated by this aircraft amounted to 7,834.

Crew

• Captain: Pyotr Alexandrovich Konoplev
• Co-pilot: Vladimir Alexandrovich Nikulin
• Flight engineer: Mirgarifan Garifulovich Gizatulin
• Radio operator: Pavel Nikolayevich Matvievsky

Accident

CCCP-Л3904 was conducting a non-scheduled service from Magadan to Khabarovsk, with planned stops at Okhotsk and Nikolayevsk-on-Amur. The initial segment proceeded without complications. However, prior to departure, the airport navigator failed to confirm that the crew had accurately prepared their flight calculations, and no formal approval of the flight plan was obtained. Despite this oversight, authorization for takeoff was granted by the airport dispatcher. The aircraft departed Okhotsk carrying four crew members and twenty-four passengers (including three children). Due to unfavorable weather conditions, landing at Nikolayevsk-on-Amur Airport was not possible; hence, the flight continued past this location without stopping.

Weather forecasts provided to the crew indicated persistent mid-level cloud cover along their route from Okhotsk to Khabarovsk, with stratiform and broken clouds having bases between 200 and 300 meters above Okhotsk airfield elevation. Conditions included icing, precipitation, and visibility ranging from two to four kilometers. Nearer to Khabarovsk, cloud bases were expected to rise between 300 and 600 meters with visibility improving up to ten kilometers. Terrain features such as hills were obscured by cloud cover. At Khabarovsk, variable stratocumulus clouds (6–9 oktas) with bases at 300–600 meters were forecasted alongside rain showers, visibility exceeding ten kilometers, and westerly winds at five to eight meters per second.

Subsequent investigation gathered statements from other crews who had flown this route before and after CCCP-Л3904’s journey. These accounts revealed that actual conditions included dry and wet snow, moderate airframe icing, and winds from north-northwest reaching speeds up to nineteen meters per second—contradicting the forecast issued at Okhotsk. Furthermore, snowfall reduced NDB (Non-directional beacon) signal ranges to approximately fifteen to twenty kilometers and degraded two-way radio communication quality; radio compasses also exhibited erratic behavior. Additionally, Captain Konoplev did not consult with the Aviation Meteorological Service Group nor receive a synoptic briefing.

During the leg between Okhotsk and Nikolayevsk-on-Amur, navigational bearings were taken three times confirming that one hour and three minutes after departure they remained on course. At 11:58 (Moscow time), attempts were made by the crew to establish contact with Nikolayevsk airport dispatchers but were unsuccessful. At 12:22, flight L3904 reported passing Nikolayevsk; however, this claim lacked confirmation from local dispatchers who also could not verify exact overflight position. The Nikolayevsk dispatcher relayed this timing information to Khabarovsk district dispatch service without disclosing that no communication had been established or precise location confirmed.

At cruising altitude of 2,700 meters and a ground speed of approximately 350 km/h by 13:16, the crew reported passing Nizhnetambovskoye but noted absence of signals from NDBs. By 13:32 they claimed visual passage over Komsomolsk-on-Amur despite other crews indicating visual flight conditions were unfavorable there. At 13:51 they reported passing Troitskoye without providing details on flight conditions.

At 14:14 they transmitted: "According to calculations passed Yelabuga at 2,700 meters in clouds; compass malfunctioning; requesting permission for descent and radar guidance." After Troitskoye passage, control responsibility was handed over from district dispatch service to area control center (ACC), but no confirmation of communication establishment with ACC was received by district dispatchers nor relayed accordingly.

CCCP-Л3904 failed to establish direct radio contact with ACC and relied on message relay via another Il-12P (registration CCCP-12586), receiving clearance to descend to 2,400 meters. The ACC duty officer informed district dispatch that communication with CCCP-Л3904 remained unestablished.

The radio operator aboard CCCP-Л3904 spent considerable time attempting VHF contact with ACC while simultaneously communicating with Khabarovsk airport’s short-wave direction finder station from which a bearing approximately at 312° was received. This information was passed along with flight number to district service operating westward but was dismissed as incorrect since they reported no aircraft presence there. This bearing data was neither communicated further nor shared with flight operations management.

At 14:20 an air defense officer contacted ACC duty officer reporting detection of an unidentified aircraft near Yedinka along Yedinka-Khabarovsk route; however a female voice responded denying any aircraft presence in that sector. The investigation later concluded this voice belonged to district service operator who denied involvement.

At 14:23 CCCP-Л3904 crew attempted again unsuccessfully to acquire a bearing from short-wave direction finder. Between approximately 14:30 and 14:40 they reported altitude at 2,400 meters with estimated arrival time over Khabarovsk at around 14:15 according to calculations.

Despite lacking precise location data for the aircraft, district dispatcher instructed descent first to 1,800 meters while advising crew to request military radar bearing via VHF. At 14:33 crew confirmed reaching altitude of 1,800 meters; dispatcher then ordered further descent to 1,500 meters alongside course adjustment for wind drift compensation.

Crew reported intermittent visual contact on course heading approximately fifty degrees and stated they had passed Khabarovsk according to calculations and were turning back. Dispatcher advised following short-wave direction finder bearing which had been out of service since late August due to maintenance; operators were instructed not to provide bearings or transmit them to aircraft.

Consequently only imprecise bearings from medium-wave direction finder were available. At around 14:50 crew acknowledged receipt of medium-wave bearing and adjusted course accordingly.

Fuel reports indicated remaining quantity dropped from eight hundred liters at 14:43 down to six hundred liters by fifteen hundred hours; dispatcher advised proceeding towards Khabarovsk employing fuel-saving measures.

The crew continued expressing doubts about bearing accuracy requesting further bearings until fifteen nineteen when dispatcher affirmed correctness instructing course heading two hundred ninety degrees maintaining altitude at three thousand three hundred meters.

It is notable that prior altitude adjustments included climbs first back up to one thousand eight hundred then two thousand seven hundred meters.

At fifteen nineteen crew reported ground speed reduced to one hundred ninety kilometers per hour requesting distance remaining to Khabarovsk which dispatcher stated as two hundred ten kilometers.

By fifteen thirty-six they transmitted distance as two hundred ten kilometers heading one hundred ten degrees.

Five minutes later at fifteen forty-one fuel remaining was reported as four hundred fifty liters ground speed two hundred km/h altitude three thousand three hundred meters in clouds; dispatcher commented on slow progress then directed descent back down to two thousand seven hundred meters setting course three hundred degrees at fifteen forty-seven.

At fifteen fifty-two fuel quantity stood at three hundred liters; at fifteen fifty-seven it dropped further to two hundred ten liters prompting recommendation for preparing forced landing selecting suitable terrain.

Dispatcher informed them distance remaining one hundred fifty kilometers instructing descent further down to two thousand one hundred meters.

At sixteen oh five fuel remaining reached two hundred liters; by sixteen oh seven crew reported descending visually toward lights.

At sixteen eleven altitude decreased to one thousand five hundred meters ground barely visible; one minute later flying at one thousand two hundred meters through variable cloud cover initiating search for landing area.

District dispatcher cautioned against landing before fuel exhaustion occurred.

The final transmission from CCCP-Л3904 came at sixteen fourteen reporting altitude one thousand meters ground not visible flying within clouds unable to see surroundings.

One minute later at sixteen fifteen local time (twenty three fifteen local) aircraft entered near vertical dive impacting terrain fatally ending flight.

Crash site was located on slope of mountain rising one thousand fifty meters elevation within Lazo District approximately one hundred forty-five kilometers southeast (bearing one hundred thirty-seven degrees) of Khabarovsk city and thirty-five kilometers east-northeast (bearing seventy-four degrees) from village Khody.

All twenty-eight occupants lost their lives in this accident.

Causes

The anticipated arrival of a new west wind did not materialize. Unaware of this, the flight crew, attempting to counteract drift, inadvertently steered the aircraft westward off the planned route. Air defense data indicated that the Nikolayevsk-on-Amur airport was bypassed to the west by as much as 55 kilometers. These findings revealed that the Nikolayevsk airport's dispatch service failed to manage or supervise the flights properly. The aircraft CCCP-Л3904 passed 24 kilometers west of Nikolayevsk airport, while a snowstorm limited the effective range of NDBs to under 20 kilometers, and two-way radio communication had an even shorter reach, preventing the crew from establishing contact with the airport. Although dispatchers possessed working radio equipment, they neglected to utilize it for flight monitoring and control, resulting in aircraft following routes toward Khabarovsk that were 30 to 40 kilometers left of the intended course. Moreover, the district service dispatcher did not oversee the crews' handoff to communication with the ACC. Meanwhile, CCCP-Л3904 veered substantially left and flew past Khabarovsk.

When the plane failed to arrive in Khabarovsk at the scheduled time of 14:15, no immediate concern was expressed by dispatchers; it took 15 minutes before they noticed. The air defense report about an unidentified aircraft near Yedinka also did not prompt any alarm. Additionally, when the crew successfully contacted the short-wave direction finder and obtained a bearing, this information was not communicated by district service personnel to either the flight operations manager or dispatch staff. Operating at night under challenging weather conditions, the crew became disoriented. Between 14:16 and 15:19, during attempts to secure bearings from the short-wave direction finder, the Il-12 effectively circled within a confined area. The precise position of CCCP-Л3904 was only identified at 15:20; however, by then it was too late since remaining fuel reserves, compounded by a strong northern headwind, were insufficient to reach Khabarovsk. Although there was an alternate airfield at Yedinka, neither the flight operations manager nor air traffic controllers were aware that it featured a ground radar transponder and thus failed to prepare it for receiving the aircraft. The Yedinka airfield dispatcher overheard radio exchanges between CCCP-Л3904 and ground services but did not intervene despite having the capability to assist. Lacking accurate knowledge of the aircraft’s location, dispatchers violated protocol by initiating descent over mountainous terrain.

See also

• Aeroflot Flight 11