1983 Anchorage runway collision

Korean Air Lines Flight 084

Industry	Aviation
Founded	1977 (aircraft manufacture date)
Headquarters	Anchorage, Alaska , United States
Products	Cargo air transport (McDonnell Douglas DC-10-30CF)

Template:Use mdy dates Template:Infobox aircraft occurrence On December 23, 1983, Korean Air Lines Flight 084 (KAL084), a cargo operation utilizing a McDonnell Douglas DC-10 model DC-10-30CF, collided with SouthCentral Air Flight 59 (SCA59), a Piper PA-31 Navajo PA-31-350 Navajo Chieftain, while both were on runway 06L/24R (currently designated as 07L/25R) at Ted Stevens Anchorage International Airport. The accident occurred when the crew of KAL084 became disoriented amid heavy fog and mistakenly attempted takeoff from an incorrect runway. Both aircraft were completely destroyed; however, there were no fatalities reported.

Aircraft

The initial aircraft involved was a McDonnell Douglas DC-10-30CF, with serial number 46960 and registered as HL7339, constructed in 1977. This airplane was powered by three General Electric CF6-50C engines.

McDonnell Douglas produced five DC-10-30CF models for Overseas National Airways (ONA), although one was sold to a different operator prior to delivery. Of the remaining four, all were lost in accidents; two crashes occurred while operating under ONA within a span of less than two months, and the other two incidents happened after the aircraft had been transferred to other operators, including the one involved in the Anchorage collision. Only one of these accidents resulted in fatalities.

The second aircraft was a Piper PA-31-350 Chieftain, bearing serial number 31-7952193 and registered as N35206.

Accident

At 12:15 Yukon Standard Time (Yukon Time Zone had recently been renamed Alaska Time Zone but the NTSB report still refers to it as Yukon Standard Time), Flight 59 received clearance to depart from Anchorage to Kenai following its filed flight plan. However, due to dense fog enveloping the airport, clearance delivery informed the pilot to anticipate a delay until 12:44. Consequently, the pilot shut down the engines and passengers disembarked temporarily. After reboarding and reestablishing contact with the tower at 12:34, Flight 59 remained parked for approximately an hour because of persistent fog. Finally, as visibility improved around 13:39, taxi clearance was granted.

By 13:44, SCA Flight 59 reached taxiway W-3—connecting the primary east–west taxiway with the approach end of runway 6L—and held short of runway 6L until the runway visual range (RVR) increased to 1,800 feet, meeting the minimum requirement for takeoff.

At 13:57, ground control at Anchorage authorized Korean Air Lines Flight 084 to taxi for departure on either runway 6R or runway 32; the flight crew selected runway 32. This choice conflicted with Korean Air Lines’ operational rules, which mandated a minimum visibility of one-quarter mile for takeoff on runway 32 at Anchorage. Visibility at that time was only one-eighth of a mile. Conversely, taking off from runway 6R—the airport’s main instrument runway—would have required transmissometers at touchdown, midfield, and rollout zones to show an RVR of no less than 600 feet; conditions on runway 6R exceeded this minimum and would have complied with KAL’s operating criteria. The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) investigation could not determine why the crew opted for runway 32 rather than runway 6R, partly because the cockpit voice recorder was never recovered.

The correct taxi path from the north apron (where the DC-10 was stationed) to runway 32 involved heading south to the east–west taxiway, then turning right onto it and proceeding to runway 32’s threshold before making a final right turn onto the runway itself. Instead, KAL084 taxied southwest along taxiway W-1 toward runway 6L/24R and positioned itself facing west on that runway. The thick fog prevented ground controllers from visually monitoring KAL084’s taxi route and also impaired the flight crew’s ability to navigate accurately around the airport. Other flight crews that day reported similar difficulties due to limited visibility and confusing signage; airport safety personnel had to assist multiple aircraft that became disoriented in the fog.

Furthermore, some illuminated taxiway and runway signs along KAL084's route were either partially or completely unlit, reducing their visibility. The intersections where taxiway W-1 met both the east–west taxiway and runway 6L/24R lacked identifying signage—a deficiency corrected after this incident. The DC-10's cockpit height of approximately 30 feet above ground level further complicated visual identification of signage and pavement markings due to increased slant range.

Once positioned on what they believed was runway 32, KAL084’s captain expressed uncertainty about their location and briefly considered switching to runway 6R. Reassured by his first officer’s confidence that they were indeed on runway 32, he reported at 14:03 holding in position on that runway and received takeoff clearance at 14:04. In reality, KAL084 was aligned on runway 24R near its midpoint. Given this position, there was insufficient remaining runway length for a safe takeoff even without any collision occurring. Despite the captain’s earlier doubt, neither pilot attempted to verify their heading against that of runway 32 using instruments; the NTSB could not ascertain why this step was omitted.

At 14:05:28, Anchorage tower cleared SCA59 to enter position and hold on runway 6L after RVR reached the required threshold of 1,800 feet. Fifty seconds later at 14:06:18, KAL084 announced its commencement of takeoff roll. Shortly thereafter, SCA59’s pilot noticed headlights approaching on the runway and initially assumed they belonged to a vehicle. Realizing these were from an aircraft accelerating for takeoff, he instructed his passengers to duck down.

Meanwhile, KAL084’s captain reacted upon seeing SCA59 by applying up elevator and left rudder controls, causing the DC-10's nose landing gear to lift off while shifting its main body gear rightward. This maneuver caused KAL084's body gear and left wing gear to straddle SCA59’s fuselage rather than striking it head-on—a circumstance likely preventing fatalities aboard the smaller aircraft.

After colliding with Flight 59, KAL084 continued beyond the end of runway at a speed far below flying velocity. It crashed through seven rigid towers supporting approach lighting for runway 6L before coming to rest approximately 1,434 feet beyond the runway threshold and immediately catching fire.

Three passengers aboard SCA59 sustained minor injuries; all others including its pilot escaped unharmed despite total destruction of their aircraft—the DC-10’s main gear sheared off both wings of SCA59 while its nose gear crushed part of SCA59's cockpit roof and damaged its vertical stabilizer. The three Korean Air Lines crew members suffered serious injuries but managed to evacuate their aircraft prior to it being engulfed in flames. Initial media reports mistakenly cited seven injuries among SCA59 occupants with none among KAL084 crew members.

See also

• Runway safety
• 2001 Linate Airport runway collision, a runway accident in fog caused by a pilot following an incorrect taxi path
• 1990 Wayne County Airport runway collision, another fog-related runway collision due to a pilot taking the wrong taxi route
• 1983 Madrid Airport runway collision, a December 1983 runway accident in fog resulting from an erroneous taxi route taken by the pilot
• Comair Flight 5191, an incident where the flight crew initiated takeoff on an incorrect runway, which could have been prevented by verifying runway heading with instruments
• Singapore Airlines Flight 006, a case involving an attempted takeoff on a runway closed for maintenance, partly due to limited visibility conditions
• 2024 Haneda Airport runway collision, a nighttime runway collision between a large airliner and a smaller turboprop aircraft currently under investigation

External links

• NTSB accident report (summary, PDF) - archived PDF at Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University
• Accident details (DC-10) on the Aviation Safety Network (archived)
• Accident details (PA-31) on the Aviation Safety Network Wikibase (archived)
• Video footage of the crash site on YouTube, with narration from an ARFF captain who responded to the incident

Legal proceedings related to the crash:

• Korean Air Lines v. State of Alaska
• State of Alaska v. Korean Air Lines
• State of Alaska v. Oriental Fire & Marine Insurance