1990 Back Bay, Massachusetts, train collision
| Industry | Passenger rail transport |
|---|---|
| Founded | May 1, 1971 |
| Headquarters | Washington, D.C. , United States |
| Products | Intercity passenger train services |
| Website | www |
The 1990 train collision in Back Bay, Massachusetts involved an Amtrak passenger service, the Night Owl, and a Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority (MBTA) commuter train operating on the Stoughton Line near Back Bay station in Boston, Massachusetts, United States. According to the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) inquiry, the Amtrak train entered a curve with a speed limit at a velocity significantly exceeding the prescribed limit, resulting in a derailment and subsequent impact with the MBTA train on an adjacent track. Although no fatalities were reported, 453 individuals sustained injuries, and Back Bay station remained closed for six days following the incident. The financial impact was estimated at $14 million. This event led to the implementation of stricter speed regulations, enhanced safety measures around Back Bay, and a comprehensive overhaul of Amtrak’s engineer training programs.
Accident
On December 11, 1990, Amtrak train #66, known as the Night Owl, departed from Union Station in Washington, D.C. at 10:30 PM. This overnight service along the Northeast Corridor was scheduled to reach Boston's South Station by 8:35 AM on December 12. Because electrification ended at New Haven, Connecticut, two diesel locomotives of model EMD F40PH (#272 and #366) were assigned to haul the train from New Haven to Boston. The train's consist included material handling cars, baggage cars, three coaches, a dining car, two sleepers, another baggage car, and an additional material handling car. At Back Bay station, there were seven crew members and 190 passengers onboard.[1]
MBTA train #906 was operating as a scheduled commuter service inbound from Stoughton to South Station on the Stoughton Line. It comprised an EMD F40PH-2C diesel locomotive (#1073), six passenger coaches, and a control car functioning in push mode with the engineer controlling operations from this front control car. At the time of the crash, it was nearing Back Bay with five crew members and approximately 900 passengers aboard.[1]
The western approach to Back Bay features a tunnel with three parallel tracks numbered 3, 1, and 2. The MBTA commuter train was running on track 1 while the Amtrak Night Owl occupied track 2—two adjacent tracks without any physical separation. The speed limit for all three tracks was . However, the lead Amtrak locomotive entered the curve traveling at , exceeding twice the allowed speed. At approximately 8:23 AM, it derailed and collided with the MBTA locomotive on the neighboring track. Emergency responders swiftly arrived at the downtown Boston site. The NTSB documented a total of 453 injuries: 50 passengers on the Night Owl, 396 aboard the MBTA train, and seven firefighters attending the scene.[1]
The impact resulted in destruction of all three locomotives involved, five Amtrak passenger cars, and one MBTA coach. Structural damage was also inflicted upon tunnel support columns.[1] Additionally, Dartmouth Street above the tunnel required resurfacing due to damage caused by jackknifed trains creating a hole in the roadway. Back Bay station remained closed for six days following these events. The overall damage was estimated at $14 million—comprising $9 million for infrastructure and rolling stock repairs plus $5 million allocated for cleanup efforts.[2]
Investigation
The NTSB's inquiry focused on the Night Owl service. Two crew members occupied the lead locomotive cab: Willis E. Copeland, serving as the engineer, and Richard Abramson, an apprentice engineer operating under Copeland’s guidance throughout the journey.
Copeland began his career in railroading in 1957 and had been an engineer since 1969. While working as a road foreman for Amtrak in 1979, he disregarded stop signals near Pelham Bay, narrowly avoiding a major accident due to an automatic derail device. Although Amtrak terminated his employment, he was rehired in 1983. In March 1990, Metro-North imposed a lifetime ban on Copeland from its territory (excluding New Haven Union Station) after he twice failed to stop at temporary signs protecting track maintenance crews. Abramson started at Amtrak as a ticket clerk in 1973 and began engineer training in early 1990, completing two round trips on the route as part of his instruction. While Copeland knew Abramson, he had previously supervised other apprentice engineers.
Data from the train event recorder indicated that the Night Owl was traveling faster than the permitted speed limit, likely attempting to recover lost time between New Haven and Boston. Copeland stated that he instructed Abramson to apply brakes at Ruggles station, approximately from Back Bay, but the train did not decelerate normally before emergency braking was engaged upon entering the tunnel. The recorder data contradicted this account: braking commenced shortly before reaching the tunnel, with emergency braking activated less than four seconds prior to the derailment. The NTSB concluded that even if braking had started earlier, speeds exceeding would have still caused the derailment. At the tunnel entrance, the train was moving at , reducing speed only to before the recorder ceased functioning.
Given Abramson’s role, the NTSB examined Amtrak’s engineer training program and uncovered significant shortcomings:
- Route familiarization occurred simultaneously with hands-on locomotive operation training.
- Engineers responsible for supervising apprentices received no specific training; concerns were raised about Copeland’s appropriateness for this role considering his disciplinary history.
Aftermath
The NTSB assigned full responsibility for the accident to Amtrak, highlighting Abramson’s delay in braking and Copeland’s insufficient supervision. Additionally, it criticized Amtrak’s lack of oversight in engineer training and the absence of safety warning systems at the curve. Subsequent revisions to the NTSB report removed direct fault from Abramson, attributing probable cause instead to Copeland’s failure to ensure timely braking. Both employees were dismissed following the incident. By 1992, Amtrak had introduced automatic warning mechanisms designed to slow trains approaching the curve at excessive speeds.