Adickes v. S. H. Kress & Co.
| Industry | Retail (Lunch counter) |
|---|---|
| Headquarters | Hattiesburg , United States |
Adickes v. S. H. Kress & Co. (398 U.S. 144, 1970) is a landmark decision by the United States Supreme Court, in which the majority opinion authored by Justice John Marshall Harlan II established that the responsibility to demonstrate the absence of any factual dispute lies with the party seeking summary judgment. Although later questioned by Celotex Corp. v. Catrett (1986), this precedent was not expressly overturned. While the Supreme Court's focus was primarily on procedural legal standards, the case itself involved a significant civil rights violation experienced by Sandra Adickes, a white educator who was denied service at a restaurant in the segregated South after attempting to dine with her black students.
Background
The incident at the heart of this case occurred on August 14, 1964, in Hattiesburg, Mississippi, a city still entrenched in segregation despite the recent enactment of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 on July 2, which had outlawed segregation in principle but had yet to be fully enforced in many Southern communities.
Sandra Adickes was a white teacher employed at a Mississippi Freedom School, part of an initiative aimed at improving educational access for African Americans throughout the South. At that time, the typical educational attainment for black Mississippians was only up to sixth grade. The Freedom Schools largely depended on liberal white instructors from Northern states, among whom Adickes was included. She had completed teacher training in New York during early 1964 before arriving in predominantly black Hattiesburg on July 4. Despite its majority black population, local white residents had engaged in ongoing harassment and intimidation campaigns targeting perceived Northern activists. That summer alone, three individuals had been assaulted in Hattiesburg by segregationist groups. Across Mississippi, recent years had seen numerous church bombings and murders; notably, civil rights leader Medgar Evers had been assassinated just the previous summer.
Following the passage of the Civil Rights Act and the formal end to segregation laws, Adickes’s black students were eager to partake in everyday activities previously denied to them—such as attending movies, visiting libraries, and staying at local hotels like Holiday Inn. To celebrate these newfound opportunities, Adickes planned a field trip with her students to demonstrate their expanded civic rights. She selected the local public library—funded by black taxpayers yet historically refusing admission to black patrons—and subsequently intended to take them out for lunch. On August 14, she brought six students to the Hattiesburg Public Library, where they were informed that library cards would not be issued and that trustees preferred closing the facility rather than integrating it racially. Adickes refused to leave until police arrived; the chief ultimately shut down the library.
Next, Adickes and her students proceeded to dine at a lunch counter operated by defendant S. H. Kress & Co.. Lunch counters had become symbolic battlegrounds during the Civil Rights Movement, as demonstrated by events like the Greensboro sit-ins. The group sat across two booths; while her black students were served without issue, Adickes herself was denied service under a policy refusing service to white patrons accompanied by black individuals—even though serving black customers was required by law. According to testimony from the store manager, Adickes’s presence immediately created tension among patrons both inside and outside the establishment. The manager feared that escalating mob unrest was imminent and cited this concern as justification for refusing service. During this time, a police officer entered and retreated to the back of the store. The group left shortly thereafter without eating. Upon their departure, Adickes was arrested by that same officer on fabricated charges of vagrancy, despite her stable employment as a teacher earning $2,200 annually. A legal team secured her release within hours.
Adickes initiated a federal lawsuit in New York asserting two claims: first, that Kress violated her rights under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution by discriminating based on race; second, that both her denial of service and subsequent arrest resulted from a conspiracy between Kress and local law enforcement officials in Hattiesburg. The initial claim proceeded to trial and resulted in judgment favoring Kress; however, the conspiracy allegation was dismissed prior to trial through a motion for summary judgment. Adickes appealed this dismissal, leading the United States Supreme Court to grant certiorari.
Issues
The Court considered two primary questions in its examination of this case:
- Can a plaintiff seek recovery under 42 U.S.C. §1983 (§1983) if there is a conspiracy between Kress and a law enforcement officer?
- Was it incorrect for the District Court to grant summary judgment on the conspiracy claim?
The central matter concerned the interpretation of rule 56(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which has since been revised following Adickes and the subsequent Celotex Corp. v. Catrett (1986) decision.
Holding
- The Court affirmed that a conspiracy involving Kress and a police officer would indeed permit the plaintiff to recover under §1983. To establish a §1983 claim, two criteria must be met: (1) the plaintiff must demonstrate that the defendant infringed upon a right protected by the "constitution and laws" of the United States, and (2) that this deprivation occurred "under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory." The Court concluded that when a state official participates in such a conspiracy, it clearly constitutes state action necessary for a §1983 claim.
- The Court determined that the District Court erred in granting summary judgment on the conspiracy allegation. It found that the respondent failed to satisfy its burden of proving no genuine factual dispute existed. Reviewing the evidence, the Court noted that it was not established beyond doubt that no police officer was present at the Kress store while the petitioner awaited service or that no understanding took place between such an officer and store employees to deny service. Although the store manager denied any communication with law enforcement, no affidavits from other store staff were submitted. Furthermore, officers involved in Adickes’ arrest did not provide affidavits ruling out their involvement in any conspiracy. While Kress argued that Adickes did not produce evidence confirming a police officer’s presence inside the store—which they claimed justified summary judgment—the Court ruled that since Kress failed to meet its initial evidentiary burden, Adickes was not obligated to supply such proof.
The Adickes ruling reinforced that summary judgment should remain an "extraordinary remedy," reflecting its limited intended use by the original drafters of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. This is because summary judgment precludes a jury from hearing the case. The later Celotex decision partially reversed this approach, leading to more frequent use of summary judgment. Despite prevailing before the Supreme Court, Adickes did not pursue a trial following remand.
See also
- Peterson v. City of Greenville: Another Supreme Court case concerning an S. H. Kress lunch counter