Aeroflot Flight 101/X-20

Kazakh Civil Aviation Directorate

Industry	Aviation
Headquarters	Alma-Ata , Soviet Union
Area served	Kazakhstan, Soviet Union
Key people	Rishat Nurmukhametovich Azakov (head)
Products	Civil aviation operations

Aircraft

The aircraft involved was an Ilyushin Il-18B bearing registration CCCP-75685, operated by the Kazakh Civil Aviation Directorate under Aeroflot. At the time of the accident, it had accumulated a total of 6802 flight hours.

Crew

There were eight crew members on board. The cockpit team comprised:<ref name=":0">

• Captain Konstantin Sergeevich Artamonov, serving as pilot-in-command
• Rishat Nurmukhametovich Azakov, check captain and head of the Kazakh Civil Aviation Directorate
• Co-pilot Nikolai Aleksandrovich Slamikhin
• Flight engineer Anatoliy Galiyevich Shakirov
• Navigator Vladimir Vasiliyevich Pristavka
• Radio operator Nikolay Nikolayevich Safonov

Flight attendants on duty were Stanislav Port and Avgusta Kuzmenykh.

Synopsis

Originally scheduled to depart from Domodedovo Airport at 07:30 on 4 January, the flight experienced a delay due to necessary engine maintenance. Departure from Domodedovo occurred at 10:20, with arrival at Omsk airport at 15:52 Moscow time. The subsequent leg was planned from Omsk to Alma-Ata. Concurrently, Rishat Azakov, head of the Kazakh aviation division, had just returned from investigating a Mil Mi-4 helicopter crash and personally inspected the Il-18’s landing gear before authorizing continuation of the journey. Arrival at Alma-Ata was postponed by 2 hours and 28 minutes because visibility fell below 1,000 metres (3,300 ft), forcing the airport to close temporarily for safety reasons. The flight departed Omsk at 19:30 Moscow time, maintaining a cruising altitude of 7,000 metres (23,000 ft) en route to Alma-Ata.

At 20:15 Moscow time, weather reports indicated visibility of approximately 3,000 metres (9,800 ft) at Alma-Ata, with light winds and atmospheric pressure measured at 710.5 mmHg. At 20:32, another Il-18 aircraft (CCCP-75689) successfully landed on runway 23 after two unsuccessful attempts on runway 05 requiring go-arounds. While taxiing post-landing, the operations manager inquired if it was safe for another Il-18 to land under current conditions; the pilot firmly stated that no Il-18 could safely land given the prevailing weather. Subsequently, air traffic control instructed Flight 20 to divert to its alternate airport, Sary-Arka Airport. However, five minutes later this directive was rescinded by the operations manager, who ordered Flight 20 to descend first to 4,500 metres (14,800 ft) and then to 3,000 metres (9,800 ft) for landing at Alma-Ata. Notably, the controller did not communicate the actual visibility or cloud ceiling information to the flight crew, contrary to standard procedure.

Upon reaching an altitude of 3000 meters, Flight 101/X-20 contacted air traffic control and received clearance to descend further to 700 metres (2,300 ft) for an approach on runway 23. Although the controller mentioned fog presence at the airport had lessened and did not anticipate visibility dropping below minimum safe limits, this information proved inaccurate. During final approach, after turning onto final alignment, the aircraft was approximately 500 metres (1,600 ft) right of the runway centerline. When about 10 kilometres (6.2 mi) from touchdown, controllers instructed descent to 300 metres (980 ft) and warned that visibility was deteriorating. At roughly 8.5 kilometres (5.3 mi) from the runway threshold, the aircraft established itself on the glidepath and continued descending toward landing.

Visibility had actually dropped to about 800 metres (2,600 ft), significantly below published minimums; however, neither the flight crew nor operations management were informed of this change. Consequently, the aircraft proceeded with its approach instead of diverting as required under such conditions. The non-directional beacon lights were flashing correctly but the plane began drifting slightly left of course. The controller alerted the crew about this deviation and instructed a course correction of 2° toward the beacon lights. The crew acknowledged this and confirmed visual contact with the beacon signals. Subsequently, a further course adjustment of 3° was directed by air traffic control, shifting the aircraft from slightly left to slightly right of centerline. Despite instructions from ATC to initiate a missed approach, the flight crew disregarded this order and persisted with their landing attempt.

During this critical phase, check captain Azakov directed Captain Artamonov to perform an instrument approach while he handled other landing responsibilities. Confusion arose near decision altitude (approximately 130 metres (430 ft)) as controllers advised a go-around due to limited visibility; however, both navigator and inspector reported seeing runway lights and encouraged continuation of descent. Shortly afterward, visual contact with runway lighting was lost without Captain Artamonov’s awareness; in response he diverted attention from instruments searching visually for lights, causing deviation from proper course. When ATC again commanded a go-around, Azakov was still scanning for lights while Artamonov awaited explicit instruction before executing maneuvering actions. Moments prior to impact, recognizing imminent collision with terrain, Captain Artamonov attempted evasive action; only then did Azakov issue a go-around command.

At approximately 21:01 Moscow time, Flight 101/X-20 crashed roughly 210 metres (690 ft) right of runway centerline traveling at around 300 kilometres per hour (190 mph). The impact tore off landing gear and detached the right wing from fuselage sections; meanwhile, left wing and fuselage fractured into multiple segments with ensuing fire partially consuming wreckage. Fatalities included radio operator, both flight attendants and 61 passengers; seventeen survivors sustained injuries during accident sequence.

Conclusions

The accident was attributed to the following factors:

1. The air traffic controller authorized the flight to land despite weather conditions being below the minimum safety threshold and failed to promptly notify the crew about these adverse conditions;
2. The flight crew made errors during the delayed missed approach maneuver and proceeded to operate in hazardous weather.

An additional contributing factor was the absence of METAR weather updates at 20:00, 20:15, and 20:30, coinciding with worsening weather, which could have aided the crew in deciding whether to continue the approach.

Furthermore, it was highlighted that the head of the Kazakh Civil Aviation Directorate should not have been involved in assisting the crew, as he had already logged fifteen hours of duty that day and lacked a valid medical certificate for flying.