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Aeroflot Flight 1492

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Adapted from the English Wikipedia article Aeroflot Flight 1492, available under CC BY-SA 4.0Updated 29 November 202520 sources
Aeroflot
IndustryAirline
Founded1923
Headquarters
Moscow
,
Russia
ProductsAir transport services
Websitewww.aeroflot.ru

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Not to be confused with Aeroflot Flight 1491.

Template:Infobox aircraft occurrence

Aeroflot Flight 1492 was a domestic passenger service operated by Aeroflot between Sheremetyevo International Airport in Moscow and Murmansk Airport in Russia. On 5 May 2019, shortly after takeoff, the Sukhoi Superjet 100 aircraft was struck by a Lightning strike. This resulted in a critical electrical failure, prompting the crew to return to Sheremetyevo for an emergency landing. During touchdown, the plane bounced and landed heavily, causing the landing gear to collapse and fuel to leak from the wings, which subsequently ignited a fire.[1] The blaze consumed the rear section of the aircraft, resulting in the deaths of 41 out of the 78 people on board.

Aircraft

The involved aircraft was a Russian-manufactured Sukhoi Superjet 100, with manufacturer’s serial number (MSN) 95135 and registered as RA-89098.[2] Prior to the accident, it had logged a total of 2,710 flight hours and completed 1,658 flight cycles.[3] Aeroflot’s Superjet configuration includes seating for 87 passengers: twelve in business class and seventy-five in economy class.[4]

Accident

On 5 May 2019 at 18:03 local time (15:03 UTC), Flight 1492 departed from runway 24C at Sheremetyevo International Airport, heading to Murmansk Airport. Thunderstorm activity was present near the airport, characterized by towering cumulonimbus clouds with bases at approximately 6,000 feet (1,800 m) and tops reaching around 29,000 feet (8,800 m). These storm clouds were advancing northeastward at speeds between 40–45 km/h (22–24 kn; 25–28 mph). As the aircraft neared the thunderstorm area, the crew manually selected a heading of 327 degrees at 18:07 local time (15:07 UTC), initiating a right turn earlier than prescribed by the КN 24Е standard instrument departure procedure; however, no formal clearance was requested to actively avoid the thunderstorm zone. At 15:08 UTC, while climbing through flight level 89 (about 8,900 feet (2,700 m)), the plane was struck by lightning. This event caused failure of the primary radio and autopilot systems, and the flight control mode switched to DIRECT—a degraded mode that demands increased pilot workload. The captain took manual control of the aircraft. At 15:09 UTC, the transponder code was changed to 7600 to indicate radio failure, then later switched to 7700 (emergency) at 15:26 UTC during final approach. Despite primary radio failure, the secondary radio (VHF2) remained functional, enabling the crew to re-establish communication with air traffic control and issue a pan-pan call on the emergency frequency.

The climb ceased at flight level 106 (approximately 10,600 feet (3,200 m)), and air traffic control vectored the aircraft back toward Sheremetyevo. After completing a right orbit, Flight 1492 aligned for an approach to runway 24L; the captain manually flew the approach after tuning into the instrument landing system. At this point, the aircraft weighed 43.5 tonnes (43,500 kg; 96,000 lb), exceeding the maximum landing weight by 1.6 tonnes (1,600 kg; 3,500 lb). At 15:18:53 UTC, an attempt by the captain to request a holding pattern was not recorded by ATC. The flaps were set to 25 degrees, which is recommended for overweight landings when operating in DIRECT mode. Surface winds were from 190 degrees at 30 knots (56 km/h; 35 mph; 15 m/s), resulting in a crosswind component of about 50 degrees; airspeed stabilized near 155 knots (287 km/h; 178 mph). Between altitudes of 1,100 feet (340 m) and 900 feet (270 m) above ground level, multiple predictive windshear warnings sounded with alerts stating "GO-AROUND, WINDSHEAR AHEAD," but these warnings went unacknowledged on cockpit recordings. As descent continued through approximately 260 feet (79 m), the aircraft began descending below the glideslope and triggered a "GLIDESLOPE" audio alert. The captain responded with an "advisory" call and increased engine thrust; airspeed rose from 164 knots (304 km/h; 189 mph) at 40 feet (12 m) to 170 knots (310 km/h; 200 mph) at 16 feet (4.9 m) AGL—roughly 15 knots (28 km/h; 17 mph) above target approach speed, though company procedures allow for a −5 to +20 kt margin for stabilized approaches. During the landing flare, as thrust was reduced to idle, the captain made significant alternating sidestick inputs causing pitch variations between +6 and −2 degrees.

Touchdown occurred simultaneously on all three landing gear wheels approximately 900 metres (3,000 ft) beyond the runway threshold at a speed of 158 knots (293 km/h; 182 mph), generating a vertical acceleration of 2.55 g. At this moment, within 0.4 seconds, the sidestick moved abruptly from full aft to full forward. Although spoilers had been armed, automatic deployment is inhibited in DIRECT mode and they were not manually activated. The aircraft bounced to an altitude near 6 feet (1.8 m) following this initial touchdown. The captain attempted to engage maximum reverse thrust while maintaining full forward sidestick input; however, reverse thrust activation and reverser door deployment are disabled without wheel weight-on-wheels sensors indicating ground contact and only began after the second touchdown. Before reverse thrust could fully engage, the aircraft became airborne again.

The second touchdown happened two seconds later with a nose-first impact at about 155 knots (287 km/h; 178 mph), producing a vertical load of 5.85 g. The main landing gear's weak links sheared as designed under excessive load conditions to protect wing integrity by allowing gear legs to move upward and backward; notably, no damage was sustained by the wing structure itself. The aircraft bounced again reaching heights between 15–18 feet (4.6–5.5 m). Thrust levers were advanced toward takeoff power while reverser doors began closing; simultaneously, the sidestick was pulled fully aft in what appears to be an attempted go-around maneuver. Thrust increase was inhibited until reverser doors fully closed; nonetheless, a third impact occurred traveling at roughly 140 knots (260 km/h; 160 mph), with vertical loads exceeding 5 g. This final contact caused collapse of landing gear assemblies which punctured wing tanks leading to fuel leakage and subsequent fire engulfing wings, rear fuselage, and empennage sections. Cockpit fire warnings for both aft cargo hold and auxiliary power unit activated during this sequence. After sliding down runway surface and veering leftward, the aircraft came to rest on grass between two taxiways adjacent to the runway with its nose oriented into prevailing wind at approximately 15:30 UTC. Engine power was shut down one minute later at 15:31 UTC. Flight data suggest engine controls were lost following last impact.

Evacuation commenced via front passenger doors with emergency slides deployed successfully. The first officer exited through the right cockpit window using an escape rope. Aeroflot reported that evacuation took about 55 seconds; however, video footage indicates slides remained in use up to 70 seconds post-deployment and passengers were observed carrying personal belongings out of the cabin. The fire destroyed much of the rear fuselage before being extinguished roughly 45 minutes after landing.

Passengers and crew

A total of seventy-three passengers and five crew members were aboard the aircraft. The flight team included the captain, a first officer, and three cabin attendants. The captain, Denis Yevdokimov, aged 42 (Russian: Денис Евдокимов), possessed an airline transport pilot licence and accumulated 6,844 flight hours, with 1,570 hours specifically on the Superjet. His prior experience encompassed flying the Ilyushin Il-76 and various smaller planes for the FSB (2,320 flight hours), as well as operating the Boeing 737 for Transaero (2,022 flight hours). Employed by Aeroflot, he transitioned to the SSJ-100 in 2016. The first officer, Maksim Kuznetsov, was 36 years old, joined Aeroflot in 2017, held a commercial pilot licence, and had logged 773 flight hours, including 623 on the Superjet.[5]

Among those seated toward the rear of the plane were forty passengers and a 21-year-old flight attendant named Maksim Moiseev; all perished in the accident. Of the deceased, forty were Russian nationals and one was a U.S. citizen. Twenty-six victims lived in Murmansk Oblast, among them a 12-year-old girl.[6][7] One crew member and two passengers suffered severe injuries; three crew members along with four passengers incurred minor injuries. The remaining twenty-seven passengers escaped without harm.[8]

Investigation

RA-89098 stored under cover at Sheremetyevo International Airport in 2020

The accident prompted an inquiry by the Interstate Aviation Committee (IAC). The French BEA participated as the representative body for the aircraft engine’s country of design, while EASA provided technical support to BEA.[9][10] Both flight recorder units were retrieved. The cockpit voice recorder (CVR) remained serviceable; however, the flight data recorder (FDR) casing suffered severe heat damage, making data extraction reliant on IAC experts.[5]

Data extraction concluded on 17 May 2019, enabling detailed analysis to commence. Subsequently, IAC forwarded a follow-up accident report to Rosaviatsiya, Russia’s civil aviation regulator.[11] Rosaviatsiya released a safety bulletin summarizing the incident alongside several safety recommendations.[12]

On 30 May, according to TASS, IAC specialist Vladimir Kofman spoke at the Transport Security Forum attributing "the disaster" to "hard touchdowns." This statement provoked a strong reaction from Aeroflot, prompting IAC to issue a six-point press release distancing itself from Kofman's remarks. The committee clarified that Kofman was not involved with Flight 1492's investigation and announced an internal inquiry into his comments. They requested media outlets provide any video or audio evidence of Kofman’s public statements. The IAC emphasized ongoing analysis of accident data and preparation for releasing a preliminary report on 5 June, stating that neither they nor any other parties currently possess reliable information regarding definitive causes established by the investigation team.[13][11]

Interim report

On 14 June 2019, the Interstate Aviation Committee (IAC) released their preliminary report, which offered a comprehensive reconstruction of the accident but refrained from drawing definitive conclusions. The flight crew did not request active storm avoidance assistance from air traffic control. Nonetheless, they commenced the second phase of the standard instrument departure procedure, initiating a right turn away from the storm earlier than prescribed. The pilot flying encountered difficulties maintaining altitude during a manual orbiting maneuver with a 40-degree bank angle, deviating over 200 ft (61 m) from the assigned altitude and triggering multiple audible warnings. The crew failed to conduct the approach briefing and neglected to complete the approach checklist or set the go-around altitude. The aircraft descended below the glideslope, passing through 270 ft (82 m) above ground level, prompting the pilot to increase engine thrust; as a result, the airplane accelerated approximately 15 kn (28 km/h) above the required approach speed. During landing, sidestick inputs were characterized by abrupt and intermittent movements, including wide-ranging pitch adjustments not typical of normal flight law approaches but resembling direct flight law approaches observed in other Aeroflot pilots. Additionally, the report highlighted that the pilots disregarded a windshear warning that would have necessitated a go-around unless it was false.

Investigators identified evidence of lightning strikes on antennae, various sensors, exit lights, and cockpit windows. Upon re-examination, the landing gear design was found to comply with certification standards. However, materials provided by Sukhoi indicated that current certification requirements do not account for "secondary impacts of the airframe on the ground after landing gear failure." The interim report did not address survivability factors, noting that these aspects remained under investigation and would be covered in the final report.

In May 2022, coinciding with the third anniversary of the incident, the IAC announced it anticipated releasing a draft final report soon. Numerous aircraft systems have undergone examination; however, some decrypted data from Curtiss-Wright fire protection units remain inaccessible to investigators due to intellectual property restrictions.

Final report

Released on March 28, 2025, the final investigation report identified no inherent design defects that would prevent safe operation. The investigators attributed the hard landing primarily to human factors, specifically the captain’s challenges in managing the aircraft under direct flight control law mode. The report also highlighted shortcomings in the operational documentation as contributing elements to the incident. Despite these findings, the inquiry recommended reassessing the landing gear design and exploring the reinstatement of normal flight control law. Additionally, it called for a comprehensive evaluation of crew workload when confronted with multiple failure warnings and suggested enhanced training for pilots on handling direct law flight conditions.

Criminal proceedings

A criminal probe was initiated concerning a fatal breach of air transport safety regulations. On May 6, 2019, the Investigative Committee of Russia indicated it was examining pilot competence, dispatcher performance, and the technicians responsible for aircraft inspections as potential factors, alongside mechanical issues and adverse weather conditions. According to a senior law enforcement official speaking to Lenta.ru, scrutiny would also extend to Sheremetyevo’s fire and rescue operations. The source revealed that air traffic control delayed raising the alarm and that fire trucks had not departed the station at the accident time. Of six available fire engines, only two were deployed within the initial six minutes, and these were not equipped with foam, which is more effective than water for combating fuel-fed fires.

In October 2019, charges were brought against the captain, with prosecutors seeking a seven-year prison sentence. A spokeswoman for the Russian Investigative Committee stated that his conduct "breached existing regulations and resulted in destruction and fire outbreak."

On June 20, 2023, Denis Yevdokimov, the captain, was sentenced to six years in a colony-settlement. His defense team expressed dissatisfaction with the ruling and announced plans to review the judgment before filing an appeal.

Evacuation with luggage

There was considerable conjecture that the evacuation was postponed because passengers were retrieving their hand luggage, a belief fueled by video clips showing individuals disembarking the plane carrying bags.[14][15][4][16] According to TASS, referencing a law enforcement official, most passengers seated toward the rear of the aircraft had virtually no opportunity for survival; many were unable to unbuckle their seat belts in time. The source noted that those from the rear who escaped had moved forward before the aircraft came to a halt, and he did not confirm that luggage collection delayed the evacuation process.[17] Claims that gathering personal belongings caused a hold-up during evacuation were dismissed by an unidentifiedTemplate:Failed verification eyewitness.[18][19][20][16]

Aeroflot's Official Statement

On 6 May 2019, Aeroflot declared its intention to provide financial compensation to the surviving passengers and the relatives of those who perished. Passengers who avoided hospitalization were to receive 1,000,000 rubles (approximately US$15,320), those admitted to hospitals were offered 2,000,000 rubles (around $30,640), while families of the deceased were allocated 5,000,000 rubles (about $76,600).

After Rosaviatsiya published its accident summary on 17 May, media outlets reported that the flight crew had neglected to properly set certain wing components—referred to variously as "flaps," "brakes," or "air brakes"—prior to landing. On that same day, Aeroflot responded by denying any breach of company protocols by the pilots. The airline affirmed that the flaps were correctly positioned for landing and clarified that spoilers are intended to be manually deployed only after reverse thrust is engaged once the aircraft has touched down. Aeroflot emphasized that preliminary findings from Rosaviatsiya do not constitute proof of pilot error and criticized media speculation as premature.

Flight Suspensions and Public Opinion

A petition calling for the temporary grounding of the Sukhoi Superjet 100 (SSJ100) during the ongoing investigation was initiated on Change.org on 5 May 2019. By 8 May, it had amassed over 140,000 signatures. When questioned about this public movement, Kremlin Press Secretary Dmitry Peskov stated that only authorized aviation bodies possess the authority to suspend aircraft operations—not petitions signed by citizens on online platforms. The Russian Ministry of Transport ultimately decided against halting SSJ100 flights, citing a lack of clear evidence indicating design flaws.

In the week following the crash, Aeroflot canceled roughly 50 SSJ100 flights. According to industry insiders quoted by Kommersant, the SSJ100 historically demonstrated lower dispatch reliability compared to Airbus and Boeing models within Aeroflot’s fleet. The increase in cancellations was attributed to heightened safety protocols implemented during the accident investigation period. In the weeks after the incident, multiple technical issues with the SSJ100 drew media scrutiny in Russia. For example, on 18 May 2019, an Aeroflot SSJ100 traveling from Ulyanovsk to Moscow–Sheremetyevo aborted takeoff due to a hydraulic system alert; subsequently, passengers reportedly refused further travel aboard the Superjet.

On 17 May 2019, reports emerged that regional carrier RusLine had abandoned plans to acquire 18 SSJ100 aircraft, citing potential reputational risks linked to the accident. Conversely, on 22 May, Alrosa Airlines retired its Tupolev Tu-134 fleet but reaffirmed intentions to replace these with up to three SSJ100s by 2021 despite public concerns.

On 24 May 2019, the Russian Association of Air Transport Operators (AEVT) formally requested a comprehensive reassessment of the SSJ100’s certification compliance in correspondence addressed to Transport Minister Yevgeny Dietrich. The AEVT raised questions regarding whether a lightning strike should have interrupted electrical systems and whether impact forces might have compromised the fuel system. They also called for scrutiny of flight control mechanisms, engine performance, cabin fire protection measures, and crew training programs for adherence to regulatory standards. The Superjet’s manufacturer, United Aircraft Corporation, responded by suggesting that AEVT’s actions appeared intended to exert pressure on the technical investigation process. As of late May, AEVT members operated a total of 19 SSJ100s; notably, Aeroflot—the operator involved in this accident—is not part of AEVT.

See also

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References

  1. ↑ "Full video of Russia's Sukhoi Superjet 100 crash - YouTube". YouTube. 14 May 2019. Retrieved 6 May 2020.
  2. ↑ "Aircraft accident Sukhoi Superjet 100-95B RA-89098 Moskva-Sheremetyevo Airport (SVO)". Aviation Safety Network. 8 May 2019.
  3. ↑ Cite error: Invalid <ref> tag; no text was provided for refs named fg-18may
  4. ↑ 4.0 4.1 Cite error: Invalid <ref> tag; no text was provided for refs named fg20190519
  5. ↑ 5.0 5.1 Cite error: Invalid <ref> tag; no text was provided for refs named AH
  6. ↑ «Мама, мы взлетаем»: как один полет прервал жизнь пассажиров SSJ-100 ["Mama, we take off": how a SSJ-100 flight interrupted the life of passengers]. Газета.Ru.
  7. ↑ "Jeremy Brooks of New Mexico ID'd as American killed in Russia plane crash". ABC11 Raleigh-Durham. 6 May 2019.
  8. ↑ RRJ-95B RA-89098 Interim Report (PDF) (Report). Interstate Aviation Committee. 14 June 2019.
  9. ↑ Франция включилась в расследование ЧП с SSJ100 как разработчик двигателя [France joins the state investigation of the emergency with the SSJ100 as an engine developer]. РИА Новости. 14 May 2019.
  10. ↑ BEA. "Accident to the Sukhoi RRJ95 registered RA-89098 and operated by Aeroflot on 05/05/2019 at Moscow [Investigation led by MAK / Russia]". BEA - Bureau d'Enquêtes et d'Analyses pour la sécurité de l'aviation civile. Archived from the original on 27 September 2019. Retrieved 15 May 2019.
  11. ↑ 11.0 11.1 "RRJ-95B RA-89098 05.05.2019". mak-iac.org. Retrieved 20 May 2019.
  12. ↑ Росавиация не делала выводов по расследованию катастрофы SSJ «Аэрофлота» — ведомство [Rosaviatsia did not draw conclusions on the investigation of the SSJ Aeroflot disaster - (says a representative of) the (Federal Air Navigation) Agency]. Рамблер/новости. 17 May 2019. Retrieved 20 May 2019.
  13. ↑ «Аэрофлот» ответил на слова эксперта МАК о причинах катастрофы SSJ [Aeroflot responded to the words of the expert IAC on the causes of the SSJ crash]. РБК (in русский). RBK Group. 30 May 2019. Retrieved 31 May 2019.
  14. ↑ "Were lives lost at the cost of carry-ons in Aeroflot plane crash that killed 41?". USA TODAY.
  15. ↑ Mzezewa, Tariro (6 May 2019). "In the Event of an Emergency, Leave Your Luggage on the Plane. Really". The New York Times. Retrieved 14 May 2019.
  16. ↑ 16.0 16.1 "What We Know About the Deadly Aeroflot Superjet Crash Landing". The Moscow Times. 6 May 2019. Retrieved 16 May 2019.
  17. ↑ "Данные о проблемах с эвакуацией из SSJ-100 из-за ручной клади не подтвердились" [Data on evacuation problems from SSJ-100 due to hand luggage has not been confirmed]. TASS (in русский). 11 May 2019. Retrieved 11 May 2019.
  18. ↑ "ТАСС: версия о спасении багажа из сгоревшего SSJ-100 ценой жизней людей не подтвердилась" [TASS: the version about saving luggage from the burnt SSJ-100 at the cost of people's lives was not confirmed]. NEWSru.com (in русский). 11 May 2019. Retrieved 11 May 2019.
  19. ↑ ""Я снял, как горел наш самолёт": пассажир Sukhoi Superjet 100 рассказал о смертельном рейсе" ["I shot movie while our plane was burning": a passenger of the Sukhoi Superjet 100 told about the deadly flight] (in русский). 14 May 2019. Retrieved 14 May 2019.
  20. ↑ "Я смотрел в иллюминатор и думал: мы сейчас взорвемся или нет?" [I looked out the window and thought: are we going to explode or not?]. Сибирь. Реалии (in русский). 9 May 2019. Retrieved 16 May 2019.

External links

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