Aeroflot Flight 783

Aeroflot

Industry	Airline
Founded	March 17, 1923 (1923-03-17)
Headquarters	Moscow , Soviet Union
Products	Air transport services

Template:Infobox aircraft occurrence

Aeroflot Flight 783 involved an Ilyushin Il-12P operated by Aeroflot and ended tragically on Tuesday, October 27, 1953, near Magadan, resulting in 22 fatalities.

Aircraft

The aircraft was an Ilyushin Il-12P bearing the factory number 93013102 and serial number 31-02. It was produced at the "Znamya Truda" facility in Moscow on December 31, 1949. Registered as CCCP-Л1765, the plane was assigned to the Main Directorate of the Civil Air Fleet before being allocated to the Far Eastern Territorial Administration's 141st (Khabarovsk) Air Transport Detachment. By the time of the accident, it had accumulated a total flight duration of 4,271 hours.

Crew

• Aircraft commander – Fyodor Alekseyevich Nazarov
• Pilot-instructor – Alexander Mikhailovich Altasin
• Co-pilot – Vasily Terentyevich Zhuravel
• Flight engineer – Viktor Vasilyevich Priezhzhev
• Radio operator – Alexander Stepanovich Stupin

Accident

Flight 783 was operating a routine passenger service numbered 105 from Magadan to Khabarovsk with scheduled stops at Okhotsk and Nikolaevsk-on-Amur. Onboard were 27 passengers—comprising 18 adults and 9 children—and a crew of five. Weather conditions were stable with stratiform rain clouds at a low ceiling of approximately 400 meters; snowfall occurred with a temperature of 2.2 °C and visibility reaching up to two kilometers. At 11:16 local time (02:16 Moscow time), the aircraft departed from Magadan’s "13 km" airfield heading north on a magnetic course of 025°. Shortly after takeoff, the climb rate was sluggish and the plane exhibited abrupt banking maneuvers—first veering left then right. Upon attaining an altitude between 50 and 70 meters, the aircraft pitched downward and crashed within minutes about six kilometers from the airport. The impact destroyed the forward fuselage up to frame 21, resulting in fatalities among all five crew members and seventeen passengers (twelve adults and five children), totaling twenty-two lives lost.

Investigation

The commission's inquiry determined that the incident resulted from an aerodynamic stall. Further analysis focused on identifying the root cause of this stall. Inspection of the debris uncovered a 5 mm thick ice accumulation on the tail section of the fuselage, while the upper wing surface was coated with 6 mm of ice. Crucially, the aircraft had not undergone deicing prior to departure, which impaired its aerodynamic performance. Moreover, it was established that the aircraft's takeoff weight exceeded limits by 996 kg. These combined factors contributed to the loss of control shortly after liftoff.

Responsibility was assigned to both the flight crew and the flight supervisor. The supervisor failed to adequately oversee his team. On that particular day, weather conditions in the area were unstable, leading to the airport being closed for incoming flights. Despite this, the flight supervisor permitted 13 departures without proper weather monitoring. Since meteorological minimums for arrivals and departures at the airport were identical, closure for arrivals should have extended to departures as well; however, this protocol was not followed. Additionally, when the crew submitted their flight documentation lacking load details, refueling information, and takeoff weight calculations, the airport dispatcher approved it. Consequently, an overloaded aircraft covered with snow and ice was authorized for flight. The investigative commission concluded that the primary cause of the accident was a fundamental breakdown in flight operations management at Magadan airport.