Aeroflot Flight E-15
| Industry | Aviation |
|---|---|
| Founded | 1923 |
| Headquarters | Moscow , Soviet Union |
| Products | Airline services |
Aeroflot Flight E-15 was involved in a fatal aviation disaster on 15 July 1975, when a Yakovlev Yak-40 operated by Aeroflot crashed in mountainous terrain near Batumi, resulting in the loss of all 40 occupants.
Aircraft
The aircraft involved bore the registration CCCP-87475 (factory number 9442037, serial number 37-20) and was produced by the Saratov Aviation Plant on 10 December 1974. It was assigned to the USSR Ministry of Civil Aviation and subsequently allocated to the Armenian Civil Aviation Administration’s 1st Yerevan Aviation Unit. Prior to the accident, the Yak-40 had accumulated a total of 1244 flight hours and completed 1151 landings.
Accident
Flight E-15 departed from Yerevan heading towards Batumi, with a flight crew from the 113th squadron consisting of Captain Suren Avetisovich Nersesyan as pilot-in-command, co-pilot Eduard Artashesovich Ovsepyan, and flight engineer Gennady Vladimirovich Azizyan. Additionally, a check-pilot and senior instructor from the Ministry of Civil Aviation, Nikolai Alexandrovich Loginov, was present in the cockpit. The cabin crew included stewardess Rimma Misakovna Mikaelyan. Onboard were 35 passengers—23 adults and 12 children—bringing the total number of people onboard to 40.
At 12:18 MSK, Flight E-15 entered Batumi Airport’s controlled airspace and established contact with air traffic control. Clearance was granted to descend to an altitude of 300 meters for a fourth turn, with landing instructions indicating a magnetic course of 127°. By 12:25, weather conditions were reported as overcast with cloud layers at 420 meters and scattered clouds at 300 meters, visibility at five kilometers, and southerly winds at 5–8 m/s from 195°. Despite these official reports exceeding minimum landing requirements, actual conditions had worsened significantly, with visibility reduced to three kilometers and cloud base lowered to approximately 200 meters.
When positioned about eleven kilometers from Batumi Airport, air traffic control authorized the aircraft to commence final approach and instructed a heading of 139°, noting that the plane was two kilometers left of the designated approach path. At 12:29:35, the controller updated the crew that they were five kilometers from the airport. The Yak-40 was situated between the coastline and runway threshold—approximately 1,300 meters from the threshold—when the check-pilot informed ATC of their intention to perform a go-around. Witnesses observed the aircraft flying over a point roughly 2,700 meters northwest (azimuth 307°) of the runway threshold, nearly aligned with the landing trajectory while executing a left turn. The last exchange between controller and crew occurred at this time: "Can you make a visual approach?" followed by "Yes, visual approach." Subsequently, while still enveloped in cloud cover, the aircraft passed over Mount Anaria. Attempts by ATC to re-establish contact after about 170 seconds were unsuccessful.
Eyewitness accounts indicated that the Yak-40 executed a right turn above a tea factory located nine kilometers from the airport reference point along the Korolisckali River valley before turning left onto a magnetic heading of 60°. Continuing along this course for approximately one to one-and-a-half kilometers, the aircraft initiated a climbing right turn. At approximately 12:34, flying at an altitude near 550 meters above sea level on a heading of 84°, with a right bank angle of about 20° and an angle of attack around 14°, it collided with terrain at an elevation of 594.6 meters—around fifteen kilometers from Batumi Airport. The impact caused an explosion and fire that destroyed the aircraft completely, resulting in fatalities for all forty individuals onboard.
Causes
The investigation revealed that the weather data relayed by the controller to the flight crew did not accurately represent the actual conditions. The flight operations supervisor was aware that the weather reported by AMSG at 12:15 fell below the required minima but failed to instruct the aircraft to divert to an alternate airport. Subsequently, the crew executed a go-around maneuver at approximately 150 meters altitude and 1,300 meters from the runway threshold, likely prompted by worsening visibility during the final approach. Following this, the crew entered cloud cover over mountainous terrain and opted to attempt a second approach despite insufficient conditions for visual flight. The decision to ascend and switch to instrument flight was delayed, resulting in the aircraft colliding with the mountain. The aircraft itself was fully functional and had no mechanical issues prior to impact.
The primary cause of the accident was a considerable departure from the prescribed flight path during the go-around procedure.
Additional contributing factors included:
- The provision of inaccurate visibility information to the crew (5 kilometers reported instead of 3 kilometers), while the airport’s minimum visibility requirement was 5 kilometers, combined with a lack of continuous radar monitoring during the go-around.
- Insufficient meteorological support at the airfield, characterized by weather observations conducted only every 15 minutes.
- The procedure chart and flight operation instructions did not indicate terrain features exceeding 200 meters within 5 kilometers of the approach path, whereas actual terrain altitude reached 410 meters.