Air Algérie Flight 6289
| Company type | Flag carrier |
|---|---|
| Industry | Aviation |
| Founded | 1947 |
| Headquarters | Algiers , Algeria |
Area served | Domestic and international flights |
| Products | Air transport services |
| Owner | Government of Algeria |
| Website | www |
Air Algérie Flight 6289 (AH6289) was a domestic service operated by the Algerian flag carrier Air Algérie, flying from Tamanrasset to Algiers with an intermediate stop in Ghardaïa. On 6 March 2003, the Boeing 737-2T4 assigned to this route crashed shortly after departing from Tamanrasset's Aguenar – Hadj Bey Akhamok Airport, near the Trans-Sahara Highway. Of the 103 individuals aboard, 102 lost their lives, marking it as the deadliest aviation accident in Algeria up to that point.
The crash investigation revealed that errors made by the flight crew following an engine malfunction were the primary cause. The captain assumed control from the first officer without correctly diagnosing the emergency. Due to an inadequate evaluation of the situation, the crew failed to implement proper remedial measures, resulting in a rapid deceleration and eventual crash.
Aircraft
The aircraft involved was a 19-year-old Boeing 737-2T4, bearing manufacturer serial number 22700, named Monts de Daïa and registered as 7T-VEZ. It was powered by two Pratt & Whitney JT8D-17A engines. The airplane had entered service on 9 December 1983 and had accumulated in excess of 40,000 flight hours.
Maintenance records confirmed adherence to prescribed procedures, with the most recent comprehensive overhaul conducted between October and November 2002. The left engine had been installed in 2002 and had accumulated 30,586 flight hours, while the right engine, fitted in 2001, had logged 22,884 hours.
Passengers and crew
| Nationality | Passengers | Crew | Total |
|---|---|---|---|
| Algeria/France | 97 | - | 97 |
| Algeria | - | 6 | 6 |
| Total | 97 | 6 | 103 |
On board were 97 passengers—all holding dual French-Algerian citizenship. Officials noted that upon arrival in Algiers, 39 passengers disembarked while the remaining 58 continued to Ghardaia. Among the passengers were fourteen members of Mouloudia d'Adriane football club, traveling for regional qualifiers in the Algerian Ligue Professionnelle 1.
The crew complement consisted of six personnel: two pilots and four cabin attendants. Captain Boualem Benaouicha, aged 48, possessed a total flight time of 10,760 hours, including 1,087 hours as captain on Boeing 737-200 aircraft since earning his type rating in 2001. First Officer Fatima Yousfi, aged 44, had amassed 5,219 flight hours with 1,292 on the Boeing 737-200. She was reportedly related to Algerian government official Youcef Yousfi.
Accident
Flight AH6289 connected Tamanrasset to Algiers via Ghardaia and served both local residents and tourists attracted by Tamanrasset’s archaeological landmarks and Tuareg culture. Known for its economical pricing, the flight on 6 March 2003 carried six crew members and ninety-seven passengers. First Officer Yousfi was designated as pilot flying under clear weather conditions with hot temperatures but good visibility.
At approximately 15:01 CET, clearance was requested for pushback and subsequently granted taxi permission to Runway 02. Once positioned for departure, air traffic control cleared the flight for takeoff with V1 set at 144 knots, VR at 146 knots, and V2 at 150 knots using maximum engine thrust.
During liftoff at around 15:13 CET, an engine failure occurred with a loud explosion audible from both the control tower and nearby vicinity. Debris scattered onto the runway as the aircraft veered first left then right while crew attempted to stabilize it. First Officer Yousfi communicated: "We have a small problem."
The airplane ascended to about 400 feet altitude with landing gear still deployed; however its airspeed rapidly decreased to stall speed. The aircraft pitched upward before descending and ultimately crashed at approximately 15:15 CET into an open field. It impacted on its right side before sliding across terrain and coming to rest beyond airport boundaries.
The force of impact combined with ensuing fire resulted in immediate fatalities for all but one occupant. Both pilots perished on impact while other passengers died due to the collision and subsequent fire. The sole survivor was Youcef Djillali, a 28-year-old Algerian soldier seated in the rear row without his seatbelt fastened. He was ejected from the aircraft during impact and found unconscious with multiple injuries but regained consciousness the following day; his wounds were not life-threatening.
Investigation
The Algerian Prime Minister, Ali Benflis, swiftly appointed a commission to probe the incident, with leadership entrusted to Ahcéne Affane, the Director General of the Algerian Ministry of Transport. The inquiry was supported technically by the French BEA and received cooperation from officials representing the NTSB, FAA, and Pratt & Whitney Canada. Throughout the investigation, seven sessions were convened to assess progress and discuss findings.
Engine failure during takeoff
Initial reports indicated that one engine caught fire shortly after departing from Tamanrasset, with authorities pointing to "technical issues" as a potential cause. Eyewitnesses reported hearing a loud banging noise immediately following liftoff, and engine debris was discovered on the runway. Inspection revealed that the left engine was operating at a low rotation speed and producing no thrust during flight.
Further examination identified extensive damage to the nozzle guide vanes (stator blades) located in the lower section of the left engine. This damage interfered with gas expansion and cooling processes, resulting in melting and destruction of low-pressure components and a significant reduction in engine speed. Metallurgical analysis uncovered fatigue cracks on a high-pressure blade, confirming blade failure as the root cause of the engine malfunction.
The investigation determined that while an engine failure occurred, it was contained within the engine casing. The engine cowling remained intact without outward rupture, excluding an uncontained engine failure scenario that would have generated substantial drag and impaired aircraft control. As this was a contained failure, flight control should have remained feasible, enabling an emergency landing on a single functioning engine.
Analysis of flight recorders
Given that the contained engine failure should not have led to loss of control, it was expected that the aircraft could have safely returned to the airport with only one engine compromised. The flight recorders were critical for establishing the precise cause of the accident.
Both recorders were recovered on the day of the crash. The cockpit voice recorder (CVR) sustained minor damage, whereas the flight data recorder (FDR) had been exposed to fire. Despite this, both memory modules remained intact, allowing direct data extraction by BEA on 13 March. Due to the FDR’s age, it recorded only six parameters: time, pressure altitude, speed, magnetic heading, vertical acceleration, and VHF communications.
Data showed that First Officer Yousfi completed the pre-departure checklist independently because Captain Benaouicha arrived late. The captain joined just prior to her pre-flight briefing. While taxiing, Captain Benaouicha engaged in conversation with the chief flight attendant inside the cockpit instead of concentrating on flight duties. No communication occurred regarding any possible anomalies during flight preparation, which deviated from Air Algérie’s standard procedures.
At rotation speed, Captain Benaouicha called for rotation while Yousfi requested gear retraction. Immediately thereafter, a loud bang signified failure of the left engine. The first officer responded with repeated basmala invocations and asked “What’s going on?” The captain assumed control and directed Yousfi to release the controls; she confirmed compliance and offered to retract the landing gear, but received no reply.
Yousfi described a “small problem” aboard Flight 6289. The aircraft climbed to 398 feet at 134 knots before both altitude and airspeed began to decline. The stick shaker activated momentarily as a stall warning. Speed continued dropping until a full aerodynamic stall occurred. Captain Benaouicha repeatedly urged Yousfi to release the control yoke; she insisted she had done so. This disagreement persisted until both recorders ceased abruptly at , with the last audible sound being the GPWS alert “Don’t sink.” At that moment, speed was 126 knots and landing gear remained extended.
Inability to achieve flight
Several elements contributed to the aircraft's failure to maintain safe flight. Investigators highlighted that an engine failure occurring during a vital moment, specifically rotation, left the pilots with minimal time to react effectively. Flight 6289 was operating close to its maximum takeoff weight, which limited its available lift. Moreover, the airport’s altitude of 1,300 meters combined with elevated desert temperatures led to reduced air density, further diminishing engine performance and necessitating a higher takeoff speed.
The crew’s handling of the emergency was identified as the most significant factor. If the pilots had executed correct and prompt measures, the accident might have been prevented.
Errors by the crew were apparent from the outset. Prior to departure, First Officer Yousfi’s pre-flight briefing was interrupted when Captain Benaouicha engaged the chief flight attendant in unrelated discussion. This breach of protocol disrupted critical communication regarding duties and emergency procedures during an essential phase.
Captain Benaouicha continued engaging in non-operational conversations during taxiing, thereby violating the sterile cockpit rule aimed at minimizing distractions during critical phases.
An engine malfunction occurred during rotation. The captain suddenly switched roles from pilot not flying (PNF) to pilot flying (PF), transferring instrument monitoring responsibilities to the first officer without prior coordination. This unexpected change caused confusion and reduced situational awareness for both pilots.
The captain concentrated exclusively on maintaining pitch attitude, holding an excessive angle of attack likely influenced by the airport’s difficult terrain that constrained emergency landing options.
Importantly, the landing gear remained extended throughout the emergency. Retracting the gear after engine failure is essential to decrease drag and sustain airspeed. Although the first officer requested gear retraction before the role change, her suggestion was disregarded during the crisis. The captain did not acknowledge her offer to retract it, resulting in compromised aerodynamic efficiency and ultimately leading to the crash.
Summary
The final investigation concluded that the crash resulted from engine loss during a critical flight phase, failure to retract landing gear following engine failure, and the captain assuming control without fully diagnosing the issue. Additional contributing factors included insufficient flight preparation, poorly timed landing gear retraction requests, rapid progression of events limiting crew reaction time, inappropriate climb rate considering engine loss, lack of effective teamwork after failure, near-maximum takeoff weight combined with high altitude and temperature conditions, and challenging airport terrain.
On 6 March 2003, weather conditions at the airport were 23°C with an elevation of 1,377 meters; the aircraft’s weight was 48,708 kg compared to a maximum permitted weight of 49,500 kg for a 737-2T4.
Following this accident, investigators recommended that Air Algérie improve cockpit resource management (CRM) training to ensure better compliance with procedures related to task delegation and handover. Additional suggestions were made to Algerian authorities.
Aftermath
In the wake of the disaster, crisis response centers were swiftly set up in both Algiers and Paris. High-ranking officials, including Interior Minister Moureddine Yazid Zerhouni and Transport Minister Abdelmalek Sellal, traveled to Tamanrasset to inspect the location of the crash. A formal repatriation ceremony was organized in Algiers for six French nationals who perished; two of the deceased were transported to Marseille, while four were sent to Paris.
Authorities reached a consensus to construct a memorial near the crash site as a tribute to the victims of Flight 6289. Commemorative activities included local sporting events held at the Ben Messaoud sports complex in Iméchouène. The football team Mouloudia d'Adriane, which tragically lost 14 members in the accident, was granted special sponsorship by Minister of Youth and Sports El Hadi Ould Ali to facilitate the club’s recovery and continuation. Following the incident, the club took an active role in promoting sports initiatives within Tamanrasset.
The investigation team advised Algeria to form an autonomous body dedicated to aircraft accident inquiries; nevertheless, as of 2024, such an institution has yet to be established.
See also
- Centurion Air Cargo Flight 164
- List of accidents and incidents involving commercial aircraft
- Midwest Express Airlines Flight 105
- LOT Polish Airlines Flight 7
- LOT Polish Airlines Flight 5055
- United Airlines Flight 232
External links
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- Airliner accidents and incidents caused by mechanical failure
- Airliner accidents and incidents caused by engine failure
- Aviation accidents and incidents in 2003
- Aviation accidents and incidents in Algeria
- 2003 in Algeria
- Accidents and incidents involving the Boeing 737 Original
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