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Air France Flight 358

From Alfawiki
Air France
IndustryAirline
FoundedOctober 7, 1933; 93 years ago (1933-10-07) in Paris, France
Headquarters
Paris
,
France
ProductsAir transportation services
Websitewww.airfrance.com

Air France Flight 358 was an international service operating between Charles de Gaulle Airport in Paris, France, and Toronto Pearson International Airport in Ontario, Canada. On August 2, 2005, the Airbus A340-313E assigned to this flight exceeded the runway limits and collided with the nearby Etobicoke Creek, approximately beyond the runway’s terminus. Despite the aircraft’s destruction, all 309 passengers and crew members survived, although 12 individuals suffered serious injuries. This event highlighted the indispensable contribution of well-prepared flight attendants during emergency evacuations.

Adverse weather conditions led to the cancellation of 540 flights at Pearson Airport. Smaller aircraft were redirected to airports in Ottawa, Hamilton, and Winnipeg, whereas larger jets were diverted to Montreal, Syracuse, New York, and Buffalo, New York. Flights originating from Vancouver were turned back. This incident represented the most significant emergency at Toronto Pearson since its role in Operation Yellow Ribbon.

Canadian Transport Minister Jean Lapierre described Flight 358 as a "miracle" due to the absence of fatalities despite total loss of the airplane. The media referred to it as the "Miracle in Toronto," "Toronto Miracle," "Miracle Escape," and "Miracle of Runway 24L."

The Transportation Safety Board of Canada (TSB) conducted an investigation and published a comprehensive final report on December 13, 2007. The primary contributing factors identified were severe weather conditions, limited visibility, selection of a short runway (the shortest at the airport), touchdown occurring late near the runway’s midpoint, and a delayed activation of full thrust reversers—initiated 17 seconds after landing.

Aircraft

The aircraft involved was an Airbus A340-313E with manufacturer serial number 289 and registration F-GLZQ, equipped with four CFM International CFM56 engines. Its maiden flight took place on August 3, 1999, and it was delivered to Air France on September 7, 1999. Prior to the accident, it had completed 3,711 flights accumulating a total of 28,426 flight hours.

Crew

The cockpit team consisted of Captain Alain Rosaye, aged 57, who had logged 15,411 flight hours, and First Officer Frédéric Naud, aged 43, with 4,834 hours of experience. The total crew onboard numbered twelve.

Passengers

The flight carried a total of 297 passengers: comprising 168 adult males, 118 adult females, eight children, and three infants. Represented nationalities included Canadians (104), French (101), Italians (19), Americans (14), Indians (8), Britons (7), as well as one Egyptian and one Dane. The passenger group consisted of business travelers, tourists, and students. Three individuals were seated in crew positions.

Crash

At 16:03 EDT on August 2, 2005, Air France Flight 358 overran Runway 24L at Toronto Pearson International Airport and came to rest within a ravine outside the airport boundary. All 309 occupants evacuated successfully; twelve sustained serious injuries but there were no fatalities. The aircraft was destroyed by fire following impact.

The landing occurred amid severe weather conditions characterized by strong winds, heavy rainfall, and thunderstorms. The aircraft touched down further along Runway 24L than usual. Passengers reported experiencing turbulence and lateral movement before touchdown. The plane was cleared to land on Runway 24L—the shortest runway at Pearson measuring 2,744 meters. After landing, it failed to decelerate adequately and slid approximately 300 meters into the Etobicoke Creek ravine near Highway 401 at an estimated speed of 148 km/h.

Post-impact fire was observed outside the aircraft. During evacuation procedures, one right middle exit slide deflated due to damage from debris; another slide on the left side failed to deploy; two rear left exits were obstructed by flames. Some passengers evacuated by jumping from the cabin. Flight attendants played a vital role in facilitating a safe evacuation for all passengers within the mandated timeframe of ninety seconds.

Emergency services responded rapidly—arriving within fifty-two seconds after the crash alarm sounded; according to official investigation records, the first emergency vehicle reached the scene within one minute.

Immediate aftermath

Following the incident, several passengers, including those injured, climbed up the ravine to reach Highway 401, which lies adjacent to the runway. Peel Regional Police found the initial responding officer and multiple passengers along the highway, with assistance from drivers passing by the airport. Motorists transported the injured passengers and co-pilot to medical facilities, while those unhurt were brought back to the airport. The primary fire continued burning for approximately two hours, extinguishing shortly before 18:00 EDT, and all flames were fully suppressed by early afternoon the following day, enabling investigators to commence their examination.

The crash led to the cancellation or rerouting of hundreds of flights, significantly affecting air traffic across North America. By the evening of August 2, four out of five runways at Pearson Airport were operational; however, delays for flights and passengers remained.

Traffic throughout Toronto’s highway network increased dramatically. Highway 401—one of the busiest highways globally and a crucial corridor in the Greater Toronto Area—experienced severe congestion near its widest segment, where eighteen lanes merge toward major junctions with Highways 403, 410, and 427. Although fire suppression was swift, traffic jams persisted for days as drivers slowed or stopped to observe the wreckage, causing numerous secondary accidents. In response, Ontario Provincial Police intensified highway patrols.

Weather conditions

At the time of the accident (20:04 UTC), a METAR weather observation recorded winds coming from 340° true (north-northwest) at 24 knots with gusts reaching 33 knots. Visibility was limited to approximately 1¼ miles amid thunderstorms and heavy rainfall. The sky was overcast at 4,500 feet with towering cumulus clouds present, and the temperature measured 23 °C. By 21:00 UTC, winds shifted southward as conditions gradually improved despite lingering smoke from the burning aircraft. Runway 24L is aligned at 227° true (237° magnetic), featuring an ILS approach minimum ceiling of 200 feet and visibility requirements of half a mile or a runway visual range of 2,600 feet.

According to reports from the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation, the accident occurred roughly two hours after a ground stop was issued due to severe thunderstorms. This "red alert" halted all apron and gate operations while allowing landings to continue. Visibility deteriorated significantly with lightning strikes, strong gusty winds, hail, and rainfall beginning as the plane touched down. Wind speeds increased from 5 km/h to 30 km/h and temperatures dropped from 30 °C to 23 °C within two hours. A severe thunderstorm warning had been active since 11:30 a.m., leading to cancellations of outbound flights and ground servicing but permitting incoming landings.

Injuries

The following table presents injury statistics as reported by the TSB:

Crew Passengers Total
Fatal 0 0 0
Serious 2 10 12
Minor / None 10 287 297
Total 12 297 309

Injuries were primarily sustained by individuals in the cockpit and forward cabin areas. Of those seriously injured (twelve in total), nine were hurt during impact while three sustained injuries during evacuation procedures. Passengers who jumped from the aircraft onto the ground suffered injuries such as fractured legs and damaged vertebrae. Captain Rosaye experienced back and head trauma when his seat became dislodged upon impact. Minor injuries included sprained ankles, neck strains, bruising, and inhalation of smoke.

Medical treatment was provided to thirty-three individuals at various hospitals in Toronto and surrounding areas; twenty-one were discharged after receiving minor care. Humber River Regional Hospital’s York-Finch campus treated seven patients for smoke inhalation. Other hospitals that admitted victims included William Osler Health Centre, Etobicoke General Hospital, Credit Valley Hospital, and Peel Memorial Hospital.

The emergency response involved coordination among the Greater Toronto Airport Authority, Peel Regional Paramedic Services, Peel Regional Police, Mississauga Fire and Emergency Services, Toronto EMS, and the Royal Canadian Mounted Police. The Ontario Provincial Police managed patrols on nearby highways while buses operated by the Toronto Transit Commission provided shelter close to the crash location.

Representation

Following the completion of emergency operations, the investigation was spearheaded by the Transportation Safety Board of Canada (TSB) with collaboration from principal parties in accordance with ICAO Annex 13 guidelines:

  • Transport Canada representing the nation where the incident occurred
  • Air France as the operator involved
  • Airbus as the manufacturer of the aircraft structure
  • GE Aviation as the engine producer
  • The French Department of Transport acting on behalf of both the operator and airframe manufacturer
  • The United States National Transportation Safety Board representing the engine manufacturer's jurisdiction

Evidence

Analysis of the flight data recorder and cockpit voice recorder took place in France. Initial findings indicated that the aircraft touched down beyond the runway threshold—considerably farther than usual—at a ground speed exceeding 140 knots, influenced by a tailwind. The airplane slid across a wet runway surface, covering over before overrunning into an adjacent ravine. Tire impressions showed emergency braking applied at speeds surpassing 90 knots.

TSB lead investigator Réal Levasseur Shedalin highlighted that the delayed touchdown rendered stopping impossible under wet runway conditions. There was no indication of malfunction in engines, brakes, spoilers, or thrust reversers. The malfunction of evacuation slides at two exits remains under investigation. Several passengers were forced to leap roughly 1.5 meters to reach safety.

One passenger documented four images during evacuation, which were later made public. These photographs are cited in the final TSB report to assist with understanding the sequence of events during evacuation. Mark Rosenker, then acting chairman of the National Transportation Safety Board, expressed concern that taking photos during evacuations diverts attention from safety priorities. Aerospace psychologist Helen Muir recognized their investigative importance but stressed that any delay in evacuation is undesirable.

Irregularities

The final TSB report indicates that during the flare phase, the aircraft encountered a heavy rain shower, drastically reducing forward visibility and suggesting a wet downburst contributed to the long landing distance. According to Air France’s A340-313 Quick Reference Handbook (QRH), the minimum landing distance without autobrake on dry pavement is 1,500 meters. Under wet conditions with a 5-knot tailwind, functioning thrust reversers, and rainfall of 5 mm per hour, braking distance requirements increase to 1,800 meters—exceeding available runway length at AF 358’s touchdown point.

Additional reported anomalies include:

  • Alleged explosions of passenger oxygen tanks during post-landing fire; the aircraft was equipped with both emergency chemical oxygen generators and therapeutic oxygen supplies for medical use.
  • At that time, Pearson International Airport’s "E.R.S. Aircraft Crash Chart" did not include Airbus A340 schematics, limiting rescue teams’ familiarity with fuel tank and pressurized gas container locations.

Unverified irregularities reported were:

  • A delay of approximately 12 seconds between touchdown and activation of thrust reversers.
  • Witness accounts suggested one door opened during landing; however, black box data could not confirm this occurrence.

Conclusions

The TSB determined that flight crew overlooked critical indications warranting aborting the landing and found that:

  • Air France lacked established procedures defining minimum safe distances from thunderstorm activity during approach phases.
  • Upon autopilot disengagement, the pilot flying increased engine thrust reacting to perceived descent and airspeed reduction, resulting in elevated aircraft energy and deviation above intended flight path.
  • At approximately 50 feet above ground level (AGL), wind shifted abruptly from headwind to tailwind conditions.
  • The aircraft entered a severe rainstorm close to runway threshold, significantly impairing visibility.
  • The crew remained committed to landing near threshold despite deteriorating conditions and dismissed go-around options as no longer feasible.
  • The pilot not flying failed to provide customary callouts regarding spoilers and thrust reverser deployment, causing delays in engaging thrust reversers.
  • The operational flight plan did not include landing distance calculations for contaminated runway surfaces at Toronto / Lester B. Pearson International Airport.
  • Despite METAR reports indicating thunderstorm activity, crew did not compute required landing distances nor understand margin for error under such weather conditions.
  • Terrain beyond runway end contributed notably to aircraft damage and passenger injuries.

The TSB recommended harmonizing Canadian runway safety standards with international norms by extending runways to incorporate a runway end safety area (RESA) or comparable safety features. It also called on Transport Canada to define explicit restrictions on approaches and landings amid convective weather events and to mandate enhanced pilot training focused on decision-making under adverse meteorological conditions.

Interim compensation

Within seven days following the incident, passengers received immediate cash disbursements ranging from $1,000 to $3,700 (amounts in Canadian dollars) to address urgent financial needs. These payments were facilitated through an emergency centre established at the Novotel Hotel in Mississauga, located near the airport. It is important to note that these amounts were distinct from the formal claims process initiated for passengers who did not have legal representation.

Passenger class action

Shortly after the accident, a class action lawsuit was initiated on behalf of all passengers by lead plaintiff Suzanne Deak in the Ontario Superior Court of Justice. The legal team, consisting of Gary R. Will and Paul Miller from Will Barristers in Toronto, sought damages totaling $75 million for general and aggravated harm, along with $250 million for special and pecuniary damages. Another class action was filed soon after by Sahar Alqudsi and Younis Qawasmi demanding $150 million. Both lawsuits were merged into a single proceeding, as only one class action was permitted to advance.

In December 2009, a settlement amounting to $12 million was agreed upon involving Air France and the class representing 184 of the 297 passengers aboard Flight 358 (excluding crew members). Air France committed to paying $10 million and was thereby released from any further liability related to the accident. Airbus and Goodrich, the manufacturers responsible for the aircraft’s emergency evacuation system, contributed $1.65 million and were also discharged from claims. This settlement addressed claims for 184 passengers; meanwhile, 45 individuals chose to opt out, and 68 had reached separate agreements with Air France.

According to Vancouver-based attorney J.J. Camp, passengers who sustained severe injuries could receive compensation up to $175,000, whereas those with minor injuries were expected to obtain between $5,000 and $10,000.

Air France indicated that it would not suffer financial losses from these lawsuits due to insurance coverage and refrained from offering additional assistance to passengers represented by counsel until legal agreements among lawyers were finalized.

Air France lawsuit

In June 2008, nearly three years post-accident, Air France initiated a $180 million lawsuit against the Greater Toronto Airports Authority (GTAA), NAV Canada, and the Government of Canada. The airline alleged that the GTAA failed in its duty to maintain a safe environment for civil aviation operations and held these entities solely accountable for the runway overrun, resulting injuries, and property damage. Additionally, Air France charged Transport Canada with negligence for not acting on coroner recommendations issued after the 1978 Air Canada Flight 189 crash; those recommendations called for establishing a 300-metre safety zone to extend aircraft stopping distance.

Aftermath

An investigation by the Transportation Safety Board of Canada (TSB) revealed that runway safety zones at several Canadian airports fell short of international standards. Although Toronto Pearson’s runways complied with Canadian regulations, runway 24L featured an effective runway safety area (RESA) of only 150 metres. The TSB advised airlines to implement heightened caution during landings under adverse weather conditions.

The crash of Air Canada Flight 189 in 1978 occurred near Etobicoke Creek—the same location as the AF358 accident—resulting in two fatalities after a DC-9 experienced a tire blowout during takeoff and crashed into the ravine. In response to the 2005 Air France incident, there were proposals to fill or bridge this ravine; however, these plans were deemed financially impractical. The runway where AF358 came to rest (24L-06R) measures 2.7 kilometres in length and did not exist at the time of the 1978 crash; runway designations have since been updated.

Dramatization

The Canadian television series Mayday depicted the event in the opening episode of its fourth season, titled "Miracle Escape" (known as "Desperate Escape" in certain regions), incorporating interviews with survivors alongside a reenactment.

Additionally, this accident was featured on The Weather Channel through the shows Storm Stories and Why Planes Crash.

See also

Bibliography

External links

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