Jump to content

Air France Flight 4590

From Alfawiki
Air France Flight 4590
Company typeCharter flight
IndustryAviation
Founded25 July 2000 (date of accident)
FateCrashed shortly after takeoff
Headquarters
Paris
,
France

On 25 July 2000, Air France Flight 4590, a Concorde supersonic passenger aircraft operating an international charter from Paris to New York, crashed shortly after departing, resulting in the deaths of all 109 individuals aboard and four people on the ground. This incident marked the sole fatal accident involving a Concorde in its 27 years of operation.

As Flight 4590 accelerated for takeoff at Charles de Gaulle Airport, it ran over debris left by a preceding plane, which caused one of its tyres to burst. The resulting tyre fragments struck the underside of the wing, damaging the landing gear and puncturing the integral fuel tank. The ensuing fuel leak ignited, causing a loss of thrust in the left-side engines 1 and 2. Although the aircraft managed to lift off, the combination of engine power loss, increased drag from extended landing gear, and fire-related damage to flight controls rendered the plane uncontrollable. Approximately two minutes after liftoff, the jet crashed into a hotel located in nearby Gonesse. All nine crew members and 100 passengers perished, along with four hotel occupants; four others sustained minor injuries.

In response to this catastrophe, the entire Concorde fleet was grounded. After implementing structural modifications to the aircraft, flights resumed on 7 November 2001. Nevertheless, diminishing commercial demand—particularly following the September 11 attacks—resulted in Air France retiring Concorde services in May 2003 and British Airways following suit in November 2003.

Aircraft and crew

The aircraft involved was a 25-year-old Aérospatiale-BAC Concorde (registration F-BTSC, serial number 203), equipped with four Rolls-Royce Olympus 593/610 turbojet engines fitted with afterburners. Its most recent scheduled maintenance occurred on 21 July 2000, just four days prior to the accident, with no defects reported. At that point, it had accumulated 11,989 flight hours and completed 4,873 takeoff and landing cycles.

The cockpit team consisted of:[1]

  • Captain Christian Marty (54), an Air France pilot since 1967 with a total of 13,477 flight hours, including 317 hours on Concorde. His experience also included flying Boeing 727, 737, Airbus A300, A320, and A340 aircraft.
  • First Officer Jean Marcot (50), who joined Air France in 1971 and had logged 10,035 flight hours overall, with 2,698 hours on Concorde. His background included piloting N 262, MS.760 Paris, Caravelle, and Airbus A300 aircraft.
  • Flight Engineer Gilles Jardinaud (58), with Air France since 1968 and a total of 12,532 flight hours, including 937 on Concorde. He also had experience operating Caravelle, Falcon 20, Boeing 727, 737, and 747 models.

The cabin crew comprised:[2]

Cabin Services Director:

  • Virginie Le Gouadec (36), who had served at Air France for fourteen years including one and a half years on Concorde.

Flight Attendants:

  • Brigitte Kruse (49), with twenty-two years at Air France including ten years on Concorde.
  • Anne Porcheron (36), nine years at Air France including one year on Concorde.
  • Patrick Chevalier (38), ten years at Air France including three years on Concorde.
  • Herve Garcia (32), seven years at Air France including one year on Concorde.
  • Florence Eyquem-Fournel (27), four years at Air France including one year on Concorde.

Accident

On the day the accident occurred, light and variable winds were reported, providing a tailwind during the Concorde's takeoff from runway 26R.

At 16:38 CEST (14:38 UTC), approximately five minutes before the Concorde was due to depart, Continental Airlines Flight 55—a McDonnell Douglas DC-10-30 also taking off from the same runway en route to Newark International Airport—shed a titanium alloy wear strip about long. The DC-10 did not experience any significant operational issues.

At 16:42, while accelerating for takeoff at roughly , the Concorde ran over this debris, which caused a cut to the right-front tyre (tyre No. 2) on its left main landing gear. Fragments of the tyre, with a combined weight of , struck the underside of the left wing at an estimated velocity of . Although no immediate puncture to a fuel tank was detected, a pressure wave generated by the impact ruptured fuel tank number 5 near the left landing gear bay. The resulting fuel leak was probably ignited by either an electrical arc or contact with hot engine components.

Engines one and two experienced surges and power loss due to ingestion of hot gases and debris; engine one partially regained thrust. Following fire warnings and under the captain’s instruction, the flight engineer shut down engine two.

Air traffic controller Gilles Logelin noticed flames before the aircraft became airborne and notified the crew. However, since the plane had already passed V1 speed—the critical decision speed beyond which aborting takeoff is unsafe—the pilots continued. Damage to the landing gear prevented its retraction; consequently, the aircraft failed to gain speed or altitude.

The fire compromised the inner elevon on the left wing and caused structural failure due to intense heat. Engine one surged once more but did not fully recover power; this asymmetry in thrust induced a bank exceeding 100 degrees. Efforts to stabilize the aircraft by reducing power on engines three and four were unsuccessful because of deceleration, leading to an aerodynamic stall.

The aircraft crashed with its left wing low after nearly completing a 180° turn in heading, impacting Hôtelissimo Les Relais Bleus Hotel. Video footage taken by a passenger in a passing truck recorded both the burning aircraft and subsequent crash scene.

The crew had attempted to divert toward Paris–Le Bourget Airport; however, investigators determined that a safe landing was improbable given the trajectory and conditions.

The cockpit voice recorder captured the final exchanges between crew members before impact.


Fatalities

This flight had been chartered by German firm Peter Deilmann Cruises, carrying passengers bound for boarding the cruise ship MS Deutschland in New York for a 16-day voyage to Manta, Ecuador. Among those who lost their lives were prominent figures such as German football coach Rudi Faßnacht and trade union board member Christian Götz.

All 109 individuals aboard—passengers and crew alike—perished in addition to four staff members from the Hôtelissimo hotel at the crash site.

Nationality Passengers Crew Ground Total
Austria 1 — — 1
Denmark 2 — — 2
France — 8 — 8
Germany 96 1 — 97
United States 1 — — 1
Algeria — — 1 1
Mauritius — — 1 1
Poland — — 2 2
Total 100 9 4 113

Aftermath

In the wake of the accident, all Concorde aircraft operated by Air France were grounded pending thorough investigations and safety assessments. British Airways followed this precautionary measure three weeks afterward. While Air France’s Concorde flights had been operating at a loss and primarily upheld for national pride, British Airways consistently reported profitability. Concorde pilot Jock Lowe noted that British Airways achieved an average annual net profit near £30 million prior to the crash.

Commercial flights recommenced on 7 November 2001 after implementing a £17 million safety enhancement program, but operations ceased between May 2003 for Air France and October 2003 for British Airways. This tragedy remains the sole fatal accident throughout Concorde’s service history.

Investigation

The formal inquiry was conducted by France’s Bureau of Enquiry and Analysis for Civil Aviation Safety (BEA), with Alain Bouillard serving as the lead investigator.

Post-accident evaluations determined that the aircraft exceeded its maximum takeoff weight under prevailing conditions by approximately over the structural threshold. Additionally, its center of gravity was positioned behind the allowable takeoff limit. During taxiing, fuel redistribution left the number 5 wing tank around 94% full. A missing spacer, typically responsible for aligning the left main landing gear, was found but deemed unrelated to the cause of the accident.

The BEA released its conclusive report in 2002.

Conclusions

The BEA’s findings included:

  • The aircraft was overloaded by above the maximum certified takeoff weight; however, this had minimal impact on takeoff performance.
  • After achieving takeoff speed, a metal strip (a wear strip) lying on the runway severed the tyre of wheel number 2. This strip originated from the thrust reverser cowl door of a Continental Airlines DC-10 which had departed five minutes earlier. Although replaced during maintenance in Tel Aviv and Houston, it was neither manufactured nor installed according to manufacturer specifications.
  • The aircraft was deemed airworthy with a fully qualified crew. The landing gear that failed to retract had no significant prior faults. Despite crew certification, there was no contingency plan for simultaneous failure of two engines during takeoff, as this was considered highly improbable.
  • Attempting to abort takeoff at high speed would have resulted in a runway excursion and collapse of landing gear, causing a crash.
  • The extent of structural damage made the crash unavoidable even if all engines had functioned normally.

Additional factors and alternative theories

John Hutchinson, a former British Airways Concorde captain, asserted that the fire alone should have been survivable and attributed the crash to operational mistakes and maintenance shortcomings. Journalist David Rose highlighted several preventable contributing elements.

Investigators discovered a missing spacer from the bogie beam on the left main landing gear, later recovered at an Air France facility. This absence caused a 3° misalignment in the strut, aggravated by uneven fuel distribution on left gear tyres. Drag marks showed the Concorde veered left during acceleration. Photographic evidence revealed a damaged steel landing light clipped by the plane, likely ingested into engine number 1.

Ex-Concorde pilot Jean-Marie Chauve and flight engineer Michel Suaud re-examined BEA’s conclusions regarding uneven fuel load and loose landing gear alignment. Their analysis suggested that without resistance caused by the missing spacer, takeoff would have occurred before reaching the metal strip; however, BEA contested this interpretation.

At takeoff, an excess of 1.2 tonnes of fuel remained onboard that should have been consumed during taxiing. Furthermore, nineteen pieces of luggage weighing approximately 500 kg were loaded last minute without being recorded on the manifest, increasing total weight to 186 tonnes—1 tonne beyond certified structural limits. An 8-knot tailwind reduced allowable takeoff weight to 180 tonnes, yet no adjustment in takeoff direction was made. The surplus fuel and luggage shifted the center of gravity rearwards beyond safe parameters established by Concorde test pilots. As fuel leaked from damaged tank 5, this rearward shift intensified.

During rotation for liftoff, speed registered only 188 knots—11 knots below recommended minimum speed. The flight engineer shut down engine two at an altitude of merely 25 feet; standard procedures dictate waiting until reaching stable flight at 400 feet and receiving captain’s command.

Mike Bannister, former Chief Pilot of British Airways Concorde operations, suggested evidence points to a fuel transfer pump feeding the ruptured tank remaining active, pumping fuel overboard and sustaining the fire. At impact time, tank five contained roughly 30% fuel instead of being empty as it would have been if the pump had been switched off.

Previous tyre-related incidents

In November 1981, following an investigation into four Air France Concorde tyre incidents occurring between July 1979 and February 1981, the American National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) issued a safety advisory letter to the French BEA. The NTSB characterized these events as "potentially catastrophic" due to tyre blowouts during takeoff. Throughout its 27-year operational history, Concorde encountered approximately 70 incidents involving tyres or wheels, with seven resulting in severe or potentially disastrous damage.

  • 13 June 1979: During takeoff at Washington Dulles International Airport, tyres numbered 5 and 6 exploded. The debris caused damage to engine 2, punctured three fuel tanks, cut hydraulic lines and electrical wiring, and created a significant hole in the wing above the wheel well.
  • 21 July 1979: Another tyre failure at Dulles Airport prompted the French civil aviation authority and Air France to implement revised protocols. These included mandatory pre-takeoff inspections of wheel and tyre condition, pressure, and temperature, as well as advising flight crews against retracting landing gear if tyre or wheel problems were suspected.
  • August 1981: A British Airways Concorde experienced a tyre blowout on takeoff from New York, damaging the landing gear door, an engine, and a fuel tank.
  • November 1985: A tyre burst on a British Airways aircraft departing Heathrow caused harm to the landing gear door, fuel tank, and two engines.
  • January 1988: At Heathrow, British Airways lost ten bolts from a landing gear wheel, which resulted in puncturing a fuel tank.
  • July 1993: A tyre burst during landing at Heathrow inflicted extensive damage to engine ingestion systems, landing gear, wings, and caused a puncture in an empty fuel tank.
  • October 1993: While taxiing at Heathrow, a tyre burst punctured the wing, damaged fuel tanks, and led to a significant fuel leak.

Due to its tailless delta-wing design, Concorde lacked conventional flaps or slats for takeoff and landing phases. Consequently, it required higher airspeeds and tyre speeds during takeoff compared with standard airliners. This factor elevated the risk of tyre failures. Testing revealed that fragments weighing roughly 4.5 kg could be propelled at velocities near 140 m/s by rotational forces during bursting events, releasing enough kinetic energy to breach fuel tanks.

Enhancements and attempted revival

In response to the accident, Concorde underwent several modifications such as upgraded electrical control systems, installation of Kevlar linings within fuel tanks, and development of specially engineered burst-resistant tyres. Despite these advancements, the incident marked the onset of Concorde’s operational decline. The drop in passenger numbers following the September 11 attacks, which occurred shortly before service resumed, accelerated its retirement timeline. Air France terminated operations in , with British Airways following suit five months later.

In June 2010, two organizations—the British Save Concorde Group (SCG) and French Olympus 593—sought to relaunch Concorde for "Heritage" flights during the 2012 Summer Olympics. Their plan involved acquiring four Rolls-Royce Olympus engines from the Le Bourget Air and Space Museum; however, these efforts did not succeed.

Legal proceedings

French authorities initiated a criminal inquiry in March 2005 targeting Continental Airlines after debris from one of its aircraft was found on the runway prior to the crash. Later that year, Henri Perrier—the former chief engineer and programme director at Aérospatiale—also became subject to formal investigation.

By March 2008, negligence charges were pursued against Continental Airlines along with two maintenance staff members—John Taylor and Stanley Ford. Continental refuted responsibility by asserting that the Concorde was already aflame before encountering debris. Additional charges were filed against Perrier; Concorde’s chief engineer Jacques Hérubel; and Claude Frantzen, head of France’s civil aviation authority DGAC. It was alleged they were aware of vulnerabilities in fuel tank design yet permitted continued flight operations.

The Paris trial held between February and December 2010 concluded with Continental Airlines being found criminally liable. The company was fined €200,000 ($271,628) and ordered to pay €1 million in compensation to Air France. Taylor received a suspended sentence of 15 months; Ford, Perrier, Hérubel, and Frantzen were acquitted. The court determined that runway debris from a Continental jet caused the Concorde’s tyre puncture and subsequent fuel tank rupture.

Nonetheless, in November 2012 a French appeals court overturned these criminal convictions. Continental (by then merged with United Airlines) and Taylor were cleared of criminal charges while civil liability rulings against Continental remained intact. Having disbursed €100 million in compensation to victims' families, Air France retained the right to seek indemnification from Continental for its share of damages paid.

Legacy

A tribute to the victims of the crash was erected in Gonesse, consisting of a transparent glass panel embedded with a fragment of an aircraft wing. Additionally, in 2006, a Concorde-shaped memorial surrounded by sculpted greenery was installed at Mitry-Mory, close to Charles de Gaulle Airport.

Documentaries and other media

  • The ill-fated Concorde served as the central aircraft in the film The Concorde ... Airport '79.
  • The sequence of events and contributing factors of the crash were examined in the inaugural episode of the National Geographic series Seconds From Disaster.
  • On 22 February 2009, NBC broadcast a Dateline NBC documentary focusing on the accident and its enduring impact.
  • Concorde's Last Flight was aired by both Channel 4 and Discovery Channel Canada.
  • In 2010, the Smithsonian Channel presented a 90-minute documentary dedicated to the Concorde.
  • The incident and subsequent inquiry were featured in Season 14, Episode 7 of the Canadian television series Mayday, titled "Concorde: Up in Flames," which premiered in January 2015.
  • Montreal-based synth-pop band Le Couleur released an album named Concorde in 2020, drawing inspiration from the tragedy.
  • The rock group Black Country, New Road subtly alludes to the crash in their track "Concorde."
  • The accident was also explored in an episode of Black Box Down.

BEA


External links

  1. ↑ Cite error: Invalid <ref> tag; no text was provided for refs named Observer
  2. ↑ Lua error in Module:Citation/CS1/Configuration at line 2123: attempt to index field '?' (a nil value).
Retrieved from "https://www.alfawiki.org/index.php?title=Air_France_Flight_4590&oldid=33477"