Aviastar-TU Flight 1906

Aviastar-TU

Industry	Aviation
Headquarters	Moscow , Russia
Products	Air transport services

Template:Infobox aircraft occurrence

Aviastar-TU Flight 1906 involved a Tupolev Tu-204 that crashed during its landing attempt at Domodedovo International Airport, Moscow, Russia, amid dense fog on 22 March 2010. Operating as a ferry flight from Hurghada International Airport, Egypt to Moscow, the aircraft carried no passengers; all eight crew members survived, with four sustaining serious injuries requiring hospitalization and four others suffering minor wounds. This incident marked the inaugural hull loss of a Tu-204Template:Fix/category and represented the first such loss for Aviastar-TU.Template:Fix/category

The investigation concluded that the accident resulted from autopilot malfunction combined with inadequate cockpit crew performance.

Accident

Flight 1906 of Aviastar-TU was conducted as a ferry operation with only eight crew aboard.Template:Fix/category At approximately 02:34 local time (UTC+3) (23:34 UTC on 21 March), the aircraft crash-landed roughly 1,450 metres (4,760 ft) short of runway 14R at Domodedovo Airport during a nighttime approach in foggy conditions with limited visibility. The METAR report at that time indicated wind from 160° at 3 metres per second (9.8 ft/s), and visibility measured at 100 metres (330 ft).

During the final approach phase, air traffic control alerted the crew multiple times that they were approximately 1,000–2,000 metres (3,300–6,600 ft) left of the intended landing path, followed by warnings about their altitude being too low. The flight crew appeared disoriented regarding their position and attempted to verify it using information from ATC, onboard flight instruments, and a handheld GPS device. The official investigation report noted that automatic altitude alerts beginning at about 60 metres (200 ft) above ground level and recurring every 10 metres (33 ft) were disregarded by the pilots. Nine seconds before impact, the pilot in command contacted air traffic control to confirm whether they were off course while focusing primarily on aligning with the runway rather than monitoring altitude. No corrective action was taken to arrest the descent.

The aircraft ultimately came down in a birch forest near the airport at around 23:35 local time, resulting in separation of the left wing and breakup of the fuselage into two segments. There was no post-crash fire. Emergency responders arrived approximately thirty minutes later. All crew members except for the flight engineer, who sustained severe injuries, exited the wreckage unaided. They reported that events unfolded too rapidly to provide an immediate explanation for the crash. One crew member (the purser) managed to reach a nearby highway where she flagged down a vehicle that transported her to medical care. Three additional crew members also reached the highway and awaited ambulance assistance.

The captain and first officer suffered serious fractures and concussions; two other crew members were hospitalized in stable condition. The remaining four crew sustained minor injuries treated at Domodedovo’s medical facility.Template:Fix/category This accident represented both the first hull loss involving a Tupolev Tu-204 and Aviastar-TU’s initial hull loss.

Aircraft

The aircraft involved in the incident was a Tupolev Tu-204-100, with manufacturer serial number 1450741364011 and registration RA-64011. Its maiden flight under the registration RA-64011 occurred on 25 March 1993. The plane commenced operations with Vnukovo Airlines on 3 September 1993, before being transferred to Sibir Airlines in January 2001.

Prior to the crash, this aircraft had been part of two separate incidents. On 14 January 2002, operating as Siberia Airlines Flight 852, it was en route from Frankfurt to Novosibirsk when deteriorating weather conditions at the destination forced a diversion to Omsk. During the approach, the pilots reported issues with fuel supply, which led to a simultaneous flameout of both engines. The aircraft successfully glided to a runway landing but overshot the strip and collided with runway lighting beyond the threshold. No injuries resulted from this event. The aircraft was subsequently repaired and returned to service.Template:Fv Starting in August 2006, RA-64011 was leased to several Russian carriers including Red Wings Airlines, Aviastar-TU, and Interavia Airlines, before returning again to Aviastar-TU.

On 21 March 2010, just one day prior to the accident, the aircraft was operating a flight from Moscow to Hurghada carrying 210 passengers when it had to turn back due to smoke detected in the cockpit. The cause was traced to a malfunctioning heater, which was quickly fixed.

Investigation

Despite challenging weather conditions, Rosaviatsia—the Russian federal air transport authority—reported that the approach proceeded normally and that "the crew did not indicate any system failures, malfunctions, or intentions for an emergency landing." On 22 March, Russia’s chief investigator suggested that breaches of safety regulations might have contributed to the emergency landing.Template:Fix/category Particular attention in the inquiry is being paid to how the crew navigated during the flight.

Flight data recorders were retrieved and forwarded to the Interstate Aviation Committee (Russian: Межгосударственный авиационный комитет (МАК)) for detailed examination. Pending results of the investigation, Aviastar-TU was immediately prohibited from carrying passengers while its operational practices were scrutinized. Early analysis indicates no evidence of in-flight fire or explosion damage; both engines remained operational until impact. Alexander Neradko, head of Russia’s Federal Air Transport Agency, attributed the accident primarily to human error.

It was disclosed on 30 March 2010 that approximately nine tonnes of fuel were aboard at the time of impact. During final approach at Domodedovo Airport, the autopilot disengaged as the aircraft descended through 4,200 metres (13,800 ft) altitude. The flight crew manually controlled the plane thereafter but failed to notify Air Traffic Control about the autopilot malfunction.

Two months before this event, the captain had been reprimanded for a minor infraction involving accidental deployment of spoilers during an approach while flaps were extended.

Final investigation report

On 7 September 2010, the МАК published their conclusive report regarding the accident. Key conclusions included:

• No damage was detected on the aircraft during flight;
• The plane carried 9 tons of fuel, and both engines remained functional until impact;
• At the initial phase of descent, conflicting data from the two flight computers required manual correction, which provoked an intense reaction from the captain;
• While descending through 5,400 metres (17,700 ft), the autopilot's course mode disengaged due to a radio altimeter malfunction, yet the pilots failed to inform ATC. They persistently attempted to reactivate it, exhibiting "growing agitation" accompanied by swearing. Upon reaching 4,200 metres (13,800 ft), the flight control computer also ceased functioning;
• Anticipating that the instrument landing system was unavailable because of these malfunctions, the pilot alerted the crew: "So, pay attention, I'm going to have a hard time, so get together and watch everything". He chose not to abort the landing. Investigators cited this statement as an example of inadequate Crew resource management (CRM);
• The pilot inaccurately told ATC he was certified for landing with vertical visibility of 30 m (98 ft), although his actual certification required at least 60 m (200 ft). During approach, vertical visibility fluctuated between 50 to 60 m (160 to 200 ft);
• Additionally, the pilot incorrectly informed ATC that he was conducting an Instrument landing system (ILS) approach when he was not. While the ILS was likely operational, its frequency had not been set because the crew assumed it was nonfunctional. When the ILS indicator is inactive, its needle remains centered—the same position as when perfectly aligned with the glideslope. The report implies that the pilot may have believed he was following the glideslope despite being considerably below it;
• A holder for a portable GPS device was discovered in the cockpit; however, the GPS unit itself was missing. Based on Flight recorder (CVR) data, investigators suggested that pilots might have depended on this portable GPS for positional awareness;
• The report indicates that in the final moments before impact, all three pilots concentrated on correcting lateral deviations from the landing path and neglected monitoring altitude.

Cause

The investigation identified this primary cause of the crash:

The incident involving Tu-204-100 registered RA-64011 during its approach to land under weather conditions below minimum standards permitted for this aircraft type, despite fully functional equipment, resulted from failure to initiate a go-around and continued descent without visual ground contact. This led to collision with trees and terrain in a controlled flight into terrain event.

Contributing factors outlined in the report included:

• Inadequate training for landing under adverse weather conditions;
• Deficient Crew resource management;
• Malfunction of autopilot systems;
• Failure to divert to an alternate airport;
• Failure to execute a go-around maneuver;
• Poor communication among crew members.

Criminal case

In March 2011, the two pilots, Aleksandr Kosyakov and Aleksey Mikhailovsky, received suspended prison sentences of one year each.

External links

• Official final investigation report (Russian language)
• Image of the aircraft involved prior to the accident
• Photograph showing the aircraft at the crash location
• Footage of the damaged airplane (BBC)