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Bond Offshore Helicopters Flight 85N

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Adapted from the English Wikipedia article Bond Offshore Helicopters Flight 85N, available under CC BY-SA 4.0Updated 9 August 2025
Bond Offshore Helicopters
IndustryAviation, Helicopter services
Headquarters
United Kingdom
Area served
North Sea oil platforms
ProductsHelicopter transport services

Just before 2:00 pm on 1 April 2009, Bond Offshore Helicopters Flight 85N went down northeast of Peterhead, Scotland, over the North Sea while returning from a BP oil platform located in the Miller oilfield. All sixteen individuals on board lost their lives. The aircraft involved was a Eurocopter AS332L2 Super Puma Mk 2 operated by Bond Offshore Helicopters. The accident resulted from the main rotor detaching due to a catastrophic failure of the gearbox.

The flight crew consisted of Captain Paul Burnham and co-pilot Richard Menzies, both pilots employed by Bond Offshore Helicopters. The majority of the passengers were staff members of KCA Deutag Drilling.

Earlier that same year, Bond operated another helicopter of a similar type, the Eurocopter EC225 LP, which ditched in the North Sea on 18 February 2009; fortunately, all 18 occupants were rescued.

The deadliest helicopter incident in the North Sea to date remains the 1986 British International Helicopters Chinook crash, where a Boeing CH-47 Chinook crashed resulting in 45 fatalities.

Recovery

Search efforts for survivors concluded by the evening of 2 April, with rescue teams acknowledging that survival was no longer possible. The seismic survey vessel Vigilant returned to Peterhead on 4 April. Eight bodies recovered shortly after the accident were transported to Aberdeen and subsequently transferred to a police mortuary.

The Air Accidents Investigation Branch (AAIB) hired the Vigilant for initial investigative work, arriving on site on 3 April equipped with specialised sonar technology to locate the wreckage. No signal from an EPIRB beacon was detected during this phase.

By 4 April, Grampian Police confirmed identification of the eight bodies recovered from the sea surface. Following this, the Diving Support Vessel Bibby Topaz was contracted to retrieve the remaining eight bodies, wreckage components, and both the cockpit voice recorder and flight data recorder, departing from Peterhead on 4 April.

At a depth of , Bibby Topaz located the submerged Super Puma wreckage. The remaining eight bodies were recovered from inside the helicopter’s fuselage. All wreckage alongside the combined FDR/CVR were transported to AAIB headquarters in Farnborough for thorough examination.

Investigation

The AAIB invited participation from the Bureau d'Enquêtes et d'Analyses pour la sécurité de l'Aviation Civile (BEA), Eurocopter, the European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA), and the UK’s Civil Aviation Authority. On 11 April 2009, AAIB’s preliminary report cited a "catastrophic failure of the main rotor gearbox" as the immediate cause, which led to separation of the main rotor. The report urged enhanced inspections of all Super Puma main rotor gearbox epicyclic modules.

A follow-up AAIB report released on 17 April revealed that metallic debris had been detected during flight operations 34 hours prior to the crash; however, no indications suggested imminent failure at that time. Consequently, EASA mandated urgent gearbox inspections for AS332L2 and EC225LP Super Puma models, requiring operators to complete these checks by 24 April.

On 16 July, AAIB issued Special Bulletin 5/2009 containing two additional safety recommendations urging EASA to reassess procedures for magnetic particle inspection and planetary gear examination.

The comprehensive AAIB Report 20/2011, published on 24 November 2011, concluded that fatigue fracture of a second stage planet gear within the epicyclic module caused catastrophic failure of the Main Rotor Gearbox.

Three key contributory factors were identified:

  1. Maintenance responses following detection of a magnetic particle on 25 March 2009 failed to recognize it as an indicator of gear deterioration.
  2. Subsequent detection techniques after this date did not reveal further degradation of gear components.
  3. The magnet ring design used in AS332 L2 and EC225 gearboxes diminished the likelihood of detecting debris effectively.

The investigation resulted in seventeen safety recommendations.

A UK government inquiry conducted in March 2014 determined that adherence to proper maintenance procedures could have prevented this accident.

See also

Additional helicopter accidents in the North Sea region:

Further reading