British Airways Flight 5390

British Airways

Industry	Airline
Founded	1974
Headquarters	London , United Kingdom

Template:Infobox aircraft occurrence British Airways Flight 5390 was an international passenger service operating between Birmingham Airport in England and Málaga Airport in Spain. On 10 June 1990, the flight experienced an explosive decompression when a windscreen panel detached from the cockpit due to incorrect installation while flying over Didcot, England. This incident resulted in the captain being partially ejected from the cockpit, where he remained secured by the window frame for approximately 20 minutes until the aircraft was safely landed by the first officer at Southampton Airport.

Aircraft

The aircraft involved, named County of South Glamorgan, was a BAC One-Eleven Series 528FL model with the registration Template:Airreg. This jet airliner had been manufactured in the year 1971.

Crew

The flight's captain, Timothy Lancaster, aged 42, had accumulated a total of 11,050 flight hours, including around 1,075 hours on the BAC One-Eleven type. The first officer, Alastair Aitchison, aged 39, possessed approximately 7,500 flight hours overall, with about 1,100 hours specifically on the BAC One-Eleven. Alongside them were four cabin crew members and a total of 81 passengers aboard.

Accident

At 08:20 local time (07:20 UTC), Aitchison completed a standard takeoff and then transferred control of the aircraft to Lancaster as it ascended. Both pilots released their shoulder restraints, and Lancaster loosened his lap belt. By 08:33 (07:33 UTC), the aircraft had reached an altitude of approximately 17,300 feet (5,300 m) over Didcot, while the cabin crew were preparing to begin meal service.

Flight attendant Nigel Ogden was entering the cockpit when a sudden loud noise was heard, and the cabin quickly became filled with condensation. The left windscreen panel on Lancaster’s side of the flight deck detached from the forward fuselage. The rapid decompression caused Lancaster to be violently pulled out of his seat and forced headfirst out of the cockpit. His knees caught on the flight controls, leaving his upper body exposed outside the aircraft to intense wind and freezing temperatures. The autopilot disengaged, resulting in a swift descent. The cockpit door was blown inward onto the control console, obstructing throttle controls and causing the plane to accelerate as it descended. Important flight documents and checklists were blown out, and debris from the passenger area entered the cockpit. Ogden immediately grabbed Lancaster’s safety belt, while two other flight attendants secured loose items, comforted passengers, and instructed them to assume brace positions in preparation for an emergency landing.

Since there was insufficient oxygen supply for all onboard, Aitchison initiated an emergency descent to reach breathable air pressure levels. He then reactivated the autopilot and issued a distress call; however, due to wind noise, he was unable to hear air traffic control’s response. This communication difficulty delayed the start of emergency protocols.

Ogden, still holding onto Lancaster, began to tire, so Chief Steward John Heward and flight attendant Simon Rogers took over supporting the captain. By this stage, Lancaster had slipped several centimeters further outside the aircraft, with his head repeatedly striking the fuselage. The crew feared he might have died but Aitchison insisted they continue holding him firmly to prevent him from hitting critical parts such as the left wing, engine, or horizontal stabilizer.

Eventually, Aitchison received clearance from ATC to perform an emergency landing at Southampton Airport. The cabin crew managed to free Lancaster’s ankles from entanglement with the flight controls while maintaining their grip on him. At 08:55 local time (07:55 UTC), the plane safely touched down at Southampton, and passengers disembarked using boarding steps.

Lancaster survived but sustained frostbite, bruises, shock, and fractures to his right arm, left thumb, and right wrist. Ogden suffered frostbite on his face and a dislocated shoulder; he later developed post-traumatic stress disorder. No other injuries were reported among those onboard.

Investigation

File:BA 5390 Screw comparison.jpg

Comparison of screws used in the G-BJRT windscreen (left to right: correct size, new; small size, new; correct size, old)

Authorities recovered the detached windscreen panel along with numerous screws—approximately 90 in total—near Cholsey. Analysis revealed that during the windscreen installation conducted 27 hours prior to the flight, 84 screws employed were undersized by 0.026 inches (0.66 mm) in diameter (British Standards A211-8C versus A211-8D, corresponding to #8–32 compared to #10–32 under the Unified Thread Standard). The remaining six screws conformed to standard diameter (A211-7D) but were 0.1 inches (2.5 mm) shorter than specified (0.7 inch instead of 0.8 inch). The previous windscreen had also been secured with incorrect screws, which were swapped out by the shift maintenance manager with identical replacements without consulting maintenance manuals, due to imminent departure. These undersized fasteners could not endure the stress from the air pressure differential between the cabin interior and external atmosphere during flight. (The windscreen was externally mounted, meaning cabin pressure acted to push it outward rather than hold it in place as with a "plug"-type fitting installed from inside.)

The Air Accidents Investigation Branch concluded that the shift maintenance manager responsible for fitting the incorrect screws did not adhere to British Airways’ established procedures. They advised that personnel requiring prescription eyewear should be mandated to wear it during maintenance operations. Additionally, they criticized existing policies for lacking mandatory verification or inspection by a second individual for such critical tasks. Responsibility was also attributed to local management at Birmingham Airport for insufficient oversight of the shift maintenance manager’s practices.

Awards

First Officer Alastair Aitchison together with cabin crew members Susan Gibbins and Nigel Ogden received the Queen's Commendation for Valuable Service in the Air; however, Ogden’s name was omitted from the official published list. In addition, Aitchison earned the 1992 Polaris Award recognizing exceptional airmanship.

Aftermath

Lancaster resumed his duties in less than five months following the incident. He departed from British Airways in 2003 and subsequently continued his flying career with EasyJet until his retirement from commercial aviation in 2008.

Shortly after the accident, Aitchison left British Airways and took up a position with Channel Express, which was later renamed Jet2. He completed his final commercial flight on a Boeing 737-33A from Alicante to Manchester on 28 June 2015, coinciding with his 65th birthday.

Following the event, Ogden returned to flying but later developed PTSD, leading to his retirement in 2001 due to health reasons. By 2005, he was employed as a night security guard at a Salvation Army hospital.

See also

• Sichuan Airlines Flight 8633, an incident with similarities where the first officer survived after being partially ejected from the cockpit due to a windshield failure on an Airbus A319 flight
• Southwest Airlines Flight 1380, which experienced explosive decompression caused by an uncontained engine failure, resulting in a passenger being partially expelled through a window; the passenger later succumbed to injuries

External links

• Air Accidents Investigation Branch
• Report No: 1/1992. Investigation report on the BAC One-Eleven, G-BJRT accident over Didcot, Oxfordshire on 10 June 1990
• Official final report
• Transcript of Air Traffic Control communications during the event (Archive)
• Summary of the Final Report (Archive)
• Accident database entry (Archive)
• News article featuring photo of cockpit exterior after landing Archived 12 January 2019 at the Wayback Machine