Consciousness Explained
| Company type | Book |
|---|---|
| Industry | Philosophy, Cognitive science |
| Founded | 1991 |
| Founder | Daniel Dennett |
| Products | Philosophy book on consciousness |
Consciousness Explained is a 1991 publication by American philosopher Daniel Dennett that investigates the emergence of consciousness through the interplay of physical and mental mechanisms within the brain. Dennett conceptualizes consciousness as a set of concurrent computational processes, comparing it to an academic manuscript undergoing simultaneous edits by multiple contributors—this forms the basis of his "multiple drafts" theory. He suggests that introspective accounts are more akin to theoretical constructs than straightforward depictions, cautioning psychologists against accepting them uncritically.
Dennett disputes theories grounded in "qualia"—the alleged intrinsic elements of experience—asserting that such notions lack coherence. Critics contend that while he appears to provide a scientific framework, he effectively denies the reality of subjective conscious experiences.
Summary
Dennett’s "multiple drafts" model opposes the idea of a singular focal point for consciousness (the "Cartesian theater"), instead proposing that "content-fixation" happens across diverse brain regions at varying moments. He portrays the brain as a collection of semi-autonomous modules whose interactions give rise to conscious narratives. In this framework, consciousness represents the brain’s seemingly sequential narration of its underlying parallel operations.
One of his most debated assertions is the nonexistence of qualia as traditionally defined, since their supposed attributes—such as incorrigibility, ineffability, and privacy—are mutually contradictory. This stance rejects both the hard problem of consciousness and the concept of "philosophical zombies," implying that all humans functionally resemble zombies without any immaterial components.
Dennett highlights that the brain retains only essential information needed for its operations, deliberately avoiding extensive short-term memory storage to optimize resources. Instead, it monitors changes and presumes stability in other areas, which leads to perceptual gaps demonstrated by numerous experiments and illusions. Later studies have supported these findings, with Dennett acknowledging he initially underestimated their significance.
His philosophical technique, heterophenomenology, treats participants’ verbal accounts as empirical data but does not regard them as infallible, thus facilitating psychological research beyond traditional behaviorism.
Dennett maintains that consciousness can solely be accounted for through unconscious mechanisms: "To explain is to explain away."
Reception
Consciousness Explained was recognized by The New York Times as one of the top ten books of its year. George Johnson praised it in the New York Times Book Review, describing it as "nothing short of brilliant."
Opponents argue that Dennett conflates subjective experience with observable behavior or cognition, neglecting the essential problem of consciousness. Philosopher David Chalmers, in The Conscious Mind (1996), characterizes Dennett’s view as a "denial" of consciousness, humorously suggesting Dennett might himself be a philosophical zombie. Some critics consider the book’s title misleading and propose alternatives like Consciousness Ignored or Consciousness Explained Away.
John Searle accuses Dennett of committing a category error by rejecting subjectivity as unscientific, emphasizing that scientific objectivity in knowledge does not negate ontological subjectivity. For instance, pain is a subjective phenomenon that neurology aims to comprehend and treat. Searle differentiates epistemically subjective value judgments (e.g., "McKinley is prettier than Everest") from epistemically objective statements (e.g., "McKinley is higher than Everest"). He argues Dennett reduces consciousness to mere computational functions, implying conscious experiences are illusory; conversely, Searle insists that "the existence of the appearance is the reality."
Searle further criticizes Dennett:
Dennett denies consciousness as a first-person phenomenon, equating humans to complex zombies devoid of internal sensations. This perspective is self-contradictory because it dismisses the very data that theories of consciousness seek to explain. The irony lies in conscious readers engaging with Dennett’s claims despite his rejection of consciousness.
Dennett and proponents of illusionism argue that the subjective dimension of consciousness is an outdated concept rooted in "folk psychology," claiming their reinterpretation provides the sole scientifically consistent explanation.
Leading neuroscientists such as Gerald Edelman, Antonio Damasio, Vilayanur Ramachandran, Giulio Tononi, Christof Koch, and Rodolfo Llinás affirm qualia’s existence and maintain that efforts to dismiss them arise from misunderstandings about scientific principles.
See also
- Binding problem
- Change blindness
- Homunculus argument
- Philosophy of mind
- Physicalism
- Scientism
- Society of Mind
- The Conscious Mind
- Vertiginous question
References
External links
- Dennett, Daniel (1988). Quining Qualia.
- Lormand, E. Qualia! (Now Showing at a Theater near You)
- de Leon, D. The Qualities of Qualia