Eurotrain
| Company type | Joint venture |
|---|---|
| Industry | High-speed rail |
| Founded | March 1996 |
| Founder | Siemens, GEC-Alstom |
| Headquarters | Not specified |
Area served | Asian market |
| Products | High-speed rail systems and technology |
Number of employees | Not specified |
| Parent | Siemens, GEC-Alstom |
Eurotrain was a collaborative enterprise created by Siemens and GEC-Alstom to promote high-speed rail solutions in the Asian market. In 1997, it emerged as one of two contenders vying to supply the main system for the Taiwan High Speed Rail (THSR) project and was designated as the preferred bidder by the concessionaire THSRC. Eurotrain constructed a prototype train for demonstration purposes; however, THSRC ultimately awarded the contract to a competing consortium, leading to legal proceedings that concluded with compensation awarded to Eurotrain in 2004.
Origins
Formed in March 1996, Eurotrain was a joint venture between Siemens—producer of the German ICE—and GEC-Alsthom, manufacturer of the French TGV. The partnership aimed to merge their respective high-speed rail technologies to better penetrate the Asian market. This alliance was also intended to prevent a recurrence of Siemens' previous unsuccessful bid for Korea's KTX. Ownership of Eurotrain was divided with GEC-Alsthom holding a 60% stake and Siemens owning 40%. The Taiwan High Speed Rail initiative represented the venture’s only significant project.
Initial success
The THSR project was structured as a Build-Operate-Transfer (BOT) scheme. Eurotrain aligned itself with Taiwan High Speed Rail Consortium (THSRC), while its competitor, Chunghwa High Speed Rail Consortium (CHSRC), partnered with Taiwan Shinkansen Consortium (TSC), which proposed Japanese Shinkansen technology. On 25 September 1997, THSRC was chosen as the preferred bidder.
That year, THSRC announced Eurotrain as its favored supplier for core systems encompassing rolling stock, track infrastructure, electrification, signalling, and communications.
During the concluding negotiation phase, Eurotrain and THSRC validated their technical approach by assembling a hybrid train specifically designed for demonstration purposes (refer to Demonstration train).
The June 1998 Eschede train disaster had minimal effect on THSRC’s stance; authorities requested information about the incident, but Eurotrain’s design did not utilize the wheel type implicated in the derailment. Consequently, THSRC finalized the BOT agreement with governmental authorities on 23 July 1998.
Demonstration train
To address THSRC's demand for high passenger capacity, Alstom and Siemens engineered a hybrid train that combined the lightweight, high-capacity double-deck intermediate cars from the TGV Duplex (expanded from 8 to 12 cars) with more robust power units from German Railways (DB) ICE 2 high-speed trains.
In early 1998, this demonstration train was constructed by coupling ICE 2 powerheads DB 402 042-6 and 402 046-7 with intermediate cars sourced from TGV Duplex set #224. Modifications were performed separately at Siemens's Duewag facility in Uerdingen, Germany, and GEC-Alsthom's factory in La Rochelle, France. These adjustments included linking ICE 2 powerheads to the TGV’s roof-mounted high-voltage cables, integrating electronic and optical cables on the TGV roof for ICE traction control, installing an onboard electricity rectifier, and replacing ICE automatic couplers with side buffers and standard UIC couplers. The braking system remained solely pneumatic. The ICE 2 powerheads were painted in a special livery designed to complement the TGV Duplex cars.
The complete train was assembled in Munich by April 1998 and underwent static as well as quasi-static testing. Between 25 and 30 April, it conducted trial runs reaching speeds up to 310 km/h on both the Hanover–Würzburg high-speed railway and Hannover–Minden routes to assess stability, ride quality, tunnel pressure effects, and noise levels.
On 3 May 1998, Eurotrain publicly revealed the train in Hamburg. The next day featured a demonstration journey from Göttingen to Hannover, attended by representatives from THSRC and BOHSR, during which it achieved a maximum speed of 316 km/h.
Withdrawal from the project
THSRC encountered difficulties in securing sufficient funding. In May 1999, the Japanese government offered soft loan guarantees contingent upon THSRC shifting its preference to the Taiwan Shinkansen Consortium (TSC). Additionally, a prominent Kuomintang financier, who had supported the unsuccessful CHSRC bid, committed financial backing. As a result, THSRC reopened the bidding process on 15 June 1999.
In response to TSC’s financial incentives, Eurotrain proposed acquiring a 10% equity share in THSRC in September 1999. The following year, TSC countered with a comparable proposal. Both parties enjoyed government support: Japan endorsed TSC through loan assurances, while Eurotrain received backing from the European Union’s Trade Commission. Efforts to strengthen Eurotrain’s position included planned visits from French and German ministers, which were ultimately disrupted by political controversies.
On 28 December 1999, THSRC declared its intention to finalize an agreement with the Taiwan Shinkansen Consortium, highlighting TSC’s superior technology, pricing, financing arrangements, and maintenance capabilities. Expectations regarding currency fluctuations and TSC’s deployment of a more recent Shinkansen model also influenced this choice.
Speculation arose that political considerations related to President Lee Teng-hui’s upcoming visit to Japan played a role in the decision; however, THSRC refuted these claims. Earlier in 1999, Lee had publicly endorsed the Japanese proposal, emphasizing its enhanced safety features and political advantages despite its higher cost.
Legal dispute
Eurotrain, having previously held preferred bidder status, regarded this as a binding contract that THSRC breached by engaging with TSC. Consequently, Eurotrain sought an injunction. Siemens chairman Heinrich von Pierer personally appealed to President Lee Teng-hui for intervention but was refused. Representatives from German, French, and British trade offices also questioned THSRC’s chairwoman. The injunction was denied at both initial and appellate levels in the High Court.
Although Eurotrain conceded the loss of the train system contract, it pursued damages amounting to US$800 million at the Singapore International Arbitration Centre in February 2001. THSRC maintained that their decision was commercially driven by factors such as pricing, financial strategy, and maintenance considerations. Following arbitration proceedings, the tribunal ruled in March 2004 that THSRC must compensate Eurotrain for US$32.4 million in development expenses and US$35.7 million for unjust enrichment. In November 2004, THSRC agreed to pay Eurotrain a total of US$65 million (equivalent to US$89 million including interest).
Impact and contributions
THSRC’s partnership with Eurotrain integrated European high-speed rail technologies and expertise into critical components of the project.
- The company adopted European standards for superstructure design, incorporating larger cross-sectional dimensions and more robust bridge constructions compared to conventional Shinkansen lines.
- European criteria for track stability were implemented on railway infrastructure built by Japanese contractors.
- The system was engineered for two-way operation on dual tracks—contrasting with Japan’s single-directional model—which necessitated TSC developing a novel automatic train control (ATC) system.
- A German supplier provided high-speed swing-nose switches installed on ballastless slab track to facilitate bi-directional traffic.
- Siemens delivered the Environmental Control System responsible for device monitoring and communication functions. In 2010, after recurring switch failures linked to end position detector faults, THSRC engaged Siemens to diagnose and resolve these issues.
- Service commenced using Japanese-manufactured trains operated by an initial team of 40 French and 13 German drivers, with plans underway to train local operators for complete replacement within eighteen months.
Other ventures, HTE, conclusion
During the 1990s, Eurotrain explored the possibility of bidding for the Beijing–Shanghai high-speed railway project, but its member companies eventually chose to seek contracts on their own.
On 17 December 1999, the CEOs of DB, Hartmut Mehdorn, and SNCF, Louis Gallois, called upon the European rail sector to collaborate on creating a unified high-speed train platform aimed at benefiting from economies of scale. A spokesperson for DB emphasized the successful partnership between German and French companies through Eurotrain in Taiwan as an example for Europe to emulate.
This concept, labeled Euro-Train by the press, developed into the Highspeed Train Europe (HTE) initiative, with Alstom and Siemens emerging as the key industrial collaborators by September 2000. Italy’s national railway company FS also became involved. Nonetheless, after addressing 10,000 detailed matters, unresolved conflicts on 500 points led to the termination of the project in September 2004.