Great Oil Sniffer Hoax
| Industry | Petroleum |
|---|---|
| Headquarters | France |
| Products | Petroleum |
The Great Oil Sniffer Hoax emerged in 1979 as a major controversy involving the French petroleum firm Elf Aquitaine. The company allocated more than $150 million toward the development of an oil detection technology based on gravity wave principles, which was ultimately revealed to be fraudulent. In France, this episode is commonly referred to as the "Avions Renifleurs" or "Sniffer Planes."
Background before Elf
In 1965, Aldo Bonassoli, an electrician working for an Italian telephone company, created a desalination apparatus. Belgian aristocrat Alain de Villegas, initially focused on water-related innovations, shifted his attention to a "water sniffer" device following early setbacks.
De Villegas, who was affiliated with the anti-communist Pan-European Union, encountered Jean Violet, a lawyer linked to French intelligence, in 1969. Violet, a prominent figure in European political circles and founder of the Pinay Circle, sought financial backing for the water sniffer project. Although efforts to attract investment from New York financier Crosby Kelly were unsuccessful, Italian industrialist Carlo Pesenti agreed to support initial development through Fisalma, Inc., a Swiss-registered entity incorporated in Panama and managed by Philippe de Weck from Union Bank of Switzerland (later UBS AG). Violet utilized his connections within Opus Dei to secure testing locations in Spain through tourism minister Alfredo Sánchez Bella.
Following unsuccessful trials and the spike in oil prices triggered by the 1973 Yom Kippur War, De Villegas repositioned the device as an oil detection system, persuading Pesenti to increase funding. Leveraging Pinay's network, tests were conducted over Zululand using equipment mounted on a Douglas DC-3 aircraft. By late 1975, Pesenti withdrew support due to escalating costs; subsequent drilling revealed no oil deposits at depths reaching 6,000 meters.
Elf's involvement
In 1976, de Villegas and Bonassoli were introduced to representatives of Elf, reportedly facilitated by French intelligence contacts. Bonassoli asserted that he had developed two instruments: "Delta," an airborne gravity wave sensor designed to identify oil reserves and generate printed reports; and "Omega," a device intended for closer-range detection with outputs displayed on a television screen. He consented to demonstrate these devices only in the absence of scientific observers, fearing intellectual property theft. News of their invention rapidly reached influential figures within French political spheres.
Despite evident scientific inconsistencies, Elf neglected to perform formal due diligence or verify the inventors’ track records of failure. This lapse reflected a politically motivated chauvinism surrounding the initiative. At that time, Elf was predominantly state-controlled but lacked substantial crude oil assets, placing its producer status at risk. The prospect of technology capable of pinpointing oil anywhere was highly enticing, leading officials to disregard skepticism and enforce strict confidentiality.
Between April 30 and May 7, 1976, Elf executives witnessed demonstrations aboard a transport aircraft flying over known oil regions. The devices produced illuminated signals, television maps, and printed topographical reports resembling publicly available exploration data, convincing Elf’s leadership—including founder Pierre Guillaumat—of their authenticity.
In May 1976, Elf entered into a two-year exclusive testing agreement worth 200 million Swiss Francs (approximately US$80 million), with plans for a subsequent contract in 1978 valued at 250 million Francs (around US$130 million), excluding additional expenses. This arrangement was made without informing Elf’s civilian board members.
President Valéry Giscard d'Estaing received briefings on the devices in June 1976 and was aware of contracts awarded to de Villegas’ company Fisalma. Four months later, Prime Minister Raymond Barre approved lifting currency controls to facilitate fund transfers abroad into Fisalma’s Swiss accounts. To maintain secrecy, payments were routed through minor Elf bank accounts.
Exposure
Although several flights were deemed "successful," attempts to drill at the specified sites failed to produce any results. Bonassoli argued that his apparatus was "excessively precise" and required additional refinement. Nonetheless, Elf's leadership remained optimistic, placing trust in earlier field research that aligned with the device’s readings, thereby strengthening their confidence in its potential.
The dynamic changed when control of Elf's management shifted from Guillaumat to Albin Chalandon. While initially supportive, Chalandon reviewed the evidence and recognized the absence of any practical findings. In May 1979, he commissioned Jules Horowitz, head of research at France's atomic energy agency, to evaluate "Omega." Horowitz challenged Bonassoli to identify objects through a barrier; after several unsuccessful attempts, Bonassoli admitted the device could only detect a metal ruler. Upon testing, the device generated a sheet with a simple line, whereas Horowitz demonstrated that the ruler was bent out of view.
Despite these shortcomings, efforts persisted briefly. A later demonstration revealed the deception: Omega’s outputs were merely photocopies produced inside the machine. An investigation uncovered a hidden photocopier concealed within one cabinet, explaining why the outputs closely mirrored previous reports—Bonassoli had been manually copying documents before photocopying them. He deflected criticism by claiming a vital secret component was secured elsewhere, but Elf had been misled.
Following exposure of the fraud, government response was minimal. Bonassoli returned to Italy and became something of a folk hero. Elf never fully settled the final payment but had already expended over $150 million.
Political scandal
In 1979, during an audit of France’s semi-public companies by the Cour des Comptes, auditor François Giquel raised concerns about abrupt surges in expenditures—from modest amounts around 3 million Francs escalating to hundreds of millions within three years. The President warned Giquel that this was a military secret and instructed him to remain silent. In 1982, Bernard Beck, president of the Cour des Comptes and an ally of Giscard d'Estaing, destroyed three critical documents connected to the matter.
The controversy erupted in December 1983 when the junior Secretary for the Treasury accused Beck of forfaiture ("abuse of authority") for destroying records. That same week, Pierre Péan published an extensive report in Le Canard Enchaîné, reportedly based on insider information from government sources. New president François Mitterrand leveraged the scandal to criticize his predecessor for concealing it, asserting all related documents had been destroyed. Giscard d'Estaing responded on television by presenting another copy of the report, arguing this disproved any cover-up and framing the issue as political manipulation.
However, this strategy backfired; authorities seized the report and released it in full. On 2 January 1984, Prime Minister Pierre Mauroy publicly aired it on live television, accusing Barre and Giscard of attempting to hide this embarrassing episode. Giscard countered by blaming Mitterrand for permitting attacks against his predecessor. The Economist observed that Mitterrand likely influenced the suppression of a public inquiry into Giscard’s involvement.
Bonassoli resurfaces
In January 1984, Bonassoli conducted a press briefing in Italy where he declared his intention to hand over all information related to his apparatus to the Italian National Research Council (CNR). He also revealed that the Soviets had shown interest in the technology. When pressed about accusations of deception, Bonassoli asserted that the device had undergone substantial enhancements since the 1970s. Despite these claims, no additional progress was reported.
Bibliography
- Robert Hutchinson, Their Kingdom Come – Inside the Secret World of Opus Dei, pp. 153–158, Doubleday, 1997,
- Jean Guisnel, "Als Elf-Erap freudig erbebte", Neue Zürcher Zeitung (in German), January 1994
- Daniel Singer, "AutoWorkers and 'Sniffing Planes'", The Nation, 25 February 1984
- "Jean Violet", Lobster: The Journal of Parapolitics, Issue 18, 1989
- "Big Stink", Time, 30 January 1984.
- Andrew Lloyd, "Bizarre theories of Bonassoli", New Scientist, 19 January 1984
- "Foes Blame Giscard for Sniffer Plane Scheme", The New York Times, 22 November 1984.
- R. T. Naylor, Hot Money and the Politics of Debt, pp. 258–261, McGill-Queen's Press, 2004,