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Griggs v. Duke Power Co.

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Adapted from the English Wikipedia article Griggs v. Duke Power Co., available under CC BY-SA 4.0Updated 7 August 2025

Griggs v. Duke Power Co. (401 U.S. 424, 1971) represents a pivotal Supreme Court decision concerning employment discrimination and the application of the disparate impact doctrine, delivered on March 8, 1971. The ruling clarified that employment standards must have a direct connection to job performance to prevent inadvertent discrimination against minority groups.

The Court found that Duke Power's employment criteria disproportionately excluded black workers without serving legitimate job-related objectives. The judgment underscored that Congress forbids employment practices that fail to guarantee authentic equal opportunity.

Facts

During the 1950s, Duke Power’s Dan River Steam Station in North Carolina confined black employees to the "Labor" department, which offered lower wages compared to other divisions. In 1955, the company implemented a requirement for a high school diploma for roles outside the Labor department and provided financial assistance covering two-thirds of tuition costs for employees lacking diplomas.

On July 2, 1965—aligned with the enforcement of the Civil Rights Act—Duke Power introduced two assessments: the Bennett Mechanical Comprehension Test (measuring mechanical aptitude) and the Wonderlic Cognitive Ability Test (assessing IQ). These tests were intended to enable employees without diplomas to qualify for higher-paying positions.

These prerequisites disproportionately advantaged white applicants: according to the 1960 census, 34% of white males in North Carolina held diplomas compared to only 18% of black males. Moreover, passing rates on these tests were even more uneven—58% of white candidates passed versus a mere 6% of black candidates—revealing pronounced racial disparities in hiring outcomes.

Trial court and appellate decision

Initially, the federal district court sided with Duke Power, accepting that its prior racially discriminatory policies had been discontinued. The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed this ruling, determining that the intelligence tests employed by Duke Power lacked evidence of discriminatory intent and did not violate the Civil Rights Act.

Supreme Court ruling

Under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the Supreme Court held that when employment tests disproportionately affect ethnic minority groups, employers must demonstrate these tests are "reasonably related" to job performance. Given that Title VII derives authority from Congress’s power under the Commerce Clause, the disparate impact standard used in constitutional equal protection cases such as Washington v. Davis does not apply here.

Title VII prohibits use of employment tests in hiring or promotion decisions unless they serve as a "reasonable measure of job performance," regardless of any intent to discriminate. Because Duke Power’s high school diploma requirement and aptitude tests were broad and unrelated to actual job functions, their policies for employee transfers contravened the Act.

The majority opinion was authored by Chief Justice Burger:


Significance

The Griggs v. Duke Power Co. decision established that employers carry the responsibility to justify the business necessity behind employment testing. However, this burden was relaxed by Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio (1989), which required only evidence supporting business justification. The 1991 Civil Rights Act later amended this framework, reinstating a more rigorous standard while incorporating exceptions applicable to Wards Cove itself.

David Frum observes that Griggs redefined discrimination from unequal treatment toward acknowledging failures to accommodate historically marginalized populations.

Although private employers with at least 15 employees fall under Title VII, Washington v. Davis (1976) ruled that disparate impact claims do not apply under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fifth Amendment and Fourteenth Amendment. As a result, litigation against public employers may face limitations due to sovereign immunity.

See also

References

  • E McGaughey, A Casebook on Labour Law (Hart 2019) ch 13, 595

External links