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HMS Agincourt (1913)

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Adapted from the English Wikipedia article HMS Agincourt (1913), available under CC BY-SA 4.0Updated 29 November 202543 sources
HMS Agincourt
Company typeBattleship
IndustryNaval shipbuilding
PredecessorRio de Janeiro (original Brazilian order)
Founded1911
Headquarters
United Kingdom
,
United Kingdom
ProductsDreadnought battleship

HMS Agincourt Overview

HMS Agincourt was a dreadnought battleship constructed in the United Kingdom during the early 1910s. Initially commissioned by Brazil amid the South American naval arms competition, she was notable for carrying an unprecedented fourteen heavy-caliber guns arranged in seven turrets, reflecting Brazil's desire for a formidable warship.

The vessel was ordered in 1911 under the name Rio de Janeiro from the British shipbuilder Armstrong Whitworth. However, following the decline of Brazil's rubber industry and improved diplomatic relations with Argentina, her construction was halted and the ship was sold to the Ottoman Empire. Renamed Sultan Osman I in honor of the empire’s founder Osman I, the battleship neared completion as World War I erupted. The British government then seized both this ship and another Ottoman dreadnought under construction, provoking anger in the Ottoman Empire since full payment had already been made.

Upon acquisition by the Royal Navy, the ship was rechristened Agincourt and assigned to the Grand Fleet operating in the North Sea. Throughout the conflict, she primarily conducted patrols and training exercises but also took part in the 1916 Battle of Jutland. After being placed in reserve status in 1919, Agincourt was ultimately sold for dismantling in 1922 in compliance with the Washington Naval Treaty restrictions.

Background

Starboard elevation and plan view of Agincourt
Artistic depiction of Sultan Osman I in operation for the Ottoman Navy. The royal yacht Ertuğrul is visible on the left, with the cruiser Hamidiye positioned in the background.

During the turbulent era surrounding and following the 1889 coup in Brazil, which deposed Emperor Dom Pedro II, along with the 1893–94 naval uprising, the Brazilian Navy struggled to maintain its existing fleet and was unable to procure new warships.[1] At the same time, Chile entered into a naval limitation agreement in 1902 with Brazil's chief rival, Argentina, resolving a broader territorial dispute. Despite this pact, both nations retained their interim-built vessels, many of which were considerably more modern and formidable than those in Brazil's fleet.[2]Template:Efn-ua By the early 20th century, Brazil lagged behind Argentina and Chile not only in ship quality but also in total naval tonnage—Chile possessed 36,896 long tons (37,488 t), Argentina 34,425 long tons (34,977 t), and Brazil 27,661 long tons (28,105 t)—despite Brazil's population being nearly triple that of Argentina and almost five times that of Chile.[3][4]

The early 1900s saw a surge in global demand for Brazilian coffee and rubber exports,[5] which significantly increased national revenue. Concurrently, the Baron of Rio Branco led efforts by influential Brazilians to assert Brazil’s status as a global power.[6] Consequently, late in 1904, the National Congress of Brazil initiated an extensive naval expansion program. Initial orders placed in 1906 included three small battleships; however, after the launch of Dreadnought, Brazil reconsidered its strategy. By March 1907, contracts were signed for three Minas Geraes-class battleships, with two vessels to be built immediately by British firms Armstrong Whitworth and Vickers, and a third planned subsequently.[7]

In reaction to Brazil’s naval expansion, Argentina and Chile promptly annulled their 1902 agreement and pursued their own dreadnought acquisitions.[3] Following an extended bidding process, Argentina awarded its contract to the American Fore River Shipbuilding Company, while Chile’s order—delayed by the 1906 Valparaíso earthquake—was placed with Armstrong.[8] As relations between Brazil and Argentina improved and Brazil’s economic growth slowed, Brazilian officials attempted to negotiate with Armstrong to cancel the third dreadnought from their contract but were unsuccessful. They secured financing to proceed, leading to Armstrong laying down Rio de Janeiro’s keel in March 1910.[9]

Within the Brazilian Navy leadership emerged two factions divided over main battery caliber size: one supported increasing gun size beyond the Minas Geraes class's twelve-inch guns; the other favored retaining smaller but faster-firing artillery under Admiral Marques Leão. While precise influences on government decisions remain uncertain, Leão actively advocated his position during discussions with President Hermes da Fonseca. Additional factors shaping policy included the November 1910 Revolt of the Lash, financial obligations from dreadnought loans, and a deteriorating economy marked by escalating government debt and persistent budget shortfalls.[10]Template:Efn-ua In May 1911, President Fonseca declared:

Upon taking office, I discovered that my predecessor had contracted for a battleship named Rio de Janeiro, displacing 32,000 tons with fourteen-inch guns. Various considerations indicated that acquiring such a vessel was impractical and warranted revising the contract to reduce tonnage. This revision was implemented so that we would possess a powerful unit built on more realistic specifications that have yet to be tested by experience.[11]

The agreement for constructing what would become Agincourt was finalized on June 3, 1911; her keel was laid on September 14 that year. The design featured fourteen twelve-inch guns—a notably high number—which historian David Topliss attributed to political pressures: to surpass previous ships armed with twelve such guns without increasing caliber size meant augmenting gun quantity was necessary to impress Brazilian public opinion.[12]

General characteristics

The Agincourt measured an overall length of 671 feet 6 inches (204.7 m), with a beam spanning 89 feet (27 m) and a draught of 29 feet 10 inches (9.1 m) when fully loaded. Her displacement was 27,850 long tons (28,297 t) at normal load and increased to 30,860 long tons (31,355 t) at deep load. At deep load, the ship's metacentric height was 4.9 feet (1.5 m). Despite possessing a large turning radius, she demonstrated good maneuverability relative to her considerable length and was regarded as an excellent platform for her artillery.

Upon integration into the Royal Navy, Agincourt was noted for its exceptional internal comfort and high-quality fittings. Many of the ship’s fixtures, including those in the heads, required familiarity with the Portuguese language since original instruction plates had not been fully replaced after British acquisition. By 1917, her complement consisted of 1,268 officers and enlisted personnel.

Propulsion

Powered by four Parsons direct-drive steam turbines, each connected to an individual propeller shaft, Agincourt featured high-pressure ahead and astern turbines operating the wing shafts, while low-pressure ahead and astern turbines powered the inner shafts. The propellers were three-bladed with a diameter of 9 feet 6 inches (2.9 m). Although designed to generate 34,000 shaft horsepower (25,000 kW), her turbines surpassed expectations during sea trials by producing over 40,000 shaft horsepower (30,000 kW), enabling her to slightly exceed the intended speed of 22 knots (41 km/h; 25 mph).

Her steam generation system comprised twenty-two Babcock & Wilcox water-tube boilers operating at a pressure of 235 pounds per square inch (1,620 kPa). The ship typically carried 1,500 long tons (1,500 t) of coal but could hold up to 3,200 long tons (3,300 t), supplemented by 620 long tons (630 t) of fuel oil sprayed onto the coal to enhance combustion efficiency. At full fuel capacity, Agincourt possessed a range of approximately 7,000 nautical miles (13,000 km; 8,100 mi) when cruising at 10 knots (19 km/h; 12 mph). Electrical power was supplied by four steam-driven reciprocating generators.

Armament

Sultan Osman-ı Evvel, which later became Agincourt, during her fitting-out phase

The main battery consisted of fourteen BL 12-inch Mk XIII 45-calibre guns arranged in seven twin turrets powered hydraulically. These turrets were unofficially named after days of the week from Sunday forward toward the stern. This armament represented the greatest number of heavy guns and turrets ever installed on a dreadnought battleship. The guns had an elevation range from −3° depression up to 13.5° elevation, firing 850-pound shells at a muzzle velocity of 2,725 feet per second (831 m/s). At maximum elevation, armour-piercing shells could reach just beyond 20,000 yards (18,000 m). Wartime modifications increased turret elevation to 16°, extending range marginally to about 20,435 yards (18,686 m). These artillery pieces fired at a rate of approximately 1.5 rounds per minute. When executing a full broadside, the combined muzzle blast produced an impressive sheet of flame often likened to the explosion of a battlecruiser; despite myths suggesting structural damage from such firings, no harm befell the vessel, although glassware and tableware aboard did suffer breakage during initial volleys.

Initially equipped with eighteen BL 6-inch Mk XIII 50-calibre guns for secondary armament, fourteen were mounted in armoured casemates along the upper deck, with two additional guns positioned in both the forward and aft superstructures behind protective gun shields. Following British acquisition, two extra guns were installed adjacent to the bridge on pivot mounts also shielded for protection. These weapons could depress to −7° and elevate up to 13°, later increased to 15°, delivering shells weighing 100 pounds out to ranges near 13,475 yards (12,322 m) at maximum elevation with a muzzle velocity of 2,770 feet per second (840 m/s). Their firing cadence ranged between five and seven rounds per minute but declined to about three rounds per minute once ready ammunition was depleted due to limited ammunition hoist capacity. Each gun carried roughly 150 rounds.

For close-in defense against torpedo boats, ten quick-firing 3-inch 45-calibre guns were installed on pivot mounts within the superstructure, each protected by gun shields. Additionally, Agincourt was outfitted with three submerged 21-inch torpedo tubes: one on each side beam and one located at the stern. Upon firing these torpedoes, water entering the tubes was discharged into the torpedo flat to assist reloading before being pumped overboard; consequently, crew members reloading torpedoes operated in about three feet of water during rapid firing sequences. A total of ten torpedoes were carried aboard for these tubes.

Fire Control

Each turret featured an armoured rangefinder installed on its roof, with an additional unit positioned atop the foretop. By the time of the Battle of Jutland in 1916, Agincourt was likely the sole dreadnought within the Grand Fleet lacking a Dreyer fire-control table. Later modifications included fitting a fire-control director beneath the foretop, and one turret was adapted to oversee the entire main battery during the course of the war. Between 1916 and 1917, a director for the 6-inch (152 mm) guns was installed on each side of the ship. In 1918, a high-angle rangefinder was added to the spotting top to enhance targeting capabilities.

Armour

The substantial allocation of weight to Agincourt's armament left limited capacity for protective armour. The waterline belt measured only 9 inches (229 mm) in thickness, noticeably thinner than the twelve inches or more typical of other British dreadnoughts. This belt extended approximately 365 feet (111.3 m), spanning from the forward edge of "Monday" barbette to the midpoint of "Friday" barbette. Ahead of this section, the belt tapered to six inches for roughly 50 feet (15.2 m) before further diminishing to 4 inches (102 mm) continuing forward to the bow. Towards the stern, aft of midships, the belt reduced to six inches over about 30 feet (9.1 m), then thinned again to four inches (102 mm); it ended at the rear bulkhead, not extending to the stern itself. The upper belt, six inches thick, stretched between the main and upper decks from "Monday" barbette to "Thursday" barbette. At each end of the midships armoured belts, sloping armour bulkheads three inches thick angled inward toward the terminal barbettes. Four decks on Agincourt were armoured with thicknesses ranging from 1 to 2.5 inches (25 to 64 mm).

A significant vulnerability in Agincourt's protection lay in her barbettes. Above the upper deck level, they were protected by 9 inches of armour; however, between the upper and main decks this reduced to 3 inches, and below the main deck there was no armour except for "Sunday" barbette (3 inches) and "Thursday" and "Saturday" barbettes (2 inches). The turrets themselves had armour 12 inches thick on their faces, 8 inches on their sides, and 10 inches at the rear. Roof armour measured 3 inches at the front and 2 inches at the back. Casemates housing secondary weapons were shielded by 6-inch-thick armour and further defended against raking fire by bulkheads of equal thickness.

The principal conning tower boasted 12-inch-thick sides with a roof thickness of 4 inches. The aft conning tower—also referred to as the torpedo control tower—was protected by 9-inch sides and a 3-inch roof. Communication tubes descending from these positions featured armour plating six inches thick above the upper deck and two inches thick below it. Each magazine benefited from dual armour plates on either side serving as torpedo bulkheads: one plate was one inch thick while the other measured one and a half inches.

Another drawback was Agincourt's lack of subdivision according to Royal Navy standards; this was due to Brazilian preferences favoring minimal watertight bulkheads to avoid restricting compartment sizes and maintain crew comfort. For instance, the officer's wardroom measured an expansive 85 by 60 feet (25.9 by 18.3 m), significantly larger than comparable spaces within other Grand Fleet vessels.

Wartime alterations

Following the Battle of Jutland, roughly 70 long tons (71 t) of high-strength steel was installed on the main deck to enhance protection for the magazines. Between 1917 and 1918, two 3-inch (76 mm) anti-aircraft guns were positioned on the quarterdeck. Concurrently, a 9-foot (2.7 m) rangefinder was mounted on the former searchlight platform located on the foremast. In 1918, a high-angle rangefinder was also added to the spotting top.[13]

Construction and confiscation

File:Agincourt postcard.jpg
Agincourt illustrated on a postcard before British alterations

Initially named Rio de Janeiro by her original owners, the ship was laid down on 14 September 1911 at Armstrong Whitworth’s Elswick Yard in Newcastle upon Tyne and subsequently launched on 22 January 1913.[14] After construction began, Brazil faced significant financial difficulties: a European economic downturn following the conclusion of the Second Balkan War in August 1913 diminished Brazil’s ability to secure foreign financing. Simultaneously, Brazil’s coffee and rubber exports plummeted—the latter suffering due to the loss of its monopoly in rubber production to British plantations in Southeast Asia.[15]Template:Efn-ua Additionally, intelligence regarding new dreadnought developments abroad suggested that the vessel would be outmatched once completed.[16] These circumstances led Brazil to list the ship for sale in October 1913; she was purchased by the Ottoman Navy for £2,750,000 on 28 December 1913.[17] Renamed Sultân Osmân-ı Evvel, she underwent sea trials during the July Crisis of the following year and was finalized in August as World War I commenced.[18]

The outbreak of war occurred while she was still conducting sea trials prior to delivery. Although the Ottoman crew had arrived to take possession, the British Government seized the ship for integration into the Royal Navy. The Turkish captain, accompanied by five hundred sailors aboard a transport on the River Tyne, threatened to board and raise the Turkish flag; however, First Lord of the Admiralty Winston Churchill authorized resistance "by armed force if necessary."[19] Simultaneously, Britain also appropriated another Ottoman battleship under construction by Vickers—a vessel based on the King George V class design—named Reşadiye, which was renamed HMS Erin. Although such seizures were permitted under contract only if Britain was at war at that time, Britain had not yet declared war; thus these actions were technically unlawful. Nevertheless, British authorities intended to present this as a fait accompli. On 3 August—one day before Germany’s invasion of Belgium prompted Britain’s decision to enter the conflict—the British ambassador notified the Ottoman government of Britain's seizure of these ships.[20] Churchill’s motive was to prevent these vessels from being used against British forces; however, this maneuver had significant repercussions.[21]

This confiscation generated substantial resentment within the Ottoman Empire, where public fundraising had partially financed these ships. During budgetary deadlocks concerning naval expenditures, contributions had been collected from taverns, cafés, schools, and markets throughout Ottoman society; substantial donors received a "Navy Donation Medal" as recognition. Consequently, this seizure—alongside Germany’s gifting of battlecruiser Goeben and cruiser Breslau to the Ottomans—shifted public sentiment away from Britain.[22] Although no direct evidence links this event to the Ottoman declaration of war against Britain and its allies in October 1914,[23] it is notable that early in August 1914 the Ottomans offered to transfer Sultân Osmân-ı Evvel to Germany. Historian David Fromkin has suggested that this offer was likely part of negotiations for a secret defensive pact with Germany and may have been prompted by knowledge of Britain's seizure.[24]

Before commissioning her into Royal Navy service as Agincourt, modifications were made including removal of the flying boat deck above the two central turrets. The ship originally featured Turkish-style lavatories, which were subsequently replaced.[25] The name "Agincourt" was one favored by Churchill and had initially been assigned to a sixth Queen Elizabeth class planned under the 1914–15 Naval Estimates but not yet started when war broke out.[26] The vessel earned the nickname The Gin Palace due to its opulent interiors and as a play on words derived from "A Gin Court", with pink gin being a favored beverage among Royal Navy officers at that time.[27]

Due to urgent circumstances, staffing Agincourt posed challenges for the Admiralty; her crew was assembled from diverse sources ranging from elite units such as those serving on royal yachts to personnel from detention facilities. The captain and executive officer were drawn from HMY Victoria and Albert, whose crew largely transferred aboard Agincourt on 3 August 1914. With most naval reservists already mobilized elsewhere, several minor offenders whose sentences had been commuted were recruited from naval prisons and detention centers.[28]

Service

Agincourt underwent initial trials until 7 September 1914, when she was assigned to the 4th Battle Squadron (BS) of the Grand Fleet.[29] At that time, the Grand Fleet's anchorage at Scapa Flow was still vulnerable to submarine threats, prompting much of the fleet to remain at sea; consequently, Agincourt spent forty of her first eighty days with the Grand Fleet on active patrol. This period marked the start of approximately eighteen months of inactivity, interrupted only by occasional North Sea patrols designed to lure the enemy from their bases.[30]

The 4th Battle Squadron operating in the North Sea in 1915, with Agincourt positioned second from the front.

By 1 January 1915, Agincourt remained part of the 4th BS but was reassigned to the 1st Battle Squadron prior to the Battle of Jutland on 31 May 1916. She served as the last vessel in the Sixth Division of the 1st BS, alongside Hercules, Revenge, and the flagship Marlborough—a notably diverse grouping as each belonged to a different class. This Sixth Division formed the starboardmost column of the Grand Fleet as it advanced southward to meet Admiral Beatty's Battle Cruiser Fleet, subsequently engaging their German counterparts from the High Seas Fleet in the North Sea.[31] Admiral Jellicoe, commanding the Grand Fleet, maintained a cruising formation until 18:15,Template:Efn-ua when he ordered a deployment from column into a single line based on port division, each vessel turning sequentially by 90°. This maneuver placed the Sixth Division closest to the High Seas Fleet’s battleships, which concentrated their fire on these ships as they executed their turns to port. The British later referred to this intense exchange as "Windy Corner," where despite being drenched by German shell splashes, none of the ships sustained hits.[32]

Agincourt pictured in 1918

At 18:24, Agincourt commenced firing her main battery at a German battlecruiser. Soon after, her six-inch guns engaged as German destroyers launched torpedo attacks aimed at protecting their fleet’s southern turn.[33] She successfully dodged two torpedoes; however, Marlborough was struck by one.[34] Visibility improved around 19:15, allowing Agincourt to engage a Kaiser-class battleship, though without scoring hits before it vanished into smoke and haze.[35] Approximately at 20:00, Marlborough had to reduce speed due to bulkhead damage from her torpedo hit; her division followed suit.[36] During poor visibility that night, the division lost contact with the Grand Fleet and passed near the heavily damaged battlecruiser SMS Seydlitz without opening fire.[37] At dawn only debris from the previous day's combat was visible; the division returned to Scapa Flow on 2 June.[38] Throughout this engagement, Agincourt fired a total of 144 twelve-inch shells and 111 six-inch shells but is not credited with any confirmed hits.[29]

The two Ottoman vessels seized in 1918: Agincourt (foreground) alongside Erin

Though the Grand Fleet conducted several operations in subsequent years, records do not confirm whether Agincourt took part. On 23 April 1918, she and Hercules were stationed at Scapa Flow to safeguard Scandinavian convoys between Norway and Britain when the High Seas Fleet attempted an interception. Due to inaccurate German intelligence timing—the inbound and outbound convoys were docked when German forces reached their usual route—Admiral Reinhard Scheer ordered a withdrawal without encountering British vessels.[39]

Subsequently transferred to the 2nd Battle Squadron,[29] Agincourt was present at the surrender of the High Seas Fleet on 21 November 1918.[40] She entered reserve status at Rosyth in March 1919. After failed negotiations to sell her to Brazil, she was slated for disposal in April 1921 but was instead utilized for experimental purposes later that year.[13] The Royal Navy then considered converting her into a mobile naval base; she was recommissioned on 21 November[41] for this purpose. The proposed conversion entailed removing five of her seven turrets and repurposing their barbettes into storage spaces and workshops while retaining Nos. 2 and 5 turrets.[42] However, this plan was abandoned on 23 February 1922 following ratification of the Washington Naval Treaty, which imposed limits on battleship tonnage for the Royal Navy; she was decommissioned again on 7 April and re-listed for disposal.[41]

On 22 January 1923, she was sold for £25,000 to J&W Purves under conditions requiring demolition within eighteen months after treaty ratification. The contract was promptly transferred to Rosyth Shipbreaking Co., which leased facilities at Rosyth Dockyard for dismantling operations. As the deadline of 17 January 1925 approached without full compliance with scrapping requirements, Admiralty consented to severing her hull amidships as an acceptable solution. An attempt was made during a high Spring Tide to move both halves through dockyard locks toward their beaching site for final demolition but adverse weather prevented success. Subsequently, permission was granted to utilize one of Rosyth's dry docks so that compliance could be achieved on time. Within two days both hull sections had been cut free and floated out for beaching.[43]

Notes

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Footnotes

  1. ↑ Grant, p. 148; Livermore, p. 32; Topliss, p. 240
  2. ↑ Scheina, pp. 45–52
  3. ↑ 3.0 3.1 Livermore, p. 32
  4. ↑ Preston, p. 403; Livermore, p. 32
  5. ↑ Cite error: Invalid <ref> tag; no text was provided for refs named gg3
  6. ↑ Scheina, p. 80
  7. ↑ Scheina, p. 80; Preston, p. 403; Topliss, p. 240
  8. ↑ Hough, p. 22; Livermore, pp. 39–41
  9. ↑ Topliss, pp. 247–249
  10. ↑ Scheina, pp. 81–82; Topliss, p. 269; Martin, p. 37
  11. ↑ Hermes Rodrigues da Fonseca, 3 May 1911, in Scheina, p. 354
  12. ↑ Topliss, p. 280
  13. ↑ 13.0 13.1 Cite error: Invalid <ref> tag; no text was provided for refs named b50
  14. ↑ Cite error: Invalid <ref> tag; no text was provided for refs named b45
  15. ↑ Martin, pp. 36–37
  16. ↑ Vanterpool, p. 140
  17. ↑ Hough, pp. 72, 75
  18. ↑ Hough, pp. 109–122
  19. ↑ Tuchman, Barbara Wertheim (1962). "Chapter Ten: Goeben ... An Enemy Then Flying". The Guns of August. New York: Ballantine Books (Random House). ISBN 978-0-307-56762-8. {{cite book}}: ISBN / Date incompatibility (help)
  20. ↑ Fromkin, pp. 57–58
  21. ↑ Hough, p. 121
  22. ↑ Hough, pp. 143–144
  23. ↑ Fromkin, pp. 68–72
  24. ↑ Fromkin, pp. 58–61
  25. ↑ Hough, pp. 152–153
  26. ↑ Parkes, p. 600
  27. ↑ Hough, p. 147
  28. ↑ Hough, pp. 148–152
  29. ↑ 29.0 29.1 29.2 Parkes, p. 605
  30. ↑ Hough, p. 161
  31. ↑ Hough, p. 174
  32. ↑ Hough, p. 179
  33. ↑ Tarrant, pp. 131, 133
  34. ↑ Massie, p. 630
  35. ↑ Hough, p. 183
  36. ↑ Burt, p. 206
  37. ↑ Massie, p. 651
  38. ↑ Hough, pp. 184–185
  39. ↑ Newbolt, pp. 236–237
  40. ↑ Hough, p. 186
  41. ↑ 41.0 41.1 Dodson 2021, p. 196
  42. ↑ Harner, p. 152
  43. ↑ Dodson 2022, pp. 219–224

Bibliography

  • Parkes, Oscar (1990) [1966]. British Battleships, Warrior 1860 to Vanguard 1950: A History of Design, Construction, and Armament (New & rev. ed.). Annapolis, Maryland: Naval Institute Press. ISBN 1-55750-075-4.
  • Preston, Antony (1985). "Great Britain and Empire Forces". In Gardiner, Robert & Gray, Randal (eds.). Conway's All the World's Fighting Ships 1906–1921. Annapolis, Maryland: Naval Institute Press. pp. 1–104. ISBN 0-85177-245-5.
  • Scheina, Robert (1987). Latin America: A Naval History, 1810–1987. Annapolis, Maryland: Naval Institute Press. ISBN 0-87021-295-8.
  • Tarrant, V. E. (1999) [1995]. Jutland: The German Perspective: A New View of the Great Battle, 31 May 1916. London: Brockhampton Press. ISBN 1-86019-917-8.
  • Topliss, David (1988). "The Brazilian Dreadnoughts, 1904–1914". Warship International. XXV (3): 240–289. ISSN 0043-0374.
  • Vanterpool, Alan (1969). "The Riachuelo". Warship International. VI (2): 140–141. ISSN 0043-0374.

External links

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