Hinkley Point C nuclear power station
| Company type | Nuclear power facility |
|---|---|
| Industry | Energy, Nuclear power |
| Founded | March 1, 2017 |
| Headquarters | Somerset , England, United Kingdom |
Area served | United Kingdom |
Key people | EDF Energy (74.9% owner), China General Nuclear Power Group (25.1% owner) |
| Products | Electricity generation (3,200 MWe capacity) |
| Parent | EDF Energy, China General Nuclear Power Group |
Hinkley Point C nuclear power facility (HPC) is an under-construction nuclear power plant in Somerset, England, comprising two EPR reactor units with a combined capacity of 3,200MWe.
The UK government identified Hinkley as one of eight potential nuclear sites in 2010, and the project secured its nuclear site licence by November 2012.
EDF’s board gave the green light to the development in July 2016, followed by UK government approval two months later, which included financial safeguards for the investment. The ownership structure consists of EDF Energy holding a 74.9% stake and China General Nuclear Power Group owning 25.1%. Initial cost projections stood at £18 billion based on 2015 values.
Construction commenced in March 2017, with an original completion target set for 2025. However, the timeline has been extended due to various setbacks such as the COVID-19 pandemic and Brexit, resulting in considerable budget increases. According to EDF’s 2022 financial disclosures, the cost estimate rose to between £31 billion and £32 billion (2023 prices), with Unit 1 anticipated to be operational by June 2027 but potentially delayed by up to 15 months.
In January 2024, EDF revised the final cost forecast to range from £31 billion to £35 billion in 2015 prices (excluding interim interest), equivalent to approximately £41.6 billion to £47.9 billion when adjusted to 2024 values. The expected commissioning window for Unit 1 has shifted to between 2029 and 2031.
The facility will incorporate two PWR units supplied by Framatome, each designed for an output of 1,630 MW, culminating in a total capacity of 3,260 MW.
1980s & 1990s
In 1981, plans for expanding nuclear power in the UK prompted the creation of the Alliance against Hinkley C, which opposed establishing a new reactor at Hinkley Point. By August 1982, official proposals for Hinkley C were announced. The Alliance actively disseminated newsletters promoting renewable energy investment and raising environmental concerns.
The group rebranded as the Stop Hinkley Expansion Campaign (SHE) in 1986, receiving support from Greenpeace and led by activist Danielle Grünberg alongside journalist Crispin Aubrey. SHE invested over £50,000 in opposition efforts and took part in a public inquiry lasting from 1988 to 1989 that featured testimony from more than 600 witnesses and documented around 22,000 objections.
Despite resistance, Queen’s Counsel Michael Barnes recommended proceeding with construction in 1990 but postponed action pending a comprehensive review of UK nuclear policy scheduled for 1994. SHE persisted in advocating for wind and wave energy development alternatives. Ultimately, plans for Hinkley C and other new nuclear facilities were abandoned in 1995.
2000s
A UK government white paper published in January 2008 endorsed the development of a new generation of nuclear power stations. Hinkley Point C and Sizewell C were projected to supply roughly 13% of Britain’s electricity by the early 2020s. Areva estimated that their European Pressurised Reactor (EPR) design could produce electricity competitively at approximately £24 per MWh.
At this time, Électricité de France (EDF), majority-owned (85%) by the French state, acquired British Energy for £12.4 billion in February 2009, incorporating its nuclear assets into EDF Energy. This deal included a partnership with UK utility Centrica, which obtained a 20% shareholding in EDF Energy Nuclear Generation Ltd along with an option to participate in EDF’s UK new nuclear build initiatives.
In September 2008, EDF announced intentions to build a third twin-unit EPR station at Hinkley Point alongside the existing Magnox Hinkley Point A (now closed) and the Advanced Gas-cooled Reactor (AGR) Hinkley Point B facility slated for closure in 2023.
2010s
On 18 October 2010, the UK government designated Hinkley Point—home to the decommissioned Hinkley Point A and the operational Hinkley Point B—as one of eight potential sites for new nuclear facilities. The Development Consent Order application was submitted by NNB Generation Company, an EDF subsidiary, on 31 October 2011.
In February 2013, Centrica exited the project, citing escalating costs and prolonged schedules caused by safety enhancements implemented after the Fukushima disaster. The Development Consent Order was published in March 2013. Concerns were voiced by MPs and academics regarding the negotiation process between EDF and the Department of Energy and Climate Change, leading to calls for a National Audit Office investigation.
The government reached an agreement in October 2013 on a contract for difference for Hinkley Point C’s electricity, setting a strike price of £89.50 per MWh, aiming for completion in 2023 with an operational lifespan of 60 years. In December 2013, the European Commission initiated an inquiry into possible state aid breaches linked to the project’s subsidies, with reports suggesting the UK’s plan might constitute unlawful state aid. EU Competition Commissioner Joaquín Almunia described the arrangement as “a complex measure of unprecedented nature and scale,” noting no legal deadline for concluding the investigation. Preliminary findings released in January 2014 suggested probable illegal state aid, prompting a formal investigation. Despite legal doubts, financing was approved by the European Commission ten months later.
In March 2014, Ireland’s National Trust (An Taisce) was granted permission by the Court of Appeal to contest the development consent decision, citing insufficient transboundary environmental consultation under EU law. Nevertheless, in July 2014, the Court dismissed this challenge, ruling that the risk of nuclear accidents was too low to justify further measures. Subsequently, the UN urged the UK to improve cross-border consultation procedures.
By September 2014, leaked documents revealed progress towards EU approval, which was officially granted in October 2014 with minimal opposition among commissioners. The European Commission modified profit-sharing arrangements to increase benefits for UK taxpayers.
Austria lodged a legal challenge against state subsidies in June 2015; however, this complaint was dismissed by the court in September 2020.
In September 2015, EDF conceded that Hinkley Point C would miss its original 2023 completion target. Plans to involve Areva and other investors were abandoned to accelerate progress with EDF and Chinese partners as principal investors. Reports attributed part of the high costs for UK nuclear projects to privatization.
By February 2016, EDF postponed its final investment decision pending financial confirmation from CGN amid a sharp decline in EDF’s net profits and share value; construction was not anticipated to commence before 2019.
In June 2016, EDF executives recommended deferring Hinkley Point C due to unresolved challenges including elevated debt levels; final investment approval was delayed until September.
On 28 July 2016, EDF’s board narrowly approved the project; dissenting director Gérard Magnin resigned prior to voting. The UK government deferred its decision until autumn to evaluate national security concerns.
China’s ambassador Liu Xiaoming emphasized in August 2016 that Hinkley Point C was vital for UK energy security and underscored strong China-UK collaboration through China General Nuclear Power Corporation (CGN). Reports indicated government officials considered exit strategies from contracts without significant losses, although China resisted renegotiation. The approval of Hinkley was deliberated alongside potential postponements of the Bradwell reactor project.
Following review in September 2016, the UK government granted final consent with new protective measures.
In February 2017, the UN recommended halting construction until transboundary environmental consultations were completed.
By July 2017, projected construction expenses had escalated to £20.3 billion due to delays pushing the start date between 2025 and 2027.
2020s
In January 2021, the projected construction expenses were updated to approximately £22–23 billion in 2015 currency values, with work anticipated to commence in June 2026.
By May 2022, additional postponements and budget escalations raised the estimate to between £25 and £26 billion (2015 prices), although costs related to electromechanical installations and final testing had yet to be reassessed. In July 2022, EDF suggested a possible extension of the timeline to September 2028.
On 13 September 2022, a fatal traffic incident occurred onsite involving a construction worker.
In January 2024, EDF presented three potential completion timelines: starting in 2029 with an estimated cost of £31 billion (2015 prices, equivalent to £41.6 billion in 2024), initiating in 2030 at £34 billion (2015 prices, or £46.5 billion in 2024 terms), or commencing in 2031 with a budget of £35 billion (2015 prices, translating to £47.9 billion in 2024).
Construction work
Preparatory enabling activities began in July 2008, including site surveys and parking facilities development. In 2012, EDF purchased the Manor of Sydenham property near Bridgwater, formerly the location of a British Cellophane plant, which also included a Grade II listed structure.
By 2014, roughly 400 personnel were engaged in establishing infrastructure such as access roads, roundabouts, park-and-ride services for staff, as well as initial plans for a sea wall and jetty intended to facilitate material deliveries.
In 2015, the factory grounds were cleared to accommodate temporary housing for up to 1,000 workers.
Since 2016, Somerset Passenger Solutions (SPS)—a collaboration between FirstGroup’s The Buses of Somerset and Southern National—has managed transportation for construction employees using up to 160 buses during peak periods. In September 2016, forecasts indicated that if construction proceeded immediately, operation could begin by 2025.
After receiving approval from the Office for Nuclear Regulation in March 2017, EDF initiated significant construction phases including excavation for tunnels housing cables and pipes, as well as building the jetty, seawall, and accommodation facilities.
By January 2018, EDF targeted electricity production commencement by 2025 and planned to start above-ground construction by June 2019.
The initial reactor’s base concrete was poured starting on 11 December 2018; this involved laying a platform weighing approximately 4,500 tonnes over a span of 30 hours—representing the UK's first new reactor foundation in thirty years and only the second pressurized water reactor after Sizewell B.
Completion of the first reactor’s base occurred in June 2019 using around 8,954 cubic meters of concrete; the second reactor base followed suit in June 2020 with nearly 8,991 cubic meters utilized.
The project employs the Sarens SGC-250 double ring crane—nicknamed "Big Carl"—the largest crane globally, tasked with installing over 600 heavy components including steel containment liners and dome sections. This crane was transported in more than 400 modular parts.
In February 2023, the inaugural nuclear reactor pressure vessel manufactured by Framatome in France arrived at Combwich wharf on the Bristol Channel.
By May 2024, the first of two steam generators weighing approximately 520 tonnes each was delivered via the same route as the pressure vessel.
Schedule
| Key | Completed On Time | Work In Progress | Completed With Delay |
| Package | Unit 1 | Unit 2 | Common |
|---|---|---|---|
| Sea Water Cooling Pipes Install (CRF) | Dec 2017 | ||
| Sea Wall | March 2018 - December 2018 | ||
| Nuclear Island Common Raft | June 2019 (J0) | June 2020 (J0) | |
| Cooling Water Tunnel Boring | Sept 2019 | ||
| Generation | 2029 | 2030 |
Permits and licences
In November 2012, the UK's Office for Nuclear Regulation (ONR) granted a nuclear site licence to NNB Generation Company, an EDF Energy subsidiary. This marked the first issuance of such a licence in the UK since 1987. By March 2013, three environmental permits had been obtained and planning permission secured; however, construction commencement was contingent upon finalizing the electricity pricing agreement.
During 2013, EDF engaged in negotiations with the Department of Energy and Climate Change to establish a guaranteed electricity price approximately twice the prevailing UK rates. The project supports the UK’s objective to reduce greenhouse gas emissions by 50% by the mid-2020s, contributing alongside Hinkley Point C and other nuclear facilities. By that time, EDF had invested close to £1 billion in preparing the site. Once operational, the plant is projected to generate about 7% of the UK’s electricity demand.
In 2013, Welsh government officials authorized EDF’s plan to dispose of construction sediment near Cardiff Bay. Although marine pollution specialists expressed concerns, a Welsh Government panel in 2021 determined that radiation exposure risks remained below regulatory limits.
A significant step occurred in October 2013 when the government approved a strike price deal for electricity from the plant, advancing the project’s development. By September 2016, a contract for difference with EDF was confirmed by the government, incorporating enhanced protections concerning foreign investment in critical infrastructure.
On 28 March 2017, ONR granted approval for initial construction work related to Hinkley Point C’s nuclear safety structures. Subsequently, in March 2019, the Environment Agency initiated a consultation process on an environmental permit application submitted by NNB Generation Company (HPC) Limited for the power station.
Cost to consumers
| Component | £/MWh | Percentage of total price |
|---|---|---|
| Premium for construction risk | 35 | 38% |
| Additional financing expenses | 26 | 29% |
| Operation and maintenance costs | 19.5 | 21% |
| Capital expenditure | 11 | 12% |
| Total electricity cost | 92.5 |
In 2006, Areva, designer of the EPR reactor, projected electricity generation costs at £24 per MWh.
EDF secured a government-backed Contract for difference (CfD) guaranteeing a fixed strike price of £92.50 per MWh (in 2012 prices) for Hinkley Point C electricity, indexed for inflation—equivalent to £128/MWh in 2022—over a tariff period of 35 years commencing at operation. This initial strike price could decrease to £89.50/MWh if Sizewell C receives approval.
In 2022, EDF sought amendments to the contract to maintain eligibility for the full 35-year tariff should full operation begin after May 2029, attributing delays to COVID-19 as a force majeure circumstance impacting schedules.
The National Audit Office highlighted that declining energy prices substantially raised anticipated consumer costs for CfD top-up payments—from £6.1 billion in 2013 to £29.7 billion in 2016, escalating further to £50 billion by mid-2017—exceeding eight times the original estimate.
Criticism
According to research conducted by Imperial College Business School, the construction of new nuclear power facilities in the UK is unlikely without direct government support. Even some advocates for nuclear energy have expressed concerns over the 'strike price' set for Hinkley Point C, deeming it excessively high.
In December 2013, Jim Ratcliffe, CEO of Ineos, highlighted that nuclear electricity in France was purchased at £37.94 (€45) per MWh, warning that Hinkley Point C’s £95 per MWh strike price would be unattractive for industrial consumers. Similarly, the chairman of Voimaosakeyhtiö SF described the strike price as 'very high,' stressing that Fennovoima’s Hanhikivi Nuclear Power Plant would proceed without reliance on subsidies.
A 2014 study by Agora Energiewende revealed that new wind and solar power generation could be up to 50% less expensive than nuclear projects like Hinkley Point C, based on Germany’s feed-in tariffs compared to Hinkley’s strike price. This analysis did not factor in grid upgrade expenses or anticipated future reductions in renewable energy costs. By 2023, Germany’s average day-ahead auction prices hovered around 95 €/MWh.
In 2016, Third Generation Environmentalism (E3G) suggested five economically viable alternatives to Hinkley Point C for the UK: enhanced energy efficiency measures (which would reduce demand beyond Hinkley’s output), lower-cost onshore and offshore wind power, increasingly cost-effective solar energy, interconnectors linking Norway, Denmark, and France, and cost savings achieved through improved storage technologies and smart grid flexibility.
In August 2016, Henrik Poulsen, CEO of Danish company DONG Energy, argued that accelerating offshore wind projects in the UK could fulfill energy requirements at a lower cost than Hinkley’s strike price—projected at £85/MWh initially and expected to drop to £80/MWh by the mid-2020s. On 10 August 2016, The Daily Telegraph reported that advancements in energy storage technologies diminish the necessity for baseload power plants like Hinkley Point C, noting nuclear reactors’ limited ability to adjust output dynamically.
On 26 August 2016, the Energy and Climate Intelligence Unit indicated that combining wind farms, interconnectors, gas-fired power stations, and demand-side management could allow the UK to save approximately £1 billion annually while achieving climate objectives without relying on Hinkley Point C.
On 12 October 2017, The Guardian reported findings from researchers at University of Sussex’s Science Policy Research Unit who stated that the UK government used Hinkley Point C to subsidize military nuclear infrastructure by preserving nuclear expertise. They argued that without civilian nuclear projects, military nuclear costs would escalate considerably.
In 2020, EDF announced that Hinkley Point C had generated 10,300 jobs, contributed £1.67 billion in local business expenditure, and invested £119 million in community initiatives.
Return on equity
In October 2013, an analyst from Liberium Capital described the strike price as "economically insane," predicting that Hinkley Point would become the most expensive power station globally and that EDF might achieve a Return on Equity (ROE) exceeding 20%, potentially reaching as high as 35%. The analyst criticized the UK Government for binding future consumers to these financial obligations.
A March 2014 report by Policy Connect estimated an ROE between 19% and 21%, suggesting either EDF faces higher risks justifying this return or that negotiation efforts failed to sufficiently lower expected returns relative to risk. The European Commission was skeptical of the former explanation given established risk allocations.
On 8 October 2014, the European Commission amended the "gain-share mechanism," increasing the share of profits above a 13.5% return allocated to UK taxpayers from 50% to 60%, thereby improving public returns from surplus project earnings.
Professor Dieter Helm of Oxford Energy Policy noted that if Hinkley Point C had been financed through government borrowing at a 2% interest rate rather than EDF’s capital cost of 9%, project costs would have been approximately halved.
By July 2017, EDF acknowledged a £2.2 billion increase in costs would reduce its expected project return from 9% to 8.2%. Further overruns reported in September 2019 were projected to decrease EDF Energy's internal rate of return to between 7.6% and 7.8%.
Financing
EDF's initial construction cost projection in 2012 stood at £16 billion, which rose to £18 billion by 2015 and further escalated to a range between £19.6 billion and £20.3 billion by mid-2017. The European Commission estimated the total expenditure, including financing during construction, to be approximately £24.5 billion. EDF is the primary financier, with the Chinese state-owned company CGN contributing £6 billion for a one-third ownership share. EDF also contemplated divesting an additional 15% stake. In September 2015, the UK government provided a guarantee of an extra £2 billion to support financing.
By May 2016, CNNC indicated it would hold a combined Chinese stake of 33.5% alongside CGN, though the precise distribution between the two entities remained undecided. Early in 2016, EDF CEO Jean Bernard Lévy disclosed a 68% decline in profits and a reduction in dividends, postponing the final investment decision until financial arrangements were finalized. EDF encountered difficulties in asset sales amid depressed share prices, which contributed to CFO Thomas Piquemal’s resignation over disagreements on the timing of the investment commitment.
In April 2016, EDF aimed to raise €4 billion through issuing new shares to finance construction costs; the French government pledged €3 billion and chose to receive scrip dividends in both 2016 and 2017. Regulatory uncertainties linked to the Flamanville 3 EPR reactor posed risks to British loan guarantees contingent on its timely commissioning.
In 2020, France’s financial regulator imposed a €5 million fine on EDF for providing misleading information about Hinkley Point C’s costs in 2014; the then-CEO was also fined €50,000. By December 2023, following nationalisation, EDF remained the sole private guarantor of the project, with CGN’s financial exposure capped since 2016. The original estimate of £18 billion had increased substantially, likely surpassing £32.7 billion when adjusted to 2015 prices.
As of January 2024, EDF forecasted total expenses between £31 and £35 billion (2015 prices), equivalent to £41.6–47.9 billion in 2024 values, with Unit 1 expected to become operational between 2029 and 2031. Delays were attributed to slower-than-anticipated civil engineering progress, inflationary pressures, shortages of labor and materials, as well as disruptions caused by Covid-19 and Brexit.
By February 2025, EDF had not secured new investors to replace additional funding from CGN and was absorbing extra costs independently. The project’s value was written down by €12.9 billion in the 2023 financial statements plus an additional €1.1 billion due to inflation adjustments. In June 2025, US-based asset manager Apollo provided £4.5 billion in investment-grade debt financing at an interest rate below 7%; EDF’s UK subsidiary held €6.7 billion in debt as of March.
EPR
EDF is constructing two EPR reactors designed by Areva in the United Kingdom, each with a net electrical output of 1,600 MWe (gross output of 1,630 MWe). Globally, four EPR reactors are operational: two units at China’s Taishan Nuclear Power Plant, one at Finland’s Olkiluoto Nuclear Power Plant, and another at France’s Flamanville Nuclear Power Plant. The Hinkley Point C design includes approximately 20% more equipment than Taishan’s reactors and features redesigned safety buildings. In 2019, HPC’s technical director described it as essentially a first-of-its-kind facility for the UK, which has not constructed new nuclear plants for thirty years.
In 2007, the Union of Concerned Scientists identified the EPR as the only new reactor model potentially offering enhanced safety and security compared to existing designs. Both French and German governments mandated Areva to engineer safety systems and spent fuel storage capable of withstanding military aircraft impacts. The EPR features double-walled containment structures that provide improved resistance against accidents and sabotage relative to conventional single-walled designs.
EDF and Areva have encountered significant delays and budget overruns on EPR projects at Flamanville (France) and Olkiluoto (Finland). Critics such as George Monbiot have argued that Hinkley Point C’s design is outdated when compared with emerging technologies like integral fast reactors and liquid fluoride thorium reactors. In 2015, France announced plans for a comprehensive restructuring of its state-controlled nuclear sector.
In June 2016, the Fédération Nationale des Cadres Supérieurs brought attention to several EPR design concerns: potential denial of safety approval by France’s ASN for Flamanville due to detected anomalies; similar defects possibly affecting Taishan Unit 1; discovery of falsified components from Areva’s Le Creusot facility jeopardizing safety verifications; and ongoing multibillion-euro legal disputes between Areva and Finnish utility TVO over Olkiluoto delays.
In that same year, EDF board members Thomas Piquemal and Gérard Magnin resigned citing worries about project risks. Nonetheless, EDF Project Manager Chris Bakken expressed confidence that lessons learned from previous EPR challenges encountered in Finland and France would prevent repetition of similar issues at Hinkley Point C.
Comparison with A and B
| Hinkley Point C | Hinkley Point B | Hinkley Point A | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Construction Commencement Year | 2018 | 1967 | 1957 |
| Start of Commercial Operation | 1976 | 1964 | |
| Estimated Cost | £22–£23 billion | Approximately £140 million | |
| Main Site Area | 174 hectares (430 acres) | 8.1 hectares (20 acres) | 16.2 hectares (40 acres) |
| Thermal Efficiency | 41.4% | 26% | |
| Reactor Specifications | |||
| Type of Reactor | EPR | AGR | Magnox |
| Global Reactor Identifier Number | 43 | 19 | |
| Fuel Characteristics | |||
| Fuel Material | Uranium dioxide with slight enrichment | Ceramic uranium oxide, slightly enriched | Natural Uranium metal |
| Level of Enrichment | Up to 5% | 2.2% to 2.7% | |
| Fuel Channel Count | style="text-align:center;">241 | style="text-align:center;">308 | style="text-align:center;">4,500 |
| Turbine Details | |||
| Main Turbine Output Capacity | style="text-align:center;">2 × 1,600 MW = 3,200 MW | style="text-align:center;">2 × 660 MW = 1,250 MW | style="text-align:center;">6 × 93.5 MW = 500 MW |
| Rotational Speed of Turbines | style="text-align:center;">Approximately 1,500 rpm | style="text-align:center;">3,000 rpm | |
| Cooling Water Parameters | |||
| Water Temperature Increase | style="text-align:center;">About 11 °C | style="text-align:center;">9 °C | style="text-align:center;"> |
Criticism and organised opposition
The campaign group Stop Hinkley actively advocates for shutting down Hinkley Point B and resists further development at the Hinkley Point location as well as other sites within the Bristol Channel and Severn Estuary regions. Their primary concern centers on the prolonged storage of nuclear waste on-site, which could persist for decades until a permanent disposal solution is established. Despite opposing EDF's 2008 bid to acquire British Energy, the group acknowledges that local resistance is not unanimous.
In October 2011, more than 200 demonstrators staged a blockade at Hinkley Point to contest EDF Energy's proposal for two additional reactors. Subsequently, in February 2012, activists established a camp on the future Hinkley Point C site, protesting against preparatory work sanctioned before formal planning approval and raising alarms about potential threats to a nearby nature reserve. On 10 March 2012, coinciding with the anniversary of the Fukushima disaster, approximately 200 protesters formed a human chain encircling the site to express opposition to new nuclear developments and governmental expansion initiatives.
On 8 October 2012, the Stop New Nuclear Alliance coordinated a large-scale trespass event at the Hinkley C location; eight individuals were detained primarily on charges related to cutting fences. A related demonstration and rally occurred in Bridgwater, close by.
In Germany, renewable energy company Elektrizitätswerke Schönau (EWS) lodged an official complaint in November 2014 challenging the European Commission’s approval of the project, alleging that it constituted illegal state aid under Article 107 TFEU by distorting competition. EWS also initiated an online petition that had amassed roughly 168,000 signatures by mid-2015.
In 2015, political advisor Nick Timothy criticized UK government officials for permitting Chinese involvement in the sensitive Hinkley Point C project. He cautioned about national security vulnerabilities posed by potential backdoors within nuclear reactor control systems that might disrupt the UK’s energy supply.
The National Audit Office of the UK published a report in June 2017 concluding that government commitments had locked consumers and taxpayers into a costly and high-risk agreement amid an evolving energy market landscape, with ambiguous value for money.
By March 2018, the UK nuclear regulatory authority expressed concerns regarding EDF Energy’s management frameworks at Hinkley Point C, identifying deficiencies requiring enhancement to maintain safety standards.
Additional apprehensions have been voiced about China General Nuclear Power Group (CGN), an investor blacklisted by the US Department of Commerce for attempting to acquire advanced US nuclear technology intended for military applications. As of July 2021, over one hundred Chinese engineers—approximately fifty working on-site—were engaged in constructing Hinkley Point C, drawing on experience from China’s Taishan Nuclear Power Plant EPR reactors.
The project became a political topic during France's 2017 presidential election: Marine Le Pen opposed it due to concerns over resource diversion from EDF, whereas Emmanuel Macron supported it as a strategy to rejuvenate EDF’s financial position.
In 2021, the Welsh Government's Hinkley Point C Stakeholder Reference Group evaluated potential impacts of cooling water pumping on fish populations. Although a study by CEFAS determined no negative effects on designated sites without employing an Acoustic Fish Deterrent (AFD), Dr Peter Henderson estimated that approximately 182 million fish are likely captured annually by cooling water intake screens, resulting in significant mortality rates.
Timeline
- In March 2008, the UK government (Brown ministry) and France (under President Nicolas Sarkozy) announced an agreement to construct new nuclear power facilities.
- Initial preparatory construction activities commenced shortly thereafter.
- By September 2008, EDF completed the acquisition of British Energy.
- In May 2009, Centrica entered into a joint venture with EDF targeting nuclear projects within the UK.
- October 2010 saw Hinkley Point chosen as one of eight potential sites by the UK government (Cameron–Clegg coalition).
- The regulatory review process was postponed in April 2011 due to the impact of the Fukushima disaster.
- In October 2011, NNB Generation Company submitted an application for development consent.
- EDF was granted a nuclear site licence in November 2012.
- By February 2013, Centrica withdrew from its joint venture with EDF.
- EDF obtained development consent from the Department of Energy and Climate Change in March 2013.
- In October 2013, the government and EDF finalized an agreement on the Hinkley Point C "strike price".
- On 8 October 2014, the European Commission approved State aid for Hinkley Point C.
- EDF announced in September 2015 a delay in project completion beyond 2023 and deferred its final investment decision.
- The UK government declared a £2 billion loan guarantee for the project on 21 September 2015.
- China General Nuclear (CGN) committed to invest £6 billion on 21 October 2015.
- In February 2016, EDF postponed its final investment decision as financing arrangements with CGN remained unresolved.
- On 28 July 2016, EDF proceeded with its final investment decision; Theresa May’s administration indicated forthcoming approval.
- Legal action challenging project approval was initiated by EDF board staff representatives on 31 August 2016.
- Formal approval of Hinkley Point C by the UK government occurred on 15 September 2016 following a revised agreement with EDF.
- The Office for Nuclear Regulation granted construction consent on 27 March 2017.
- On 3 July 2017, EDF projected total costs rising to between £19.6 billion and £20.3 billion; the government assigned responsibility for cost overruns to contractors.
- EDF announced a possible £2.9 billion cost increase on 25 September 2019, potentially pushing total expenses beyond £22 billion.
- Completion of Unit 2’s reactor base by 1 June 2020 outpaced Unit 1 due to replicated design efficiencies; steel installation increased by 45%, liner floor construction advanced by 30%, and cooling system installation rose by 50%.
- Despite COVID-19 constraints, lifting of Unit 2’s liner cup finished on 14 September 2020, achieving a pace 30% faster than prior efforts.
- The world’s largest crane installed a dome measuring 47 metres wide on the first reactor building on 15 December 2023.
- On 8 February 2024, National Grid completed over four million man-hours upgrading grid infrastructure around HPC and delivered a massive 174-tonne supergrid transformer to Bridgwater substation in Somerset.
- The final containment vessel liner ring for Unit 2 was installed on 14 October 2024.
- Reactor pressure vessel placement in Unit 1 occurred on 3 December 2024.
- The second reactor building’s dome was installed by the world’s largest crane on 17 July 2025.
1980s PWR proposal
During the 1980s, the Central Electricity Generating Board (CEGB) proposed constructing a Hinkley Point C power station as a counterpart to Sizewell B, utilizing an identical pressurised water reactor design at an estimated cost of £1.7 billion. Although planning permission was secured in 1990 following a public inquiry, this initiative was discontinued in the early part of the decade due to economic impracticalities arising from industry privatisation and the cessation of low-interest government funding.
See also
- Moorside clean energy hub
- Energy policy of the United Kingdom
- Energy use and conservation in the United Kingdom
- Nuclear power in the United Kingdom
- Proposed nuclear power stations in the United Kingdom
- T-pylons – transmission structures connecting to Hinkley Point C nuclear facility