Jump to content

Indian Airlines Flight 605

From Alfawiki
Indian Airlines
IndustryAirline
Founded1953
Headquarters
Mumbai
,
India
ProductsAir transport services

Indian Airlines Flight 605 was a domestic passenger service operating between Bombay and Bangalore. On 14 February 1990, the Airbus A320-231 bearing registration VT-EPN crashed onto a golf course while attempting to land at Bangalore airport, resulting in the deaths of 92 out of the 146 people onboard.

The official Indian inquiry determined that the accident likely stemmed from the flight crew selecting the "Open descent/flight idle" mode instead of engaging "Glideslope capture," which caused the aircraft to descend beneath the correct approach path. Despite receiving radio altitude alerts, the pilots neither advanced the throttles nor initiated a go-around, reflecting a delayed recognition of the situation during final approach.

In response to the tragedy, the Directorate General of Civil Aviation (DGCA) issued 62 recommendations. These included implementing time-stamping for air traffic control recordings, establishing dedicated investigative teams, installing crash alert sirens in Bangalore, reviewing Airbus evacuation procedures, redesigning cockpit instrument controls, and conducting a nationwide evaluation of airport safety standards.

The Indian Commercial Pilots' Association criticized the complexity of the Airbus A320’s systems, suggesting this contributed to crew difficulties in handling the emergency. A similar Airbus A320 accident occurring less than two years later led to modifications in flight control units and broader safety improvements.

Aircraft

The aircraft involved was an Airbus A320-231 with registration VT-EPN and serial number 79, approximately five months old at the time. It had logged about 370 flight hours over 302 flights and was equipped with two IAE V2500-A1 engines.

Departure and approach

Flight 605 took off from Bombay Airport at 11:58 local time after experiencing a one-hour delay. Earlier that day, it had completed two flights between Bombay and Goa. Onboard were 139 passengers and seven crew members, including four infants. The planned route followed airway W17 from Bombay to Belgaum via Karad, then airway W56 from Belgaum to Bangalore. The takeoff and en route segments proceeded without incident.

At 12:53 local time, Flight 605 appeared on Bangalore’s radar and was instructed to execute a right turn for a visual approach to Runway 09. The pilots disengaged autopilot and switched radio communications to Bangalore Tower.

Accident

During landing, the aircraft descended well below the glideslope; its landing gear first contacted terrain belonging to the Karnataka Golf Association approximately 2,800 feet short of the runway threshold. Initially, passengers and some crew believed a normal landing had occurred. The plane then bounced and struck the ground again, causing seat belts to fail and occupants to be thrown forward. Subsequently, it collided with a 12-foot embankment which tore off engines and landing gear before flying over a road and crashing into a grassy, rocky area near the airport perimeter.

Emergency response

A fire erupted immediately after impact. Survivors escaped through an opening in the fuselage while cabin crew opened emergency exits to facilitate evacuation. The crash claimed 92 lives—88 passengers and four crew members—with 54 survivors sustaining injuries; two of these later succumbed to their wounds.

Eyewitness accounts noted no firefighting response due to ineffective radio communication between air traffic control and fire services. Although a portable radio transmitter intended for tower-to-fire station contact was available, it was not operational on the day of the accident.

Passengers and crew

Flight 605 was transporting 139 passengers along with 7 crew members, comprising 2 pilots in the cockpit and 5 cabin attendants, including 4 infants on board.

The pilot in command was Captain Cyril Fernandez, a 46-year-old Indian citizen who had been with Indian Airlines since 1977. His career advanced from co-pilot to Captain on the Hawker Siddeley HS 748, then he earned a Boeing 737 co-pilot certification in 1983, followed by a Captain rating in 1984. In 1989, he qualified as an Airbus A320 co-pilot. Fernandez accumulated a total of 9,307 flight hours, with only 68 hours on the A320. He was undergoing supervision during his first of ten route checks to qualify as captain and occupied the left seat.

Captain Satish Gopujkar, also an Indian national aged 44, supervised Fernandez. Gopujkar joined Indian Airlines in 1969 and initially served as co-pilot and later Captain on the HS 748. He obtained a Boeing 737 co-pilot rating in 1981 and pilot-in-command rating in 1983. In 1989, he became an A320 co-pilot. With a total of 10,340 flight hours, including 255 on the A320, Gopujkar fulfilled dual roles as both co-pilot and check pilot during this flight, seated on the right side. Before Flight 605, he had been involved in a taxiing incident at Cochin but was not held accountable.

Casualties

The accident claimed the lives of 92 individuals, among them Captains Fernandez and Gopujkar. Of the remaining survivors, 54 were injured; at least 20 suffered head trauma, 32 had injuries to their lower limbs, and 7 sustained chest injuries. Most of those who died experienced severe trauma; around 81 victims endured shock combined with burn injuries.

The investigation report revealed that some passengers survived the initial crash impact but were rendered unable to escape due to injuries sustained before the ensuing fire consumed the wreckage. Survival chances were notably higher for those seated close to emergency exits and evacuation slides.

Investigators observed that numerous survivors and casualties suffered head and leg injuries likely resulting from limited legroom and seats moving forward during impact, causing heads to strike seatbacks.

Investigation

The Ministry of Civil Aviation of India initiated an inquiry into the crash, involving both the Indian Aircraft Accident Investigation Bureau (AAIB) and Canada's Transportation Safety Board (TSB). On February 19th, investigators surveyed the crash location and examined the wreckage, noting that the aircraft's nose section was obliterated upon striking an embankment, followed by a fire that completely destroyed the plane.

Initial inspection

During their examination of Flight 605’s flight control surfaces—including rudder, ailerons, horizontal stabilizer, flaps, and slats—investigators found no evidence of malfunction or failure. Additionally, terrorism was ruled out based on absence of any signs indicating onboard explosions or explosive devices.

FDR and CVR analysis

Following recovery of the Flight Data Recorder (FDR) and Cockpit Voice Recorder (CVR), their data was scrutinized. Flight 605 approached Bangalore Airport in 'open descent' mode with engines throttled back to idle power, leading to a gradual descent profile.

Upon visual contact with the runway, the crew disengaged autopilot and communicated with Bangalore Tower. At approximately 1:40 pm local time, instruments indicated an altitude just below 5,000 feet with an approach path about 600 feet above the standard glide slope. Captain Fernandez requested a go-around maneuver to climb back to 6,000 feet and realign; however, Check Pilot Gopujkar queried whether Fernandez preferred a go-around or adjusting vertical speed instead. Fernandez opted for vertical speed adjustment rather than executing the safer go-around procedure.

To intercept the glide slope, Fernandez increased descent rate to approximately 1,000 feet per minute—exceeding the usual rate of about 700 feet per minute—and accelerated speed to roughly 275 km/h rather than the recommended maximum of 240 km/h while remaining in vertical speed mode. After completing the landing checklist, Gopujkar instructed cabin crew to be seated and reported selecting a "700 ft rate of descent." However, due to similar design and proximity of controls, he inadvertently engaged the altitude hold knob instead of vertical speed control.

This mistake caused the aircraft to revert into 'open descent' mode with engines at idle throttle again, resulting in reduced thrust that led to loss of airspeed and rapid descent—an issue unnoticed by both pilots. The radio altimeter alarmed at "400 ft," prompting Gopujkar’s realization: "You are descending on idle open descend eh, all this time!" At "300 ft," he asked whether flight directors should be switched off; Fernandez confirmed his was off while Gopujkar’s remained active. Had both flight directors been deactivated at this point, the aircraft would have shifted into speed mode automatically increasing engine power for recovery.

At around 135 feet above ground level, Fernandez acknowledged imminent danger: "Hey, we're going down!" Gopujkar responded with "Oh, shit!"—his final recorded statement. Fernandez commanded an immediate TOGA (Take-off Go-around) thrust application; however it was too late to avoid impact. The aircraft briefly lifted but failed to clear a twelve-foot embankment before crashing. Investigators concluded that initiating TOGA just two seconds earlier might have prevented the accident.

Judicial conclusions

The High Court of Karnataka determined that the crash occurred because the pilots failed to recognize the critical nature of the situation and did not advance the throttles in a timely manner, despite receiving radio altitude alerts at "Four Hundred," "Three Hundred," and "Two Hundred" feet, while the aircraft was descending with throttles at idle or open settings.

Dispute

The investigative authorities from India, along with Airbus Industries, attributed the accident to pilot error. In contrast, the India Commercial Pilot Association (ICPA) contested this conclusion, pointing to a design defect within the Airbus A320 as the underlying cause.

The ICPA defended Captain Gopujkar by asserting that there was no concrete proof of pilot mistakes since the flight data recorder failed to verify such errors. They proposed that the engines remained at idle due to a significant system malfunction and noted unsuccessful attempts to deactivate the flight director. Additionally, they emphasized that a 0.5-second lag in the auto-thrust system's reaction was a crucial factor.

At that period, the Airbus A320 was a relatively recent model, introduced in 1988, distinguished by its fly-by-wire (FBW) technology. Unlike traditional aircraft where pilot inputs directly manipulate actuators, the A320’s onboard computer processes throttle commands and only executes them when considered appropriate.

Earlier, an Airbus A320 had been involved in the Air France Flight 296Q accident, which was officially ascribed to pilot error. The pilot had criticized the FBW system, igniting debate over the A320’s design integrity.

Consequences

Less than two years later, another fatal crash involving an A320 occurred with Air Inter Flight 148 in France, resulting in 87 fatalities due to controlled flight into terrain (CFIT). This investigation delivered strong criticism of the A320 cockpit layout. As a result, changes were implemented to the Flight Control Unit panel display, and the French aviation safety authority issued 34 safety recommendations.

See also

External links