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Metcalf sniper attack

From Alfawiki
Adapted from the English Wikipedia article Metcalf sniper attack, available under CC BY-SA 4.0Updated 7 August 2025
Pacific Gas and Electric Company
IndustryEnergy
Headquarters
San Jose, California
,
United States

On April 16, 2013, the Metcalf transmission substation operated by Pacific Gas and Electric Company near Coyote, California, close to San Jose, was subjected to an armed assault. Attackers discharged firearms at 17 electrical transformer units, resulting in equipment damage exceeding $15 million, though power supply interruptions were minimal.

Assault

In the early hours of April 16, 2013, armed individuals employed rifles to target the Metcalf Transmission Substation, inflicting severe damage on 17 transformers.

Preparation

Prior to the shooting, several fiber-optic cables managed by AT&T were severed. Investigators also discovered small rock formations near the attack site, which are believed to have been used as vantage points for reconnaissance.

Timeline

  • 12:58 a.m. – Fiber-optic lines belonging to AT&T near U.S. Route 101 south of San Jose were cut.
  • 1:07 a.m. – Customers served by Level 3 Communications experienced service loss after cables close to the Metcalf substation were damaged.
  • 1:31 a.m. – Surveillance footage recorded a flashlight signal followed by muzzle flashes from rifles and sparks caused by bullets striking the fence.
  • 1:37 a.m. – PG&E received an alert from motion sensors at the substation, likely triggered by bullets grazing the perimeter fence.
  • 1:41 a.m. – A nearby power plant engineer contacted emergency services reporting gunfire.
  • 1:45 a.m. – The first transformer bank sustained damage and oil leakage, causing overheating and triggering an equipment failure alarm at PG&E’s control center located approximately away.
  • 1:50 a.m. – Another flashlight signal was observed, indicating the conclusion of the attack. Investigators later recovered over 100 spent 7.62×39mm cartridge cases.
  • 1:51 a.m. – Law enforcement arrived on scene but found no suspicious activity and departed due to locked gates.
  • 3:15 a.m. – PG&E personnel commenced evaluation of the damage.

Sophistication of attack

Jon Wellinghoff, former Chairman of the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, remarked that military specialists characterized the assault as a "professional operation," noting absence of fingerprints on shell casings. He described it as "the most significant domestic terrorism event targeting the electrical grid." Nevertheless, the Federal Bureau of Investigation did not link it to any terrorist organization.

Henry Waxman, senior member of the United States House Committee on Energy and Commerce, referred to the incident as "an unprecedented and highly coordinated attack on an electric grid substation using military-grade weaponry," emphasizing the disruption to communications and extensive damage that required weeks for restoration. He cautioned that under different circumstances, it could have led to major power outages or graver consequences.

Aftermath

Seventeen transformers suffered extensive damage necessitating repairs costing more than $15 million. To avoid widespread blackouts, energy officials redirected electricity from nearby plants in Silicon Valley. Although some residential areas experienced brief power outages, significant consumers largely remained unaffected, according to an expert from the Electric Power Research Institute.

Both PG&E and AT&T offered rewards of $250,000 each for information leading to the identification and conviction of those responsible.

In June 2014, PG&E revealed plans to allocate $100 million over a three-year period toward enhancing security measures at substations, including Metcalf.

A July 2014 report by the Congressional Research Service on Physical Security of the U.S. Power Grid referenced this attack and noted that following it, the FERC implemented mandatory physical security standards for substations in 2014.

Investigation

In October 2015, the United States Department of Homeland Security suggested that the incident might have been executed by someone with authorized access.

Precursor publications

A declassified report from 2007, released in 2012 by the National Research Council of the National Academies for the Department of Homeland Security, emphasized weaknesses within the national electric grid, focusing especially on high voltage transformers.

See also

External links