Mohamad Farik Amin

Mohammed Farik bin Amin
Born	(1975-02-16) February 16, 1975 Malaysia
Other names	Zubair Zaid, Abu Zubair
Occupation(s)	Alleged senior member of Jemaah Islamiyah and al Qaeda
Known for	Detained at Guantanamo Bay; subjected to CIA enhanced interrogation techniques

Mohammed Farik bin Amin (born February 16, 1975), also known by the alias Zubair Zaid, is a Malaysian individual alleged to have held a senior role within Jemaah Islamiyah and al Qaeda. He was detained at the Guantanamo Bay detention camp and is among a group of 14 detainees who were previously held at secret CIA facilities. The ODNI identifies Amin as a close subordinate of Hambali and notes his familial connection as a cousin to Malaysian militant Zulkifli Abdhir.

Per Time Magazine, Amin, Hambali, and Mohammed Nazir Bin Lep were apprehended on Diego Garcia, where they confessed to conducting reconnaissance on bombing targets in Thailand. Their joint capture occurred in central Thailand on August 11, 2003. The ODNI specifies that Hambali and bin Lep were arrested together, whereas Amin was taken into custody at some point during 2003.

On August 9, 2007, the United States Department of Defense officially designated all fourteen "high-value detainees" transferred from CIA black sites as "enemy combatants," thereby authorizing formal charges before Guantanamo military commissions. This decision followed court rulings that restricted military commissions to cases involving "illegal" enemy combatants.

A December 2008 analysis by the Brookings Institution, led by Benjamin Wittes, classified detainees based on allegations:

• Amin was listed within the category of "al Qaeda leadership cadre."
• He was also among those who did not provide statements directly addressing the military accusations during their tribunals.

Arrest of Bin Amin by Thai Officials

On June 8, 2003, Thai authorities apprehended Mr. bin Amin, referred to by the Government as “Zubair.” While detained, he admitted involvement in procuring forged documents on behalf of Hambali.

Bin Amin’s Detention Under CIA at COBALT

After being handed over to CIA custody at the COBALT facility, Mr. bin Amin underwent enhanced interrogation methods. He subsequently reaffirmed the information he had previously disclosed to Thai officials concerning the fraudulent documents.

Details regarding the treatment of Mr. bin Amin and other detainees are documented in the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence’s report on the CIA’s Detention and Interrogation Program. Throughout this report, Mr. bin Amin is frequently identified as Abu Zubair. During his detention, CIA interrogators employed both authorized enhanced and standard interrogation methods.

Standard Interrogation Methods

The CIA's approved “standard interrogation techniques” encompass:

• Isolation from others
• Sleep deprivation lasting up to 72 hours
• Limited caloric consumption
• Restriction from reading materials
• Exposure to loud music and white noise
• Temporary use of diapers

Enhanced Interrogation Methods

“Enhanced interrogation techniques” used by the CIA involve physical or psychological stress exceeding standard procedures, including:

• Attention grasp, walling, facial hold or slap, abdominal slap
• Cramped confinement, wall standing, stress positions
• Sleep deprivation extending beyond 72 hours
• Prolonged diaper use and exposure to insects
• Waterboarding along with other sanctioned techniques

Mr. bin Amin experienced both standard and enhanced interrogation practices, as well as unauthorized actions such as having a broomstick placed behind his knees during stress position exercises.

Conditions at DETENTION SITE COBALT

Between September 2002 and 2004, DETENTION SITE COBALT detained a total of 64 individuals. From January through August 2003, the primary locations for enhanced interrogation procedures were COBALT and DETENTION SITE BLUE. Within CIA circles, COBALT was often labeled as “the dungeon,” with some personnel equating the facility itself to an enhanced interrogation tactic.

At COBALT, detainees faced numerous harsh conditions including prolonged sleep deprivation, enforced standing, exposure to loud music, sensory deprivation, extended solitary confinement, diminished food quality and portions, enforced nudity, and physical mistreatment. The environment involved shackling prisoners in darkness with a waste bucket nearby, inadequate heating during winter months, and forcing detainees to stand with their arms shackled overhead for lengthy durations. Instead of being released for bathroom breaks, detainees sometimes wore adult diapers while restrained. Frequently, they were bound naked on tarps while cold water was poured over them.

Unauthorized practices reported at COBALT included medically unnecessary rectal rehydration, invasive rectal examinations conducted with excessive force, and the simultaneous use of enhanced interrogation techniques by multiple interrogators on a single detainee. There were at least two instances of mock executions. Even detainees suffering injuries such as broken feet or those using prosthetic limbs were compelled to stand shackled for extended periods as part of sleep deprivation.

During the detention of Mr. bin Amin, sleep deprivation lasting up to 72 hours was considered routine. Prior to his detention, Gul Rahman died as a result of coercive interrogation methods combined with severe confinement conditions; no disciplinary actions were taken against those responsible.

A CIA photograph depicts a waterboard setup at COBALT surrounded by buckets and a bottle containing an unidentified pink liquid; the CIA did not provide any clarification regarding this image.

Ineffectiveness of Enhanced Interrogation Techniques

The Senate Committee determined that the CIA’s employment of “enhanced interrogation techniques” failed to produce effective intelligence or cooperation from detainees. Their findings highlighted several critical points:

• These methods did not serve as reliable tools for gathering intelligence or securing detainee cooperation.
• The CIA made false claims regarding the success of these techniques.
• The severity of these methods was far greater than what was communicated to policymakers.
• Conditions under which detainees were confined were more severe than officially reported.
• The CIA repeatedly furnished inaccurate information to the Department of Justice, complicating legal evaluations.
• Congressional oversight efforts were deliberately evaded or obstructed.
• Oversight and decision-making processes within the White House were hindered.
• Program management interfered with other national security operations within the Executive Branch.
• The CIA’s Office of Inspector General faced obstruction in its oversight responsibilities.
• The agency coordinated media disclosures containing classified and frequently inaccurate details about these interrogation methods.
• Certain coercive techniques employed were unauthorized by either the Department of Justice or CIA Headquarters.
• The CIA failed to rigorously assess the effectiveness of these interrogation procedures.

CIA’s Reaction to the Report

The CIA admitted that it lacked a systematic and comprehensive evaluation regarding the effectiveness of various interrogation approaches.

CIA Director John Brennan

John O. Brennan, the Director of the CIA, expressed skepticism regarding the value of enhanced interrogation techniques, indicating that it was not possible to definitively connect these practices to the acquisition of reliable intelligence.

President Barack Obama

In response to the Senate Subcommittee’s findings, President Barack Obama openly conceded, "We tortured some folks," recognizing that the enhanced interrogation methods employed amounted to torture and represented a breach of ethical boundaries.

The Ninth Circuit Court

One of the earliest judicial bodies to confront the government's use of severe interrogation measures—such as waterboarding, confinement in cramped spaces, walling, and sleep deprivation—was the Ninth Circuit Court. It determined that these actions constituted torture, as detailed in the Senate Select Committee Report.

Subsequent Research

The Intelligence Science Board commissioned experts in 2006 who concluded that coercion, infliction of pain, and threats seldom yield dependable intelligence and advocated for additional study. A Harvard study conducted in 2016 underscored the strategic detriments to U.S. national security stemming from detainee treatment. That same year, FBI investigators from the High-Value Detainee Interrogation Group found that rapport-building, non-coercive interrogation techniques are superior for obtaining precise and actionable intelligence.

"Architects" of the Enhanced Interrogation Techniques

In 2017, the American Civil Liberties Union, representing Suleiman Abdullah Salim, Mohamed Ahmed Ben Soud, and relatives of Gul Rahman, announced a settlement in litigation against Dr. James Mitchell and Dr. Bruce Jessen—psychologists contracted by the CIA responsible for designing the interrogation methods applied to these plaintiffs.

The lawsuit, filed under the Alien Tort Statute, accused Mitchell and Jessen of committing serious human rights abuses including torture, unauthorized human experimentation, and violations constituting war crimes.

The joint settlement statement confirmed that Mitchell and Jessen collaborated with the CIA in creating coercive interrogation tactics. The plaintiffs attested to undergoing these techniques which caused significant pain and suffering. While Mitchell and Jessen denied awareness or accountability for specific abuses resulting in injury or death, they expressed remorse for the harm experienced by the plaintiffs.

Details of the settlement remain confidential.

Results of the Torture on bin Amin

Although the CIA asserted that torture facilitated locating Hambali, documentation including CIA records indicate that intelligence was primarily derived from signals intelligence, a CIA informant, and investigations conducted by Thai authorities.

Joint Review Task Force

On January 21, 2009, President Barack Obama issued executive directives concerning detainees at Guantanamo Bay. A newly established review system incorporating six federal departments replaced prior evaluations conducted solely by the Department of Defense.

The Joint Review Task Force designated certain detainees as too dangerous for release despite insufficient evidence to formally charge them. This classification was publicly disclosed on April 9, 2013, following a Freedom of Information Act request.

Among those classified as too innocent to prosecute but too risky to free was Mohammed Farik bin Amin. President Obama announced that such cases would undergo periodic reassessment by a Periodic Review Board.

Periodic Review Board

The initial evaluation took place on November 20, 2013. By April 15, 2016, a total of 29 individuals had been assessed; nonetheless, Mohammed Farik bin Amin was excluded from this group. His request for transfer was rejected on September 15, 2016.

Trial

In August 2021, the U.S. government formally indicted Mohammed Farik bin Amin, Mohammed Nazir bin Lep, and Hambali on charges related to murder and terrorism linked to the 2002 Bali bombings. During the proceedings, bin Amin's defense introduced his artwork illustrating torture techniques such as waterboarding and stress positions as part of their evidence.

On January 26, 2024, a military jury convened at Guantánamo sentenced both bin Amin and bin Lep to 23 years of imprisonment for their participation in the bombings. However, due to a confidential agreement with a high-ranking Pentagon official, their sentences could be shortened to a maximum of six years contingent upon their cooperation in testifying against Hambali.

On December 18, 2024, both bin Amin and bin Lep were relocated to Malaysia.