Nisour Square massacre

Blackwater Security Consulting

Company type	Private military contractor
Industry	Security services, military contracting
Founded	1997
Founder	Erik Prince
Fate	Renamed to Constellis
Headquarters	Moyock, North Carolina , United States
Products	Private security services, military contracting
Website	www.constellis.com

The Nisour Square massacre took place on September 16, 2007, when personnel from Blackwater Security Consulting (currently known as Constellis), a private military contractor hired by the United States government for security operations in Iraq, opened fire on Iraqi civilians in Nisour Square, Baghdad. While escorting a U.S. embassy convoy, their actions resulted in 17 fatalities and 20 injuries. This event provoked widespread condemnation within Iraq and severely impacted diplomatic relations between the U.S. and Iraq. In 2014, four Blackwater employees faced trial in U.S. federal court; one was convicted of murder, while the other three were found guilty of manslaughter and weapons violations. In 2020, President Donald Trump issued pardons to all four, a decision that drew criticism from United Nations experts who argued it breached international law.

Blackwater personnel asserted that their convoy was attacked and that they responded with defensive gunfire; however, Iraqi authorities and police investigator Faris Saadi Abdul maintained that the shootings were unprovoked. Following the incident, Blackwater’s authorization to operate in Iraq was suspended temporarily. The U.S. State Department acknowledged the loss of innocent lives, and a military investigation appeared to support the Iraqi government's claim of Blackwater’s responsibility. Iraqi officials committed to ensuring accountability for the company. Numerous inquiries ensued, including an investigation by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), which concluded that at least 14 of the 17 Iraqis killed were shot without just cause.

Incident

Shortly before noon on September 16, 2007, a car bomb detonated near the Izdihar Compound, where U.S. and Iraqi officials were convening. In response, a 19-member Blackwater Tactical Support Team (TST), designated "Raven 23," deployed to the south side of Nisour Square to secure an evacuation corridor for U.S. officials and another Blackwater security unit. Although team leader Jimmy Watson had instructions to hold position at a checkpoint, he made a "tactical decision" to move forward into Nisour Square; upon arrival, he was ordered to "lock down the traffic circle" to facilitate faster movement for the other team. Soon after taking position, Raven 23 opened fire on civilians reacting to an approaching vehicle, resulting in 14 deaths and 20 injuries.

During opening statements at the 2014 trial, defense attorneys argued that Raven 23 perceived an approaching Kia vehicle as a legitimate car bomb threat and acted out of self-defense. Prosecutors disputed this claim, stating there was no hostile fire before the shooting began and that guards continued firing despite no ongoing threats. The Kia’s driver was fatally shot in the head; despite this, the vehicle kept moving and was further fired upon, killing the passenger—who was the driver’s mother. Eventually, a grenade destroyed the Kia.

A State Department report from that day indicated that eight to ten assailants fired upon Raven 23 from multiple positions after it entered Nisour Square at 12:08 p.m. Another Blackwater team (TST 22) was redirected to assist Raven 23, which returned fire and withdrew with one armored vehicle. As Raven 23 left the area, some members continued shooting, causing additional civilian casualties. TST 22 arrived after Raven 23 had departed but were blocked by Iraqi Army and Police vehicles; subsequently, a U.S. Army convoy escorted them back to the Green Zone.

According to Iraqi authorities, as the convoy neared Nisour Square, a Kia sedan carrying a woman and her adult son approached slowly on the wrong side of the road and ignored police commands. The security team first fired warning shots before resorting to lethal force against the Kia and deploying stun grenades. Iraqi police and soldiers mistook these stun grenades for fragmentation devices and returned fire toward Blackwater personnel. Iraqi investigators also claimed that Blackwater helicopters engaged vehicles from above—a charge denied by Blackwater.

Blackwater’s version differed significantly: they stated that despite verbal commands, hand signals, and objects thrown at it, the Kia continued advancing toward their convoy even after warning shots were fired. When an Iraqi policeman approached the vehicle—possibly assisting its occupants—guards believed he was pushing it closer as part of a vehicle bomb threat and opened fire, killing both passengers and the policeman. Subsequently, other Iraqi police began firing at Blackwater personnel, who reported being under attack to State Department operations. Marty Strong, Blackwater’s vice president, stated that their convoy had been struck by a large explosive device along with small arms fire disabling one vehicle; some reports attribute this explosion to mortar fire.

On September 27, 2007, The New York Times revealed that during the confusion one Blackwater team member continued shooting at civilians despite colleagues’ calls for cease-fire; another contractor intervened by pointing his weapon at him to stop firing. Three guards later testified during trial that they believed these shootings were unwarranted.

Immediate Consequences

In the wake of the attacks, Blackwater's activities in Iraq were halted temporarily. Numerous investigations were launched by both Iraqi and U.S. authorities. The event led Iraqi Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki to call on the U.S. administration to cancel its contract with Blackwater USA, demanding an official apology, compensation for the families of the victims, and accountability for the involved security personnel. Although the U.S. House of Representatives approved legislation to allow prosecution of private contractors operating in combat zones under U.S. law, the Senate did not bring the bill to a vote.

Authorization to Operate in Iraq

On September 18, 2007, a spokesperson from the Iraqi Interior Ministry announced that Blackwater was "prohibited from operating anywhere within the Republic of Iraq." Despite this declaration, Blackwater continued its operations until January 2009, when the U.S.–Iraq Status of Forces Agreement came into effect. Industry analyst P. W. Singer described the ban as "unavoidable," considering the U.S. government's dependence on private military contractors who operate under limited regulatory oversight.

As of July 3, 2007, the Private Security Company Association of Iraq listed Blackwater as lacking a license despite the company's efforts to obtain one. Nevertheless, Blackwater's contracts with the U.S. Department of State and CIA seemed unaffected by licensing complications. It remained uncertain whether the license revocation would be permanent.

Following a related event, on September 19, 2007, U.S. authorities suspended all land travel for diplomats outside Baghdad’s Green Zone, confining movement to a restricted central area and mandating helicopter transport elsewhere. By September 22, Blackwater had resumed its usual operations.

Afterwards, Blackwater applied for an Iraqi government license but was denied in January 2009. The Iraqi government ordered Blackwater to leave pending new regulations for contractors under the Iraqi-U.S. security agreement. On January 31, 2009, the U.S. State Department informed Blackwater that its security contract would not be renewed.

Inquiry Processes

The U.S. State Department announced intentions to investigate this "tragic incident." Iraqi Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki reported that Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice assured a "fair and transparent" investigation would be conducted. A joint commission between American and Iraqi officials was established, co-chaired by Iraqi Defense Minister Abd al Qadir and U.S. Embassy Chargé d'affaires Patricia A. Butenis, tasked with probing both the shooting and broader issues related to private security contractors.

Henry Waxman, chair of the United States House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, which had previously examined private security firms, announced additional hearings aimed at evaluating how this incident affected U.S. security interests. Waxman criticized the excessive dependence on private security companies such as Blackwater.

On October 4, 2007, investigative leadership was transferred to the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

Results

Iraqi officials determined that Blackwater guards were responsible for the fatalities; this conclusion was supported by U.S. military documentation. A report from the House Oversight Committee revealed that Blackwater personnel discharged weapons with lethal intent on a weekly basis in Iraq—firing their weapons 195 times between early 2005 and September 2005—and initiated fire first in over 80% of those encounters.

U.S. military assessments described instances where Blackwater guards employed excessive force, including firing grenade launchers and machine guns without provocation against unarmed civilians and local security forces.

The FBI concluded that at least 14 out of 17 Iraqi deaths were unjustified; only three were considered lawful killings. Blackwater expressed willingness to support accountability if misconduct was confirmed but noted that key employees had not yet cooperated fully with investigators.

In January 2008, The New York Times identified contractor Paul Slough—previously serving with the 3rd Infantry Division and Texas National Guard—as responsible for numerous deaths during the incident.

Radio communication logs released in December 2008 showed guards reporting incoming fire from insurgents and Iraqi police during the event.

Forensic analysis of bullets conducted in April 2009 yielded inconclusive results; none matched firearms used by Blackwater personnel.

In April 2011, founder Erik Prince criticized federal investigative procedures, disputing allegations against U.S. or Blackwater staff members. He contended that ballistics tests were conducted with an intent to assign guilt rather than establish facts and pointed out that the FBI failed to thoroughly examine all bullet sources or account for foreign cartridge cases unrelated to U.S. or Blackwater forces. Given frequent shootings in that area, it remained unclear whether some shell casings originated from this specific incident or others nearby.

October 2007 United Nations report

In October 2007, the United Nations published a comprehensive two-year investigation revealing that private contractors, although officially employed as "security guards," were undertaking military roles. The document characterized firms such as Blackwater as participants in a "novel form of mercenary conduct," which is considered unlawful under international law. Nevertheless, the United States has not ratified the 1989 UN Mercenary Convention prohibiting mercenary activities, nor the 1977 additional protocol to the 1949 Geneva Conventions, which defines mercenaries as civilians primarily motivated by financial gain who directly engage in hostilities. The U.S. differentiates defensive measures by security personnel from active combat, a distinction not recognized by the Protocol.

Reactions from Iraqis

Halim Mashkoor, a resident of Baghdad, condemned the unchecked conduct of security companies against civilians and questioned whether such actions would be acceptable in countries like the U.S. or the United Kingdom. Hasan Jaber Salman, a lawyer injured during an incident involving Blackwater personnel, asserted that "no one provoked Blackwater" prior to their opening fire on vehicles. An Iraqi police officer described Blackwater operatives as having "become the terrorists" after firing without cause on local civilians, while a local businessman called for accountability rather than financial restitution. After receiving backing from Iraqi ministers to terminate Blackwater’s operations, Iraqi Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki appealed to the U.S. government to cancel its contract with Blackwater and demanded $8 million in compensation for families affected.

The January 1, 2010 dismissal of all charges against Blackwater by a U.S. judge provoked widespread indignation throughout the Arab world.

Actions against Blackwater

U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates acknowledged that while the Pentagon holds legal jurisdiction over its contractors, commanders are hampered by insufficient "means and resources" to enforce effective oversight. On October 4, 2007, the U.S. House approved legislation subjecting all private contractors operating in Iraq and other combat zones to the Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act, thereby enabling prosecution under U.S. courts. Senate Democrats indicated plans to introduce comparable legislation shortly thereafter.

Richard J. Griffin, who served as Assistant Secretary of State for Diplomatic Security overseeing Blackwater USA operations, resigned in November 2007 following a House Oversight Committee investigation that revealed inadequate supervision during the Blackwater shootings in Baghdad. Meanwhile, Howard Krongard, appointed as Inspector General of the U.S. State Department in 2005, stepped down in December 2007 amid allegations of obstructing inquiries into the shootings.

Court Proceedings

On September 24, 2007, the Iraqi Ministry of the Interior declared its intention to pursue criminal charges against Blackwater personnel involved in the shooting incident, although the specific legal processes for some individuals remained uncertain. An advisor to al-Maliki highlighted that three of the guards were Iraqi citizens and therefore subject to potential prosecution under Iraqi law. The Iraqi authorities demanded an official apology, financial restitution for the families of the victims, and accountability from those guards implicated.

Subsequently, on October 11, 2007, the Center for Constitutional Rights initiated a lawsuit against Blackwater USA under the Alien Tort Claims Act, representing an injured Iraqi individual and relatives of three of the seventeen people killed on September 16. This case was resolved through a confidential settlement in January 2010. Another civil suit filed by families of six victims reached a settlement on January 6, 2012, also for an undisclosed amount.

Federal Criminal Charges

In December 2008, the United States Department of Justice formally charged five Blackwater employees—Donald Ball, Dustin Heard, Evan Liberty, Nicholas Slatten, and Paul Slough—with manslaughter, attempted manslaughter, and violations related to weapons use. A sixth guard, Jeremy Ridgeway, entered a guilty plea to lesser offenses and agreed to testify against his colleagues.

Although the trial was slated for early 2010, it was dismissed on December 31, 2009, by Judge Ricardo Urbina. The judge ruled that the Department of Justice had improperly handled evidence and infringed upon constitutional protections by relying on compelled testimony safeguarded under the Fifth Amendment. This dismissal drew criticism from Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki, while then-Vice President Joe Biden committed to pursuing an appeal.

On April 22, 2011, a federal appellate court reinstated manslaughter charges against the five former Blackwater guards, citing pervasive errors in the earlier dismissal. The court determined that the district court’s decision was legally flawed. The US Supreme Court declined to intervene on June 5, 2012, allowing prosecution efforts to continue.

Prosecutors dropped charges against Ball in September 2013 after reevaluating which evidence was admissible.

Judgments and Sentencing

The trial for the four remaining defendants began on June 17, 2014. Following ten weeks of testimony and nearly a month of jury deliberations, all were convicted on October 22, 2014. Nicholas Slatten was convicted of first-degree murder, while Slough, Liberty, and Heard were found guilty of voluntary and attempted manslaughter as well as using a machine gun during a violent crime. The jury concurred with prosecutors that the shooting constituted a criminal offense rather than a mistake made in combat. Slatten faced life imprisonment; the others received lengthy sentences with weapons charges imposing a mandatory minimum of 30 years under legislation originally enacted during the cocaine crisis of the 1990s. The inclusion of these weapons charges had sparked internal debate within the Justice Department and was criticized by defense lawyers as excessively harsh.

On April 13, 2015, federal judge Royce C. Lamberth sentenced Slatten to life imprisonment and imposed 30-year sentences on each of the other three defendants.

On August 4, 2017, a panel of three judges from the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit overturned Slatten’s murder conviction and ordered resentencing for his co-defendants to time served. The panel recommended that Slatten be tried separately in a new trial, ruling that his joint trial with others was unjustified. While affirming that prosecutions were authorized under the Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act, the court found that mandatory minimum sentences violated constitutional protections against cruel and unusual punishment.

On December 19, 2018, Slatten was once again convicted of murder and subsequently sentenced to life imprisonment on August 14, 2019. Heard, Liberty, and Slough were resentenced on September 5, 2019; their new terms were approximately half as long as their original 30-year sentences.

Pardons

On December 22, 2020, then U.S. President Donald Trump issued full presidential pardons to Slatten, Slough, Liberty, and Heard. The White House emphasized their extensive service records as veterans of the US Armed Forces and pointed to widespread support from both the public and officials. The statement also mentioned the Court of Appeals' determination that additional evidence should have been introduced during Mr. Slatten's trial, alongside recent allegations suggesting the primary Iraqi investigator may have had connections with insurgents.

This act of clemency provoked significant backlash from Iraqi citizens and families of the victims. Marta Hurtado, spokesperson for the UN Human Rights Office, condemned the pardons for promoting a culture of impunity and possibly encouraging future violations. The Iraqi Foreign Ministry denounced the pardon decision, asserting it failed to adequately consider the gravity of the offenses committed.

See also

• 2004 Fallujah ambush
• Battle of Haditha
• Haditha massacre
• Human rights in post-invasion Iraq
• Ilario Pantano
• Shadow Company

External links

• Jeremy Scahill on Democracy Now! October 23, 2014, "Blackwater Execs Remain Free as Guards Convicted for Killing 14 Iraqis in Massacre" (interview beginning approximately 45 minutes into audio)