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Noorullah Noori

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Adapted from the English Wikipedia article Noorullah Noori, available under CC BY-SA 4.0Updated 7 August 202511 sources
Mullah Noorullah Noori
Born1967
OccupationPolitician
Years active1996–present
Known forActing Minister of Borders and Tribal Affairs for the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan; former Governor of Balkh Province; Guantanamo detainee

Mullah Noorullah Noori ( ; born 1967) currently serves as the acting Minister of Borders and Tribal Affairs for the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan, a position he has held since September 2021.[1] During the Taliban's initial rule from 1996 to 2001, he held the office of Governor of Balkh Province.[2][3][4][5][6]

Noori spent more than twelve years detained at the United States' Guantanamo Bay facility in Cuba.[7] On May 31, 2014, he was released together with four other senior Taliban members, collectively known as the Taliban Five, in exchange for U.S. Army soldier Bowe Bergdahl and subsequently transferred to Qatar.[8]

In the aftermath of a failed prison uprising at the Qala-i-Jangi fortress in late 2001, where over 400 prisoners lost their lives, General Rashid Dostum brought Noori to assess the situation. Accounts suggest that Noori directed Taliban combatants under his command to surrender peacefully to Dostum’s Northern Alliance forces.[3]

Noori was taken into custody at Guantanamo on January 11, 2002. The U.S. government justified his detention based on his positions as interim Provincial Governor of Jalalabad, temporary Governor of Mazar-i-Sharif, and Governor of Balkh Province.[9] Since January 25, 2001, he has been listed by the United Nations Security Council's 1267 Committee.[6]

During negotiations between the U.S. and Taliban in late 2011 and early 2012, Noori’s continued detention posed a major challenge. Reports suggested that releasing him along with four other senior Taliban figures would enable progress in talks by allowing them to relocate to Doha, Qatar, where they could establish an official Taliban office.[2][10]

Governor under the Taliban

Farida Kuchi, a nomadic tribeswoman from the Kuchi community and a candidate for the 2005 Wolesi Jirga, began her involvement in political activism in 1998 by presenting a list of 1,000 displaced Kuchi refugees to then-Governor of Balkh, Noori.Cite error: Closing </ref> missing for <ref> tag

Combatant Status Review Tribunal

At the outset, the Bush administration maintained that captives in the war on terror were not entitled to protections under the Geneva Conventions.[11] This stance was legally contested, requiring the U.S. to implement credible tribunals to evaluate prisoner of war status.

Consequently, the United States Department of Defense instituted the Combatant Status Review Tribunals. These tribunals were tasked solely with recommending whether detainees met the Bush administration’s criteria for "enemy combatant," without adjudicating lawful combatant status.

Summary of Evidence memo

On August 8, 2004, a Summary of Evidence memo was compiled for Mullah Noorullah Noori’s Combatant Status Review Tribunal. The document alleged that Noori was affiliated with the Taliban, having served as a security guard for Taliban officials in Kabul and Jalalabad before providing security in Mazar-E Sharif. He reportedly carried a Kalashnikov and acted as governor in Mazar-E Sharif for approximately eight to nine months prior to his capture. The memo further claimed he engaged in frontline combat against coalition forces, attended Taliban leadership meetings concerning surrender negotiations with the Northern Alliance, and was apprehended together with other Taliban members.

Transcript

Noori took part in his Combatant Status Review Tribunal. On March 3, 2006, pursuant to a court order issued by Jed Rakoff, the United States Department of Defense released a five-page summarized transcript of his tribunal proceedings.

Administrative Review Board hearing

Individuals designated as "enemy combatants" underwent annual reviews by Administrative Review Boards (ARBs). These boards did not reconsider prisoner of war status or enemy combatant classification but focused on assessing whether continued detention was warranted based on ongoing threat levels or if detainees could be safely repatriated or released.

First annual Administrative Review Board

The Summary of Evidence memo prepared for Noorullah Noori’s initial annual Administrative Review Board emphasized reasons supporting ongoing detention. These included his previous roles as a security guard for governors in Jalalabad and Mazar-E-Sharif and his tenure as acting governor before capture. It also noted his service as a security guard for a Taliban official in Kabul and participation in Taliban leadership meetings regarding surrender discussions with the Northern Alliance.

Conversely, factors supporting release or transfer highlighted Noori’s claim that his involvement with the Taliban was driven by survival rather than political commitment, absence of contact with al Qaeda operatives, and an allegiance motivated by fear rather than ideology.

Transcript

Noori took part in his Administrative Review Board hearing.

Second annual Administrative Review Board

A Summary of Evidence document was created for Noori’s second yearly review.

Third annual Administrative Review Board

The Summary of Evidence memo for Noori’s third annual review highlighted his military and political involvement: serving as a Taliban general allied with al Qaeda since 1995, administering Balkh Province as one of the few literate tribal leaders, and bearing the title of Mullah. He directed frontline defenses, facilitated surrender negotiations, and accommodated al Qaeda commanders. His connections included relationships with senior Taliban figures and participation in the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan. Reports indicated he supported attempts to undermine the Afghan transitional government and aided associates engaged in narcotics trafficking that financed Taliban and al Qaeda operations. He commanded roughly 150 combatants along with control over a helicopter.

Arguments supporting his release noted Noori’s assertion that he did not view the United States as an adversary, lacked firsthand knowledge of Usama bin Laden beyond media coverage, and expressed readiness to back Afghanistan’s new government without opposing the U.S. if freed.

Board recommendations

In September 2007, the Department of Defense published two extensively redacted memos from this board addressed to Gordon R. England, the Designated Civilian Official. The review board met on January 31, 2007, issuing a unanimous recommendation that was heavily redacted. This recommendation was sent to England on March 29, 2007, who authorized continued detention on April 2, 2007.

Writ of habeas corpus

A writ of habeas corpus was submitted on Noorullah Noori’s behalf under Civil Action No. 08-cv-1828 in late 2008 before US District Court Judge Ricardo M. Urbina. On December 17, 2008, attorney Patricia A. Sullivan filed a status update indicating that a DTA appeal for Noori had been initiated in 2007.

Joint Review Task Force

After assuming office in January 2009, President Barack Obama committed to ending torture at Guantanamo and establishing a new interagency review mechanism to replace the Department of Defense-only OARDEC process. The Joint Review Task Force subsequently categorized some detainees as too dangerous for release but lacking sufficient evidence for formal charges. On April 9, 2013, this classification became public following a FOIA request. Noorullah Noori was among the 71 individuals deemed too risky to free yet not chargeable. Although President Obama pledged that such detainees would be reviewed by a Periodic Review Board, fewer than twenty-five percent have undergone this process.

Release negotiations

By 2009, most Afghan detainees at the U.S. facility had been repatriated. During late 2011 and early 2012, U.S.-Taliban peace discussions underscored the detention of Noorullah along with four senior Taliban figures—Khirullah Khairkhwa, Mohammed Fazl, Abdul Haq Wasiq, and another—as a significant sticking point. Talks centered on relocating these five individuals to Doha, Qatar, where they would open an official Taliban office.

In March 2012, Ibrahim Spinzada, described as "Karzai's top aide," reportedly obtained their consent for transfer to Qatar. Although Karzai initially opposed this plan, he later endorsed it. Nonetheless, U.S. officials stated that the Obama administration had yet to approve the transfer.

Release from Guantanamo Bay

On June 1, 2014, Noori along with four others, collectively referred to as the Taliban five, were freed from Guantanamo Bay and transported to Qatar aboard U.S. military C-17 aircraft. Their liberation was part of a negotiated exchange for U.S. Army soldier Bowe Bergdahl, who had been held captive in Afghanistan for five years, facilitated by the Emir of Qatar. As a stipulation of their release, they were obliged to stay within Qatar for a period of 12 months.

Following their release, the Taliban confirmed Noori’s determination to reengage in combat against American forces. A Taliban official reported that upon reaching Qatar, Noorullah Noori expressed his intention to return to Afghanistan and resume military operations targeting U.S. troops.

External links

  1. ↑ "Factbox: Taliban announces makeup of new Afghan government". 2021-09-07. {{cite web}}: Missing or empty |url= (help)
  2. ↑ 2.0 2.1 Cite error: Invalid <ref> tag; no text was provided for refs named AsiaTimes2012-01-20
  3. ↑ 3.0 3.1 Cite error: Invalid <ref> tag; no text was provided for refs named Milwaukee2001-11-29
  4. ↑ Cite error: Invalid <ref> tag; no text was provided for refs named OutlookAfghanistan2012-01-05
  5. ↑ Cite error: Invalid <ref> tag; no text was provided for refs named NYTimes2001-11-29
  6. ↑ 6.0 6.1 Cite error: Invalid <ref> tag; no text was provided for refs named UNResolution1988
  7. ↑ Cite error: Invalid <ref> tag; no text was provided for refs named DoDList2
  8. ↑ Cite error: Invalid <ref> tag; no text was provided for refs named FazlRelease
  9. ↑ Cite error: Invalid <ref> tag; no text was provided for refs named UNAlQaidaList2003
  10. ↑ Cite error: Invalid <ref> tag; no text was provided for refs named MiamiHerald2012-03
  11. ↑ Cite error: Invalid <ref> tag; no text was provided for refs named Bbc2002-01-21