Said Ali al-Shihri

Sa'id Ali Jabir Al Khathim Al Shihri
File:Said Ali al-Shihri.jpg Said Ali Al Shihri in 2009.
Born	Riyadh, Saudi Arabia
Died	Yemen
Nationality	Saudi
Other names	Said Ali al-Shihri, Abu Sufyan Al-Azadi
Known for	Former Deputy Emir of AQAP

{{Infobox person | name = Sa'id Ali Jabir Al Khathim Al Shihri | image = Said Ali al-Shihri.jpg | caption = Said Ali Al Shihri in 2009. | birth_date = | birth_place = Riyadh, Saudi Arabia | death_date = | death_place = Yemen | other_names = Said Ali al-Shihri, Abu Sufyan Al-Azadi | known_for = Former Deputy Emir of AQAP | nationality = Saudi | module =

Sa'id Ali Jabir Al Khathim Al Shihri (Arabic: سعيد علي جابر الخثيم الشهري) was a Saudi national who served as the deputy leader of Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP). He was implicated in the abduction and killing of foreign nationals in Yemen. Detained near the Durand Line in December 2001, he became one of the earliest prisoners transferred to Guantanamo Bay detention camp, arriving on 21 January 2002. He remained in U.S. custody for nearly six years before being returned to Saudi Arabia, where he participated in a rehabilitation program.

Following his release, al-Shihri traveled to Yemen and appeared in a January 2009 video on YouTube alongside three others, announcing the establishment of AQAP. As the deputy commander and highest-ranking Saudi within the organization, he was instrumental in recruiting Saudis and securing financial support inside Saudi Arabia. By late 2009, a covertly recorded cell phone video circulated via AQAP couriers showed him soliciting donations from affluent Saudis.

There were multiple reports claiming his death: initially on 24 December 2009 after an airstrike in Yemen, and again following a drone strike on 10 September 2012. Nonetheless, Yemeni officials and AQAP sources later confirmed he had survived these attacks. On 21 October 2012, al-Shihri issued an audio statement denying reports of his demise.

On 22 January 2013, sources reported that he succumbed to injuries sustained during a late-2012 drone strike. AQAP officially acknowledged his death on 17 July 2013, stating that although he survived the earlier strike, he was ultimately killed by a U.S. drone strike in 2013 after suffering serious wounds. In August 2014, AQAP released a video recounting his survival of the 2012 attack and subsequent death the following year.

Early life

According to the Yemen Post, al-Shihri did not complete high school. The United States Department of Defense reported that around 2000 he spent approximately two months in Afghanistan and received training at a Libyan camp situated north of Kabul. He asserted that his purpose for being in Afghanistan was to buy carpets for his family’s furniture business and denied any involvement with weapons or combat activities.

In 2001, al-Shihri departed Saudi Arabia for Bahrain. Authorities placed him on a watch list due to allegations that he financed travel for fighters heading to Afghanistan after the September 11 attacks and assisted Saudis in obtaining fraudulent travel documents. He was also accused of meeting extremists in Mashad, Iran and providing them with information about routes into Afghanistan through the Al-Tayyibat crossing.

Capture

Al-Shihri was apprehended near the Pakistan border close to Spin Boldak in December 2001. At the time, he was traveling with an Afghan driver, a member of the Saudi Red Crescent, and a Saudi embassy official inside a vehicle supplying an Afghan camp. He carried a leg wound attributed to the American aerial bombardment of Afghanistan and possessed $1,900, which he claimed was intended for the Red Crescent; however, U.S. authorities suspected these funds were used to finance fighters traveling from Bahrain to Afghanistan.

Combatant Status Review

At the outset, the Bush administration asserted that detainees captured during the War on Terror were not entitled to protections under the Geneva Conventions, which led to calls from critics for proper tribunals to establish their legal status. In response, the Department of Defense created Combatant Status Review Tribunals (CSRTs) tasked with determining whether individuals qualified as "enemy combatants."

Those held had no access to legal counsel during CSRT proceedings and were denied full disclosure of all evidence used against them. The CSRTs operated without adherence to conventional evidentiary standards, generally accepting government-provided information as truthful. Detainees were permitted to submit "reasonably available" evidence and request witness testimony. Between July 2004 and March 2005, CSRTs conducted status reviews for detainees; al-Shihri was among those who opted not to participate.

The U.S. Supreme Court, in Boumediene v. Bush, determined that CSRTs did not provide an adequate substitute for habeas corpus protections, highlighting concerns over factual inaccuracies and the tribunals’ lack of authority to order release.

A Summary of Evidence memorandum accused al-Shihri of:

• traveling from Saudi Arabia to Afghanistan after the September 11 attacks carrying $1,900 intended for the Red Crescent;
• serving as an "al Qaida travel facilitator" by financing fighters and assisting border crossings between Afghanistan and Iran;
• appearing on a watch list for helping Saudis obtain fraudulent travel documents;
• undergoing training at a camp located north of Kabul in Libya;
• receiving a fatwa that authorized assassination;
• sustaining a leg injury during U.S. aerial strikes in Afghanistan.

Administrative Review Board

Individuals designated as "enemy combatants" by the Combatant Status Review Tribunal were subject to annual Administrative Review Board hearings. These sessions evaluated potential threats detainees might pose if released or transferred and considered reasons supporting continued detention.

2005 Summary of Evidence memo

The three-page Summary of Evidence memo prepared for his 2005 annual review outlined fifteen principal factors supporting ongoing detention alongside eight factors favoring release or transfer. It indicated that al-Shihri entered Afghanistan via its eastern border with Pakistan, contrary to previous claims about crossing from Iran in the west. The directive to carry out an assassination was attributed to Sheikh Hamud Al-Uqqla. He was reported to have met with Abu Faisal al Ghamdi, who served as regional director of the charity al Wafa, an organization linked by U.S. intelligence to terrorist activities; additionally, a phone number belonging to another al Wafa director was found among his possessions. The memo reiterated his claim that his travel was motivated by humanitarian objectives and that he was wounded within 17 hours of arriving. He denied any affiliation with al Wafa, al Qaida, weaponry, combat operations, or recruitment efforts and stated that Osama bin Laden "did not represent Islam."

2006 Summary of Evidence memo

The four-page Summary of Evidence memo from 2006 detailed twenty-two factors advocating for continued detention and nine supporting release or transfer. It noted that al-Shihri chose charitable work in Pakistan after hearing Shaykh Abdullah al-Jibrin speak at the Al-Rajeh mosque in Saudi Arabia and viewing footage depicting Afghan refugees. He reportedly visited a refugee camp near Chaman, Pakistan to observe humanitarian aid activities. The memo described his involvement with fighters: meeting extremists in Mashad, Iran after September 11 to provide guidance on entering Afghanistan through the Al-Tayyibat crossing. It specified his crossing point near Spin Buldak, accompanied by an Afghan driver, a Saudi Red Crescent employee, and a Saudi embassy official delivering supplies to a camp approximately 5 kilometers from Spin Buldak and Quetta, Pakistan. One alias linked him to military training camp applications submitted from an Arab office in Kandahar. The document accused him of "instigating" an assassination based on a fatwa issued by Al-Uqqla. Contrary to earlier statements, it claimed he was not injured but instead escaped Afghanistan through Iran en route to Kuwait. Reports indicated he received hospital treatment from the Red Crescent in Pakistan before being detained there.

2007 Annual Review Summary

The 2007 Summary of Evidence memorandum for Said Ali Shari's yearly assessment identified eleven factors supporting his continued detention and six favoring either release or transfer. No additional allegations were introduced. On January 9, 2009, the Department of Defense disclosed two extensively redacted memoranda addressed to Gordon R. England, the Designated Civilian Official, originating from Al-Shihri's review board. Both the board’s recommendation and England’s decision dated July 23, 2007, remained heavily censored.

Guantanamo Health Records

On March 16, 2007, the Department of Defense made public the detainees’ height and weight data. Al Shihri was recorded as standing 62 inches tall. His weight was documented on 46 separate occasions, ranging from 138 pounds upon his arrival on January 21, 2002, to 171 pounds on November 19, 2006.

Return to Saudi Arabia

A list released by the Department of Defense on November 25, 2008, indicated that Al Shihri was transferred back to Saudi custody on November 9, 2007, along with thirteen other detainees. His repatriation was subject to formal internal evaluations in 2005, 2006, and 2007; however, only the Board’s recommendations from 2007 and the final approval by the Designated Civilian Official were published—and both were redacted.

At least ten individuals from this group were repatriated without undergoing formal review processes. BBC journalist Peter Taylor identified this cohort as "batch 10," which was considered problematic; notably, Al Shihri and four others from this batch appeared on Saudi Arabia’s most wanted list.

Life After Release

Following his return to Saudi control, Sa'id participated in a Saudi government rehabilitation and reintegration initiative designed for former jihadists, which received partial funding from the United States.

Co-founder of Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula

After completing the Saudi rehabilitation program in January 2009, Sa'id featured in multiple jihadist videos. One such video identified him as the second-in-command of Al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula. He appeared alongside Abu Hareth Muhammad al-Oufi, Abu Baseer al-Wahayshi, and Abu Hureira Qasm al-Rimi in a threatening video posted on YouTube.

The New York Times linked Al-Shihri to a car bomb explosion outside the U.S. Embassy in Sana'a.

On January 26, 2009, the Saudi Gazette published interviews with Al Shihri’s father and wife. His father described Sa'id as having left school after primary education and noted his two marriages and a young daughter. He recounted Sa'id’s troubled mental state post-detention, where Sa'id expressed that he "thought about death all the time." After release, Sa'id intended to serve as an imam and was housed by family members. However, following Ramadan, he abandoned his pregnant wife and child with relatives and vanished.

His wife stated that Sa'id behaved normally before disappearing and regarded the monthly government stipend of 3000 Saudi Riyals as "an honor." She also reported that after his disappearance, a sister-in-law mentioned he had asked her to acquire a cell phone but never used it to call.

The Saudi Gazette also revealed that Yusuf Al-Shihri—one of Al-Shihri’s brothers-in-law—was a former Guantanamo detainee. While his wife noticed no unusual behavior, their father blamed Sa'id’s defection on influences from other ex-detainees and expressed sorrow that Sa'id had not succumbed to injuries sustained in Afghanistan.

Muhammad al-Oufi’s mother told the Saudi Gazette that her son’s radicalization was largely due to Sa'id’s influence.

Encouraged Somali Pirates to Intensify Assaults on "Crusaders"

On 16 April 2009, CBS News conveyed a statement from Al Shihri calling on Somali pirates to amplify their attacks against "crusaders" both at sea and within Djibouti.

Although CBS highlighted limited proof of direct coordination between Al Qaeda and Somali pirate groups, the broadcast included a pledge from al-Shihri’s faction to leaders Osama bin Laden, Ayman Al Zawahiri, and Mullah Omar that they would establish a new front in the Arabian Peninsula.

Identified as a Former Detainee Who Resumed Terrorist Activities

On 27 May 2009, the Defense Intelligence Agency issued a fact sheet naming ex-detainees who had reportedly "re-engaged in terrorism," among them al Awfi and Al Shihri.

Associated with the Killing of Christian Missionaries in Yemen

According to Fox News, referencing Robert Spencer of Jihad Watch, Said Ali Al Shihri was linked to the abduction and murder of Christian missionaries Rita Stumpp, Anita Gruenwald, Eom Young-sun, as well as the kidnapping of six additional medical missionaries.

Fox News also cited Gregory Johnsen, editor of "Islam and Insurgency in Yemen", who commented on the situation.

No group claimed responsibility for these killings; however, al-Shihri’s alleged involvement raised doubts about the success of Saudi jihadist rehabilitation initiatives and complicated U.S. strategies under President Barack Obama aimed at closing Guantanamo Bay.

Issued a Video Appeal for Financial Support

On 30 September 2009, the Middle East Media Resources Institute reported that Said Al Shiri published a video soliciting donations. Both Said's father and Prince Muhammad Bin Naif, Assistant Deputy Interior Minister for Security Affairs, publicly denounced these fundraising attempts.

Reported Death in Yemeni Airstrike

On 24 December 2009, ABC News covered an airstrike in Yemen that might have eliminated senior al Qaeda figures, potentially including Nasir al-Wuhayshi, al-Shihri, and Anwar al-Awlaki.

Captured by Yemeni Authorities

Yemeni security forces announced on 19 January 2010 that they had detained al-Shiri after he tried to bypass a checkpoint; his arrest followed a vehicular accident.

Audio Message Released in February 2010

The Yemen Post revealed that al Shihri issued an audio recording following rumors of his death and capture. The message indicated that Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula leader Nasser al Wahayshi was killed during the December airstrike. Al Shihri took credit for Nigerian Umar Umar Farouk Abdulmutalib’s attempted airline bombing and warned of forthcoming operations aimed at controlling the Bab Al-Mandab strait. He further accused the U.S. of planning troop deployments into Yemen targeting his organization.

Mass Arrests of Alleged Followers in March 2010

On 25 March 2010, Saudi authorities reported apprehending 100 individuals suspected of supporting Al Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula. Intelligence suggested that some detainees were exchanging encrypted emails with Said Al Shihri, a Saudi AQAP commander believed to operate under the alias "Abu Hajer."

Custody Dispute Involvement

In August 2009, Saoud Aal Shaye al-Qahtani, who was previously married to Umm Hajir Al-Azdi—al-Shihri’s wife—initiated a legal battle over child custody. He claimed that Umm Hajir, known for advocating takfir (the act of declaring others as apostates), had taken their 11-year-old son to Yemen alongside al-Shihri in May 2009. Al-Qahtani expressed apprehensions related to her remarriage to al-Shihri, the incarceration of her younger brother at Guantanamo Bay, the presence of three militant jihadist siblings, and the death of her second spouse at the hands of Saudi security forces in 2004.

Death Reports

On 22 January 2013, relatives of al-Shihri announced that he had succumbed to injuries from a previous airstrike. An AQAP spokesperson verified his passing after what was described as a "long journey" combating what they termed the "Zio-Crusader campaign." The precise details surrounding his death remain uncertain; family members indicated that a drone strike might have caused his fatal wounds in December 2012. However, on 9 April, AQAP’s media division distributed an audio recording and photograph of al-Shihri, while an AQ cleric contested the claims about his demise.

Confirmed Death

Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula officially declared on 17 July 2013 that al-Shihri had been killed in a U.S. drone strike. This declaration, shared via militant platforms, did not disclose the exact date of his death. Later, in August 2014, the group disclosed that he had survived a 2012 drone attack but suffered severe injuries including the loss of his right eye, right ear, and part of his skull before ultimately dying in 2013.