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TACA Flight 390

From Alfawiki
TACA International
IndustryAirline
Headquarters
San Salvador
,
El Salvador
ProductsAir transport services

TACA Flight 390 was a scheduled service on May 30, 2008, operated by TACA International, traveling from San Salvador, El Salvador, to Miami, Florida, with intermediate stops in Tegucigalpa and San Pedro Sula, Honduras. Upon landing at Tegucigalpa's Toncontín International Airport, the Airbus A320-233 overran the runway, colliding with an embankment and causing damage to several vehicles.[1]

The investigation, conducted by El Salvador's Civil Aviation Authority, concluded pilot error was the primary cause. The flight crew initiated a go-around following an unstable initial approach but miscalculated the available runway length amid worsening weather conditions. The aircraft touched down well beyond the advised touchdown zone. Contributing elements included a tailwind, the aircraft’s substantial weight, and a wet runway surface, which collectively hindered braking effectiveness and led to the overrun. Despite rainfall during the incident, investigators determined the wet runway was not the main factor.[1]

Aircraft

The aircraft involved was an Airbus A320-233, construction number 1374, manufactured in 2000. It began service with TACA in 2001 under registration N465TA and was later re-registered as EI-TAF in 2006. The plane had been leased twice: first to Cubana de Aviación in 2001 and then to Martinair in 2007.

Passengers and Crew

Nationality Total
Honduras 60
Costa Rica 17
Argentina 9
Guatemala 8
United States 7
Nicaragua 5
Mexico 3
El Salvador 3
Brazil 2
Canada 2
Colombia 2
Spain 2
Germany 1
Georgia 1
Italy 1
Uruguay 1
Total 135

Onboard were 124 passengers and a crew of eleven representing sixteen different nationalities, with Hondurans forming the largest group. All crew members were Honduran except for the Salvadoran pilots. Costa Rican authorities reported twenty-three nationals aboard; however, TACA’s passenger list showed only seventeen. The Spanish embassy confirmed that two Spanish citizens residing in Honduras were passengers. Additionally, Argentina’s embassy noted that nine ballet dancers traveling to a festival in Honduras were among those onboard.

Distinguished passengers included Brian Michael Fraser Neele, Brazil’s ambassador to Honduras; Daniel López Carballo, former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; Harry Brautigam, president of the Central American Bank for Economic Integration; Norman Garcia, former Honduran Minister of Industry and Commerce; Marta Castillo, Vice-president of the Chamber of Commerce; and Helio Fallas, former Costa Rican Minister of Housing.

Flight crew details:

  • Captain Cesare Edoardo D'Antonio Mena, aged 40, served as pilot-in-command with a total of 11,899 flight hours, including 8,514 hours on the Airbus A320.
  • First Officer Juan Rodolfo Artero Arevalo, aged 26, acted as pilot-not-flying with accumulated experience of 1,607 flight hours, including 250 hours on the Airbus A320.

Airport

Toncontín International Airport is regarded as one of the world’s most hazardous airports due to its location within a valley encircled by mountainous terrain and densely populated neighborhoods in Tegucigalpa. This unique environment necessitates a highly specialized approach procedure for safe landings. Pilots must perform a steep descent followed by a sharp turn amid frequently difficult weather conditions. The runway itself is relatively short at just under two kilometers and is bordered by public roads at both ends.

Both pilots had prior experience operating at Toncontín: Captain D'Antonio had completed fifty-two landings there, while First Officer Artero had five.

Accident

Flight 390 operated as a short-distance route from San Salvador to Tegucigalpa, with a continuing leg to Miami, Florida. On 30 May 2008, the aircraft was carrying 124 passengers alongside 11 crew members. Although planned to depart at 08:45 local time, it actually took off from Comalapa Airport at 09:05.

First approach

At 15:17 local time, while flying at an altitude of 15,000 feet approaching from the west, Flight 390 established contact with Tegucigalpa approach control. The crew was instructed to descend to 10,000 feet for a VOR approach to Runway 02, followed by a visual circling maneuver before landing. Weather conditions featured visibility of 2 kilometers, low cloud cover south of the airport, rain, and winds at 5 knots.

Air traffic control then directed the flight to descend further to 9,000 feet and report upon reaching the southwest fix for the VOR approach. Cleared to maintain flight at 5,600 feet, the crew attempted to locate the runway but encountered poor visibility. Captain D'Antonio prepared for a possible go-around if the runway remained out of sight. First Officer Artero observed the city but could not spot the runway. Concerned about the limited visibility, the captain requested permission to climb to 8,000 feet in order to initiate a go-around.

09:26:35 Captain Check if you see anything; if not, we will execute a go-around
09:26:39 First Officer [Unintelligible], ...not yet. No.
09:26:46 First Officer The city is visible here, Captain!
09:26:48 Captain Yes, but I can’t circle like this
09:26:49 First Officer Understood.
09:26:57 Captain Request clearance to climb to eight thousand and... heading zero zero eight.

ATC granted approval for ascent to 8,000 feet and instructed a left turn toward the VOR station. During this go-around phase, Captain D'Antonio decided against engaging TO/GA thrust settings so as to minimize discomfort for passengers.

Second approach

While ascending to 8,000 feet, Captain D'Antonio opted not to use Runway 20 due to cloud cover and restricted visibility conditions. Instead, he planned to circle and land on Runway 02 despite encountering a tailwind. This plan was communicated to ATC and received authorization. Doubtful about proceeding with this landing option, he contacted TACA operations regarding diversion possibilities at San Pedro Sula Airport, which had been pre-designated as an alternate airport with additional fuel loaded for contingencies. Although the TACA representative suggested landing on Runway 20, Captain D'Antonio chose to adhere to his initial plan because of weather concerns.

First Officer Artero asked for updated weather information; ATC reported wind speeds of seven knots. During descent through 6,000 feet altitude, the crew visually acquired the runway and decided on circling for an approach to Runway 02. The controller confirmed wind direction at 200° with a speed of ten knots. The crew informed ATC that they would continue visual circling toward Runway 02 due to difficulty performing a circling approach to Runway 20 under prevailing conditions.

During this circling maneuver, both autopilot and flight director systems were disengaged; landing gear was lowered and flaps fully extended. The crew completed their landing checklist and proceeded with descent. ATC cleared them for landing while advising that the runway was wet and there was a ten-knot tailwind present. Around 09:45 a.m., Flight 390 touched down on Toncontín’s Runway 02 approximately four hundred meters beyond the displaced threshold while experiencing a ten-knot tailwind.

Crash

Shortly after landing, the flight crew activated the ground spoilers and gradually applied manual braking, reaching full pedal pressure while the Airbus A320 was still moving at 90 knots. The thrust levers remained in forward idle, with most spoilers retracted, yet the aircraft's deceleration was inadequate. As the plane approached the runway's end, the antiskid system was disabled and the spoilers fully deployed. Both pilots engaged the parking brake, but despite these efforts, the aircraft overran at a speed of 54 knots, briefly became airborne again, and ultimately crashed onto a public roadway, striking two vehicles—including a taxi—and a motorcycle. The fuselage fractured into three primary segments; the cockpit and avionics bay intruded into the business class cabin, resulting in numerous injuries.

A fire ignited on the right wing upon impact but was swiftly extinguished by a nearby fire truck. Emergency teams from Toncontín airport were promptly dispatched. Survivors evacuated through opened doors and structural breaches in the fuselage, while rescue personnel worked to extricate occupants trapped within business class by debris.

Response

Emergency responders arrived within minutes, controlling fuel leaks and putting out fires. They opened the forward door to release passengers who were trapped and assisted at least two individuals confined in crushed vehicles. Authorities secured the crash site and managed crowds of spectators.

TACA established dedicated communication lines for relatives and published passenger manifests. The airline confirmed that emergency protocols were immediately enacted.

The accident claimed five lives, including Captain D'Antonio. Among the deceased were Jeanne Chantal Neele, spouse of Brazil’s ambassador to Honduras Brian Michael Fraser Neele—who was also aboard—and Nicaraguan businessman Harry Brautigam, president of the Central American Bank for Economic Integration; Brautigam suffered a fatal heart attack. Initial reports mentioned two fatalities on the ground; Honduran media later verified these were a taxi driver and motorcyclist whose vehicles were crushed beneath the aircraft.

A total of sixty-five individuals sustained injuries, many resulting from smoke inhalation and cuts; thirty-nine were seriously hurt, with one patient airlifted due to critical burns. Passengers seated in business class endured the most severe trauma. Notable among the injured were Ambassador Fraser Neele and former head of Honduras’ armed forces Daniel López Carballo. Victims received treatment at major hospitals in Tegucigalpa—including Honduras General Hospital and Military Hospital—with some transferred to specialized medical facilities. TACA’s executive director Roberto Kriete reported at least four patients in critical condition, including First Officer Artero.

In response to the crash, Honduran President Manuel Zelaya ordered Toncontin International Airport closed to large aircraft operations, redirecting flights to Palmerola Air Base and San Pedro Sula airports; smaller planes remained permitted at Toncontin. Zelaya referenced concerns expressed by U.S. President George W. Bush regarding airport safety and announced plans for constructing a new airport near Toncontin to mitigate its status as one of the world’s most hazardous airports.

Investigation

The responsibility for examining the accident was assigned by Honduran officials to the Civil Aviation Authority of El Salvador in accordance with the Convention on International Civil Aviation. Despite this delegation, the Honduran Civil Aviation Authority remained actively engaged due to the event occurring within its jurisdictional airspace. Investigative teams from the United States National Transportation Safety Board and the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) also took part in the inquiry. Furthermore, representatives from France's BEA were dispatched to provide support.

Landing analysis

The aircraft attempted a second landing approach to Runway 02 at Toncontín amid recognized challenging weather conditions involving both tailwind and headwind components. The touchdown happened approximately 400 meters beyond the runway’s displaced threshold, with the plane traveling at a ground speed near 160 knots. The nose gear remained elevated for around seven seconds before making contact roughly 950 meters from the threshold.

Immediately following touchdown, maximum use of reverse thrust and ground spoilers was initiated, succeeded by manual braking which deactivated the autobrake system. Brake pressure readings indicated proper operation, showing variability attributable to the anti-skid system’s function in preventing aquaplaning.

Nevertheless, the flight crew prematurely retracted the spoilers and decreased thrust reverser power under the impression that deceleration was adequate. The aircraft’s landing weight—close to its maximum limit due to unloaded cargo—negatively impacted its stopping performance. At about 1,550 meters from the threshold, just 300 meters short of the runway’s end, the crew observed a reduction in deceleration from 0.35G to 0.15G and consequently disabled the anti-skid system.

Turning off the anti-skid eliminated aquaplaning protection; inspection of the wheels revealed three with flat spots consistent with aquaplaning on a wet surface. With insufficient runway remaining for effective stopping, despite braking efforts, the aircraft overran onto an adjacent road.

Simulations conducted by investigators determined that applying full braking and maximum reverse thrust immediately upon touchdown would have prevented the runway excursion.

Weather condition

Radar imagery indicated that Tegucigalpa was enveloped by rain-laden clouds and low cloud ceilings during Flight 390’s approach, which complicated visibility for landing. These conditions were influenced by Tropical Storm Alma, responsible for heavy rainfall, flooding, and variable winds throughout the area.

The storm directly affected Flight 390’s landing attempts at Toncontín. After an unsuccessful effort to land on Runway 02, the crew considered Runway 20; however, the cloud ceiling measured only 2,500 feet—below that runway’s minimum decision altitude of 2,703 feet. Concerned about terrain hazards associated with Runway 20, including potential mountain collision, the captain opted to return to Runway 02.

Meteorological data revealed strong winds at Tegucigalpa airport including both headwinds and tailwinds. The tailwind component reached approximately 10 knots—twice the maximum allowable limit of 5 knots for landing—which would have adversely affected braking performance. According to Airbus A320 operational procedures, when landing with a tailwind, touchdown should occur before the first perpendicular taxiway; Flight 390 made contact roughly 150 meters beyond this point.

The runway surface lacked adequate grooving necessary for effective water drainage, leading to accumulation on its surface that diminished braking capability and heightened aquaplaning risk.

Together, the presence of a 10-knot tailwind combined with standing water on the runway significantly compromised deceleration effectiveness.

Decision to land

The challenging approach into Toncontín was further complicated by unfavorable weather conditions. After an unsuccessful initial landing attempt, the crew faced heightened workload and stress, which likely influenced their judgment under the pressure of avoiding a diversion to San Pedro Sula. This scenario contributed to suboptimal decision-making.

Although air traffic control alerted the crew about the significant tailwind on Runway 02, Captain D'Antonio chose to proceed with landing on that runway. Despite San Pedro Sula being designated as an alternate destination and company guidelines advising diversion under such circumstances, the decision was made to continue the landing attempt.

Upon touchdown, braking performance was compromised due to the tailwind, the aircraft’s near-maximum landing weight, and a short, wet runway surface. The Actual Landing Distance (ALD) required was calculated at 1,572 meters, while Toncontín’s available runway length was 1,649 meters. Since the aircraft touched down beyond the recommended touchdown zone, it exceeded the distance available for stopping safely.

Conclusion

The investigation report concluded that the aircraft landed with a tailwind from the displaced threshold end of the runway. As this was the first intermediate stop on a lengthy transcontinental flight, the plane was close to its maximum permitted landing weight (63.5 tons compared to a 64.5-ton limit). Additionally, the runway conditions were adversely affected by wetness following Tropical Storm Alma.

The Civil Aviation Authority identified the primary cause as the flight crew’s choice to continue with the landing without adequately evaluating runway conditions, which breached standard operating procedures. Contributing elements included the absence of runway grooving and an elevated landing speed.

Aftermath

In response to the accident, Toncontín’s runway underwent refurbishment in May 2009, featuring a 300-meter extension that increased its length from 1,863 meters to 2,163 meters. Eventually, flight operations at Toncontín Airport were transferred following the inauguration of Comayagua International Airport (previously Palmerola Air Base) in 2021.

See also

External links

  1. ↑ 1.0 1.1 Cite error: Invalid <ref> tag; no text was provided for refs named CAA final report
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