United Airlines Flight 175

United Airlines Flight 175
Industry	Aviation
Headquarters	Chicago, United States
Products	Passenger air transport (domestic route Boston to Los Angeles)

United Airlines Flight 175 was a domestic route operating between Logan International Airport in Boston and Los Angeles International Airport. On September 11, 2001, it was seized by five terrorists affiliated with al-Qaeda. The aircraft, a Boeing 767-200 carrying 51 passengers and 9 crew members (not including the hijackers), was intentionally flown into the South Tower of the World Trade Center in New York City. This attack resulted in the deaths of everyone on board as well as over 600 individuals located in the upper floors of the tower. Flight 175 ranks as the second most fatal airplane crash ever recorded, following American Airlines Flight 11.

The flight took off from Logan Airport at 08:14. Approximately 28 minutes later, the hijackers assaulted the crew, forced their way into the cockpit, and killed both pilots. The lead hijacker, Marwan al-Shehhi, who had received pilot training specifically for this mission, assumed control of the plane. Unlike the team responsible for Flight 11, those on Flight 175 did not turn off the transponder, allowing air traffic control (ATC) to detect its deviation from the planned route at 08:51. Despite attempts by ATC to establish communication, the aircraft continued flying erratically toward New York City and nearly collided with other planes. Meanwhile, three passengers were able to contact relatives on the ground, providing information about the hijackers and reporting casualties.

Within just 21 minutes after taking control, al-Shehhi crashed Flight 175 into floors 77 through 85 of the South Tower at 09:03. This strike occurred shortly after Flight 11 had impacted the North Tower at 08:46. Due to media attention focused on Flight 11’s crash, Flight 175’s impact was broadcast live globally. The resulting fire and structural damage caused the South Tower to collapse at 09:59, killing all individuals inside at that time. Recovery operations identified some victims’ remains; however, many remain unidentified.

Attacks

The hijacking of this flight was part of the coordinated September 11 attacks planned by Osama bin Laden, leader of al-Qaeda, who provided both funding and logistical support. The operation was masterminded by Khalid Sheikh Mohammed. Bin Laden, Mohammed, and the hijackers were driven by opposition to U.S. backing for Israel and American involvement in Middle Eastern affairs. Bin Laden gave his approval for these attacks in late 1998 or early 1999. The World Trade Center was selected due to its status as a powerful emblem of American economic influence.

Hijackers

The group that commandeered United Airlines Flight 175 was led by Marwan al-Shehhi, a native of the United Arab Emirates who received pilot training in Hamburg, Germany. By January 2001, all pilot hijackers had completed their training; al-Shehhi obtained his commercial pilot license in South Florida alongside Mohamed Atta (who led American Airlines Flight 11) and Ziad Jarrah (Flight 93). Other members included Fayez Banihammad (also from UAE) and three Saudi nationals: brothers Hamza and Ahmed al-Ghamdi as well as Mohand al-Shehri.

Their preparation involved training at an al-Qaeda camp located in Mes Aynak, Afghanistan, where they focused on weapons handling and explosives usage. Following this, they continued training in Karachi, Pakistan to familiarize themselves with Western customs and travel procedures. In Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, they conducted surveillance exercises related to airport security by boarding flights operated by U.S. carriers to observe security checks, crew activities, and cabin service schedules.

Approximately one month before executing their plan, Marwan al-Shehhi purchased two small pocket knives in Boynton Beach, Florida; Fayez Banihammad acquired a two-piece utility knife set from Wal-Mart; Hamza al-Ghamdi bought a Leatherman Wave multi-tool. The hijackers arrived in Boston from Florida between September 7 and September 9.

Aircraft

The aircraft involved was a Boeing 767-200, bearing the registration N612UA, which United Airlines had received in 1983. This model could accommodate 168 passengers, distributed as 10 in first class, 32 in business class, and 126 in economy. On the day of the incident, it carried 56 passengers alongside 9 crew members, resulting in a load factor of approximately 33 percent—significantly lower than the average of 49 percent recorded over the prior three months.

Crew

The flight was commanded by Captain Victor Saracini, aged 51, who had a background as a Navy fighter pilot and had served with United for 16 years. First Officer Michael Horrocks, 38, brought experience as a former Marine Corps fighter pilot and had been with the airline for two years. The cabin crew consisted of purser Kathryn Laborie, aged 42, with seven years at United; flight attendants Michael Tarrou (38) with a decade of service, Amy King (29) with eight years, Amy Jarret (28) with six years; and Robert Fangman (33), Alfred Marchand (44), and Alicia Titus (28), each having less than one year on the job.

Passengers

Among the 60 individuals on board (excluding the five hijackers) were nationals from various countries: 50 Americans, three Germans, two British citizens, along with passengers from Iran, Israel, Indonesia, Ireland, and Canada. The youngest victim was Christine Hanson (born February 22, 1999), while the oldest passenger was Dorothy DeAraujo from Long Beach, California, aged 82. Noteworthy travelers included hockey scout Garnet Bailey and former athlete Mark Bavis.

Boarding

Approximately two hours prior to boarding, hijacker Marwan al-Shehhi contacted Ziad Jarrah at 05:01 to confirm that preparations for the attacks were underway. Hamza al-Ghamdi and Ahmed al-Ghamdi checked out from their hotel and took a taxi to Logan International Airport. They arrived at United Airlines Terminal C check-in counter at 06:20; Ahmed proceeded to check two pieces of luggage. Although the hijackers had tickets purchased weeks before, they behaved as if buying new ones and struggled to respond to security questions adequately, causing agents to repeat inquiries slowly until satisfied. At 06:45, al-Shehhi checked one bag; Fayez Banihammad and Mohand al-Shehri completed their check-in at 06:53, with Banihammad checking two bags. None of these individuals were selected for additional screening under CAPPS protocols.

At 06:52, al-Shehhi phoned Mohamed Atta’s cellphone to confirm synchronization; Atta was preparing to board Flight 11 from a different terminal. Between 07:23 and 07:28, al-Shehhi and the other hijackers boarded Flight175, taking seats in first and business class.

The flight was set to depart at 08:00 bound for Los Angeles with a total of 51 passengers plus five hijackers on board. The aircraft pushed back from the gate at 07:58 and lifted off at 08:14 from Runway 9 as Flight 11 was simultaneously being hijacked. Both captain and first officer overheard suspicious transmissions originating from an unidentified aircraft—later identified as Flight 11’s cockpit—but delayed reporting this until entering New York Center airspace to avoid interception.

By 08:33, Flight175 had reached its cruising altitude of , which is typically when cabin service commences. Air traffic controllers asked Flight175’s pilots whether they could spot Flight 11; initially unable to do so, they soon located it at and received instructions to maintain separation. At 08:42, after transitioning into New York Center airspace, Flight175’s crew reported hearing a broadcast directing passengers to remain seated—this was their final communication before the assault began.

Hijacking

The hijacking took place between 08:42 and 08:46. Authorities believe the al-Ghamdi brothers used knives, bomb threats, and mace to force passengers and crew toward the rear of the aircraft. A flight attendant suffered a stabbing, and pilots were killed by Fayez Banihammad and Mohand al-Shehri, enabling Marwan al-Shehhi to assume control of the plane. The initial indication of irregular activity was the aircraft's transponder changing codes shortly after the North Tower was struck, accompanied by a deviation from its planned route. Unlike Flight 11, Flight 175’s data continued to be monitored. At 08:51, it altered its altitude; during the following three minutes, air traffic controllers attempted unsuccessfully to establish contact and cleared adjacent airspace. By 08:55, the New York Air Traffic Control Center had been informed of the hijacking, with controller Bottiglia remarking, "We might have a hijack over here, two of them."

Near misses

During this timeframe, Flight 175 came dangerously close to colliding midair with Delta Air Lines Flight 2315 traveling from Hartford to Tampa, missing by roughly 300 feet. Bottiglia directed the Delta pilot to execute evasive maneuvers due to the suspected hijacking. The Traffic Collision Avoidance System likely activated as Flight 175 momentarily ceased its descent at 28,000 feet, ascended approximately 300 feet, then resumed descending after passing Delta’s aircraft. Shortly thereafter, Flight 175 narrowly avoided TWA Flight 3 from JFK to St. Louis by about 500 feet and also evaded Midwest Express Flight 7 from Milwaukee to New York just prior to crashing.

Calls

Flight attendant Robert Fangman along with passengers Peter Hanson and Brian David Sweeney placed phone calls using GTE airphones located in the rear section of the plane. Records indicate passenger Garnet Bailey attempted four calls to his wife.

At 08:52, Fangman contacted United Airlines maintenance in San Francisco, reporting the hijacking situation: both pilots were deceased, a flight attendant had been stabbed, and hijackers appeared to be in control of the aircraft. The call lasted approximately 75 seconds before ending. Maintenance personnel then tried reaching the cockpit via Aircraft Communication Addressing and Reporting System (ACARS) but received no reply.

Brian David Sweeney phoned his wife at 08:59, leaving a message detailing the hijacking. At 09:00, he spoke briefly with his mother, Louise, informing her that passengers intended to storm the cockpit. Concerned about interference from hijackers, he ended the conversation quickly after saying goodbye.

At 08:52, Peter Hanson called his father in Easton, Connecticut. Traveling with his wife and daughter—the youngest victim in the September 11 attacks—Hanson reported that the cockpit had been overtaken, a flight attendant stabbed, and possibly others killed. He described erratic aircraft movements and urged his father to contact United Airlines; when unsuccessful in reaching them, his father alerted law enforcement.

Hanson’s second call at 09:00 conveyed worsening conditions:

It's getting bad, Dad. A stewardess was stabbed. They have knives and Mace. They said they have a bomb. Passengers are sick; the plane moves jerkily. I don't think the pilot is flying. I think we are going down—likely toward a building. Don't worry, Dad. If it happens, it'll be very fast... Oh, my God... oh, my God.

The call ended suddenly amid a woman’s scream. Hanson's father and Louise Sweeney then witnessed live on television as the plane crashed into the South Tower.

Crash

At 08:58, Flight 175 was positioned over New Jersey at , with al-Shehhi likely observing smoke emanating from the North Tower. During the final five minutes before impact, the aircraft entered a continuous power dive exceeding , descending at an average rate surpassing per minute—an extraordinary speed for a commercial airliner.

Approximately two minutes prior to collision, New York Center notified another Air Traffic Control facility that tracked Flight 175’s trajectory over New Jersey, Staten Island, and Upper New York Bay, as al-Shehhi maneuvered the plane toward the South Tower. In its closing moments, the plane banked sharply left, narrowly avoiding missing or merely grazing the building. The aircraft struck the South Tower’s southern face nose-first around , impacting floors 77 through 85 while carrying roughly of jet fuel. All occupants aboard perished instantly.

By 09:03, several news organizations were already reporting on the initial crash into the North Tower. The collision involving Flight 175 was captured live on television and recorded by nearly 100 amateur cameras, with footage extensively replayed before networks imposed restrictions on its broadcast. As of October 2024, there are 72 documented video perspectives of the second plane's impact. The initial assumption that Flight 11’s crash was accidental delayed evacuation orders for the South Tower; this stance changed following Flight 175’s collision.

The Port Authority promptly ordered a full evacuation of the North Tower immediately after Flight 11 struck but did not issue similar instructions for the South Tower during the subsequent 17-minute interval; workers were told to stay put. Nevertheless, approximately 2,900 individuals evacuated from floors that later became inaccessible before Flight 175's impact.

Over 600 people remained trapped between floors 77 and 110 when Flight 175 crashed, resulting in hundreds of fatalities both onboard and inside the building. Unlike the North Tower—where escape routes above floor 92 were destroyed—Flight 175 hit near the southeast corner of the South Tower’s southern face while executing a steep bank, narrowly missing Stairwell A located in the northwest corner. This left one stairwell largely intact throughout the building's height. Only 18 people managed to escape via this stairwell before the collapse at 09:59. Many trapped occupants avoided stairwells or moved upwards hoping for rooftop rescue amid smoke and fire; others may have been descending when the tower fell. Those unable to flee succumbed to fire, smoke inhalation, or structural failure. Three individuals fell from upper floors; two jumped to escape conditions inside—one landed on firefighter Daniel Suhr, who was killed.

The impact of Flight 175 also inflicted minor damage on the burning North Tower; windows on its east side shattered due to the pressure wave, exacerbating existing fires. Debris such as landing gear and fuselage fragments struck nearby buildings at 45–47 Park Place about north of the World Trade Center complex, causing significant structural damage.

Aftermath

The collision of Flight 175 with the South Tower occurred lower and more rapidly than Flight 11’s strike on the North Tower, impacting near a corner and critically weakening the building’s structural framework. This resulted in a heavier load pressing down on an already damaged and unbalanced section engulfed by flames. After burning for 56 minutes, the South Tower collapsed at 9:59 A.M. The collapse was primarily caused by fires fueled by the aircraft’s jet fuel rather than the initial impact. Although it was struck second, the South Tower was the first to fall. Tragically, there were no survivors inside at the time of its collapse.

Flight 175’s flight recorders were never located. Various debris, including landing gear components, an engine, and sections of the fuselage, were recovered near the World Trade Center site. In 2013, a wing flap from a Boeing 767 was found close to Ground Zero.

During recovery operations, small passenger remains were identified through DNA testing; however, many victims’ remains were never recovered. Following the attacks, United Airlines retired the flight numbers 175 and 93. In 2011, these numbers were unintentionally reused for codeshare flights, prompting criticism from media outlets and labor unions; United Airlines subsequently confirmed these designations would not be reassigned.

The names of those who perished on Flight 175 are engraved at the National September 11 Memorial & Museum. The United States government provided financial assistance to victims’ families, with a minimum payment of $500,000 for those who accepted compensation and waived their rights to pursue legal claims. More than $7 billion has been distributed through the September 11th Victim Compensation Fund to address claims related to all attacks.

Ninety-six lawsuits were initiated against United Airlines and affiliated entities; most were resolved confidentially with estimated settlements totaling approximately $500 million. Only one wrongful death case proceeded to trial before reaching a settlement in 2011. Additional legal actions targeting government officials were largely dismissed as lacking merit.

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