Jump to content

Western Libya campaign

From Alfawiki
Adapted from the English Wikipedia article Western Libya campaign, available under CC BY-SA 4.0Updated 29 November 2025102 sources
Operation Flood of Dignity
Company typeMilitary operation
IndustryMilitary
Founded4 April 2019
FounderLibyan National Army (LNA)
Area served
Western Libya, including Tripoli
Key people
Khalifa Haftar
ProductsMilitary campaign to seize control over western Libya


Template:Infobox military conflict

The Western Libya campaign was a military operation launched on 4 April 2019 by the Operation Flood of Dignity (Template:Langx-ar) conducted by the Libyan National Army (LNA), representing the Libyan House of Representatives, aiming to seize control over western regions of Libya, including the capital city Tripoli, which was held by the internationally recognized Government of National Accord (GNA). After fourteen months of combat, by June 2020, the GNA had reclaimed full authority over Tripoli, prompting a withdrawal of LNA forces from the capital.[1]

This campaign resulted in more than 2,468 fatalities.[2] The conflict commenced on 4 April 2019,[3] occurring just ten days prior to the planned Libyan National Conference intended to organize presidential and parliamentary elections,[4] and five days following the successful conclusion of initial rounds of the 2019 Libyan local elections.[5] Consequently, this military escalation forced the postponement of the upcoming Libyan National Conference by the United Nations Support Mission in Libya.[4]

The conflict has seen occurrences classified as war crimes and crimes against humanity; these fall under the jurisdiction mandated by the International Criminal Court investigation in Libya, pursuant to United Nations Security Council Resolution 1970.[6][7]

Background

Overview of western Libya prior to the April 2019 LNA offensive

After the ousting and death of Muammar Gaddafi and the collapse of the Great Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya in 2011, Libya experienced significant instability in its political and military spheres. By 2014, clashes among rival groups intensified, with the House of Representatives, headquartered in the eastern city of Tobruk, emerging as the principal political entity asserting its legitimacy as Libya's government. This House was backed militarily by Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar's Libyan National Army. In early 2016, a competing administration known as the Government of National Accord (GNA) was formed in Tripoli, receiving support from the UN and various nations.[8] Throughout 2017 and 2018, numerous efforts were made to facilitate dialogue between these two administrations and to arrange for new elections.[9][10][11] In November 2018 and again in February 2019, Haftar met with GNA Prime Minister Fayez al-Sarraj for direct negotiations.[12] Established in 2011,[13] the Supreme Judicial Council of Libya maintained its role as a unified national institution despite the political division,[14] conducting Libya-wide "transparent elections" in 2019 that resulted in a "peaceful transfer of power."[15]

Between 2018 and 2019, consultations were conducted with approximately 7,000 Libyans in person and around 130,000 online, organized by the United Nations Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL) alongside the Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue. These discussions culminated in plans to convene the Libyan National Conference in Ghadames from April 14 to April 16, 2019. The conference aimed to advise Libya’s House of Representatives and High Council of State on procedures and timing for conducting the anticipated presidential and parliamentary elections scheduled for that year.[4] The initial phase of the municipal elections in Libya took place on March 30, 2019.[5] The conference also sought to bring together all political factions with invitations extended broadly to establish a unity government between Sarraj and Haftar and develop a framework for drafting a new constitution.[16] However, concerns arose during March 2019 due to Haftar’s advancing forces in southern Libya over preceding months,[17] prompting Ghassan Salamé, head of UNSMIL, on April 4, to announce postponement of the conference. He emphasized it would be rescheduled "as soon as possible" because this historic opportunity must not be compromised. Salamé also stressed that holding such a conference amid active conflict would jeopardize participants’ safety and freedom to express their views.[4]

On April 4, 2019, Marshal Haftar released an audio message on Facebook declaring war against the UN-recognized Government of National Accord and announced that the Libyan National Army would seek military control over Tripoli.[18] In reaction, Tripoli’s government under Prime Minister Fayez al-Sarraj together with the Presidential Council called for a full mobilisation of all security forces.[19][20] Subsequently, on April 6, Prime Minister Sarraj—acting as supreme commander—established a joint operations room led by Major General Osama al-Juwaili, commander of the western military region, to coordinate military activities.[21]

International (non-UNSMIL)

Beginning in early 2015 and continuing up until the April 2019 offensive on Tripoli, Haftar benefited from sustained assistance provided by French officials. This support encompassed French advisors, covert agents, and special forces personnel who contributed to the LNA’s military engagements in Libya’s eastern and southern regions.[22] In July 2016, a helicopter crash near Benghazi resulted in the deaths of three French special forces members.[22] According to Bloomberg News, Italian authorities have been longstanding supporters of the al-Sarraj-led administration.[23]

The Economist highlighted that a May 2018 meeting convened by French President Emmanuel Macron between al-Sarraj and Haftar—amidst ongoing Franco-Italian competition over Libyan influence—undermined Ghassan Salamé’s mediation efforts aimed at organizing the Libyan National Conference. The publication identified the Greenstream natural gas pipeline and both French and Italian oil interests as pivotal elements shaping these countries’ interactions with Libyan political actors during 2018.[24]

Bloomberg News also characterized Russia, Egypt, and the United Arab Emirates as key supporters of Haftar.[23] Prior to the LNA’s assault on Tripoli, Saudi Arabia reportedly provided $20 million to Haftar’s forces. These funds were intended to secure tribal allegiances, recruit and compensate fighters, and cover additional military expenditures.[25]

On 27 December 2019, Bloomberg News disclosed Turkey’s plans to deploy its naval forces for Tripoli’s defense and dispatch troops to train Government of National Accord (GNA) fighters. Furthermore, Turkmen rebel factions engaged in northern Syria were anticipated to be relocated to Libya.[26][27] By 29 December, approximately 650 members of the Syrian National Army had arrived in Libya and were positioned along the eastern front lines near Tripoli.[28]

April

4 April

On 4 April 2019, marking the initial day of the offensive, the Libyan National Army (LNA) secured control over Gharyan.Cite error: Closing </ref> missing for <ref> tag[29] According to him, his mission orders included targeting roads and bridges.[30] The Portuguese Ministry of Defence clarified that the individual was not serving as a member of their armed forces.[31] Meanwhile, the GNA denied ownership of the aircraft that had been shot down.[32]

8 May

An ambulance clearly marked and carrying the Director of Tripoli Ambulance and Medical Emergency Services along with two medical staff members was destroyed on 8 May in Twaisha, located in Qasr bin Ghashir, Tripoli, by LNA forces. The Director suffered severe injuries resulting in the loss of both legs and remained in critical condition as of that date. The accompanying medical personnel were also wounded. Syed Jaffar Hussain, WHO's representative in Libya, condemned the attack on the ambulance as a "shocking and intolerable breach of international humanitarian law."[33]

10 May

Several extremist armed factions declared they would not adhere to any ceasefire agreement potentially established between GNA Prime Minister Fayez al-Sarraj and LNA commander Khalifa Haftar. Among them, the Al-Samoud Brigade from Misurata, led by Salah Badi, who is subject to U.S. and U.N. sanctions,[34] stated that "true rebels will reject any agreement with war criminal Haftar," emphasizing that their combat against LNA forces represents a "Jihad for God" which will continue until total victory is achieved.[35]

11 May

Haftar’s forces made advances into southern neighborhoods of Tripoli, particularly targeting the al-Aziziya district.[36] Additionally, the LNA launched aerial attacks on militia positions located in Wadi al-Rabih and Ain Zara.[36] Visual evidence was also released displaying LNA troops moving forward towards Sirte.[36]

13 May

On 13 May, the GNA reported that Haftar’s forces had taken control of both Tripoli Airport and Gharyan—sites subsequently targeted by GNA air strikes.[37] Furthermore, Haftar’s troops occupied areas along Tripoli Airport Road, Qasir Benghashir, near Gharyan, and Sooq Al-Khamis—all locations struck by GNA forces.[37] Meanwhile, LNA air raids caused extensive material destruction in Al-Zawiya city west of Tripoli.[37]

14 May

By 14 May, LNA ground defenses claimed to have shot down a GNA military aircraft within Libya’s central Jufra District.Template:Fix/category[citation needed]

June

6 June

Airstrikes conducted by the LNA targeted Mitiga Airport, resulting in the destruction of two GNA-operated Bayraktar TB2 drones along with an operations center.[38][39]

13 June

According to an LNA spokesperson, their forces successfully downed a GNA warplane that was engaging their troops in Al-Dafiniya, situated west of Tripoli.[40] The aircraft had departed from Misrata Airbase and subsequently crashed roughly 20 km from Misrata during the pilot’s return flight to base after the confrontation.[40] The pilot perished following the crash.[40] While the GNA confirmed the aircraft’s crash, they attributed it to mechanical failure rather than enemy action.[40] Additionally, an LNA claim states that they shot down a GNA Air Force helicopter near Misrata. Although the GNA admitted losing a helicopter, they dismissed claims of it being shot down and cited an accident as the cause.[41]

26 June
Situation in western Libya after the GNA retook control of Gharyan (June 2019)

The GNA declared that it had regained control of Gharyan from LNA forces.[42] The clashes resulted in numerous LNA casualties, with dozens killed and at least eighteen captured by GNA units.[43] During the LNA retreat, GNA air forces launched attacks against their convoys.[42]

30 June

LNA defensive measures succeeded in destroying a GNA Bayraktar Tactical UAS drone.[44][45]

July

2 July
GNA troops in Tripoli, July 2019

An air raid conducted by the LNA struck the Tajoura Detention Center located near Tripoli, Libya while it housed hundreds of detainees. This attack resulted in at least 53 fatalities and caused injuries to approximately 130 individuals.[46] The facility served as a holding site for migrants and refugees aiming to reach Europe when a storage hangar used as living quarters was targeted in the airstrike.[46]

4 July

A GNA Air Force L-39 aircraft was downed by forces loyal to General Haftar near Tarhuna, roughly 80 km southeast of Tripoli. The GNA confirmed the loss of the jet.[47][48]

6 July

Reports indicated that the Popular Front for the Liberation of Libya had aligned itself with the LNA offensive.[49]

17 July

Seham Sergiwa, a parliamentarian representing Benghazi, was apprehended by the LNA's 106th Brigade during a raid on her residence. The operation left her husband and son injured and barred them from receiving visitors while hospitalized.[50] As of late July 2019, Sergiwa's whereabouts remained unknown.[51]

25 July

By this date, the initial contingent of 1,000 out of a planned total of 4,000 Sudanese Rapid Support Forces (RSF) — veterans associated with the Darfur genocide and the June 3, 2019 Khartoum massacre — had arrived in Libya. Their deployment aimed to relieve LNA personnel guarding oil facilities, thereby enabling those troops to participate in operations against Tripoli.[52][53] On the same day, Bayraktar TB2 drones struck al-Jufra Air Base, destroying two LNA-operated Ilyushin Il-76TD cargo aircraft parked on the ground.[54]

29 July

On 29 July 2019, Ghassan Salamé, head of the United Nations Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL), presented a three-point peace proposal to the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). His plan emphasized achieving consensus within both the UNSC and influential member states on the ground, urging Libyans to embrace reconciliation rather than perpetuating conflicts driven by external interests that devastate their nation.[55] The proposal called for a ceasefire between the Government of National Accord (GNA) and Libyan National Army (LNA) including their allied militias during Eid al-Adha, alongside confidence-building initiatives such as prisoner releases and exchanging remains of conflict victims;[55] an international conference involving countries engaged in the conflict aimed at halting hostilities, enforcing existing arms embargoes, and promoting adherence to international human rights standards;[55] and a national Libyan assembly akin to the originally intended Libyan National Conference.[55]

August

6 August

An Ilyushin Il-76TD cargo aircraft operated by the GNA was destroyed on the ground at Misrata Airport following an attack by an LNA Wing Long drone.

11 August

During Eid al-Adha, a ceasefire was observed, which UNSMIL chief Salamé characterized as a "notable decrease in hostilities along key frontlines in southern Tripoli and other locations," with "some breaches" reported. Overall, the truce largely persisted throughout the Eid celebrations. This ceasefire represented the initial phase of the three-stage Salamé peace initiative.

20–29 August

The LNA made multiple unsuccessful efforts to seize control of Gharyan.

September

13 September

The GNA asserted that six soldiers from the United Arab Emirates were killed in airstrikes targeting Al-Jufra airbase. Contrarily, the UAE stated that six of its troops died in a vehicular accident in Yemen.

21 September

The GNA reported that drones originating from the United Arab Emirates struck a residential neighborhood in Tripoli. The attack in the al-Hadaba district resulted in serious injuries to several family members.

October

1 October

Forces loyal to Khalifa Haftar, supported by the United Arab Emirates (UAE), conducted artillery shelling on Mitiga Airport in Tripoli, as reported by sources affiliated with the Burkan Al-Ghadab Operation (Volcano of Rage Operation) of the Libyan Army operating under the GNA leadership.

6 October

Foreign warplanes allied with the LNA carried out airstrikes targeting Misrata Airport, resulting in injuries to one staff member and damage to two aircraft, according to statements from the Volcano of Rage Operation media office.

Additionally, LNA aircraft launched attacks on the Equestrian School located in Janzour, west of Tripoli. This assault caused injuries to at least three children and an elderly man, and also led to the death of two horses.

15 October

UNICEF released a statement conveying its "deep sadness and shock" over the deaths of three children and their mother during an LNA airstrike on the al-Furnaj district in Tripoli.

18 October

A Wing Loong II combat drone operated by the LNA was downed near Misrata by a surface-to-air missile.

19 October

Mohammed Gununu, spokesperson for the Libyan Army under GNA command, confirmed that a Wing Loong drone, reportedly supplied by the UAE to LNA forces, was shot down over Misrata.

November

14 November

The LNA conducted a raid in Sirte and successfully thwarted an offensive south of Tripoli.[56]

18 November

An airstrike struck a biscuit factory in Wadi Rabi'a, Tripoli, resulting in the deaths of ten individuals, including two Libyans and multiple migrants, while injuring 35 others.[57]

19 November

Air strikes by the LNA targeted Misrata’s port area, focusing on armored vehicles imported from Turkey and a nearby ammunition storage site.[58]

December

12 December

Haftar declared the initiation of a fresh offensive, describing it as the "final battle" aimed at capturing the capital.[59]

14 December

A Bayraktar TB2 drone belonging to the GNA was downed in Ain Zara, located in Tripoli.[60]

21 December

The LNA captured a vessel flying Grenada's flag, which was crewed by several Turkish nationals.[61] The ship and its crew were released by the LNA two days afterward.[62]

27 December

Syrian rebel factions supported by Turkey, namely the Sultan Murad Division and Sham Legion, engaged in combat on behalf of the GNA at the "Al-Takbali" camp within the Salah al-Din district of southern Tripoli. These fighters were transported via Mitiga and Misrata International Airports.[63]

January

4 January

An air raid targeting a military academy in Tripoli resulted in the deaths of 28 cadets and injuries to 24 others, as reported by the GNA. The BBC News attributed responsibility for the strike to the LNA.[64] The Turkish Ministry of National Defense issued a statement condemning the assault by Haftar's forces, labeling them "enemies of peace" and accusing them of targeting the Military Academy in Tripoli to fulfill illicit objectives.[65] The UNSMIL also denounced the attack.[66]

5 January

The first Syrian combatant affiliated with the Sultan Murad Division was reported killed while fighting on behalf of the GNA.[67]

6 January

Following the defection of Brigade 604—a Madkhali militia operating within the city—the LNA seized control of Sirte. This shift compelled the GNA-aligned Sirte Protection and Security Force to withdraw after short clashes.[68][69]

In Tunis, a gathering of 19 Libyan specialists in economics and finance, representing a broad spectrum of Libyan stakeholders, convened as part of the intra-Libyan segment of the Salamé three-point peace plan.[70]

12 January
Status in western Libya following LNA's capture of Sirte (Jan 2020)

A ceasefire proposal jointly advanced by Russia and Turkey, with backing from German and Italian leadership, was anticipated to be enacted as part of the ongoing Libyan peace process.[71][72][73] However, General Khalifa Haftar declined to endorse the ceasefire agreement following negotiations held in Moscow, mediated by Russia and Turkey, involving GNA leader Fayez al-Sarraj. Haftar criticized the accord, stating it overlooked numerous demands from the Libyan army.[74]

19 January
Anti-Haftar demonstration during the Berlin conference on 19 January 2020

Following five preparatory international meetings conducted over several months,[75] the Berlin conference convened on 19 January 2020, gathering political leaders from countries accused of breaching the arms embargo on Libya alongside other significant international actors. The objective was to halt foreign interference in Libya's conflict. This event initiated the second phase of the three-point peace strategy.[76] Both Serraj and Haftar attended but refrained from direct participation in main sessions due to their refusal to share a room. They were kept apprised about ongoing discussions.[75] Near the conference location, approximately 150 protesters gathered expressing opposition to Haftar, holding signs such as "Haftar kills Libyan children".[77]

22 January

An unmanned Bayraktar TB2 drone bearing GNA insignia was downed by LNA forces shortly after departing from Mitiga International Airport.[78]

25 January

UNSMIL documented breaches of the arms embargo, indicating that within the preceding ten days multiple cargo and other flights were observed landing at airports across both western and eastern Libya. These flights supplied advanced weaponry, armored vehicles, advisors, and combatants to involved parties.[79]

28 January

A LNA-operated Wing Loong II combat drone was destroyed near Misrata after being shot down.[80]

February

3 February

On 3 February, the 5+5 Libyan Joint Military Commission, composed of five senior military officers appointed by the GNA and five senior officers from the LNA, convened in Geneva. This meeting formed part of the military track within the intra-Libyan segment of the Salamé three-point peace initiative. The commission's objective was to finalize practical arrangements for overseeing and reinforcing the current ceasefire.

18 February

The 5+5 Libyan Joint Military Commission commenced its second round of discussions in Geneva, continuing efforts to advance ceasefire negotiations.

20 February

Following a brief interruption caused by an LNA assault on Tripoli's harbor, talks within the 5+5 military track resumed in Geneva.

24 February

Between mid-January and early March 2020, the United Arab Emirates is believed to have supplied over 100 shipments amounting to approximately 5,000 metric tons of materiel to forces under Khalifa Haftar's Libyan National Army. These deliveries were transported via aircraft originating from UAE military bases and from the UAE's airbase located in Assab, Eritrea. Although the exact contents remain unconfirmed, they are suspected to include weaponry and ammunition—potentially heavier artillery—as well as communications devices and other equipment. The United Nations arms embargo on Libya was widely regarded as ineffective, with former UN weapons inspector Moncef Kartas asserting that there was a complete disregard for the embargo, a sentiment echoed by UN deputy special envoy Stephanie Williams.

25 February

The LNA successfully downed a Turkish-made Bayraktar TB2 drone operated by the GNA and released footage showing the drone's wreckage.

26 February

The political track of Libya’s peace process kicked off in Geneva involving 20 Libyan participants drawn from both factions of the HoR based in Tobruk and Tripoli, along with independent figures selected by UNSMIL. Among those present were Interior Minister Fathi Bashagha, former Education Minister Othman Abdul Jalil, and ex-head of the HCS Abdulrahman Sewehli. The intended group composition included 13 HoR members representing both Tobruk and Tripoli branches, 13 representatives from the HCS Template:Fix/category[clarification needed], and 14 independent Libyans chosen by UNSMIL, totaling 40 participants. On this same day, the LNA shot down another Turkish-made Bayraktar TB2 drone belonging to the GNA and released video evidence of the downed aircraft.

March

9 March

Approximately 40 Syrian mercenaries, who had been enlisted by the Turkish Army, escaped to Italy, increasing the total number of Syrian combatants fleeing from Libya to Europe to close to 200.

26 March

The LNA secured control over Zelten, al-Assah, Al-Jamil, and Riqdalin along the northwestern coastline, while also advancing efforts to seize the Ras Jdir region near the Tunisian frontier. Sarraj declared that pro-GNA forces would initiate Operation Peace Storm as a counteroffensive against LNA units.

31 March

LNA forces successfully downed two GNA Bayraktar TB2 drones in the vicinity of Tripoli.

April

14 April

LNA units operating Pantsir-S systems shot down a GNA Dassault Mirage F1 fighter jet.

16 April

GNA troops laid siege to al-Watiya airbase. Additionally, a GNA Bayraktar TB2 drone was brought down near Tarhuna.

17 April

Two GNA Bayraktar TB2 drones were destroyed: one close to Bani Walid and another in the southern area near Wadi Dinar.

18 April

The GNA launched a multi-pronged assault on Tarhuna, attacking from five directions. They reported capturing 102 fighters loyal to Haftar during this operation. On the same day, LNA forces shot down a GNA Bayraktar TB2 drone south of Tripoli.

19 April

A combat drone was reportedly shot down in Alwhaska near Misrata. GNA sources identified the drone as an LNA-operated Wing Loong II, while the LNA claimed to have downed a TAI Anka drone. However, a United Nations Security Council report later confirmed that the destroyed drone was a TAI Anka operated by the GNA.

21 April

The LNA initiated a counteroffensive from al-Watiya air base, capturing Al-Aqrabiya town located north of the base.

29 April

Ahmed Mismari, spokesperson for Libya's eastern-based forces, announced a ceasefire for Ramadan following several weeks of intense clashes resulting in setbacks. He stated on television that this truce was agreed upon at the behest of the international community and allied nations.

30 April

In response to Haftar’s unilateral ceasefire declaration, the GNA rejected the move and affirmed its intention to continue military operations.

May

5 May

The GNA initiated an operation aimed at capturing the al-Watiya airbase. They reported having successfully surrounded the facility and claimed to have destroyed two enemy Grad rocket launcher vehicles along with several ammunition transport units.

On the same day, the GNA also announced that they had taken control of areas located south of Tripoli.

9 May

The LNA executed a mortar strike on Mitiga International Airport, resulting in the destruction of a fuel storage facility and damaging four aircraft—three civilian planes and one GNA LAAF Il-78.

18 May

The GNA secured full control over Al-Watiya Air Base, capturing a Pantsir missile system, an armed Mi-35 helicopter, as well as the wreckage of two non-operational Mirage F1 jets and a Su-22.

19 May

GNA forces expanded their territorial control by retaking the towns of Badr and Tiji.

20 May
Situation in western Libya after the GNA took control of Al-Watya airbase and Mizdah (May 2020)

Mohammed Gununu, spokesperson for the GNA, stated that their forces had destroyed seven Pantsir missile batteries located at Al-Watiya airbase, Tarhouna, and Al-Wishka.

23 May

GNA troops recaptured two military camps—Hamza and Yarmuk—from LNA control in areas south of Tripoli.

25 May

According to the mayor of Bani Walid, Russian mercenaries affiliated with the Wagner Group and allied to the LNA withdrew from Western Libya along with their heavy weaponry following the arrival of Antonov An-32 cargo aircraft at Bani Walid airport. The destination of their retreat remains unconfirmed.

27 May

The US military accused Russia of deploying fighter jets to support Russian mercenaries fighting alongside LNA forces. US officials reported that Russian Mig-29 aircraft were transferred from Syria to provide protection for approximately 1,200 Russian mercenaries withdrawing from Libya. The commander of Africa Command alleged that Russia employed mercenary pilots to conduct an air campaign on behalf of Haftar’s forces (LNA). Meanwhile, LNA officials announced plans to commence an air offensive against GNA positions in the near future.

29 May

Pro-GNA units gained control over the Al-Kayikh district in Tripoli, situated close to Qaser Bin Ghashir town.

June

1 June

The town of al-Asaba, located south of Gharyan, was regained by the LNA.[81]

2 June

An LNA unit was ambushed by GNA forces south of Tripoli, with the GNA reporting the deaths of at least 48 LNA combatants.[82]

4 June

GNA troops initiated an offensive against Tripoli Airport,[83] successfully seizing control.[84] Following this, LNA units withdrew from their remaining positions on Tripoli’s southern periphery, enabling the GNA to reclaim full authority over the city. This event concluded the LNA’s 14-month siege of the GNA’s capital.[85][86]

5 June
Situation in western Libya after the LNA withdrawal from Tripoli, Tarhuna, and Bani Walid (June 2020)

The GNA pressed forward to recapture Tarhouna, a key LNA bastion southeast of Tripoli, and succeeded in retaking it. Additionally, Bani Walid fell under GNA control.[87] Analysts in the West attributed this swift alteration in the strategic landscape to Turkey’s escalated military support for the GNA.[88][85]

Aftermath

Following the LNA's withdrawal from Tripoli, forces loyal to the GNA initiated a campaign on June 6 to reclaim the city of Sirte, previously under LNA control.[89]

On June 11, the United Nations voiced alarm over reports concerning the unearthing of eight mass burial sites in Tarhuna; officials from the GNA indicated that the Libyan Red Crescent had recovered approximately 160 bodies from these graves.[90][91]

Strategic analysis

The Middle East Institute has noted that the LNA’s assault on Tripoli has further destabilized Libya, enabling local factions affiliated with the ISIL to regain influence in southern regions. The conflict between LNA and militias aligned with the GNA diverted efforts away from combating ISIL, simultaneously creating new power voids which extremist jihadist groups could potentially exploit.[92]

Casualties

By mid-January 2020, data from the World Health Organization under the United Nations indicated more than 2,280 fatalities, including over 2,000 combatants and around 280 civilians. The civilian death count rose to approximately 458 by late June 2020.[2]

The Syrian Observatory for Human Rights reported that during military operations across Tripoli, Misrata, Cyrene, Tarhuna, and other Libyan locations, 403 Syrian mercenaries supported by Turkey lost their lives; among them were 27 children.[93] At least fifty of these fighters were identified as former ISIS affiliates. These mercenaries received training in Turkey before deployment to Libya.[94]

Legal framework and evidence collection

According to United Nations Security Council Resolution 1970, the International Criminal Court (ICC) holds the authority to investigate and prosecute allegations of war crimes, crimes against humanity, or genocide occurring in Libya on or after 15 February 2011. As of 6 April 2019, the ICC had issued two active arrest warrants for LNA commander Mahmoud al-Werfalli, linked to the alleged killing of 33 individuals in and around Benghazi between June 2016 and July 2017, as well as for the purported execution of ten people "before an applauding crowd" in Benghazi from 23 to 25 January 2018. Regarding the 2019 offensive in Western Libya, ICC Chief Prosecutor Fatou Bensouda declared on 11 April that the ICC would not hesitate to issue arrest warrants for suspects involved in war crimes and crimes against humanity. On 16 April, Bensouda further clarified that accountability would extend to both direct perpetrators and commanders responsible for war crimes in Libya, including anyone "ordering, requesting, encouraging or otherwise contributing" to such offenses within the Court’s jurisdiction.

Human Rights Watch reported that prior to the 4 April 2019 assault on Tripoli, both GNA and LNA forces had documented histories of human rights violations. The LNA was noted for indiscriminate attacks on civilians, summary executions of captured combatants, and arbitrary detentions, while evidence also indicated abuses committed by GNA forces against civilians.

On 17 April, Al-Sarraj announced that the GNA would submit evidence to the ICC concerning the 16 April Grad rocket attacks on residential neighborhoods, which resulted in at least seven fatalities and seventeen injuries. He attributed responsibility for these attacks to Haftar. Subsequently, on 2 May, GNA spokesperson Muhanad Younis confirmed that administrative measures had been implemented to document war crimes during the Western Libya offensive and to forward these records to the ICC.

The United Nations Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL) reported on 30 January 2020 that extrajudicial killings had occurred in areas under Haftar’s control, specifically in Tarhouna and Tripoli.

Allegations of War Crimes

On 11 April 2019, the relatives of militiaman Firas al-Kikli reported that he was captured by LNA forces and subsequently killed. Photographs showing al-Kikli’s mutilated corpse were widely shared on social media platforms.

Between 15 and 17 April 2019, several rocket strikes using imprecise weaponry targeted three heavily populated neighborhoods in and around Tripoli’s Abu Salim district. Amnesty International (AI) characterized these assaults as "unlawful attacks potentially constituting war crimes." Drawing on eyewitness accounts and satellite imagery, AI noted that those responsible neglected to take adequate measures to safeguard civilians and civilian properties. The locations struck included Hay al-Intissar—where five rockets hit five residences resulting in five adult fatalities and one child injured—Hay Salahaddin, and the "Kikla buildings," where three rockets impacted a construction firm, a residential structure, and open ground, causing injuries to two individuals. Journalists from Thomson Reuters reported that Grad rocket shelling on 16 April in residential zones led to at least seven deaths and seventeen injuries. AI found no proof of military objectives in these attacks and was unable to definitively identify the perpetrating armed faction. Residents of Abu Salim attributed the bombardment to LNA forces. Amnesty International’s Magdalena Mughrabi urged the International Criminal Court to investigate potential war crimes committed by all factions involved in the 2019 Western Libya campaign, emphasizing that "the deployment of artillery and other inaccurate weapons like GRAD rockets in civilian areas is forbidden under international humanitarian law, and such indiscriminate assaults may amount to war crimes."

On 2 May, BBC Arabic released an investigation into suspected war crimes during the Tripoli offensive, which had been extensively circulated on Facebook. The report highlighted the killing of three prisoners of war and revealed that an LNA special forces unit disseminated videos and images depicting mutilated corpses.

An armed faction attacked a station belonging to the Great Man-Made River project on 18 May, jeopardizing water supplies to Tripoli and Gharyan. Maria do Valle Ribeiro, the United Nations Humanitarian Coordinator for Libya, stated that targeting critical civilian infrastructure could constitute a war crime. The assailants identified themselves as supporters of Haftar, with their leader reportedly being Khalifa Ehnaish, who is loyal to Haftar. However, the LNA denied any command responsibility for this incident.

On 2 July 2019, an airstrike struck the Tajoura Detention Center near Tripoli while hundreds were detained inside. This attack resulted in at least 53 deaths and injured around 130 detainees. The United Nations Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL) considered this large-scale civilian casualty event as potentially constituting a war crime.

An airstrike on 27 July 2019 targeted a field hospital close to Tripoli’s capital, killing five medical personnel and injuring seven others. It is believed that aircraft operated by the LNA carried out this attack.

On 4 August, an LNA airstrike hit a wedding ceremony in Murzuk, causing 43 fatalities and injuring 60 attendees. The European External Action Service (EEAS) commented on the civilian casualties at Murzuk, highlighting that "indiscriminate attacks on densely inhabited residential areas" may qualify as war crimes under international law.

UNSMIL described the aerial bombing of a biscuit factory in Wadi Rabi'a, Tripoli, on 18 November—which claimed ten lives—as a potential war crime.

Legal proceedings

On 26 June 2019, four families from Libya initiated legal action in a United States federal court against Haftar, accusing him of war crimes committed during the 2019 Western Libya offensive and seeking $125 million in damages and reparations. The complaint claimed that Haftar was accountable for acts including "torture, mass killings, indiscriminate destruction of civilian assets, and genocide."

Within Libya

Fayez al-Sarraj, Prime Minister and chairman of the GNA's Presidential Council, accused Haftar of treachery and attempting a coup d'état. He expressed that earlier discussions with Haftar had appeared to foster genuine progress toward a political resolution. Sarraj remarked, "When we hosted the UN Secretary General in Tripoli, we were taken aback to learn of Haftar's military mobilization despite advances in the political process." He further affirmed the government's commitment to defending the capital. On 17 April, the GNA Presidential Council explicitly rejected any peace negotiations that would include LNA Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar.

Since 6 April, Colonel Mohamed Gnounou, spokesperson for the GNA military, announced that forces loyal to the Presidential Council were advancing against Haftar’s troops to thwart the coup attempt. He described the assault as unexpected and destructive to Libyans' aspirations for democracy, noting that preparations were underway for a national conference in Ghadames.

On 7 April, Ali Faraj Qatrani, deputy head of the Libyan Presidential Council, defected to the LNA, resigning from his GNA role. He accused GNA leader Fayez al-Sarraj of being "controlled by militias" and endorsed the LNA’s Tripoli offensive as a means to eliminate "terrorists and criminal gangs" from the city.

The Libyan Popular National Movement—considered illegal by the GNA—issued a statement supporting the army’s efforts to dismantle "militia rule in Tripoli" and honored the sacrifices made by members of the Libyan Armed Forces.

On 16 April, the advisory council representing the Al-Barghata tribe publicly backed the LNA’s military campaign while rejecting any foreign intervention in Libya’s internal matters.

Street demonstrations

On Friday, 12 April, approximately two thousand individuals took to the streets in Tripoli and Misrata to voice their opposition to the LNA's military offensive on Tripoli. The demonstrators condemned what they perceived as support for the assault from France, the United Arab Emirates, and Saudi Arabia, with protesters in Misrata notably setting a French flag on fire.[95][25] The subsequent Friday, 19 April 2019, saw protests erupt again in Martyrs' Square, Tripoli, where participants expressed dissent not only against Haftar but also against foreign nations backing him, particularly France.[96][97] Some protesters on that day donned reflective vests, which Agence France Presse linked to the yellow vests movement. One individual held a sign reading, "Surprised by the French response to the attack on Tripoli" ("Surpris par la conduite française face à l'attaque de Tripoli").[97] Demonstrations in Martyrs' Square persisted on 26 April, marking the third consecutive Friday of protests.[98]

Demonstrations opposing Haftar and the LNA persisted in both Tripoli and Misrata on 3 May.[99] Protesters in Tripoli explicitly denounced what they alleged was French assistance to Haftar and the LNA. Several carried placards depicting French president Emmanuel Macron crossed out in red. A number of participants wore yellow vests as a symbol of their resistance to French governmental actions.[100]

On 27 September, protests resumed at Martyrs' Square, with participants expressing opposition to the assault on Tripoli as well as condemning foreign interference from France, the UAE, Saudi Arabia, and Egypt,[101] and again on 18 October.[102] During the demonstration on 18 October, participants condemned the LNA airstrikes on al-Furnaj that resulted in the deaths of three children. They demanded international accountability for Haftar and urged the GNA to boycott the Berlin conference, intended as the second phase of the Salamé three-point peace plan, until LNA ceased its offensive.[102]

Municipal elections

Ghassan Salamé, the head of UNSMIL, praised the Libyan people and the Central Commission of Municipal Council Elections for successfully conducting local elections on 20 April in Brak al-Shati, Edri al-Shati, al-Rahibat, Ubari, al-Garda al-Shati, al-Shwairif, and Zaltan amid ongoing intense military clashes. Voting proceeded in Sabha on 27 April; however, the LNA obstructed elections in Sabratha and Sorman.

International

United Nations Secretary-General António Guterres expressed via Twitter his hope that clashes near Tripoli would be avoided and reaffirmed the UN’s dedication to supporting a political resolution. On 5 April, the UN Security Council urged Haftar to cease all troop movements.

On 4 April, a joint declaration from the United States, United Kingdom, United Arab Emirates, France, and Italy condemned the offensive. Subsequently, on 6 April, the G7 nations emphasized that Libya’s power struggle lacked a military solution and called on Haftar to halt his advance toward Tripoli.

Egypt voiced serious concern about the Tripoli conflict on 5 April, urging all parties to prevent escalation and reiterating its support for UN-led political efforts as the sole viable path forward. On 9 April, Egypt backed the Libyan National Army’s campaign to dismantle militias while warning against foreign interference. President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi met with LNA Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar in Cairo on 14 April and affirmed Egypt’s backing of counterterrorism operations, highlighting that combating terrorism is essential for establishing a stable civil state and initiating Libya’s reconstruction across multiple sectors.

On the same day, Russia called for all factions to reach an agreement. The UN announced that the planned Libyan national conference aimed at organizing elections would proceed as scheduled in Ghadamis from 14 to 16 April despite ongoing hostilities.

On 7 April, the United States withdrew an unspecified number of United States Africa Command personnel from Libya. India evacuated 15 Central Reserve Police Force peacekeepers to Tunisia. The UN requested a two-hour ceasefire to facilitate evacuation of wounded soldiers and civilians. Meanwhile, Russia vetoed a UN Security Council resolution targeting only the LNA’s advance on Tripoli, insisting any resolution must apply equally to all parties involved.

UNSMIL announced on 9 April that the Libyan National Conference in Ghadames—intended to map out electoral processes—was postponed due to escalating violence. This conference had originally been set for 14–16 April.

Since the onset of hostilities, Tunisia has enhanced security measures along its border with Libya. On 10 April, Tunisia completely closed the Ras Ajdir border crossing with Libya.

On 19 April, the White House revealed that President Donald Trump had spoken with Khalifa Haftar on 15 April, acknowledging Haftar’s pivotal role in combating terrorism and protecting Libya’s oil assets.

In a joint statement issued on 16 July 2019, France, Britain, Egypt, the United Arab Emirates, the United States, and Italy called for an immediate cessation of hostilities around Tripoli and cautioned against "terrorist groups" exploiting Libya’s political instability.

On 2 January 2020, Turkey’s Grand National Assembly approved a motion by a vote of 325–184 authorizing deployment of troops to support the Government of National Accord in Libya.

See also

Lua error in mw.title.lua at line 359: bad argument #2 to 'title.new' (unrecognized namespace name 'Portal').

Notes

References

  1. ↑ Lua error in package.lua at line 80: module 'Module:Citation/CS1/Suggestions' not found.
  2. ↑ 2.0 2.1 Cite error: Invalid <ref> tag; no text was provided for refs named casualties
  3. ↑ Lua error in package.lua at line 80: module 'Module:Citation/CS1/Suggestions' not found.
  4. ↑ 4.0 4.1 4.2 4.3 Lua error in package.lua at line 80: module 'Module:Citation/CS1/Suggestions' not found.
  5. ↑ 5.0 5.1 "Libya holds municipal elections in first vote for five years". Middle East Monitor. 31 March 2019. Archived from the original on 1 April 2019. Retrieved 20 April 2019.
  6. ↑ Cite error: Invalid <ref> tag; no text was provided for refs named HRW_ICC_jurisdiction
  7. ↑ Cite error: Invalid <ref> tag; no text was provided for refs named Bensouda_20190417
  8. ↑ Fielder, Jez (5 April 2019). "Libya, a country divided: From Gaddafi to Haftar, how did they get here?". Euronews.
  9. ↑ Asmahan Soliman; Hossam Bahgat (25 February 2017). "Haftar and Sarraj in Cairo: The details of Egypt's partially successful Libyan summit". Mada Masr. Retrieved 5 April 2019.
  10. ↑ Mustafa Fetouri (8 May 2017). "Libyan peace may be possible after Abu Dhabi talks". The National. Retrieved 5 April 2019.
  11. ↑ Ex_Admin (12 November 2018). "Libya elections by June 2019, UN envoy tells Reuters at Palermo Conference". Libyan Express. Retrieved 1 February 2019.
  12. ↑ Cite error: Invalid <ref> tag; no text was provided for refs named aj1
  13. ↑ "Challenges for the Libyan Judiciary: Ensuring Independence, Accountability and Gender Equality" (PDF). International Commission of Jurists. 2016. Archived (PDF) from the original on 17 October 2016. Retrieved 14 October 2019.
  14. ↑ Zaptia, Sami (7 October 2019). "After new elections, members of Libya's Supreme Judiciary Council hold first meeting in Tripoli". Libya Herald. Archived from the original on 13 October 2019. Retrieved 13 October 2019.
  15. ↑ "UNSMIL congratulates the newly elected members of the Supreme Judicial Council in Libya". UNSMIL. 10 July 2019. Archived from the original on 14 October 2019. Retrieved 14 October 2019.
  16. ↑ "Libya Lurches Toward Battle for Capital as Sarraj Vows to Fight". Bloomberg News. 6 April 2019.
  17. ↑ Patrick Wintour (21 March 2019). "UN Libya envoy hopes reconciliation talks will bring stability". The Guardian.
  18. ↑ Abdulkader Assad (4 April 2019). "Khalifa Haftar declares war on Tripoli". The Libya Observer. Archived from the original on 5 April 2019. Retrieved 5 April 2019.
  19. ↑ "Libya declares mobilisation to face Haftar's forces". Middle East Monitor. 4 April 2019.
  20. ↑ Alexander Morgan; Matthew Holroyd (5 April 2019). "Tensions flare in Libya as eastern Libyan commander orders forces to move on Tripoli". Euronews.
  21. ↑ PC President forms joint military operations room as war rocks Tripoli yet again Archived 24 April 2019 at the Wayback Machine. Libya Observer. Published 6 April 2019. Retrieved 30 April 2019.
  22. ↑ 22.0 22.1 Cite error: Invalid <ref> tag; no text was provided for refs named ForeignAff_FR_warlord
  23. ↑ 23.0 23.1 Cite error: Invalid <ref> tag; no text was provided for refs named Bloomberg_FR_IT_roles
  24. ↑ Cite error: Invalid <ref> tag; no text was provided for refs named Economist_2manycooks
  25. ↑ 25.0 25.1 Cite error: Invalid <ref> tag; no text was provided for refs named AJE_WSJ_KSA_funds_attack
  26. ↑ Cite error: Invalid <ref> tag; no text was provided for refs named bl-20201227
  27. ↑ Cite error: Invalid <ref> tag; no text was provided for refs named guardian-20200102
  28. ↑ Cite error: Invalid <ref> tag; no text was provided for refs named Guardian_2kSNA_helping_GNA
  29. ↑ "Libya's Haftar forces say warplane downed near Tripoli". France 24. 7 May 2019.
  30. ↑ "(VIDEO) Portuguese pilot: I was hired by civilian contract & was requested to destroy roads & bridges". Archived from the original on 2 July 2020. Retrieved 30 June 2020.
  31. ↑ "Haftar forces shoot down Tripoli government warplane, LNA video shows apparent foreign pilot". Thomson Reuters. 7 May 2019. Archived from the original on 8 May 2019. Retrieved 8 May 2019.
  32. ↑ "Tripoli-based military spokesperson says downed warplane does not belong to Libyan Air Force". The Libya Observer. 8 May 2019. Archived from the original on 8 May 2019. Retrieved 8 May 2019.
  33. ↑ "Libye : l'ONU condamne une attaque contre une ambulance à Tripoli" [Libya: the UN condemns an attack against an ambulance in Tripoli] (in français). ONU Info/United Nations. 9 May 2019. Archived from the original on 11 May 2019. Retrieved 11 May 2019.
  34. ↑ [1]Template:Fix/category[dead link]
  35. ↑ "Libia: brigata Al Sumud a "Nova", "nessun accordo con il criminale di guerra Haftar"" [Libya: Al Sumud to "Nova" brigade, "no agreement with Haftar war criminal"]. agenzianova.com (in italiano). 10 May 2019. Retrieved 14 May 2019.
  36. ↑ 36.0 36.1 36.2 "LNA Advances on Tripoli, Opens New Front in Sirte". Asharq AL-awsat.
  37. ↑ 37.0 37.1 37.2 "Libyan Air Force targets Haftar's forces in Tripoli Airport and Gharyan positions". 13 May 2019.
  38. ↑ "Letter dated 29 November 2019 from the Panel of Experts onLibya established pursuant to resolution 1973 (2011) addressed to the President of the Security Council" (PDF). United Nations Security Council. 9 December 2019. p.32 The Panel is aware that two Bayraktar TB2 UCAVs were destroyed by HAF air strikes against the Misrata air academy on 6 and 7 June 2019], with a third shot down by HAF on 30 June 2019, but combat losses have reportedly been much higher
  39. ↑ "Libya:Drone test laboratory for a new type of air warfare". Air & Cosmos International. 15 November 2019. Retrieved 18 March 2021.
  40. ↑ 40.0 40.1 40.2 40.3 Abdulkader Assad (13 June 2019). "Libya Air Force aircraft crashes, pilot killed as Haftar's forces claim the shoot-down". The Libya Observer. Archived from the original on 16 June 2019. Retrieved 14 June 2019.
  41. ↑ "Haftar's forces 'shoot down helicopter, killing pilot' in western Libya". The New Arab. 13 June 2020.
  42. ↑ 42.0 42.1 Wintour, Patrick (27 June 2019). "Libyan government forces capture key town from warlord". The Guardian – via www.theguardian.com.
  43. ↑ "'Big loss': Libya's UN-recognised government retakes key town". aljazeera.com.
  44. ↑ "ASN Wikibase Occurrence # 226717". 1 July 2019.
  45. ↑ "Letter dated 29 November 2019 from the Panel of Experts onLibya established pursuant to resolution 1973 (2011) addressed to the President of the Security Council" (PDF). United Nations Security Council. 9 December 2019. p.32 The Panel is aware that two Bayraktar TB2 UCAVs were destroyed by HAF air strikes against the Misrata air academy on 6 and 7 June 2019, with a third shot down by HAF on 30 June 2019, but combat losses have reportedly been much higher
  46. ↑ 46.0 46.1 Cite error: Invalid <ref> tag; no text was provided for refs named detention
  47. ↑ "LNA forces claim downing of Libya L-39 Albatross jet". 5 July 2019.
  48. ↑ "Haftar forces shoot down unity government plane". Arab News. 5 July 2019.
  49. ↑ "Tobruk MP claims terrorists from Turkey support Tripoli government against Haftar". Uprising Today. 6 July 2019. Archived from the original on 6 July 2019. Retrieved 6 July 2019. There are also reports that the Popular Front for the Liberation of Libya, a pro-Jamahiriya resistance organisation led by Saif al-Islam al-Gaddafi, the son of Brotherly Leader Muammar al-Gaddafi who was overthrown and murdered in 2011, is supporting the Tobruk-based forces.
  50. ↑ Lister, Tim; Bashir, Nada (20 July 2019). "She's one of the most prominent female politicians in her country. A few days ago she was abducted from her house". CNN. Archived from the original on 22 July 2019. Retrieved 22 July 2019.
  51. ↑ Givetash, Linda (22 July 2019). "American family of kidnapped Libyan politician pleads for her return". NBC. Archived from the original on 23 July 2019. Retrieved 23 July 2019.
  52. ↑ Cite error: Invalid <ref> tag; no text was provided for refs named DailyBeast_Hemeti_responsibility
  53. ↑ Cite error: Invalid <ref> tag; no text was provided for refs named Dabanga_1000RSF_oil_sites
  54. ↑ Cite error: Invalid <ref> tag; no text was provided for refs named Gameofdrones2
  55. ↑ 55.0 55.1 55.2 55.3 "Statements by SRSG Ghassan Salamé to the United Nations Security Council concerning Libya on 29 July 2019". UNSMIL. 29 July 2019. Archived from the original on 9 September 2019. Retrieved 9 September 2019.
  56. ↑ "Libyan National Army Targets GNA in Sirte". Asharq AL-awsat. Retrieved 22 November 2019.
  57. ↑ "SRSG Ghassan Salame Briefing to the Security Council – 18 November 2019". UNSMIL. 18 November 2019. Archived from the original on 19 November 2019. Retrieved 19 November 2019.
  58. ↑ "East Libyan forces target munitions in Misrata with air strikes". Reuters. 19 November 2019.
  59. ↑ "Libyan Commander Haftar orders forces to advance on Tripoli in 'final battle'". France 24. 12 December 2019. Retrieved 13 December 2019.
  60. ↑ "What we know about the drone shot down in Tripoli". Italian Military Radar. 14 December 2019.
  61. ↑ "Libya forces ship with Turkish crew into port as Greece slams sea deal". euronews. 22 December 2019.
  62. ↑ "Libya: Khalifa Haftar's forces release ship with Turkish crew". aljazeera.com.
  63. ↑ "ظهور إرهابيين سوريين موالين لتركيا في طرابلس الليبية". al-ain.com (in العربية). 29 December 2019.
  64. ↑ "Libya conflict: Tripoli military school suffers deadly air strike". BBC. 5 January 2020.
  65. ↑ [2] Turkey condemns airstrikes on military school in Libya
  66. ↑ "UN condemns Tripoli military academy attack which led to at least 29 dead cadets". Libya Herald. 5 January 2020.
  67. ↑ News Desk (9 January 2020). "First Syrian militant killed in Libya as hundreds more deploy". AMN - Al-Masdar News | المصدر نيوز. Archived from the original on 9 January 2020. Retrieved 9 January 2020.
  68. ↑ "Libya: Haftar forces announce capture of large parts of Sirte". aljazeera.com.
  69. ↑ "Sirte falls to Haftar's forces, thanks to a Madkhali brigade from the inside | The Libya Observer". libyaobserver.ly. Archived from the original on 12 January 2020. Retrieved 6 January 2020.
  70. ↑ "UNSMIL Convenes Meeting of Libyan Economic Experts to Discuss Establishment of an Experts Commission to Unify Financial and Economic Policy and Institutions". United Nations Support Mission in Libya. 7 January 2020. Archived from the original on 13 January 2020. Retrieved 13 January 2020.
  71. ↑ Assad, Abdulkader (11 January 2020). "Putin admits Russians are fighting in Libya". The Libya Observer. Archived from the original on 13 January 2020. Retrieved 13 January 2020.
  72. ↑ Alharathy, Safa (12 January 2020). "Italy says it's working with Turkey and Russia to end crisis in Libya". The Libya Observer. Archived from the original on 13 January 2020. Retrieved 13 January 2020.
  73. ↑ Alharathy, Safa (12 January 2020). "Haftar accepts ceasefire in Tripoli". The Libya Observer. Archived from the original on 13 January 2020. Retrieved 13 January 2020.
  74. ↑ "Libya's Haftar leaves Moscow without signing ceasefire agreement". www.aljazeera.com.
  75. ↑ 75.0 75.1 Zaptia, Sami (7 January 2020). "'Keep your hands off Libya', UNSMIL's Salame to foreign interference". Libya Herald. Archived from the original on 7 January 2020. Retrieved 15 January 2020.
  76. ↑ Colitt, Raymond (14 January 2020). "Merkel Confirms Libya Conference in Berlin for January 19". Bloomberg News. Archived from the original on 15 January 2020. Retrieved 15 January 2020.
  77. ↑ "Libyen-Konferenz legt Berliner Stadtzentrum lahm" [Libyan conference paralyses the centre of Berlin]. RBB Fernsehen (in Deutsch). 19 January 2020. Archived from the original on 22 January 2020. Retrieved 22 January 2020.
  78. ↑ "GNA drone shot down in Tripoli". Italian Military Radar. 22 January 2020.
  79. ↑ "UNSMIL Statement on continued violations of arms embargo in Libya". UNSMIL. 25 January 2020. Archived from the original on 25 January 2020. Retrieved 26 January 2020.
  80. ↑ "LNA UAV shot down in Misrata". Italian Military Radar. 28 January 2020.
  81. ↑ "Haftar's forces carry out attacks on Gharyan, retake Al-Asaba town". Libyan Observer. 1 June 2020. Retrieved 2 June 2020.
  82. ↑ "كمين محكم لـ"الوفاق" يوقع قتلى بقوات حفتر بطرابلس (شاهد)". عربي21 (in العربية). 2 June 2020.
  83. ↑ "Libyan army launches operation to recapture Tripoli airport". Anadolu Agency. 3 June 2020. Retrieved 3 June 2020.
  84. ↑ "Libyan gov't captures Tripoli Airport from Haftar forces". Daily Sabah. 3 June 2020. Retrieved 3 June 2020.
  85. ↑ 85.0 85.1 "Libya conflict: GNA regains full control of Tripoli from Gen Haftar - BBC News". BBC. 7 May 2020. Retrieved 4 June 2020.
  86. ↑ 04 Jun 2020 15:29 GMT (6 April 2020). "Libya's GNA says it regained full control of the capital, Tripoli | News". Al Jazeera. Retrieved 4 June 2020.{{cite web}}: CS1 maint: numeric names: authors list (link)
  87. ↑ "Libyan government says it has entered Haftar stronghold Tarhouna". 5 June 2020. Archived from the original on 5 June 2020. Retrieved 5 June 2020 – via uk.reuters.com.
  88. ↑ Wintour, Patrick (5 June 2020). "UN-backed Libyan forces oust renegade general from Tripoli". The Guardian. Retrieved 5 June 2020.
  89. ↑ "Libya's GNA says offensive launched for Gaddafi's hometown of Sirte". Middle East Eye. 6 June 2020. Retrieved 6 June 2020.
  90. ↑ "UN chief shocked at Libya mass graves in recently freed town". news.yahoo.com. 12 June 2020. Retrieved 13 June 2020.
  91. ↑ "UN chief shocked at Libya mass graves in recently freed town". France 24. 11 June 2020. Retrieved 11 June 2020.
  92. ↑ Giorgio Cafiero (30 May 2019). "Is ISIS the real winner of Hifter's Tripoli offensive?". Middle East Institute. Retrieved 3 July 2019.
  93. ↑ "Celebrating the return of commander from Libya | Al-Hamza Division members open fire up in the air in Jendires triggering panic among people • The Syrian Observatory For Human Rights". 15 June 2020.
  94. ↑ "SOHR reveals | New exclusive information about 50 ISIS members identified by names, joining battles in Libya • The Syrian Observatory For Human Rights". 28 May 2020.
  95. ↑ Zaptia, Sami (13 April 2019). "Thousands demonstrate in Tripoli and Misrata against war, Hafter and Hafter's foreign allies". Libya Herald. Archived from the original on 13 April 2019. Retrieved 14 April 2019.
  96. ↑ "Heavy clashes near Libya's Tripoli amid 'new phase of attack'". Al Jazeera English. 20 April 2019. Archived from the original on 20 April 2019. Retrieved 20 April 2019.
  97. ↑ 97.0 97.1 "En Libye, des gilets jaunes pour dénoncer l'offensive d'Haftar et la France" [In Libya, yellow vests protestors denounce the Haftar offensive and France] (in français). Orange Actu/AFP. 19 April 2019. Archived from the original on 20 April 2019. Retrieved 20 April 2019.
  98. ↑ "UN: Rockets hit civilian areas in Libya's capital Tripoli". WTOP-FM/AP. 26 April 2019. Archived from the original on 26 April 2019. Retrieved 26 April 2019.
  99. ↑ "Tripoli and Misrata protest, may 3, 2019". The Libya Observer. 4 May 2019. Archived from the original on 5 May 2019. Retrieved 7 May 2019.
  100. ↑ "Des Libyens en gilets jaunes dénoncent une ingérence française" [Libyans in yellow vests complain about French interference] (in français). Valeurs actuelles. 5 May 2019. Archived from the original on 6 May 2019. Retrieved 5 May 2019.
  101. ↑ "Tripoli war protest, September 27, 2019". The Libya Observer. 28 September 2019. Archived from the original on 29 October 2019. Retrieved 29 October 2019.
  102. ↑ 102.0 102.1 "Tripoli war protest, October 18, 2019". The Libya Observer. 19 October 2019. Archived from the original on 29 October 2019. Retrieved 29 October 2019.
Cite error: <ref> tag with name "UNSMIL_Salame_190904" defined in <references> is not used in prior text.

External links

Template:Tripoli