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Yemeni civil war (2014–present)

From Alfawiki
Yemeni civil war
Company typeArmed conflict
IndustryMilitary conflict
Founded2014
FounderHouthi movement, Presidential Leadership Council, Supreme Political Council
Headquarters
Yemen (multiple locations including Sanaa and Aden)
,
Yemen
Area served
Yemen
Key people
Rashad al-Alimi, Mahdi al-Mashat, Abdrabbuh Mansur Hadi, Abdul-Malik al-Houthi, Ali Abdullah Saleh
ProductsNone
Number of employees
Multiple armed groups and factions involved (exact numbers unknown)

The Yemeni civil war () represents a complex, ongoing conflict that began in late 2014, involving multiple parties. The primary contenders are the Presidential Leadership Council, headed by Rashad al-Alimi, and the Supreme Political Council, led by Mahdi al-Mashat, with both factions asserting their legitimacy as Yemen's rightful government.

The hostilities erupted in September 2014 when the Houthi forces captured the capital city of Sanaa and quickly took control of key governmental institutions. On 21 March 2015, the Houthi-led Supreme Revolutionary Committee announced a general mobilization aimed at toppling then-president Abdrabbuh Mansur Hadi and extending their influence into southern regions. Allied with supporters of former president Ali Abdullah Saleh, the Houthis seized control of Lahij Governorate and advanced toward Aden, compelling Hadi to leave Yemen on 25 March 2015. Simultaneously, a coalition led by Saudi Arabia initiated airstrikes intending to reinstate Hadi’s administration. Although Iran has not engaged directly, this conflict is widely interpreted as part of the larger Iran-Saudi proxy rivalry.

At present, Houthi forces maintain control over Sanaa and most territories that constituted North Yemen, excluding the eastern Marib Governorate. Since the establishment of the Southern Transitional Council (STC) in 2017 and its subsequent takeover of Aden in 2018, pro-republican factions have become divided. This fragmentation has led to confrontations between Saudi-backed supporters of Hadi and southern separatists supported by the United Arab Emirates. Meanwhile, extremist organizations such as Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and the Islamic State operate in several areas, further complicating security challenges.

In April 2022, a UN-mediated nationwide ceasefire lasting two months facilitated limited fuel deliveries to Houthi-controlled zones and allowed partial resumption of flights from Sanaa International Airport. Shortly thereafter, the Hadi administration was disbanded, with governance transferring to the PLC, which incorporated the STC. The United Nations extended this truce twice amid ongoing peace talks. The conflict has caused more than 150,000 fatalities and triggered severe famine due to widespread disruption of healthcare services and infrastructure.

In March 2023, The Wall Street Journal disclosed that Iran had agreed to suspend military aid to the Houthis as part of a Chinese-facilitated Iran-Saudi rapprochement agreement—a strategic effort to encourage Houthi participation in peace negotiations. Nonetheless, Iran has continued to supply military equipment and logistical assistance. By December 2023, UN special envoy Hans Grundberg reported commitments from conflicting parties toward implementing ceasefire measures.

The Saudi-led coalition’s aerial bombardments have faced global criticism for causing significant civilian casualties—estimated at nearly 19,200 by March 2022—while Houthi drone strikes targeting Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and southern Yemen have also been broadly condemned. Since 2015, the UN Security Council has enforced an arms embargo on the Houthis that remains active. The United States has provided intelligence and logistical support to the Saudi-led coalition; despite earlier intentions to halt such assistance, the Biden administration resumed arms sales to Saudi Arabia in 2022.

Historical context

Islam in Yemen is predominantly divided between the Sunni and Shia branches. Within the Shia community, the Ismaili and Zaydi sects historically competed for dominance. Following the collapse of the Ismaili dynasties governed by the Hamdan tribe in the 11th century, the Ayyubid expansion prompted most members of the Hamdan tribe to embrace Zaydism, a branch of Shia Islam.

The Rasulid era saw a rise in adherence to the Shafi'i Sunni tradition. Over time, rivalry persisted between northern Zaydi factions and the southern Rasulid rulers until the weakening of Rasulid power and increased foreign influence, notably from the Ottoman Empire, diminished this contest.

The Ottoman Empire's defeat in World War I paved the way for Yemen's initial partial unification under the Hamid al-Din dynasty, led by Imam Yahya and his successor. This regime established a power structure with Zaydis holding supremacy over Sunnis. Growing dissatisfaction with enforced Zaydi customs culminated in Imam Badr’s overthrow in 1962, sparking a civil war between royalists and republicans. Although this conflict stemmed more from historical rivalries than ideological divides, Saudi Arabia intervened to uphold the monarchy, but republican forces ultimately secured victory by 1970.

Simultaneously, southern anti-colonial movements fought British control, resulting in a socialist government allied with the Soviet Union: the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen (PDRY). The PDRY became involved in northern conflicts, initially backing republican factions against Saudi-backed elements. The Yemen Arab Republic under Hamdi sought to curtail Saudi influence but was short-lived. Political turmoil, including targeted killings, led to Colonel Ali Abdullah Saleh’s 33-year leadership. His administration oversaw the 1990 unification of Yemen, followed by a civil war in 1994 which he decisively won, solidifying the Republic of Yemen under constitutional law.

Saleh pursued constitutional changes to enable his son’s succession but faced widespread protests and resistance that forced his removal. During this period, an international coalition known as "Friends of Yemen" emerged to combat al-Qaeda on the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), which was responsible for attacks on US military interests. The coalition’s role intensified amid the Arab Spring, following recommendations from both the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) and United Nations to place Yemen’s crisis response under international oversight.

The Houthis

Following the 1960s, Zaydis encountered marginalization and policies promoting Sunnification under Sunni-led administrations. Salafi groups in Saada highlighted al-Shawkani as an intellectual forebear, influencing Yemeni governments to implement Sunnization strategies aimed at national cohesion while weakening Zaydi Shi'ism.

Ansar Allah, commonly referred to as the Houthis, is a Zaydi movement originating from Yemen’s northern Sa'dah Governorate near the Saudi border. Their insurgency began in 2004 after their leader, Hussein Badreddin al-Houthi, was killed during a military operation following his opposition to government policies.

Throughout the 2000s, hostilities fluctuated with several peace deals brokered but subsequently disregarded. The conflict escalated in 2009 with Saudi Arabia briefly joining forces with Yemeni government troops before tensions eased following a 2010 ceasefire.

During the 2011 Yemeni Revolution, Houthi leader Abdul-Malik al-Houthi backed demonstrations calling for President Ali Abdullah Saleh’s resignation. Later that year, Houthis laid siege to the Salafi-majority village of Dammaj, advancing their goal of autonomy within Sa'dah.

The Houthis abstained from participating in the 2012 presidential election that extended Abdrabbuh Mansur Hadi’s presidency unopposed. While they took part in the National Dialogue Conference, they rejected the 2014 agreement that prolonged Hadi’s term.

By mid-2014, conflict between Houthis and Sunni tribal groups had spread beyond northern Yemen into additional governorates such as Sanaa Governorate, signaling their transformation from a localized insurgency into a major national political force.

Outset of Hostilities

Following several weeks of demonstrations opposing the Hadi administration's reduction of fuel subsidies, clashes erupted between Houthi forces and Yemen Army units commanded by General Ali Mohsen al-Ahmar. In a swift confrontation during September 2014, the Houthis captured control of Sanaa, Yemen’s capital city. This forced President Abdrabbuh Mansur Hadi to enter negotiations, culminating in the government's resignation and a significant expansion of Houthi authority within state institutions.

In January 2015, the Houthis rejected a proposal to divide Yemen into six federal regions and proceeded to seize the presidential palace in Sanaa. This action led to the resignation of Hadi and his cabinet. By February 2015, the Houthis had disbanded the parliament and established a Revolutionary Committee to administer governance.

On 21 February, after being held under house arrest by the Houthis, Hadi managed to flee to Aden, where he denounced the takeover as unlawful and reaffirmed his role as Yemen’s legitimate president. Meanwhile, former president Ali Abdullah Saleh, believed to be aligned with the Houthis, openly opposed Hadi and called for him to leave the country.

On 19 March 2015, forces loyal to Hadi achieved victory over troops led by General Abdul-Hafez al-Saqqaf at Aden Airport; al-Saqqaf retreated to Sanaa. Subsequent reports indicated that warplanes operated by the Houthis conducted airstrikes on Hadi’s compound in Aden.

Following mosque bombings in Sanaa on 20 March, Houthi leader Abdul-Malik al-Houthi announced mobilization efforts against Al-Qaeda affiliates and supporters of Hadi, explicitly excluding civilians from southern Yemen. President Hadi declared Aden as Yemen’s provisional capital while Sanaa remained under Houthi control.

That same day, Al-Qaeda fighters temporarily took control of Lahij’s provincial capital before being driven out. On 21 March, Hadi reiterated his legitimacy and pledged to restore order and reclaim Sanaa from Houthi forces. He designated Aden as Yemen’s “economic and temporary capital.”

In response to escalating hostilities in Sanaa, the Houthi Revolutionary Committee appointed Major General Hussein Khairan as defense minister to oversee military operations.

Supporters of the Houthis

In April 2015, the U.S. National Security Council clarified that Iran does not exercise direct command or control over the Houthis. Nonetheless, the United States has consistently accused Iran of providing arms and financial support to them. Former Secretary of State John Kerry cautioned Iran against actions that could further destabilize Yemen. Both Iran and the Houthis deny any formal military alliance; however, Iran’s Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei expressed “spiritual” backing for the movement in 2019.

The Yemeni civil war is commonly interpreted as part of a broader proxy struggle between Iran and Saudi Arabia. The U.S., Saudi Arabia, UAE, and Western analysts assert that Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) networks supply weapons, training, logistical assistance, and media support to the Houthis. Saudi authorities view this involvement as an Iranian effort to establish a client state within Yemen and create a military stalemate. Western experts suggest that Iran’s strategy encompasses establishing missile bases aimed at Gulf Cooperation Council nations, asserting naval control over the Bab al-Mandeb Strait through area denial tactics, and escalating cyberwarfare operations.

Some experts challenge this perspective, indicating that much of the Houthis’ armament originates from black market sources or suppliers other than Iran. IRGC commander Nasser Shabani claimed that in 2018 IRGC directed Houthi attacks on Saudi oil tankers. In March 2023, reports from The Wall Street Journal revealed that Iran consented to cease military aid to the Houthis as part of a China-mediated rapprochement agreement with Saudi Arabia.

Eritrea has faced allegations of channeling Iranian supplies to the Houthis and offering medical treatment for their fighters; however, Eritrea denies such accusations and regards Yemen’s conflict as an internal matter. According to United Nations documentation, North Korea has provided weapons to the Houthis through intermediaries.

Supporters of the Yemeni Government

Following a formal appeal for assistance, the Yemeni government secured considerable international support, notably from the United States and the Persian Gulf monarchies. During President Hadi's administration, the U.S. frequently conducted drone strikes aimed at Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula. Additionally, Yemen received arms shipments from the U.S., although Pentagon reports indicated that equipment valued at hundreds of millions of dollars was lost after delivery. Saudi Arabia provided financial backing up until late 2014 but halted aid amid the Houthis' seizure of Sanaʽa and their expanding control over governmental institutions. The United Kingdom also contributed weapons utilized by the Saudi-led coalition, with Amnesty International drawing attention to a laser-guided bomb supplied by U.S.-based Raytheon that caused civilian casualties in 2019.

In May 2019, then-Secretary of State Mike Pompeo declared an "emergency" to accelerate $8.1 billion in arms sales to Gulf partners including Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Jordan, citing concerns over Iranian regional activities. Despite resistance from Congress, a 2020 report by the Office of Inspector General confirmed Pompeo complied with legal requirements but criticized inadequate evaluation of civilian harm risks and breaches of Arms Export Control Act limits during authorization.

Saudi-led Military Intervention in Yemen

In March 2015, responding to a request from Yemen’s internationally recognized government, Saudi Arabia initiated a military campaign alongside eight other Arab nations, supported logistically by the United States, targeting Houthi forces in Sanaʽa. The Gulf Cooperation Council (excluding Oman) endorsed this operation following President Hadi’s appeal. Within hours, King Salman announced full control over Yemeni airspace with the objective of preventing further Houthi advances toward Hadi’s southern base.

The coalition consisted of air forces from Egypt, Morocco, Jordan, Sudan, Kuwait, UAE, Qatar, and Bahrain. While Pakistan refrained from deploying troops, it contributed naval forces to enforce an arms embargo on the Houthis. After concluding the initial bombing phase in April 2015, Saudi Arabia launched Operation Restoring Hope, which combined diplomatic and military strategies to end hostilities; nonetheless, airstrikes and combat persisted in strategic locations such as Aden.

The UAE collaborated with the United States to combat AQAP and IS-YP insurgencies in Yemen. UAE Ambassador Yousef Al Otaiba emphasized significant territorial losses for AQAP and improved security conditions that facilitated humanitarian aid distribution. However, an Associated Press investigation alleged that certain coalition members engaged in negotiations or recruited AQAP militants for frontline engagements. Both the UAE and the U.S. Department of Defense strongly denied these accusations. Local authorities also dismissed claims of cooperation between AQAP and coalition forces, noting a decline in terrorist activities since Emirati involvement began.

In July 2020, the UK Ministry of Defence disclosed that over 500 Saudi airstrikes might have violated international law amid renewed UK arms exports to Saudi Arabia. In March 2019, despite a congressional vote to terminate support for Saudi operations in Yemen, President Trump vetoed the measure. His successor Joe Biden suspended arms sales to Saudi Arabia and the UAE in January 2021 and announced plans to end U.S. support for the Saudi-led coalition by February 2021. As of April 2021, arms exports to the UAE continued while those to Saudi Arabia remained on hold.

Leaked confidential Saudi documents from August 2020 revealed Riyadh’s earlier strategic choices, including permitting Houthi advances into Sanaʽa despite intelligence warnings and obstructing post-ceasefire reconstruction efforts led by Germany and Qatar. These revelations underscored the intricate nature of Saudi Arabia’s policy toward Yemen even before its military intervention commenced.

Arab League

In 2015, Yemen's foreign minister residing in Egypt advocated for an Arab League military intervention targeting the Houthis. Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi put forward a proposal to establish a joint military force. Subsequently, in March 2015, the Arab League declared the creation of this unified force to tackle conflicts occurring in both Yemen and Libya.

US role

Starting in the mid-2000s, the United States has engaged in targeted eliminations of Al-Qaeda operatives within Yemen, predominantly utilizing unmanned aerial vehicles, although confirmation of specific strikes is often limited. By 2015, records from the Bureau of Investigative Journalism indicated 415 drone strikes across Pakistan and Yemen, with estimated civilian casualties ranging between 423 and 962; however, these numbers were contested by former CIA deputy director Michael Morell.

Throughout Yemen’s civil war, U.S. drone operations focused on high-profile leaders of Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, such as Ibrahim al-Rubeish and Nasser bin Ali al-Ansi near Mukalla in 2015. Since the conflict’s onset, approximately 240 suspected AQAP militants have been killed due to U.S. strikes. In 2013, reports titled 'Death by Drone' were released by Mwatana directors and Open Society Foundations, shedding light on civilian deaths caused by nine U.S. drone attacks.

The United States has supported coalition forces by providing intelligence sharing, aerial refueling capabilities, search and rescue assistance, along with increased arms sales to coalition members. In January 2016, Saudi Arabia’s foreign minister disclosed that U.S. and UK military personnel were embedded within the command center overseeing Saudi-led airstrikes but did not participate in target selection.

In March 2025, the U.S. executed extensive air and naval operations against Houthi targets—marking the largest Middle Eastern military action during President Donald Trump’s second term. These initial assaults aimed at disabling radar installations, air defense systems, and missile and drone infrastructure to prevent Houthi attacks on commercial shipping and naval vessels in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden.

Islamic State presence and operations

The Islamic State (IS) proclaimed multiple provinces within Yemen and called on its adherents to combat both the Houthi movement and Zaydi groups. ISIS militants have carried out bombing campaigns, including significant attacks on mosques located in Sanaʽa. On 6 October 2015, IS orchestrated coordinated suicide bombings in Aden that resulted in the deaths of 15 soldiers aligned with the Hadi government and Saudi-led coalition forces. Targets included the al-Qasr hotel—serving as a pro-Hadi headquarters—and various military installations. Yemeni and UAE officials reported fatalities comprising 11 Yemeni soldiers and four from the UAE; initially, blame was attributed to Houthis and former president Ali Abdullah Saleh.

Humanitarian aspects of the war

By April 2015, nearly ten million Yemenis were deprived of access to essential resources such as water, food, and electricity due to ongoing hostilities. Organizations including UNICEF and Oxfam highlighted widespread displacement alongside severe food insecurity impacting over ten million individuals, among them approximately 850,000 children suffering from malnutrition. Humanitarian aid efforts featured a medical vessel delivering 2.5 tonnes of pharmaceuticals to Aden and a UNICEF aircraft transporting 16 tonnes of supplies to Sanaʽa. Saudi Arabia committed $273.7 million in emergency assistance aimed at supporting 7.5 million people requiring medical care, clean water, nutrition, and shelter.

In May 2015, Oxfam cautioned that a five-day humanitarian ceasefire was inadequate for fully alleviating the crisis. Reports also revealed that Houthis had imposed an unlawful war tax on goods entering territories under their control, intensifying economic hardships. Later that year, Cyclone Chapala struck Yemen causing additional damage to healthcare facilities already on the brink of collapse. Save the Children projected that up to 10,000 preventable child fatalities could occur annually due to the conflict; by December 2016 more than 1,200 children had died directly from war-related causes.

By March 2017, data from the World Food Programme showed that approximately 60% of Yemen’s population—around 17 million people—were experiencing crisis or emergency levels of food insecurity. A cholera outbreak resurged in June 2017 with mortality rates approximating one death per hour; by late June over 200,000 cases were reported alongside more than 1,300 fatalities. The majority of infections developed within Houthi-controlled regions where conditions favored rapid disease transmission.

In June 2018, citing security concerns after a staff member was killed in Taiz, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) withdrew most of its international personnel while retaining roughly 450 local employees. Since hostilities began, casualties exceeded 10,000 deaths with at least 40,000 wounded—primarily resulting from air raids.

By March 2019, nearly 9.8 million Yemenis urgently required healthcare services according to the International Rescue Committee. Restrictions including airport closures and limited civilian flights curtailed access to medical treatment abroad; additionally, high travel costs further constrained mobility.

A UNDP report published in September 2019 warned that if conflict persisted Yemen could become the world’s poorest country by 2022—with an estimated 79% living below the poverty threshold and 65% falling into extreme poverty.

On International Day of Persons with Disabilities in December 2019, Amnesty International emphasized how almost five years of warfare had left millions disabled individuals excluded from adequate healthcare services. The conflict driven by coalitions backed by Saudi Arabia and UAE produced one of the most severe humanitarian disasters worldwide.

In March 2020 humanitarian aid directed toward Houthi-held areas diminished amid donor apprehensions regarding possible diversion of resources. By June that year UNHCR reported over 3.6 million displaced persons alongside a critical funding shortfall—only $63 million had been secured out of $211.9 million required for operational needs.

Human Rights Watch issued warnings in July 2020 about overcrowded detention centers in Aden presenting grave COVID-19 health hazards; these facilities lacked sufficient medical care and were controlled by authorities supported by UAE.

The World Food Programme forecasted in March 2021 that ongoing blockades led by Saudi Arabia risked causing over 400,000 Yemeni children under five years old to succumb to acute malnutrition within that year as food security deteriorated dramatically across the country.

Allegations of War Crimes

Farea Al-Muslim has asserted that the conflict has involved direct war crimes; for instance, a Saudi airstrike targeted an internally displaced persons (IDP) camp, while the Houthis have at times obstructed humanitarian aid deliveries. The United Nations alongside prominent human rights organizations have raised concerns regarding potential Saudi war crimes during the aerial campaign.

British analyst Alex de Waal emphasized that accountability extends beyond Riyadh and Abu Dhabi to include London and Washington, highlighting significant arms sales: since the onset of the war, the UK has sold at least £4.5 billion worth of weaponry to Saudi Arabia and £500 million to the UAE, while under the Trump administration, the US authorized $110 billion in arms deals.

In August 2018, UN investigators indicated that all parties engaged in the conflict—including Yemen’s government, the UAE, Saudi Arabia, and the Houthis—might be responsible for war crimes. The UN characterized Yemen as experiencing the most severe humanitarian crisis globally, recording 6,475 fatalities but estimating substantially higher actual death tolls. The report condemned Saudi-led airstrikes and detailed violations such as unlawful killings, arbitrary detentions, torture, enforced disappearances, and recruitment of children.

In February 2020, British law firm Stoke White called on authorities in the UK, US, and Turkey to probe senior UAE officials for alleged war crimes and torture in Yemen under universal jurisdiction laws.

By March 2020, Human Rights Watch accused Saudi military personnel and Saudi-supported Yemeni forces of abuses in eastern Al Mahrah Governorate, including arbitrary arrests, torture, and unlawful detainee transfers to Saudi Arabia. The report documented numerous detentions and forced transfers. A Yemeni human rights report from May 2020 recorded over 1,600 arbitrary arrests, 770 enforced disappearances, 344 instances of torture, and at least 66 deaths within unofficial prisons since May 2016. While most violations were attributed to the Houthis, UAE-backed groups and Saudi-aligned government forces were also implicated.

A July 2020 investigation by Sky News revealed that a Saudi-led coalition airstrike in northern Yemen killed six children and three women. Analysis of bomb fragments suggested use of a US-manufactured GBU-12 guided bomb. The Joint Incidents Assessment Team continues to investigate these events.

The UN has accused both factions of recruiting child soldiers. In August 2018, reports indicated that two-thirds of child combatants fought alongside the Houthis with approximately 800 cases documented in 2017. In December 2018, The New York Times exposed Saudi Arabia’s recruitment of Sudanese child soldiers from Darfur to combat Houthis—up to 14,000 Sudanese militia members participated. Allegations also surfaced that British SAS forces trained child soldiers in Yemen in 2019. Additionally, Al Jazeera reported Saudi efforts to enlist Yemeni children as border guards against Houthi forces. In January 2022, UN data showed that over 1,400 child soldiers recruited by Houthis died on battlefields between 2020 and mid-2021.

In February 2022, five United Nations staff members were abducted by unidentified armed individuals in Abyan governorate in southern Yemen while returning to Aden from a field mission. They were freed in August 2023.

Children and women

According to UN assessments, the war had directly caused more than 3,000 child fatalities by December 2020, with additional deaths resulting indirectly from factors like food scarcity and the breakdown of essential infrastructure. By late 2021, children under the age of five represented 70% of the total casualties, amounting to roughly 259,000.

Women and children among Yemeni refugees are increasingly vulnerable to smuggling and trafficking amid the ongoing conflict and lawlessness. Populations at risk, including Somali migrants, endure heightened violence and exploitation; issues such as child sex trafficking and prostitution have escalated significantly due to poverty and the war. The UNFPA underscores critical deficiencies in sexual and reproductive health services and notes a rise in child marriages as families struggle with economic distress.

Despite legislation prohibiting the recruitment of minors since 1991, armed factions continue to enlist children as young as ten years old. Between March and April 2015 alone, at least 140 minors were forcibly recruited. By 2018, around 1.8 million Yemeni children suffered from malnutrition.

Both the Saudi-led coalition and Houthi forces have been listed by the UN for causing child casualties during hostilities. Saudi Arabia was briefly removed from this list in 2016 after pressure from Gulf countries but was reinstated in 2017 following documented strikes on schools and medical facilities that resulted in hundreds of child deaths. The Houthis were accountable for over 400 child fatalities in 2016. In June 2020, despite reports of nearly 222 child casualties in 2019, the UN again removed the Saudi-led coalition from the blacklist, raising concerns about ongoing risks to children.

In May 2019, airstrikes conducted by Saudi and Emirati forces near Sanaa resulted in five civilian deaths and over thirty injuries. Since 2016, approximately 4,800 civilian deaths have been attributed to the Saudi-led coalition compared to about 1,300 caused by Houthi actions.

UNICEF has reported that since the onset of conflict in March 2015, two million children have left school, with an additional 3.7 million at risk due to unpaid educators since 2017.

On October 9, 2019, Save the Children issued a warning regarding a spike in cholera cases in northern Yemen linked to fuel shortages, impacting thousands of children and families.

Health

The Yemeni civil war—often referred to as the "world’s forgotten war"—has precipitated a profound humanitarian catastrophe. By 2018, UN warnings indicated that approximately 13 million Yemenis were facing starvation, potentially marking the worst famine witnessed in a century. The conflict had caused an estimated total of 230,000 deaths by December 2020, with around 130,000 resulting from indirect causes such as food insecurity and collapsed healthcare systems. Save the Children estimated that starvation claimed the lives of roughly 85,000 children over the previous three years.

Between October 2016 and August 2019, Yemen experienced over two million suspected cholera cases alongside nearly 3,716 deaths. Since October 2019, seasonal influenza outbreaks have resulted in more than 270 fatalities amid inadequate healthcare infrastructure compounded by ongoing conflict. From April through July 2020, excess burials peaked at about 1,500 per day due to COVID-19.

The ongoing conflict has fragmented Yemen’s disease monitoring systems; government-controlled regions and Houthi-held areas maintain separate early warning networks. By the close of 2021, UN estimates placed conflict-related deaths at over 377,000 individuals, with children under five constituting approximately 70% of these fatalities.

Religious minorities

Religious minorities represent under 1% of Yemen’s population and include communities such as Baha’is, Jews, Christians, and Hindus. Reports indicate that within territories controlled by the Houthi movement, these groups face discrimination and intolerance. The Baha’i International Community has documented instances where several Baha’is were detained by Houthis due to their faith.

On January 10, 2019, in Al-Bayda province, AQAP executed four individuals, citing their atheistic beliefs as the reason.

By March 2020, Yemen’s Jewish Cemetery in Aden had been destroyed, and the whereabouts of the remaining 50 Jews in Yemen were uncertain. In July 2020, it was reported that the Houthi militia was detaining the last Jews residing in Kharif District. Shortly thereafter, five Jews were permitted to leave Yemen, reducing the community to roughly 33 individuals. Humanitarian agencies observed only a small number remained in Sanaa. On March 29, 2021, the Iranian-supported Houthi administration expelled the final Jewish residents of Yemen to Egypt, marking the end of a continuous Jewish presence spanning centuries.

Education

Yemen’s education system has suffered extensive damage due to the ongoing civil war. During the 2015–2016 academic year, approximately 1.8 million children were out of school from a total enrollment exceeding five million students. Around 3,600 schools have been affected: 68 are occupied by armed factions, 248 have sustained severe damage, and 270 serve as shelters for displaced persons. The government faces significant challenges in addressing these issues because of its limited control and scarce resources.

Major obstacles include inadequate funding for school operations and teacher remuneration, shortages of reconstruction materials for damaged facilities, and insufficient textbooks and educational supplies. These issues are further intensified by the unstable government’s constrained financial capacity.

Despite these difficulties, the Ministry of Education succeeded in administering final examinations for primary and secondary students during the 2015–16 school year and issued certificates accordingly. UNICEF continues to raise funds aimed at supporting students and rehabilitating schools affected by conflict.

Residential condition

The civil war has led to a marked decline in living standards across Yemen. Although prohibited by official decree, Houthi forces have planted more than half a million anti-personnel mines throughout Yemen, including in Aden, resulting in thousands of civilian casualties and disabilities. The pro-Hadi Yemeni Army has cleared approximately 300,000 mines from areas it has retaken, including nearly 40,000 mines near Marib province.

Between March 2015 and December 2018, airstrikes conducted by the Saudi-led coalition comprising nine countries caused over 4,600 civilian deaths and severely damaged vital civilian infrastructure essential for production, storage, and distribution of goods and food. This destruction led to factory shutdowns and widespread unemployment. The resulting decline in production triggered shortages of foodstuffs, medicines, and everyday necessities while inflating prices beyond what many civilians can afford.

Refugees

Djibouti—a small nation located in the Horn of Africa near Yemen—has experienced a significant arrival of refugees since hostilities began. Refugees have also escaped Yemen toward Somalia, entering regions such as Somaliland and Puntland starting March 28. By April 16, 2015, Oman had received 2,695 refugees from 48 different nationalities.

An Indonesian student studying in Yemen reported that Al-Qaeda operatives facilitated the rescue of at least 89 Indonesian nationals trapped amid the conflict. According to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), nearly 100,000 people had fled Yemen by August 2015, primarily seeking refuge in Saudi Arabia and Djibouti. By September 2016, UNHCR estimated that approximately 2.4 million Yemenis were displaced internally with another 120,000 having sought asylum abroad.

In 2018, close to 500 refugees escaping Yemen’s civil war arrived on Jeju Island in South Korea. This influx caused local concern and prompted government action to tighten asylum regulations.

The International Organisation for Migration reported that despite persistent risks along migration routes, nearly 150,000 Ethiopian migrants entered Yemen in 2018—mostly aiming to reach Saudi Arabia for employment opportunities.

In October 2019, Kuwait contributed $12 million to UNHCR to support humanitarian initiatives assisting Yemen’s internally displaced persons (IDPs), according to Salvatore Lombardo, UNHCR’s Chief of Staff.

Evacuation of foreign nationals from Yemen

On 28 March 2015, the Royal Saudi Navy facilitated the evacuation of diplomats and United Nations personnel from Aden to Jeddah amid ongoing Houthi assaults. The following day, Pakistan dispatched two special PIA flights to extract approximately 500 Pakistanis stranded in Aden. Alongside this, UN staff and Arab diplomatic officials were also evacuated after airstrike incidents.

India initiated its evacuation operations by deploying naval vessels and aircraft, commencing sea evacuations from Aden on 2 April, followed by airlifting nationals from Sanaa to Djibouti on 3 April after obtaining landing permissions at the Houthi-controlled airport. The Indian Armed Forces' Operation Raahat successfully rescued more than 4,640 Indian citizens and around 960 foreign nationals from 41 different countries. Sea evacuations concluded by 11 April, with the airlift operations ending on 9 April. Some Americans and Europeans took part in the Indian-led evacuation efforts, as the U.S. government did not arrange a dedicated evacuation for its private citizens.

A Chinese missile frigate arrived in Aden on 29 March to aid in repatriating Chinese nationals, deploying troops ashore on 2 April to ensure secure evacuations. This marked China's inaugural military evacuation of this nature, successfully extracting hundreds of Chinese and other foreign individuals. Meanwhile, the Philippines evacuated 240 Filipino nationals through Saudi Arabia back to Manila.

The Malaysian government utilized two Royal Malaysian Air Force C-130 aircraft to retrieve citizens from airports in Djibouti and Dubai, also conducting sea evacuations from Aden. By mid-April, roughly 600 people—including Indonesians, Cambodians, Thais, and Vietnamese—had been relocated to Malaysia.

The Indonesian Air Force sent a Boeing 737-400 along with chartered planes to evacuate Indonesian nationals remaining in various Yemeni cities.

Ethiopia announced plans for airlifting its citizens upon request; out of an estimated 50,000 Ethiopians residing in Yemen, over 3,000 registered for evacuation. By mid-April, about 200 had been successfully evacuated.

Throughout April, Russia conducted at least nine flights transporting over 1,000 individuals of diverse nationalities—mainly Russian citizens—from Houthi-controlled Sanaa and some from Aden to a military air base near Moscow.

The UNSC Resolution 2216 was adopted on 14 April 2015.

United Nations response

Since the onset of conflict in Yemen, the United Nations has closely monitored developments, aiming to address security challenges and resolve the dispute between Hadi and the Houthis. Its most significant prior attempt was the 2014 Peace and National Partnership Agreement before hostilities intensified into full-scale war.

On 2 April 2015, UN Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs Baroness Amos voiced grave concern over civilian casualties amid fierce fighting; aid organizations reported more than 500 fatalities and approximately 1,700 injuries within two weeks. The UN agency for children emphasized both child casualties and their recruitment as combatants.

During a Security Council session on 4 April, Russia advocated for "humanitarian pauses" in coalition airstrikes to facilitate aid delivery; however, Saudi Arabia questioned the practicality of this approach.

On 22 March 2015, the UN reaffirmed recognition of Hadi as Yemen’s legitimate president while promoting peaceful conflict resolution. Shortly afterward, Saudi Arabia commenced military air campaigns. Subsequently, on 14 April 2015, the United Nations Security Council imposed sanctions targeting Abdul-Malik al-Houthi and Ahmed Ali Saleh, enforced an arms embargo against the Houthis, and demanded their withdrawal from seized territories. The Houthis rejected this resolution and called for mass protests.

UN envoy Jamal Benomar, who previously played a role in ending Ali Abdullah Saleh’s rule, resigned on 15 April. He was succeeded by Mauritanian diplomat Ismail Ould Cheikh Ahmed, appointed on 25 April. A UN Panel of Experts report published in 2018 accused the UAE, Yemeni government forces, and Houthis of torturing civilians.

In December 2018, UN-facilitated negotiations between Houthis and the Saudi-backed government were scheduled. The UN also began evacuating injured Houthi fighters from Sanaʽa to Oman as part of peace initiatives following nearly four years of civil war.

The UN estimates that over 3.6 million Yemenis have been displaced due to ongoing hostilities. The World Food Programme, which feeds more than 12 million Yemenis monthly, faces critical funding shortages threatening suspension of most aid operations within Yemen.

On 27 September 2020, the UN announced a prisoner swap agreement involving more than 1,000 detainees between Iran-aligned Houthis and the Saudi-supported Hadi government. This agreement originated from the peace talks held under the 2018 Stockholm Agreement that included ceasefire arrangements in Hodeida as well as plans for a UN monitoring mission; however, persistent military offensives obstructed full implementation and exacerbated Yemen’s humanitarian emergency.

On 7 October 2022, the UN Human Rights Council passed a resolution concerning Yemen without establishing an independent monitoring body. This action followed its earlier decision not to renew the mandate of the Group of Eminent Experts (GEE), an impartial entity monitoring human rights violations since 2017.

Peace process

Since 2014, the Yemeni Civil War has generated a profound humanitarian emergency. Attempts to reestablish peace have involved significant accords and diplomatic talks.

A notable milestone was the Stockholm Agreement signed in December 2018 between Yemen’s government and the Houthi insurgents. This pact emphasized a ceasefire in Hodeida, repositioning of forces, and delivering humanitarian aid. It represented a crucial advance in alleviating civilian hardships and fostering dialogue.

Further negotiations under UN mediation concentrated on political resolutions, prisoner exchanges, and the creation of a transitional administration aimed at addressing conflict causes and encouraging national reconciliation.

The November 2019 Riyadh Agreement between the Yemeni government and the Southern Transitional Council (STC) aimed to resolve southern Yemen’s internal disputes through power-sharing arrangements. This accord was instrumental in promoting Yemen’s political cohesion and broader peacemaking initiatives.

Despite these developments, persistent obstacles remain due to ongoing hostilities, political fragmentation, and regional tensions. The humanitarian situation continues to be dire, with millions requiring immediate assistance.

In March 2023, The Wall Street Journal disclosed that Iran consented to cease military support to the Houthis and adhere to the UN arms embargo as part of a China-mediated Iran-Saudi rapprochement agreement. This step is intended to encourage Houthi militants toward peaceful negotiations. Officials from Saudi Arabia and the US described Iran’s compliance as a crucial "litmus test" for sustaining this thaw amid Iran’s global isolation due to its nuclear activities, internal unrest, and backing of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.

Other developments

On 27 March 2015, armed Houthi forces stormed Al Jazeera’s Sanaʽa bureau amid Qatar’s involvement in the Saudi-led military campaign against them. The Qatar-based broadcaster condemned the incident. The following day, Ali Abdullah Saleh declared he and his family would not pursue presidential candidacy despite supporters promoting his son Ahmed. He urged Abdrabbuh Mansur Hadi to resign and called for fresh elections.

Throughout the conflict, Saleh’s location was uncertain. On 4 April, Foreign Minister Riad Yassin stated Saleh had departed Yemen aboard a Russian plane evacuating foreigners from Sanaa International Airport. Subsequently, Saleh reportedly sought a "safe exit" from the Saudi-led coalition, which was refused.

On 28 April, King Salman restructured the Saudi cabinet by removing Prince Muqrin from his position as crown prince amid speculation about his stance on the Yemen campaign. The next day, Yemen’s government-in-exile announced intentions to pursue membership in the Gulf Cooperation Council. Media reports highlighted that the civil war had engulfed nearly all of Yemen except Socotra island, which later experienced conflict linked to the South Yemen insurgency in 2017.

On 30 September 2019, Houthi forces freed 290 Yemeni detainees, an action viewed by the UN as revitalizing peace initiatives. In September 2020, the UN facilitated an exchange involving 1,081 prisoners related to the conflict between opposing factions, including Saudi and Sudanese troops allied with the Saudi-led coalition. In October 2020, two American hostages were released by Houthis in return for freeing 240 former Houthi fighters held in Oman.

In January 2021, US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo announced intentions to designate the Houthi movement as a "foreign terrorist organization," naming its leaders as Specially Designated Global Terrorists. This announcement raised concerns among diplomats and humanitarian agencies regarding potential negative effects on peace negotiations and aid distribution.

Although announcing troop withdrawals in 2019, the UAE sustained a strategic footprint in Yemen. By May 2021, reports emerged detailing UAE construction of an airbase on Mayun Island in the Bab el-Mandeb Strait featuring a 1.85 km runway and hangars. This facility enhances control over operations across the Gulf of Aden, Red Sea, East Africa, and supports airstrikes within Yemen.

On 7 October 2021, Bahrain, Russia, and other members of the UN Human Rights Council opposed prolonging investigations into war crimes committed in Yemen. The council narrowly declined a Dutch resolution seeking to continue independent inquiries monitoring abuses. Earlier probes suggested potential war crimes by all parties; Saudi Arabia reportedly exerted significant lobbying against this motion despite not holding council membership.

On 20 March 2022, following talks held in Switzerland, the UN and International Committee of the Red Cross announced agreements between Yemen’s government and Houthis to release 887 prisoners. They also consented to visitation rights and anticipated further detainee exchanges. UN special envoy Hans Grundberg highlighted this progress as a positive step toward resolving the conflict after recent rapprochement between Saudi Arabia and Iran facilitated by China.

Water

Yemen is enduring one of the globe’s most critical Water, Sanitation, and Hygiene (WASH) emergencies, intensified by governance breakdowns that have left the nation without a sustainable water supply system. The absence of adequate sanitation and potable water has fueled a surge in health crises, notably a significant increase in cholera outbreaks since 2015. The scarcity of water affects the entire population, with the cost of drinking water having more than doubled, rendering it unaffordable for the majority of Yemenis.

The shortage of fuel has further deepened the crisis by restricting the functionality of water pumping stations that provide services to over three million individuals through public networks. The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) has responded by procuring 750,000 liters of diesel to sustain water access and collaborating with local officials to deliver water to approximately 330,000 residents in Aden, including drilling wells to alleviate shortages. Nevertheless, groundwater extraction from wells reached unsustainable levels as early as 2016.

Throughout the conflict, control over water resources has been strategically leveraged. Yemen lacks surface rivers and depends extensively on groundwater; in 2017, only about 250,000 out of Taiz’s 654,330 inhabitants had access to public water systems. Persistent hostilities and security issues have obstructed non-governmental organizations from maintaining sanitation infrastructure. Aerial attacks have critically damaged water production capabilities in Taiz.

Water availability has declined due to natural geographic limitations, insufficient investment in infrastructure, and destruction caused by ongoing conflict. Aquifer recharge rates are diminishing while encroachment of saltwater is increasing. Since the onset of civil war in 2015, damage to water storage facilities and military control over supply chains have further disrupted distribution. More than 15 million people require medical care and over 20 million depend on clean water and sanitation—marking a 52% rise since the conflict began—while government bodies lack the capacity to fulfill these urgent needs.

Agriculture

The civil war in Yemen has drastically impaired agricultural output, pushing the nation toward widespread famine. Following the adoption of UNSC resolution 2216 in April 2015, Yemen has been subjected to a comprehensive blockade by land, sea, and air that severely restricts foreign aid deliveries to areas under Houthi control. Given that imports supply around 90% of Yemen’s food requirements, this blockade critically constrains food accessibility. Of the country’s 24 million inhabitants, approximately 13 million endure daily hunger while six million face the threat of starvation. Reports reveal that the Saudi-led coalition has specifically targeted agricultural infrastructure within Houthi-held territories, exacerbating food shortages and increasing dependence on limited imports.

Notes


External links

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