Yugavia Flight S-519

Yugavia Flight S-519 (also known as Aeroflot-Yugavia Flight 519) was a domestic Russian route connecting Elista and Makhachkala. On the afternoon of November 7, 1991, the aircraft impacted Mt. Kukurtbash’s slope approximately 23 km (14 miles) from Makhachkala Airport, resulting in the loss of all 51 individuals aboard. At the time, this accident was the deadliest involving a Yakovlev Yak-40 and remains the second most fatal Yak-40 crash to date.

Aircraft Details

The plane involved was a Yakovlev Yak-40 bearing registration CCCP-87526. Built in 1975, it had been in service for about 16 years when the accident occurred. This particular Yak-40 (manufacturer's serial number 9520841, production number 41-08) was assembled at the Saratov Aviation Plant in 1975. It was initially delivered to the Soviet Ministry of Civil Aviation, which assigned it on July 6 to the Elista Aviation Detachment under the North Caucasus Civil Aviation Directorate.

Passenger Information

Although designed to accommodate 32 passengers, the flight carried 47 individuals onboard. Of these, only 34 were officially listed as passengers while an additional 13 boarded without authorization. The total comprised 39 adults and eight children. Due to this excess load, the aircraft exceeded its maximum takeoff weight by approximately 260 kg (573 pounds).

Flight personnel

• Captain: Alexander Milshin
• First officer: Alexander Shulepov
• Flight engineer: Mir Ochirov
• Cabin attendant: B. Tsedenova

Accident

Flight C-519, operated from Elista to Makhachkala, was flown by a team comprising Captain Alexander Milshin, first officer Alexander Shulepov, and flight engineer Mir Ochirov. The cabin staff included flight attendant B. Tsedenova. Although the aircraft cabin was equipped with 32 seats, 34 passengers were officially listed for the journey, alongside an additional 13 unauthorized individuals onboard, totaling 47 passengers—39 adults and 8 children. The takeoff weight surpassed the allowable limit by 260 kilograms; however, the aircraft’s center of gravity remained within acceptable bounds. Departure from Elista Airport occurred at 12:43.

The planned route required passing through OPRS points Aktur, Almar, Ronka, Kizlyar, followed by navigation along Flight Corridor 3 to the descent area at OPRM for landing. Initially, the captain set a cruising altitude of 5100 meters. After crossing Aktur at 12:58 and contacting the circle dispatcher (DPK) of sector B1 at the North Caucasus Automated Air Traffic Control Center (SKTs AS UVD) "Strela," clearance was granted to ascend to 5700 meters, which was reached at 13:01:35. The flight then proceeded toward the Grozny traverse. At 13:01:40, the crew requested permission to deviate directly to Kizlyar, bypassing Ronka; this would have taken them outside the North Caucasus center’s jurisdiction into the M1 Astrakhan Zone Center of the Unified Air Traffic Management System, requiring coordination between dispatchers. The North Caucasus dispatcher declined this direct routing but approved off-course flight to Grozny after Almar. Upon passing Grozny, the dispatcher confirmed their position and instructed them to continue toward OPRS Kizlyar, which was followed.

At 13:23, after entering M1 sector airspace, the crew contacted Astrakhan center’s dispatcher reporting their altitude at 5700 meters and providing an estimated time over Kizlyar. Contrary to Makhachkala Airport Flight Procedures, the dispatcher directed them to proceed off-course straight to the Makhachkala beacon. Despite awareness that this routing crossed the mountainous Kanaburu range, the crew complied and turned toward Makhachkala beacon post-Kizlyar.

The aircraft descended to 5100 meters at 13:34. Positioned approximately 100 kilometers from Makhachkala airport and 35 kilometers right of air corridor No. 3, the crew contacted approach control (DPP), falsely stating entry into airport airspace via corridor No. 3. Although radar indicated an unidentified course, the approach controller did not correct their routing or inform them of their true position. Instead, in violation of protocol, he authorized descent to 1800 meters at OPRM along an unapproved trajectory—dangerous for IFR operations due to nearby mountains with elevations of 890 and 720 meters. At 13:39, when the aircraft was at 1800 meters altitude and located 45 kilometers from Makhachkala airfield but 23 kilometers right of course, approach control instructed contact with landing control (DPSP) without coordinating transfer conditions. The crew acknowledged without confirming location or adjusting course.

At a distance of 41 kilometers from the airport, communication with landing control revealed a misidentification of position as bearing 122°, distance 36 kilometers; actual position was bearing 118°, distance 41 kilometers. The landing controller cleared descent to 1050 meters based on airport pressure and directed heading toward the beacon despite minimum safe altitude in that sector being set at 1800 meters per regulations. Following these instructions without question led the aircraft into a radar "blind" zone obscured by terrain peaks causing intermittent radar contact loss. At 13:40, with no radar return visible, the controller reported an estimated bearing of 308°, whereas actual bearing was approximately 296°. Two successive erroneous position reports misled both crew and controller into believing alignment with established route was intact. Consequently, the crew maintained course relying solely on dispatcher information instead of utilizing all onboard navigation aids that would have revealed deviation toward hazardous mountainous terrain.

At 13:41:41, upon reporting reaching altitude of 1050 meters, dispatch advised continuation toward OPRM marker. However, off-course positioning prevented reception of marker signals—both audio and visual—which should have guided approach. Nevertheless, at 13:42:16, crew claimed passage over marker; without radar confirmation of actual location, dispatcher instructed descent to 400 meters for final approach turn with magnetic heading of 143° at 13:42:24. The aircraft lacked a Ground Proximity Warning System (GPWS). Sky conditions included continuous cloud cover with unknown base altitude; crew assumed cloud ceiling matched airport elevation at approximately 980 meters and planned to break through clouds transitioning to visual flight rules for landing preparation.

Without reducing vertical speed during descent initiation and left turn toward final approach alignment, five seconds later at 13:42:56 while flying in clouds at roughly 550 meters altitude with a left bank angle near 20°, the aircraft collided with Mount Kukurt-Bash’s slope (elevation 894 meters), located about 23 kilometers west (azimuth approximately 290°) from Makhachkala airport. The impact destroyed the plane completely and ignited a fire. All four crew members and all forty-seven passengers lost their lives in this accident.

Cause

The catastrophe occurred due to significant breaches of flight protocols and air traffic control procedures within mountainous regions by both the flight crew and air traffic controllers. This resulted in the aircraft descending beneath a safe altitude outside the designated approach corridor, culminating in a controlled flight into terrain and the total loss of the plane.

See also

• List of accidents and incidents involving commercial aircraft
• List of accidents and incidents involving the Yakovlev Yak-40