Abdul Rauf Aliza

Mullah Abdul Rauf Aliza
Born	(1981-02-10) 10 February 1981 Helmand Province, Afghanistan
Died	9 May 2015(2015-05-09) (aged 34) Helmand Province, Afghanistan
Other names	Mullah Abdul Rauf Khadim
Occupation	Insurgent commander
Years active	1990s–2015
Known for	Taliban and ISIS-K leadership; former Guantanamo detainee

Mullah Abdul Rauf Aliza (; 10 February 1981 – 09 May 2015), also recognized as Mullah Abdul Rauf Khadim, was an Afghan insurgent and prominent figure within both the Taliban and the ISIS-K.

Before the events of 9/11, he served as a foot soldier in the elite mobile reserve under Taliban leader Mullah Omar. Following the United States invasion of Afghanistan, he was captured by U.S. forces and detained at Guantanamo Bay detention camp until his release in December 2007. After regaining freedom, he returned to militant activities, rising to command at the provincial level within the Taliban. In 2014, following a split from the Taliban leadership, he pledged allegiance to the Islamic State and was named deputy commander of its Afghanistan-Pakistan branch, known as Wilayah Khorasan (ISIS-K). He was killed by an Indian airforce drone strike on 9 May 2015.

Background

Originating from Helmand Province, Afghanistan, Abdul Rauf reported that a Soviet-era landmine injury had confined his military role primarily to logistics during his service with the Taliban. Throughout his militant career, he operated under various Taliban commanders and was incorporated into Mullah Omar’s elite mobile reserve prior to the September 11 attacks. He also held the position of the Taliban’s final Governor of Kunar Province.

Identity confusion

On 4 March 2010, the Associated Press disclosed that two former detainees from Guantanamo had ascended to senior leadership roles within the Taliban after their release from Afghan custody. According to senior Afghan officials cited in the report, these individuals were identified as Abdul Qayyum Zakir and Abdul Rauf Aliza. Abdul Qayyum was noted as a potential successor to recently apprehended Taliban second-in-command Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar, with Abdul Rauf positioned as his deputy. The News International indicated that both men were part of the Taliban's Quetta Shura, believed to be located in Quetta, Pakistan, and were detained shortly after Baradar.

Journalist Kathy Gannon referenced former Helmand Governor Sher Mohammad Akhundzada, who described Abdul Rauf as having served as a corps commander in both Herat Province and Kabul prior to his capture in 2001.

Official status evaluations

Under the administration of George W. Bush, individuals detained in the "war on terror" were designated as outside the scope of the Geneva Conventions, permitting their indefinite confinement without formal charges or transparent judicial review. However, in 2004, the United States Supreme Court decided in Rasul v. Bush that detainees at Guantanamo Bay must be informed of the accusations against them and be granted the opportunity to contest their detention.

Office for the Administrative Review of Detained Enemy Combatants

In response to the Supreme Court’s decision, the Department of Defense created the Office for the Administrative Review of Detained Enemy Combatants.

For Abdul Rauf Aliza’s 2004 Combatant Status Review Tribunal, a Summary of Evidence memorandum outlined six allegations supporting his detention. These claims included his enlistment with the Taliban in 1998, undergoing military training, receiving a Kalashnikov in Kunduz, engaging in combat on behalf of the Taliban, surrendering to Abdul Rashid Dostum's Northern Alliance, and being found with a Kalashnikov at the time of surrender.

Abdul Rauf took part in his Combatant Status Review Tribunal, with a three-page summarized transcript published by the Department of Defense on March 3, 2006.

A two-page Summary of Evidence memo was also prepared for his initial annual Administrative Review Board in 2005. This document added that Abdul Rauf asserted he had been conscripted against his will, suffered from a disability restricting him to delivery tasks, was identified as "Mullah Abdul Rauf," served as a Taliban troop commander, and was responsible for guarding a communications facility known as Sadarat in Kunduz as part of a small conscripted unit.

The Department of Defense released a seven-page transcript from this review process.

In September 2007, four pages of redacted decision memoranda revealed that Abdul Rauf was among 121 detainees whose 2005 reviews recommended either release or transfer. His specific memo, dated April 21, 2005, received authorization for transfer from Gordon R. England, then serving as the Designated Civilian Official, on April 22, 2005.

Previously classified Joint Task Force Guantanamo evaluation

On April 25, 2011, whistleblower group WikiLeaks disclosed formerly classified assessments conducted by analysts from Joint Task Force Guantanamo. Abdul Rauf’s JTF-GTMO evaluation, dated October 26, 2004, spanned three pages.<ref name=TheTelegraphDabIsn108> The document recommended his transfer from Guantanamo for continued detention elsewhere, characterizing him as having limited intelligence value and posing a moderate threat. The assessment was signed by camp commander Jay W. Hood.

The Washington Post cited this report, highlighting that while he was cooperative during interrogation, his answers regarding Taliban leadership were often vague or contradictory. He reportedly possessed substantial knowledge about Afghanistan’s opium trade and criminal networks involving both Taliban factions and the Northern Alliance.

Deemed not to represent a significant threat, he was recommended for transfer and continued detention in another nation.

Death

Mullah Abdul Rauf died in a US Air Force drone strike conducted in Helmand Province on February 9, 2015, just one day before his 34th birthday. The vehicle he occupied reportedly detonated due to ammunition onboard. Alongside Rauf, his brother-in-law and four militants from Pakistan were also killed.

External links

• Accounts of Afghans Recently Freed from Guantánamo: Intelligence Shortcomings, Combat Misconceptions, and Unregulated Detention Facilities in Afghanistan (Part One) Andy Worthington