Aeroflot Flight N-36

Aeroflot

Industry	Aviation
Founded	1923
Headquarters	Moscow , Soviet Union
Products	Air transport services

Aeroflot Flight N-36 was a scheduled domestic service operated by Aeroflot between Chernivtsi International Airport and Zhuliany Airport in the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic. On 17 December 1976, the flight tragically ended in a crash near Kiev Airport, resulting in 48 deaths and 7 survivors.

Aircraft

The aircraft involved was an Antonov An-24 with a seating capacity for 50 passengers. Manufactured in 1963, it completed its maiden flight on 8 June of that year. At the time of the incident, the plane had logged 27,244 flight hours and undergone 24,754 pressurization cycles.

Accident

On 17 December 1976 at 20:32 Moscow time, the An-24 departed from Chernivtsi carrying 50 passengers and five crew members on flight N-36 bound for Kyiv-Zhuliany Airport.

The crew received weather forecasts indicating cloud cover between 100 and 1000–1500 meters, accompanied by strong south-easterly winds, mist, drizzle, and snowfall. Conditions were expected to produce moderate turbulence with visibility ranging from 1000 to 2000 meters and significant atmospheric icing within clouds. Upon departure, visibility at Kyiv-Zhuliany had decreased to 800 meters with low clouds at approximately 70 meters; winds were light but icing remained severe. Although frequent weather observations were conducted by the Aero-meteorological station, they failed to detect when horizontal visibility fell below 700 meters—the minimum required for An-24 operations—and did not alert air traffic controllers accordingly. Contrary to established procedures, continuous visibility monitoring along the landing path at bearing 81° magnetic was not maintained between 20:55 and 22:10. Despite adverse weather conditions, incoming flight crews did not request precise horizontal or vertical visibility measurements.

During its final approach to Kyiv airport on an 81° bearing, the aircraft utilized a non-directional beacon and a radiolocation landing system (TESLA) under instructions from the landing controller. The airport’s instrument landing system was unavailable due to maintenance activities. Air traffic control did not provide radar guidance or relay glide path entry information to the crew. Consequently, aircraft СССР-46722 initiated descent too late with a vertical speed exceeding design parameters.

At this time, air traffic control was communicating simultaneously with three aircraft on the same frequency, causing confusion in transmissions. The An-24 requested its distance from the runway twice; however, both requests were obscured by overlapping communications from other flights. Approximately 2,500 meters from the runway threshold, the aircraft descended below the prescribed glide slope without receiving any warning from ATC. Upon reaching a critical altitude of 100 meters, pilots failed to observe runway lighting but continued their approach instead of executing a go-around.

When descending to an altitude of 30–35 meters above ground level, the “danger height” warning activated. The crew applied control inputs resulting in a g-force of 1.9 g; nevertheless, these corrective actions were insufficient due to excessive descent rate and insufficient altitude margin. Two seconds later, the right side of the aircraft struck a concrete barrier protecting the non-directional radio beacon station located 1,265 meters from the runway threshold and 40 meters off the runway centerline to the right. The plane then made contact with the ground via its front and left landing gear within the station’s compound before briefly becoming airborne again. It subsequently collided with another concrete fence on the opposite side of this area. Moments later, the left wing impacted trees followed by a collision between the nose and a 4.5-meter-high railway embankment. The remainder of the fuselage came to rest on railway tracks approximately 1,150 meters from the runway threshold and offset by 40 meters to the right of centerline. A post-crash fire erupted that completely consumed the aircraft.

The accident resulted in fatalities among four crew members and forty-four passengers. A single flight attendant along with six passengers survived; one passenger escaped without injuries.

Investigation

Due to the aircraft being consumed by fire, the commission was unable to establish why the danger height alarm probe failed to activate at the expected 60-meter altitude. Significant inaccuracies were found in the aero-meteorological station's reporting, which informed the air traffic controller of horizontal visibility at 700 meters and vertical visibility at 50 meters. However, weather conditions recorded 30 seconds after the incident were worse than the minimum requirements for the An-24. Additionally, aircraft 46440, attempting to land 2 minutes and 6 seconds prior to aircraft 46722, diverted to the dispersal field at Boryspil Airport because its crew could not see the runway lights. This indicates that the actual horizontal visibility at Zhuliany airport was less than 700 meters, making it unsafe for An-24 aircraft to attempt landing under those circumstances.