American Airlines Flight 320

American Airlines

Industry	Airline
Founded	April 15, 1930 (1930-04-15) in Texas, United States
Headquarters	Fort Worth, Texas , United States
Products	Air transport services
Website	www.aa.com

American Airlines Flight 320 was a regularly scheduled route operating between Chicago Midway and LaGuardia Airport in New York City. On February 3, 1959, the Lockheed L-188 Electra assigned to this flight crashed into the East River while on final approach to LaGuardia, resulting in the deaths of 65 out of the 73 individuals on board. Adverse weather conditions, including thick clouds and fog, caused the aircraft to descend below its designated glide path, impacting roughly short of the runway threshold. This incident was notable as the first accident involving the Lockheed Electra, which American Airlines had recently introduced into their fleet.

Crew members who survived indicated that their flight instruments showed a safe altitude until the moment of impact. Conversely, eyewitness accounts described the plane flying at an unusually low altitude compared to standard approach profiles. The Civil Aeronautics Board conducted an investigation and concluded that pilot error, linked to unfamiliarity with the Electra and challenging weather conditions, was the primary cause. However, the Air Line Pilots Association contested this finding, attributing the accident mainly to faulty instrumentation and severe weather rather than crew mistakes. The crash spurred recommendations for mandatory installation of flight data recorders on large passenger aircraft and led to significant improvements at LaGuardia Airport, including lengthening runways, upgrading approach lighting systems, and implementing an instrument landing system on the runway involved.

Background

Flight 320 was part of American Airlines' routine service connecting Chicago and New York City, operated using one of their newly acquired Lockheed L-188 Electra turboprop airliners. The Electra had been introduced into commercial operation less than two weeks prior, with American scheduling six daily round trips on this corridor. The airline intended to expand Electra deployment across more routes as production by Lockheed progressed. These aircraft accommodated approximately 70 passengers and offered faster travel times than the Douglas DC-7s previously used, reducing flight duration between Chicago and New York by about half an hour.

On February 3, 1959, Flight 320 was slated for departure from Chicago Midway Airport at 9:00 p.m. EST but faced delays due to snow driven by strong winds. The aircraft eventually took off 54 minutes late, making it one of the final departures before Midway shut down operations amid the storm. Onboard were sixty-eight passengers and five crew members for what was expected to be a 1 hour 42 minute journey. The flight proceeded without incident while cruising at an altitude of 21,000 feet.

Accident

At approximately 11:34 p.m., Flight 320 neared New York City airspace. Air traffic control at LaGuardia reported overcast conditions with a cloud ceiling at 400 feet and visibility limited to about 1.25 miles. Pilots were directed to maintain a position north of the airport before preparing for a direct approach to runway 22 over the East River. By 11:55 p.m., when about 2.8 miles from touchdown, Flight 320 received final clearance to land on runway 22 and responded with "320." No further radio transmissions followed.

Shortly thereafter, while traveling at roughly 140 knots, the aircraft collided with the East River approximately 4,900 feet short of the runway threshold. Observers aboard nearby tugboats reported seeing the plane flying unusually low just before it struck the water nose-first. Another witness near the Whitestone Bridge estimated its altitude at around 100 feet above ground level; he observed illuminated cabin windows and the underside of the aircraft but could not determine whether landing gear had been extended. Survivors described a normal descent phase prior to impact. Residents in surrounding areas also noted hearing the Electra flying lower than typical approach altitudes.

This tragedy represented both the inaugural crash involving a Lockheed L-188 Electra and American Airlines’ first significant accident since Flight 327 in January 1957.

Aftermath

A privately owned tugboat from New England, located near the accident scene, was the initial responder. The vessel released its barges and employed its searchlight to aid survivors, including one individual rescued from approximately four feet underwater. Shortly thereafter, two police helicopters along with several Coast Guard and NYPD boats arrived on site. Despite challenging conditions such as poor visibility and strong river currents, rescuers detected cries for help downstream. Public safety officials established four rescue points along the river, while ambulances faced difficulties navigating icy roads. Those rescued were transported to Flushing Hospital and Queens General Hospital, and two temporary morgues were set up on opposite sides of the river.

By 5:00 a.m. the following morning, rescuers had saved nine survivors and recovered 22 bodies, with 39 individuals still unaccounted for when worsening weather conditions forced a halt to recovery operations. One of the survivors later succumbed to injuries in the hospital. The New York Red Cross provided rare blood types to assist victims. Identification of bodies took place at Queens General Hospital with assistance from FBI agents and city detectives, utilizing fingerprint records from immigration and military archives. Autopsies conducted on twenty victims revealed fatal injuries including crushed chests and fractured necks, indicative of the significant impact forces.

The aircraft's fuselage broke apart upon collision; however, an initial 20-foot section remained intact. After two hours, only a three-foot portion of the tail was visible above water. Search teams recovered debris, personal effects, and mail from the site.

The Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB) quickly dispatched investigators who secured airline documentation. A team of 25 specialists examined all elements of the flight—weather conditions, operational procedures, engines, instrumentation, and structural integrity of the aircraft. Meanwhile, Queens County District Attorney Frank O'Connor initiated an investigation into rescue operations, suggesting that improved rescue boat systems at municipal airports could have saved additional lives. The House Interstate and Foreign Commerce Committee requested a confidential briefing from the FAA and subsequently established a subcommittee to investigate this crash alongside broader safety concerns linked to transitions between jet and turboprop aircraft.

In subsequent days, reports emphasized missing safety mechanisms that might have averted the accident. The Air Line Pilots Association recommended implementing the Electronic Flash Approach System to enhance altitude awareness and advocated for a fully integrated instrument landing system offering both vertical and lateral guidance for approaches to runway 22. At that time, only two U.S. airports—New York International (since July 1957) and Newark Metropolitan (since March 1958)—were equipped with such dual-function systems. Port of New York Authority commissioners explained that installing these systems on runway 22 posed challenges because approach lighting would interfere with shipping lanes in Queens.

Aircraft

The aircraft involved was a Lockheed L-188 Electra turbine-propeller model, serial number 1015, registered as N6101A. It was among the earliest Electras delivered to American Airlines and bore the name "Flagship New York." Manufactured by Lockheed on November 27, 1958, it had accumulated 302 flight hours before the crash. The plane was powered by four Allison 501-D13 engines.

Marketed as an efficient and lucrative aircraft, the Electra was the first turbine-propeller plane produced in the United States. Eastern Air Lines received its first Electra in October 1958 and commenced commercial service in January 1959. American Airlines took delivery in December 1958 and operated its inaugural commercial flight just twelve days prior to this crash. Following this incident, two additional Electras experienced catastrophic structural failures—Braniff Airways Flight 542 in September 1959 and Northwest Airlines Flight 710 in March 1960—resulting in total fatalities. Lockheed identified design defects related to engine mounts and wing structures after thorough investigation and implemented corrective measures. Nevertheless, adverse publicity eroded public confidence in the aircraft’s safety, limiting production to only 174 units.

Passengers and crew

The flight was occupied by 68 passengers and 5 crew members, all residents of the United States. Out of those on board, five passengers survived the incident, while the remains of two victims were never located. Among the fatalities were notable individuals such as Beulah Zachary, executive producer of Kukla, Fran and Ollie; Robert Emerson, a research professor recognized for his work on plant photosynthesis; and Herbert Greenwald, a prominent real estate developer from Chicago.

Captain Albert Hunt DeWitt, aged 59, had been flying since 1929 and had amassed more than 28,000 hours in the air, including 48 hours specifically on the Electra and 2,500 hours under instrument conditions. He was regarded as one of American Airlines’ most veteran pilots, having flown over seven million miles. DeWitt held the position of chief pilot in New York and was planning to retire shortly after this flight. His cause of death was determined to be drowning combined with severe internal trauma.

First Officer Frank Hlavacek, 33 years old, brought eight years of experience with American Airlines and logged over 10,000 flight hours, including 36 on the Electra. A World War II veteran with prior ownership of an air service in California, he survived the crash but sustained serious injuries. He later returned to active duty.

Flight Engineer Warren Cook, aged 36, had served eleven years at American Airlines and accumulated approximately 8,700 flight hours with 81 on the Electra. He also served in the Army Air Corps during World War II. Cook was injured during the accident but recovered fully and resumed his role at American Airlines.

Investigation

Investigators interviewed Flight Engineer Warren Cook within two hours following the crash; he described the approach as normal and stated that impact with the water was unexpected. First Officer Frank Hlavacek was interviewed several days later due to his injuries; he recounted announcing altimeter readings every 100 feet during descent and noted that the aircraft struck the river at the moment he called out "five hundred feet." Both pilots independently confirmed this timing.

Once weather conditions improved, recovery operations commenced. By February 5, approximately one-quarter of the aircraft had been retrieved, increasing to half by the following day. Salvage cranes briefly lifted the fuselage before it fractured and sank again. The tail section was recovered late on February 5; damage patterns suggested the aircraft may have been in a "nose up" attitude upon impact, indicating a possible last effort to gain altitude. Divers encountered difficulties due to strong winds, powerful currents, and limited visibility. Some debris was discovered as far as 30 miles away near Northport on Long Island. Retrieved components were cataloged, cleaned, and stored at LaGuardia Airport’s Marine Air Terminal Hangar 9. By February 7, both nose and cockpit sections had been recovered; notably, the cockpit remained largely intact with a functioning spring-wound clock.

In response to the accident, on February 9 the FAA implemented increased minimum visibility standards for Lockheed Electra landings during adverse weather conditions. American Airlines and Eastern Airlines—the sole operators of Electras at that time—described these measures as temporary. Lockheed Aircraft Corporation expressed disappointment over the restrictions but committed to full cooperation throughout the investigation. The FAA rescinded these visibility requirements the following day, permitting flights to continue under previous regulations.

Altimeter issues

The initial phase of the investigation concentrated on the aircraft's altimeters. Lockheed Electra turboprops utilized a distinct altimeter model compared to older piston-engine planes. While the traditional version featured three hands to display altitude, the newer design integrated a single needle indicating tens and hundreds of feet alongside a rotating drum representing thousands. Manufactured by Kollsman Instrument Corporation, which produced both types, the updated instrument was termed a "precision drum altimeter," created to meet Air Force demands for higher-speed flight. The Air Force had previously reported pilots misinterpreting older altimeters by as much as 10,000 feet. Nevertheless, pilots training with the newer model reported errors up to 1,000 feet due to misreading. As a result, American Airlines intended to add a centrally located third altimeter of the old three-hand variety while retaining the new models on each side. Pilots at Eastern Airlines operating Electras expressed concerns that the new altimeters were susceptible to misreading and slower response times; they also installed an additional old-style altimeter. American Airlines defended the modern design as more precise with finer graduations and dismissed pilot complaints, asserting their planned third instrument would also be the newer type. Flight crews disputed this claim, maintaining it would be an older model. At the time of Flight 320’s crash, only two new-style altimeters had been installed.

Following the FAA’s removal of landing restrictions on Electras, it mandated swapping any new-style altimeters for the older three-hand versions. Both Eastern and American Airlines complied with this directive. On February 20, 1959, the FAA expanded these restrictions to include Boeing 707s equipped with new-style altimeters due to operational challenges.

During the CAB hearing in March 1959, first officer Hlavacek testified that he consistently cross-checked all altimeters during flight and found close agreement among them. He explained that the captain flew on autopilot with only minor manual corrections during approach. Although some ice had accumulated on the windshield, it was not deemed dangerous. Hlavacek could not see runway lights but noticed flashing red signals shortly before impact.

Flight engineer Cook clarified previous statements regarding altimeter readings after the accident, attributing earlier discrepancies to misinterpretation caused by shock. He confirmed that de-icing systems were engaged prior to descent and that autopilot was used until roughly 400 feet above ground level, where manual control typically commenced. Cook also stated he did not observe any approach lights through the windshield before impact.

Altimeters recovered from the wreckage underwent testing at La Guardia’s instrument facility. Results indicated normal operation down to about 1,000 feet but showed lagging performance below that altitude. However, manufacturer representatives testified at the CAB hearing that no mechanical faults existed before the crash. Damage caused by post-crash water immersion was evident in negative altitude readings from salvaged instruments. Investigators acknowledged their inability to verify precise altimeter readings at impact. The director of flying operations at American Airlines described simultaneous failure of two altimeters as "almost mathematically impossible." Lockheed specialists attempted to reproduce a 500-foot error by simulating ice accumulation in pressure lines supplying the altimeters but only achieved errors up to 50 feet in various tests.

To explore why the crew failed to spot the runway, CAB heard from Northeast Airlines DC-3 pilots who had landed minutes earlier without visibility problems under comparable cloud ceiling conditions. Nonetheless, survivors and rescue teams reported pockets of fog and low clouds over the river at the time of impact.

Final report

The CAB published its conclusive report on January 10, 1960, determining that the crew's distraction and insufficient monitoring of critical flight instruments caused the aircraft to descend below the designated glide slope. Factors influencing the accident included the crew's limited familiarity with the aircraft, unsafe approach procedures involving autopilot use close to the ground, incorrect altimeter settings, and potential misinterpretation of altimeter and vertical speed indicators. Adverse weather conditions and absence of visual cues further contributed to errors in altitude assessment. The board criticized the airline for not providing comprehensive simulator training for Electra pilots, suggesting that such training could have prevented the accident. Additionally, it recommended that the FAA mandate installation of flight data recorders on all large turbine-powered airplanes.

Investigators recovered more than 90% of the main structural parts and most onboard systems. At impact, the flaps were properly positioned and the landing gear was deployed. The propeller blade angles corresponded with power settings consistent with pilot statements during approach. Neither vertical speed indicator mechanism was recovered. Both altimeters were retrieved but suffered damage from submersion, making it impossible to verify their accuracy prior to the crash.

Records of maintenance and pilot complaints concerning this altimeter model showed no instances of simultaneous failure of both devices. The CAB dismissed this scenario as statistically improbable and questioned parts of the surviving crew’s testimony. Failure of a single altimeter was also considered unlikely. Eyewitness reports and impact evidence suggested that pilots may have misread one or more altimeters due to unfamiliarity with their newer design. Misinterpretation of vertical speed indicators—featuring different scales than those in older aircraft or used during captain training—was also plausible.

The CAB confirmed that all required airport perimeter, boundary, and runway lighting were operational but noted that their upward angle combined with a nearby dike probably rendered them invisible to the crew during premature descent beneath cloud cover.

The report met strong opposition from the Air Line Pilots Association president, who labeled it "grossly inaccurate" and claimed it failed to provide a reasonable explanation for the cause of the accident. He stated that American Airlines pilots collectively opposed what they viewed as unjust accusations directed at crew members and an attempt to close the case without proper cause determination. The association attributed the crash to marginal weather conditions and inadequate approach lighting and aids at the airport. First officer Frank Hlavacek expressed anger over the report’s faulting of the deceased captain and hoped American Airlines would formally challenge its conclusions.

Additional investigations

On February 6, 1959, a special subcommittee was established by the United States House Commerce Committee to investigate this crash along with broader safety concerns amid aviation’s transition from piston-engine to jet and turboprop aircraft. Chaired by Representative John Bell Williams of Mississippi—a former WWII bomber pilot—the subcommittee reviewed new aircraft equipment and pilot training procedures. They conducted an inspection of LaGuardia Airport’s runway where Flight 320 had approached but did not publicly release their findings.

During Senate Commerce Committee hearings in January 1960, the CAB safety director testified that installation of high-intensity runway lighting at LaGuardia might have averted the accident. He advocated for improved copilot training programs and mandatory electronic flight data recorders to support accident investigations. Following these hearings, senators called for modern lighting systems at Chicago’s Midway Airport and regulations requiring copilots to be certified on their specific aircraft types. FAA administrator Elwood Richard Quesada disclosed that although federal authorities had committed 75% funding for high-intensity lighting and radar instrument approaches at LaGuardia, local airport officials had failed to provide their required 25% funding share.

Legacy

In response to the Flight 320 disaster, the FAA and the New York Port Authority revealed plans in March 1960 to equip La Guardia’s runway 22 with an instrument landing system and approach lighting. This initiative required the closure and relocation of the Rikers Island Channel, necessitating collaboration with the United States Army Corps of Engineers. The initial stage, which involved installing an 825-foot approach lighting system, was finalized by March 1961.

By 1962, authorization was anticipated for moving the ship channel. The project included lengthening runway 4/22 from 5,000 feet to 7,000 feet and extending runway 13/31 from 5,965 feet to 7,000 feet. Runway 22 was set to receive a comprehensive instrument landing system alongside a 3,000-foot approach lighting array. This $42 million undertaking reached completion in March 1966.

In 1957, the CAB required flight data recorders on all turbine-powered aircraft certified for altitudes above 25,000 feet. Although the Lockheed Electra was capable of higher flight levels, American Airlines limited its certification to that altitude to avoid this rule. The CAB’s final report in January 1960 advocated for FAA regulations mandating flight data recorders on all large turbine aircraft. By April of that year, the FAA was considering rules for installing these devices on all turboprop airliners and instructed U.S. carriers to fit turbine-powered planes with recorders by November. Despite resistance from the Air Transport Association, which cited concerns about cost and added weight, the FAA extended compliance deadlines until May 1961.

By 1964, the FAA proposed further requirements for cockpit voice recorders on all large commercial airplanes by July 1966, aiming to provide investigators with vital communication records from flight crews during emergencies.

References

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