Court Line Flight 95

Court Line Aviation

Industry	Aviation
Headquarters	London Luton , England, United Kingdom
Products	Chartered international flights

Template:EngvarB Template:Infobox Aircraft occurrence

Court Line Aviation Flight 95 was a chartered international service operating from London Luton Airport, Bedfordshire, England, to Munich-Riem Airport, West Germany, on 18 April 1974. The flight was conducted using a Court Line BAC One-Eleven model BAC One-Eleven 518 registered G-AXMJ. During the aircraft’s take-off roll, a Piper PA-23 Aztec (registration G-AYDE), operated by McAlpine Aviation, entered the active runway without clearance. Despite evasive efforts by the One-Eleven crew, a collision occurred that resulted in the death of the Aztec’s pilot and injuries to its passenger.

The heavily damaged One-Eleven managed to abort its take-off safely and was evacuated via emergency slides with no injuries reported among its occupants. The Aztec was destroyed beyond repair, whereas the One-Eleven was restored and returned to operational service. The investigation led to four safety recommendations.

Accident

Flight 95 was a chartered international journey from London Luton Airport in Bedfordshire, UK, bound for Munich-Riem Airport in West Germany. At approximately 15:19 GMT, the One-Eleven was cleared to taxi to holding point Delta where it awaited further clearance. By 15:24 GMT, permission was granted for the aircraft to enter runway 08/26 and backtrack along Runway 08 to hold at the threshold pending take-off clearance. Between 15:25:14 and 15:25:23, the One-Eleven confirmed entering runway 08/26. Shortly after, at around 15:25:32, the Aztec pilot reported readiness to taxi. The wind conditions were communicated as coming from 300° at 10 knots (19 km/h; 12 mph) and the pilot was offered a choice between runways 08 or 26 for departure. Since Luton operates a single runway, the smaller aircraft’s pilot selected runway 26—the opposite direction of that assigned to the Court Line BAC One-Eleven.

Around 15:26, air traffic control instructed the Aztec with "Cleared to Alpha Two Six", which deviated from standard phraseology; the correct instruction should have been "Cleared to holding point Alpha, Runway Two Six". This improper communication contributed directly to the incident. Meanwhile, at 15:25:24, the One-Eleven received take-off clearance and began its roll at approximately 15:27:31. At about 15:27:49, controllers requested that the Aztec advise when ready for take-off; its pilot replied that readiness would be achieved within thirty seconds.

The Aztec then proceeded onto the active runway intending to backtrack to its designated departure end. The Aztec’s passenger—himself a qualified pilot—questioned via intercom whether clearance had been granted for runway entry but received no response before crossing onto the runway. Concurrently, the One-Eleven had accelerated to roughly 100 knots (190 km/h; 120 mph) during its take-off sequence under control of its first officer. Observing the unauthorized incursion from his left and recognising that stopping was unlikely, the captain took over controls. He advanced both throttles fully and attempted to evade by steering right while lifting the port wing above the smaller aircraft.

The passenger aboard the Aztec noticed the approaching One-Eleven and ducked but could not alert his pilot before impact occurred.

The collision resulted in the port wing of the One-Eleven slicing through the Aztec’s cabin structure, instantly killing its pilot and injuring his passenger. The Aztec lost its upper cabin section and sustained propeller damage; simultaneously, approximately 6 metres (20 ft) of the outer port wing of the One-Eleven suffered severe damage causing fuel leakage from its tank. By applying full reverse thrust and maximum braking effort, the One-Eleven successfully aborted take-off within remaining runway distance, coming to rest about 750 metres (2,460 ft) beyond the collision point.

Due to risk posed by leaking fuel, an emergency evacuation was ordered by the commander. While rear doors opened normally allowing deployment of evacuation slides, both forward doors required substantial force before passengers could exit safely. No injuries occurred during evacuation. Subsequent investigation replicated difficulties opening these forward doors and found that inadequate manufacturer instructions had led to improper stowage of escape slides; one door had an incorrect component installed. A safety advisory was issued to all operators of BAC One-Elevens and relevant aviation authorities regarding this defect.

Following this accident, some airline pilots advocated prohibiting general aviation aircraft from operating at Luton Airport; however, this position was not supported by the Guild of Air Pilots and Air Navigators.

BAC One-Eleven

The BAC One-Eleven 518 involved bore the registration G-AXMJ and was constructed in February 1970. After the incident, the aircraft underwent repairs and was subsequently reinstated into operational service.

Piper Aztec

The Piper PA-23 Aztec implicated in the event carried the registration G-AYDE. It was produced in 1967 and acquired by McAlpine Aviation in 1970.

Investigation

The Accidents Investigation Branch conducted a thorough inquiry into the accident, culminating in a final report published on 26 February 1975. The investigation concluded that the Aztec pilot entered the active runway without authorization. Additionally, non-standard communication terminology used by the Luton controller was identified as a contributing element. It was determined that Luton Airport’s ground markings and signage complied with the regulations in force at that time. The airport lacked stop bars or stop lights, which were not mandated by law then.

Neither pilot received radio updates regarding each other’s positions, potentially leaving them unaware that departures were occurring from both ends of the runway. While the Aztec’s radio equipment met existing legal standards, its configuration drew criticism because the passenger or co-pilot could not hear transmissions made by the pilot through his headset. The report issued four recommendations: three focused on improving operations at Luton Airport, and one addressed enhancements to aircraft radio installations.

Sources

• Appleton, John; Cave, Ian G (1978). British Civil Aircraft Registers 1919–1978. Earl Shilton: Midland Counties Publications. ISBN 0-904597-15-6.

External links

• Air Accident Investigation Branch report on the accident