Dmitry Medvedev
Dmitry Medvedev | |
|---|---|
| Born | Dmitry Anatolyevich Medvedev September 14, 1965 Leningrad, Soviet Union |
| Occupation(s) | Lawyer, politician |
| Years active | 1987–present |
| Known for | President of Russia (2008–2012), Prime Minister of Russia (2012–2020), Deputy Chairman of the Security Council of Russia (2020–present) |
Dmitry Anatolyevich Medvedev (born 14 September 1965) is a Russian lawyer and politician currently serving as the Deputy Chairman of the Security Council of Russia since 2020. He held the office of President of Russia from 2008 until 2012 and subsequently served as Prime Minister from 2012 to 2020.
Medvedev secured the presidency in the 2008 election and was regarded as comparatively more liberal than his predecessor, Vladimir Putin, who assumed the role of prime minister during Medvedev’s term. His administration prioritized a comprehensive modernisation programme focused on reducing Russia’s dependence on oil and gas by diversifying the economy. Notable accomplishments under his leadership included ratifying the New START nuclear arms reduction treaty with the United States, overseeing economic recovery following the Great Recession, and guiding Russia to success in the Russo-Georgian War. Additionally, he initiated an anti-corruption campaign, despite later facing allegations related to corruption.
Upon completing a single presidential term, Medvedev was succeeded by Putin in 2012, who then appointed him as prime minister. Medvedev stepped down along with the government on 15 January 2020 to enable constitutional reforms proposed by Putin; he was replaced by Mikhail Mishustin on 16 January 2020. On that same day, Putin named him Deputy Chairman of the Security Council.
Initially perceived as a figure likely to promote liberal reforms and foster better relations with Western countries, Medvedev’s stance has grown increasingly hawkish and critical of the West, particularly in the period leading up to the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Experts interpret this evolution as an attempt to sustain political influence within Putin’s dominant regime. Medvedev continues to be viewed as a possible successor to Putin.
Early life and education
Dmitry Medvedev was born on 14 September 1965 in Leningrad, then part of the Soviet Union. His father, Anatoly Afanasyevich Medvedev (1926–2004), worked as a chemical engineer and taught at the Leningrad State Institute of Technology. His mother, Yulia Veniaminovna Medvedeva (née Shaposhnikova, born 1939), studied languages at Voronezh University and was a Russian language instructor at Herzen State Pedagogical University before later becoming a tour guide at Pavlovsk Palace. The family resided in a modest 40m2 apartment located in Leningrad’s Kupchino district. Dmitry was their only child, raised in a Soviet intelligentsia household with maternal ancestry linked to the Belgorod area.
From a young age, Medvedev exhibited strong intellectual curiosity; his first-grade teacher described him as an insistent questioner. He showed deep engagement with his studies, having read his father’s ten-volume Small Soviet Encyclopedia by third grade and developing early interests in geology and chemistry during his primary school years. During adolescence, he began a relationship with Svetlana Linnik, who would later become his wife, coinciding with a challenging academic phase. Medvedev later reflected on his final exams in 1982 as a moment when he had to fully apply himself for the first time.
Academic background and student life
In the fall of 1982, Medvedev, then 17 years old, commenced his legal studies at Leningrad State University, a discipline he found increasingly engaging and well-matched to his interests. His peers characterized him as both tactful and assertive during discussions.
Throughout his university years, Medvedev was a fan of English rock groups such as Black Sabbath and Led Zeppelin, while also participating in competitive rowing and weightlifting events.
He completed his degree at the Leningrad State University Faculty of Law in 1987, graduating alongside future colleagues including Ilya Yeliseyev and Konstantin Chuychenko. Although he contemplated a career in the prosecutor’s office, he ultimately opted for postgraduate research in civil law as a budget-supported graduate student.
By 1990, Medvedev had successfully defended his dissertation titled "Problems of Realisation of Civil Juridical Personality of State Enterprise," earning the degree of Doctor of Juridical Science (Candidate of Juridical Sciences) specializing in civil law.
Among his instructors was democratic figure Anatoly Sobchak, whose 1988 Soviet parliamentary campaign Medvedev effectively managed as its informal leader.
Following Sobchak’s election victory, Medvedev assumed the role of an associate professor (docent) at Saint Petersburg State University, where he taught civil and Roman law until 1999. He co-authored a prominent three-volume textbook on civil law that sold over one million copies. To supplement his academic income, Medvedev co-established a modest legal consultancy with Anton Ivanov and Ilya Yeliseyev.
St Petersburg career
In 1990, Anatoly Sobchak returned to head the Leningrad City Council, appointing Medvedev—who had orchestrated his election campaign—to a position. Vladimir Putin, another Sobchak protégé, served as an adviser. After Sobchak became Mayor, Medvedev worked as a consultant to City Hall’s Committee for Foreign Affairs under Putin’s leadership.
By November 1993, Medvedev took on the role of legal affairs director at Ilim Pulp Enterprise (ILP), a timber company based in St. Petersburg. He contributed to formulating strategy during a period of significant expansion and acquired a 20% equity stake in the firm. Over seven years, ILP evolved into Russia’s largest lumber enterprise, generating approximately $500 million annually. Medvedev divested his shares in 1999 prior to entering federal service; the financial details of this transaction remain confidential.
Federal government tenure
In June 1996, Putin entered the Russian presidential administration. By August 1999, he was appointed Prime Minister of Russia, and in November that year, several associates from St. Petersburg, including Medvedev, were recruited to senior positions within the Moscow government. On December 31, Medvedev was named deputy head of the presidential staff, placing him in close proximity to Putin. Acting President Putin elevated him to 1st class Active State Councillor of the Russian Federation—the highest federal civilian rank—on January 17, 2000. During the presidential election later that year, Medvedev acted as campaign manager for Putin, who secured victory with 52.94% of votes cast. Medvedev described this responsibility as "a test of strength."
As president, Putin focused on curbing oligarchic corruption and economic inefficiency. In 2000, he appointed Medvedev chairman of the board at gas giant Gazprom, alongside Alexei Miller. Medvedev successfully curtailed widespread tax evasion and asset stripping by previous management teams. He held the position of deputy chair from 2001 to 2002 before resuming chairmanship in June 2002 until assuming the presidency in 2008. Under his guidance, Gazprom restructured its debt profile and expanded market capitalization from $7.8 billion in 2000 to $300 billion by early 2008. Additionally, Medvedev led negotiations concerning gas pricing with Ukraine and Belarus.
In October 2003, Medvedev succeeded Alexander Voloshin as presidential chief of staff. Two years later, in November 2005, Putin promoted him to first deputy prime minister, entrusting him with overseeing the implementation of Russia’s Priority national projects, which aimed to enhance public health services, education quality, housing availability, and agricultural development. While these initiatives raised wages for healthcare and education workers and increased housing construction activity, their impact was constrained by limited funding—only about 4% of the federal budget—and public sentiment generally regarded these efforts as falling short of expectations.
Presidential Candidate
Following his appointment as first deputy prime minister, Medvedev quickly became viewed as a likely contender for the 2008 presidential race. However, Western analysts regarded him as too liberal and Western-leaning to receive Putin’s backing. Instead, it was anticipated that candidates from the siloviki—Putin’s favored security and military officials—would emerge as frontrunners. Nonetheless, Medvedev consistently led public opinion surveys among Russian voters, outperforming competitors such as Sergei Ivanov and Viktor Zubkov. His visibility was further enhanced by his significant involvement in the National Priority Projects.
On 10 December 2007, during a televised event, President Putin publicly declared his support for Medvedev as his chosen successor. At this event, four pro-Kremlin parties—United Russia, Fair Russia, Agrarian Party of Russia, and Civilian Power—officially nominated him. Subsequently, United Russia formally endorsed Medvedev at its party congress on 17 December 2007. He submitted his candidacy to the Central Election Commission of Russia on 20 December 2007 and announced plans to resign from his position as chairman of Gazprom to comply with legal requirements preventing the president from holding other offices. His candidacy was officially approved on 21 January 2008. Putin characterized his endorsement by stating:
Campaign
As the election date of 2 March 2008 neared, Vladimir Putin remained the most popular political figure in Russia. A December 2007 survey conducted by the Levada Center indicated that 79% of Russians would cast their vote for Medvedev if elections were held immediately.[1] His principal challengers, Communist Gennady Zyuganov and LDPR leader Vladimir Zhirinovsky, each attracted approximately 9% support.[2]
Following Putin’s endorsement, Medvedev committed to appointing Putin as prime minister should he win the presidency, allowing Putin to maintain considerable political influence despite constitutional restrictions on consecutive presidential terms.[3] Analysts predicted a power transition favoring the prime minister under this framework. Campaign materials frequently featured both men together accompanied by the slogan "Together We Win" ("").[4]
In December 2007, Medvedev promised an increase of 260 billion rubles in funding for National Priority Projects in 2008. His campaign strategy was notably restrained; he declined invitations to televised debates citing his duties as first deputy prime minister and instead engaged voters through his website Medvedev2008.ru.[5]
Launching his campaign in January 2008, Medvedev traveled across multiple oblasts.[6] On 22 January, at Russia's second Civic Forum, he outlined a liberal-conservative platform aimed at modernizing Russia through "decades of stable development," building upon Putin’s stabilization efforts.[7] At the Fifth Krasnoyarsk Economic Forum on 15 February, Medvedev highlighted freedom—personal liberty, economic freedom, and freedom of expression—as fundamental political principles.[8]
He criticized "legal nihilism," advocated for judicial independence and anti-corruption initiatives, and supported protection of private property rights alongside deregulation and tax reductions. Medvedev presented an economic modernization plan focused on four pillars: institutions, infrastructure, innovation, and investment.[8][9][10]
Victory in the election
On 2 March 2008, Medvedev secured the presidency of Russia, obtaining 70.28% of the votes (totaling 52,530,712) with a voter turnout of 69.78%. His primary opponents, Gennady Zyuganov and Vladimir Zhirinovsky, garnered 17.72% and 9.35% respectively. Approximately 75% of Medvedev’s backing originated from Putin’s voter base. Polls indicated that had both Putin and Medvedev competed, Medvedev's support would have dropped to just 9%.
The legitimacy of the election was questioned by international monitors. Andreas Gross, leading the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE) delegation, described the process as "neither free nor fair," highlighting issues such as unequal candidate registration and Medvedev’s extensive deployment of administrative resources to dominate media exposure. Russian analyst Shpilkin identified signs of vote tampering but determined that even after correcting these irregularities, Medvedev would still have won with around 63%, rather than the official 70%.
Inauguration
Medvedev took office as Russia’s third president on 7 May 2008 during a ceremony held at the Grand Kremlin Palace. Upon receiving the presidential insignia, he stressed his commitment to safeguarding civil liberties and economic freedoms while tackling legal nihilism to promote national progress.
His inauguration was followed by Victory Day on 9 May, where he participated in the military parade at Red Square and issued a decree aimed at providing housing for war veterans.
Key appointments
On 8 May 2008, Dmitry Medvedev appointed Vladimir Putin as Prime Minister of Russia in line with his campaign promise. The State Duma confirmed Putin’s nomination with a strong majority of 392 votes in favor and 56 against; only deputies from the Communist Party opposed.
Putin presented his proposed cabinet on 12 May 2008, which Medvedev approved. While most members remained from Putin’s previous administration, several notable changes were made: Aleksandr Konovalov, previously Medvedev’s student, replaced Vladimir Ustinov as Minister of Justice; Sergei Shmatko succeeded Viktor Khristenko as Minister of Energy; Igor Shchyogolev took over from Leonid Reiman as Minister of Communications; and Vitaliy Mutko was appointed to lead the newly established Ministry of Sports, Tourism and Youth Policy.
Within the presidential administration, Sergei Naryshkin replaced Sergei Sobyanin as head, and Alexander Bortnikov succeeded Federal Security Service director Nikolai Patrushev. Medvedev incorporated his economic advisor Arkady Dvorkovich and press secretary Natalya Timakova into his inner circle, while his longtime classmate Konstantin Chuychenko assumed the role of personal assistant.
Medvedev sought to preserve political equilibrium within the government but notably curtailed the dominance of security and military-affiliated siloviki figures who had held sway for nearly twenty years. Instead, he elevated a group known as civiliki—comprising St. Petersburg civil law experts aligned with Medvedev—to prominent governmental roles.
"Tandem rule"
From the outset of Medvedev's presidency, considerable media attention focused on his dynamic with Putin. For the first time in Russian history, the constitutionally empowered president shared power with a prime minister—Putin—who remained the nation's most favored political figure. Unlike previous prime ministers, who were generally subordinate and less prominent, this unique power-sharing arrangement was labeled "tandemocracy."
Political analyst Daniel Treisman observed that during the early phase of Medvedev’s administration, Putin seemed to step back from active political engagement. Nevertheless, the financial turmoil of 2008 and the conflict in South Ossetia prompted Putin to reassert a more dominant political presence.
2008 Russo-Georgian War
The protracted dispute involving Georgia and the separatist territories of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, which were supported by Russia, intensified during the summer of 2008. On 1 August, South Ossetian forces violated a 1992 ceasefire by shelling Georgian villages. In retaliation, Georgian military units entered South Ossetia on 7 August, swiftly seizing much of Tskhinvali.
At the onset of hostilities, Medvedev was away on vacation while Putin attended the opening ceremony of the 2008 Beijing Olympics. Early on 8 August, Medvedev likely authorized military operations against Georgia during a conversation with Defence Minister Anatoliy Serdyukov. He publicly denounced Georgia’s actions as aggression targeting Russian peacekeepers and citizens and vowed an appropriate response.
Russian troops launched a counterattack that defeated Georgian forces within five days. On 12 August, Medvedev declared an end to the "Operation to force Georgia into peace," followed by a peace agreement facilitated by French President Nicolas Sarkozy. Subsequently, on 26 August, Medvedev signed a decree recognizing South Ossetia and Abkhazia as independent states after receiving approval from the State Duma. The conflict resulted in 48 Russian military fatalities and over 180 Georgian casualties.
The intervention garnered widespread support across political factions within Russia, enhancing Medvedev’s approval ratings by approximately ten percentage points to exceed 70%, reflecting public perception of effective leadership.
In the aftermath, Medvedev introduced a five-point foreign policy strategy known as the Medvedev Doctrine. On 30 September 2009, an EU-backed fact-finding mission concluded that hostilities commenced with Georgia’s large-scale military offensive against Tskhinvali during the night of 7–8 August.
2008–09 economic crisis
In September 2008, Russia faced significant repercussions from the 2008 financial crisis. Despite earlier assurances from officials such as Finance Minister Alexei Kudrin regarding Russia’s economic stability due to sound macroeconomic fundamentals and substantial reserves, the recession became Russia’s deepest post-Soviet downturn, with GDP shrinking by over 8% in 2009. The government allocated more than one trillion rubles (exceeding $40 billion) to stabilize banks and introduced a $50 billion stimulus loan program aimed at supporting distressed enterprises. No major banking institutions failed during this period, and smaller failures were managed effectively. Economic conditions stabilized in 2009, with robust growth resuming only in 2010. President Medvedev’s approval ratings declined from 83% in September 2008 to 68% by April 2009 but rebounded to 72% by October as economic conditions improved.
Experts contend that this financial crisis, combined with the conflict in South Ossetia, postponed Medvedev’s liberal reform initiatives as the government was compelled to focus on crisis management and foreign policy challenges rather than pursuing economic reforms.
Economy
Medvedev initiated a modernisation initiative designed to reshape Russia's economic structure by lessening reliance on oil and gas income and promoting a diverse economy fueled by advanced technology and innovation. This plan targets five key sectors: efficient energy use; nuclear technology; information technology; medical technology and pharmaceuticals; alongside space technology integrated with telecommunications.
In his November 2010 annual address to the Federal Assembly, Medvedev stressed the need to speed up privatisation of non-essential state-owned assets at both federal and regional levels. He encouraged regional authorities to divest unnecessary holdings to finance expenditures following the economic downturn, in line with the government's strategy for $32 billion in asset sales over three years. The funds generated from privatisation were intended to support economic modernisation efforts, with additional incentives for regions that secured their own financing.
Advancing technological innovation was among the president’s top priorities. In May 2009, Medvedev formed the Presidential Commission on Innovation, which he led monthly, involving senior government officials as well as academic and business experts. He suggested that major state enterprises would eventually undergo privatisation, regarding the recent expansion of state involvement in the economy as a temporary measure.
On 7 August 2009, Medvedev assigned Prosecutor General Yury Chayka and Audit Directorate head Konstantin Chuychenko to examine the function of state corporations—an exclusive entity promoted under Putin—questioning their appropriateness within the economic framework.
During June 2010, Medvedev’s visit to Twitter’s headquarters in Silicon Valley underscored his dedication to attracting cutting-edge technology innovation and investment into Russia.
Police reform
Following a 2009 incident involving a police officer shooting in a supermarket, Medvedev made reforming Russia's law enforcement a key priority. He launched the initiative in late 2009 through a presidential decree instructing the government to develop reform plans. By August 2010, a draft law was made available online, attracting over 2,000 comments within a day, which led to multiple adjustments. On 27 October 2010, Medvedev presented the draft to the State Duma, which passed it on 28 January 2011; the Federation Council approved it shortly after on 2 February. The president enacted the law on 7 February 2011, with its provisions coming into force on 1 March 2011.
The reform package included a 30% wage increase for police officers, downsizing of Interior Ministry staff, and the centralization of police funding and authority. To support these changes, about 217 billion rubles (approximately $7 billion) were allocated from the federal budget for the years 2012–2013.
Anti-corruption campaign
On 19 May 2008, Medvedev signed a decree establishing an Anti-Corruption Council. During its inaugural session on 30 September 2008, he emphasized the importance of tackling corruption.
In July 2008, Medvedev introduced the National Anti-Corruption Plan, which recommended tougher penalties such as disqualifying officials for minor corrupt acts and mandatory corruption disclosures. The government was assigned to draft corresponding legislation. The resulting bill, On Corruption Counteraction, became law on 25 December 2008 as Federal Law N 273-FZ. Professor Richard Sakwa noted this as Russia's first substantial anti-corruption statute, though its initial impact was limited. Russia's score on the Corruption Perceptions Index improved marginally from 2.1 in 2008 to 2.2 in 2009, indicating a slight positive effect from these measures.
On 13 April 2010, Medvedev enacted decree No. 460 launching the National Anti-Corruption Strategy, a medium-term policy updated every two years. This strategy increased penalties, strengthened public budget oversight, and incorporated sociological data. This development reflected dissatisfaction with the limited success of the earlier plan.
By January 2011, Medvedev admitted that the government had fallen short in effectively combating corruption.
On 4 May 2011, he approved amendments that significantly raised fines for corruption offenses—up to one hundred times the bribe value—with a maximum penalty of 500 million rubles (around $18.3 million).
Education
President Medvedev introduced the "Our New School" initiative and required annual governmental evaluations of its progress.
Development of the political system
The regional elections held on 1 March 2009 sparked allegations that administrative resources were misused to benefit United Russia, with opposition leader Sergey Mironov voicing strong criticism. In response, Medvedev called for restraint in such practices. By August 2009, he committed to challenging United Russia's dominance and advocated for "new democratic times." Nevertheless, the October 2009 regional elections again resulted in a United Russia victory with about 66% of votes amid similar accusations, leading opposition parties to stage an unprecedented walkout from parliament. Despite Medvedev’s assurances promoting political diversity, analysts observed an increasing disconnect between his statements and actual political developments.
In October 2009, Deputy Chief of Staff Vladislav Surkov cautioned that democratic experiments might destabilize Russia. In November 2010, Medvedev vetoed a restrictive anti-protest law that would have prohibited individuals convicted of organizing unauthorized rallies from obtaining permits for demonstrations.
Later that month, Medvedev openly criticized United Russia’s overwhelming control as causing political stagnation harmful to both ruling and opposition factions. He acknowledged imperfections in Russian democracy but affirmed ongoing progress amid rising discontent over centralized governance.
During his first State of the Nation address in November 2008, Medvedev proposed constitutional reforms extending presidential terms to six years and State Duma terms to five years. In May 2009, he signed legislation permitting the president to nominate candidates for chairperson and deputies of the Constitutional Court rather than having judges elect them.
Medvedev also created a commission aimed at preventing historical distortions detrimental to Russia’s interests. He rejected comparisons equating Stalinism with Nazism, denied Soviet responsibility for invading Poland, and credited Stalin with playing a role in Europe's salvation.
On the Day of Remembrance of Victims of Political Repressions in October 2009, Medvedev stressed the importance of honoring national tragedies alongside victories and condemned Soviet-era repressive actions.
In September 2009, he supported ending direct elections for regional leaders in favor of Kremlin appointments, stating that direct elections would not return within at least a century.
Revisions to election legislation
In 2009, Medvedev advocated for reducing the State Duma election threshold from 7% down to 5%, a change that was enacted into law that spring. Under this adjustment, parties securing between 5% and 6% of the vote were assured a single seat, while those obtaining between 6% and 7% would receive two seats. These allocations occurred prior to assigning seats to parties surpassing the 7% threshold.
According to Russian electoral regulations, parties already represented in the Duma can submit candidate lists without additional requirements, whereas others must gather signatures. Medvedev’s amendments in 2009 lowered the signature collection obligation from 200,000 to 150,000 for the 2011 Duma elections, and further reduced it to 120,000 for elections thereafter.
Foreign affairs
In August 2008, early in Medvedev’s presidency, Russia entered into conflict with Georgia during the 2008 South Ossetia war, intensifying tensions with the United States. On 26 August, after the Federal Assembly voted unanimously, Medvedev signed a decree recognizing Abkhazia and South Ossetia as independent nations—an action that drew condemnation from the G8. Subsequently, on 31 August, he articulated Russia’s foreign policy framework known as the Medvedev Doctrine, which emphasized:
- The primacy of core international law principles.
- Advocacy for a multipolar global order.
- The avoidance of confrontational relations with other countries.
- Safeguarding Russian nationals abroad.
- Strengthening partnerships within friendly regions.
During his address to parliament on 5 November 2008, Medvedev announced intentions to deploy the Iskander missile systems and radar-jamming equipment in Kaliningrad Oblast as a countermeasure to U.S. missile defense installations in Eastern Europe. Nevertheless, following U.S. President Obama’s September 2009 decision to discontinue missile defense deployment plans in the area, Medvedev rescinded these deployment initiatives.
In March 2011, Medvedev appealed to President Obama to exercise restraint and reduce civilian casualties amid NATO’s military intervention in Libya, voicing concerns over indiscriminate use of force.
On 21 November 2011, Medvedev asserted that the conflict with Georgia had effectively halted NATO’s further expansion.
At the Yaroslavl Global Policy Forum in 2011, he characterized Karl Marx’s theory of class struggle as extremist and hazardous, cautioning that economic inequality could provoke social unrest during periods of economic decline.
In August 2014, President Obama acknowledged a constructive working relationship with Medvedev.
During his visit to Armenia on 7 April 2016, Prime Minister Medvedev honored victims at the Tsitsernakaberd Memorial Complex commemorating the Armenian genocide, which Russia officially recognized in 1995.
Dynamics with Putin
Despite the Russian constitution vesting supreme authority in the presidency, debates continued over whether Medvedev or Prime Minister Vladimir Putin wielded greater power. The London Daily Telegraph observed that Kremlin analysts noted Medvedev addressed Putin using the formal "Вы" (vy), while Putin responded with the informal "ты" (ty).
A September 2009 survey by the Levada Center involving 1,600 participants revealed that 13% perceived Medvedev as holding dominant power, 32% favored Putin, and nearly half (48%) believed they shared influence equally. Medvedev reinforced his leadership role by declaring, "I am the leader of this state, I am the head of this state, and the division of power is based on this."
2012 presidential elections
Prior to the 2012 Russian presidential vote, some experts interpreted certain initiatives by Medvedev—such as his late 2010 outreach to NATO and the United States, along with his calls for a more robust political opposition—as attempts to craft a distinct identity separate from Putin’s and to present himself as a reformist figure. Conversely, other commentators regarded this perceived division as overstated, viewing it instead as a tactical effort to appeal to diverse segments of society.
The trial outcome involving former oligarchs Mikhail Khodorkovsky and Platon Lebedev, who had financially supported opposition groups before their incarceration, was widely regarded as an indicator of Putin’s sustained authority.
During the United Russia party congress on 24 September 2011, Medvedev publicly backed Putin’s candidacy for president and disclosed their prior arrangement permitting Putin’s return to the presidency in 2012 after being barred by term limits in 2008. This strategic "rokirovka" (castling) maneuver positioned Medvedev for a significant government role. Putin accepted this plan and pledged support for Medvedev as prime minister contingent on United Russia’s success in the forthcoming legislative elections. The Russian Orthodox Church also lent its support to this political arrangement.
In his final annual address to the nation on 22 December 2011, Medvedev advocated for political reforms including reinstating direct elections for regional governors and allocating half of the State Duma seats through regional elections. He stressed the importance of broadening lawful political engagement; however, critics from the opposition argued that these proposals fell short of addressing widespread concerns regarding alleged electoral fraud during the December 2011 polls.
On 7 May 2012, marking his final day in office, Medvedev signed pivotal documents promoting civil society development, human rights, and modernization efforts. He ratified directives from a presidential council meeting focused on civil liberties and issued a decree initiating a program aimed at improving engineering expertise to support Russia’s economic modernization between 2012 and 2014.
First term
On 7 May 2012, coinciding with the conclusion of his presidency, Dmitry Medvedev was nominated by President Vladimir Putin for the position of prime minister. The State Duma approved his appointment on 8 May 2012 with a vote tally of 299 in favor and 144 against. United Russia, under Medvedev’s leadership, maintained a parliamentary majority after securing approximately 49% of votes and obtaining 238 out of 450 seats in the 2011 legislative elections. Medvedev formally assumed office following Putin’s decree signing on the same day.
Medvedev represented Russia at the G-8 Summit held in the United States on 19 May 2012, substituting for Putin. His cabinet was officially formed on 21 May, and on 26 May he became chairman of United Russia after formally joining the party—making him Russia’s first prime minister affiliated with a political party.
In response to the 2014 Ukrainian revolution and Russia’s subsequent annexation of Crimea, Medvedev visited Crimea on 31 March 2014 shortly after its formal incorporation into Russia on 18 March. During this visit, he announced the establishment of the Federal Ministry for Crimea Affairs tasked with managing integration processes.
Second term
On 7 May 2018, Vladimir Putin put forward Dmitry Medvedev as a candidate for a subsequent term as prime minister.[11] The State Duma ratified his appointment the following day, with 374 deputies voting in favor.[12] Putin gave his endorsement to the Cabinet’s structure on 15 May and later approved its full membership on 18 May.[13][14]
In March 2017, Medvedev encountered significant public criticism after the Anti-Corruption Foundation released the documentary He Is Not Dimon to You, which triggered demonstrations in Moscow calling for his resignation and expressing disapproval of Putin.[15] During the summer of 2018, mass protests broke out in response to a government initiative raising the retirement age, announced on 14 June coinciding with the commencement of the 2018 FIFA World Cup. These protests contributed to a sharp decline in approval ratings for both Medvedev and Putin.[16] Following the 2019 Siberia wildfires, Medvedev suggested revising regulations concerning wildfire management and advocated consulting international experts to enhance firefighting methods.[17]
Resignation
On 15 January 2020, Dmitry Medvedev and his Cabinet stepped down after President Putin delivered a Presidential Address to the Federal Assembly proposing constitutional reforms designed to redistribute presidential powers. Medvedev explained that his resignation was intended to enable these substantial changes, which he claimed would "significantly alter Russia's power dynamics." Putin accepted this resignation.
Although officially described as voluntary under Article 117, the Executive Order referenced Article 83 (c) and part 2 of Article 117, implying that Putin formally dismissed the Cabinet. According to Kommersant, this was effectively a forced resignation, since these constitutional clauses permit the president to dissolve the government without providing justification.
Following this, Putin offered Medvedev the role of Deputy Chairman of the Security Council.
Deputy Chairman of the Security Council (2020–present)
On 16 January 2020, Medvedev assumed the position of Deputy Chairman of Russia’s Security Council, receiving a monthly remuneration of 618,713 rubles (approximately 8,723.85 USD).Cite error: Closing </ref> missing for <ref> tag The UK government followed suit in 2022, applying sanctions connected to the ongoing Russo-Ukrainian War.[18]
Pensions
During a 2016 visit to Feodosia in the territory annexed by Russia, Medvedev encountered backlash from residents concerning Russian pensions that were not adjusted for inflation despite increasing living expenses.[19] His indifferent reply gave rise to the popular "there's no money, but hang in there" meme. In 2018, proposed pension reforms by the Second Medvedev cabinet ignited widespread protests across the country.
Corruption allegations
In September 2016, opposition figure Alexei Navalny revealed details about Medvedev’s purported 80-hectare summer residence featuring lavish facilities and a duck house—this revelation led to public mockery and turned ducks into a symbol of protest.[20] The estate, enclosed by a six-foot barrier, is said to be approximately 30 times the size of Moscow's Red Square, situated on a restored 18th-century site along the Volga River.[21]
Navalny’s Anti-Corruption Foundation published He Is Not Dimon To You in March 2017, an investigative report accusing Medvedev of owning extensive properties, yachts, wineries, and estates worth around US$1.2 billion. The investigation alleges this wealth was amassed through oligarchic gifts and loans from state banks.[22] The video attracted over 24 million views within its first month.[23] Medvedev rejected these claims as "nonsense".[24]
These disclosures triggered mass protests throughout Russia. Authorities detained hundreds of participants, including Navalny himself, condemning the gatherings as "illegal provocations".[25] According to a 2017 survey by the Levada, 45% of Russians expressed support for Medvedev’s resignation.[26]
Publications
Medvedev has contributed scholarly articles related to his doctoral research published in Russian legal journals and co-authored a civil law textbook for university students first issued in 1991, with its sixth edition appearing in 2007. He authored Questions of Russia's National Development (2007), which examines the state's involvement in social policy and economic growth. Furthermore, he co-wrote A Commentary on the Federal Law "On the State Civil Service of the Russian Federation", offering both academic and practical insights into the 2004 civil service legislation.
In October 2008, Medvedev presented the inaugural podcast on the presidential website. His video blog entries were also disseminated through the official LiveJournal community blog_medvedev.
On 23 June 2011, Medvedev participated in launching RIA Novosti’s "Eternal Values" initiative together with the Russian chapter of the Wikimedia Foundation. RIA Novosti released one hundred images under free Creative Commons licenses; Medvedev personally contributed a photograph to Wikimedia Commons under the username Dmitry Medvedev for RIAN.
Medvedev granted his first extensive interview to Novaya Gazeta on 13 April 2009, discussing topics such as civil society development, transparency among public officials, and Internet progress.
- Photo book.
Presidential election
| 2008 presidential election | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Candidate | Affiliation | Ballots | Percentage | |
| Dmitry Medvedev | United Russia | 52,530,712 | 71.2 | |
| Gennady Zyuganov | Communist Party | 13,243,550 | 18.0 | |
| Vladimir Zhirinovsky | Liberal Democratic Party | 6,988,510 | 9.5 | |
| Andrei Bogdanov | Democratic Party | 968,344 | 1.3 | |
| Source: Election results | ||||
Prime minister nominations
| 2012 | |||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Votes in favor | Votes against | Abstentions | Absent | ||||
| 299 | 66.4% | 144 | 32.0% | 0 | 0.0% | 7 | 1.6% |
| 2018 | |||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Votes supporting | Votes opposing | Abstained | Did not participate | ||||
| 374 | 83.9% | 56 | 12.6% | 0 | 0.0% | 16 | 3.6% |
General sources
- Photo album.
External links
- Official personal website
- Official portal of the Prime Minister of Russia
- Video diaries
- Official VK profile of Medvedev at VK
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- ↑ In that same poll, 42% attributed Medvedev’s strength to Putin’s endorsement.
- ↑ Sakwa 2011, p.282
- ↑ Putin confirmed his willingness to assume the prime minister role upon Medvedev’s victory.
- ↑ Medvedev pledged close collaboration with Putin after the election.
- ↑ Sakwa 2011, pp.282–283
- ↑ Reuters, 17 January 2008.
- ↑ Sakwa 2011, p.287
- ↑ 8.0 8.1 Cite error: Invalid
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- ↑ NPR analysis of Medvedev's governance approach.
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- ↑ ...
- ↑ ...
- ↑ ...
- ↑ UK Financial Sanctions List
- ↑ Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty
- ↑ Bloomberg
- ↑ Financial Times
- ↑ Yle Nyheter
- ↑ Alexei Navalny YouTube
- ↑ BBC News
- ↑ BBC News
- ↑ Bloomberg
- Pages with script errors
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- No local image but image on Wikidata
- Dmitry Medvedev
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