HMA No. 1

Vickers, Sons and Maxim

Industry	Armaments manufacturing, Airship construction
Founded	1828
Headquarters	Barrow-in-Furness , England
Products	Airships, armaments, submarines

His Majesty's Airship No. 1 "Mayfly"

His Majesty's Airship No. 1' was developed and constructed by Vickers, Sons and Maxim at their Barrow-in-Furness facility in Lancashire, England, intended as a reconnaissance rigid airship for the Royal Navy. It holds the distinction of being the first British rigid airship ever built, created specifically to rival the German advancements in airship technology. Commonly known by the nickname "Mayfly," a term coined by the ship’s enlisted personnel, the official naval designation was 'HMA Hermione, reflecting the affiliation of the naval team at Barrow with HMS Hermione, a cruiser stationed nearby that was assigned as its support vessel.

On 24 September 1911, while being transferred from its hangar at Cavendish Dock for comprehensive testing, the airship suffered structural failure due to strong winds and broke apart before it could undertake its maiden flight. Despite never achieving flight, the short-lived existence of Mayfly yielded important experience and experimental insights that benefited British airship crews and designers in subsequent developments.

Background

In July 1908, Captain Reginald Bacon, who served as the Royal Navy's Director of Naval Ordnance, proposed that the Navy should procure an airship to rival the achievements of the early German rigid airships developed by Count Ferdinand von Zeppelin. The British Government consented to allocate a budget of £35,000 (equivalent to several million pounds today) for the construction of a dirigible balloon by the Admiralty. By March 1909, Vickers, Sons and Maxim, an armaments manufacturer, offered to build the airship for £28,000 (adjusted for inflation to present-day values), excluding the gas bags made from goldbeater's skin and the outer covering, which the Admiralty was responsible for supplying through contractors. Vickers also agreed to erect a construction shed at their own cost in exchange for a decade-long exclusive contract on airship production, similar to an existing agreement they held with the Crown regarding submarines. However, when awarded the contract on 7 May 1909, design duties were split between Lieutenant N.F. Usborne from the Admiralty and C.G. Robertson of Vickers, but the proposed 10-year monopoly was ultimately denied.

Design

The Mayfly was conceived as an aerial reconnaissance vehicle, sharing similarities with contemporary Zeppelins but featuring significant distinctions. Measuring 512 feet (156 meters) in length and 46 feet (14 meters) in diameter, it exceeded the length of the then-current LZ 6 Zeppelin by 66 feet (20 meters) and possessed a volume 50% greater, thereby offering enhanced lift capacity. Officially designated His Majesty's Airship No. 1 (HMA No. 1), it was commonly nicknamed "Mayfly" by its naval crew and sometimes referred to as the "Hermione Airship," after HMS Hermione, where its crew was housed. As an experimental craft, HMA No. 1 was designed with cost-effectiveness in mind.

During this period, Zeppelins typically carried useful loads near 10,000 pounds (4,500 kilograms) and cruised at speeds around 37 mph (60 km/h). The Vickers design aimed to be capable of water mooring, equipped with wireless communication apparatus, sustaining speeds up to 40 knots (46 mph/74 km/h) over a continuous 24-hour period, reaching altitudes of approximately 1,500 feet (460 meters), and accommodating a crew of twenty comfortably. The airship incorporated mooring equipment at its nose to enable attachment to mooring masts—a pioneering British standard practice—with Mayfly being the first rigid airship fitted with such apparatus.

Prior to full-scale assembly, an experimental section was fabricated employing diverse construction methods: one end utilized hollow timber spars; the central frame combined timber and aluminium; while the opposite end employed solely aluminium components. Although timber proved most effective structurally, the Admiralty preferred metal materials. The emergence of duralumin in late 1909 prompted its adoption due to its superior strength-to-weight ratio compared to traditional materials—ahead of Zeppelin’s use by four years. Developing HMA No. 1 entailed inventing novel technologies and extensive experimentation with materials and manufacturing processes before finalizing production techniques.

The hull comprised forty twelve-sided transverse frames spaced at intervals of 12.5 feet (3.8 meters), some reinforced with wire cross-bracing, creating seventeen bays of varying lengths between 12.5 feet and 37.5 feet (3.8 to 11.4 meters). These frames were interconnected by twelve longitudinal girders along with a triangular-section keel beneath the main structure. The hull’s aerodynamic shape was influenced by American expert Albert Zahm’s research; it reportedly reduced head resistance to 40% compared with contemporary Zeppelins. Although a fully streamlined form had been proposed initially, it was rejected by the Admiralty due to construction complexity; it would not be until 1918 that such streamlined designs were realized with airships like the R80.

Material testing for the outer covering concluded with treated silk being selected. Additionally, the upper half received a coating mixed with aluminium powder to minimize heat absorption; this treatment resulted in a primrose yellow underside contrasted by an aluminium-colored top surface.

Control surfaces were designed following concepts developed by Short Brothers and validated through experiments at the National Physical Laboratory. These included quadruple rudders and triple elevators mounted on the trailing edges of cruciform tail fins, complemented by forward triplane elevators and small triple rudders located behind the aft gondola.

Two gondolas crafted from mahogany using the Consuta technique ensured watertight integrity permitting water operations. Each housed a Wolseley 160 hp water-cooled V-8 engine: the forward gondola powered two four-bladed propellers measuring approximately 11 feet 10 inches (3.61 meters) in diameter mounted on outriggers and geared to rotate at half engine speed; the rear engine drove a single two-bladed propeller about 15 feet (4.6 meters) long affixed at its rear. To compensate for fuel consumption without venting lifting gas, equipment was installed to recover water from exhaust gases and replenish weight accordingly. Despite these innovations, significant errors arose due to lack of experience alongside challenges posed by Admiralty specifications and complex systems such as water recovery from engine exhausts.

Construction and trials

The construction shed, which also functioned as a hangar, was designed by Vickers and erected extending from the wall of Cavendish Dock at their Naval Construction Yard in Barrow. It was supported by piles driven into the basin floor. Inside the shed was a floating platform on which the airship was assembled; this platform could be moved out of the shed together with the airship itself. Work commenced in 1909, with an expected completion date in August of that year and delivery planned for two months later. However, difficulties arose in June while driving piles into the dock floor, delaying the shed's completion until June 1910. Only then could construction of HMA No. 1 properly begin. A protective screen was installed in the dock along with a newly engineered floating mooring mast standing 38 ft (12 m) tall, designed to endure a steady pull of 80 tons (81 tonnes). This provided a significant safety margin, considering the maximum force exerted by the airship on the mast was estimated at roughly 4 tons (4 tonnes) during winds reaching 80 mph (130 km/h).

To prepare for Mayfly’s completion, crew training began on 25 February 1910. This included instruction on handling rubber fabric (conducted at Messrs Short Brothers works in Battersea, London), petrol engine operation at Vickers’ facilities, as well as lessons on signaling, aeronautics, and meteorology.

An entry from the Handbook for HMA No. 1 recorded:

“Two separate crews were assigned to manage the ship while it was out, as this was pioneering work. They lived aboard the airship without discomfort despite no arrangements for cooking or smoking onboard. At night, the living quarters maintained a temperature slightly above outside air temperature, and since the ship was free from drafts in both keel and cabin areas, it was expected that appropriate clothing would prevent any cold-related issues.”

Lieutenant N.F. Usborne, who was responsible for the design of HMA No. 1 at the Admiralty, was appointed as its captain.

Upon completion, Mayfly held the distinction of being the largest airship constructed to that date.

Static trials

Static testing commenced inside the shed on 13 February 1911. During these trials, engines were operated and controls tested; however, outdoor testing awaited more favorable weather conditions.

On Monday, 22 May 1911, Mayfly was moved out of its confined shed for handling and mooring evaluations. It was towed stern-first from the narrow enclosure before being gradually rotated out of Cavendish Dock and secured to a mooring mast mounted on a pontoon. While moored, nine officers remained aboard—living quarters were in the keel with telephone links between gondolas—to conduct engine tests that were unfortunately cut short due to radiator malfunctions. The following day brought winds of 45 mph (72 km/h), and throughout both nights spent outside the shed, searchlights illuminated the airship to monitor its movement closely. The vessel showed no tendency to rise; calculations revealed that removing fixtures weighing approximately three tons would be necessary for it to achieve lift-off. It was therefore returned to the shed where, after removing ballast, fuel, and some equipment, it floated for about five hours with both gondolas roughly 3 ft (0.91 m) clear of the water. These conditions allowed engineers to perform trim assessments. It became clear that significant weight reductions were essential if HMA No. 1 were ever to become airborne.

The most severe alteration involved stripping away the external keel, which compromised and distorted the airship’s structural framework. Hartley Pratt, a draughtsman at Vickers working in another department, predicted this would have disastrous consequences but his concerns were disregarded. Pratt eventually left Vickers but later returned to lead design efforts on Britain's next airship project—the No. 9r ordered in 1913 from Vickers. Additional modifications included eliminating forward elevators and removing water recovery equipment. The gondolas’ positions were reversed so that the heavier forward gondola was relocated aft. The cabin and crew accommodations intended for use while docked were also removed. Weight reduction efforts became so extreme that holes were drilled into engine control levers to save mass. These changes resulted in Mayfly having a disposable lift capacity of 3.21 tons. Under considerable pressure from an Admiralty solicitor, Captain Murray Suter reluctantly agreed to accept No. 1 provisionally on condition that it be flown.

Final sortie

File:1911 09 24 Vickers HMAno1 BarrowInFurness.jpg

Mayfly emerging from its floating shed on 24 September 1911

File:HMA 1 "Mayfly" wreck 1.jpg

HMA No.1 after structural failure

While still housed indoors, a more advanced method was developed to extract Mayfly from its hangar. This involved a set of electric winches designed to carefully pull the airship out, even when wind conditions were unfavorable. On 24 September 1911, the decision was made to move Mayfly outside for comprehensive testing. However, as the bow passed through the hangar entrance, a sudden gust caused the craft to tip almost onto its beam ends. Although it eventually regained balance, during the maneuver to turn the nose back toward the dock, audible cracks were heard amidships and the airship fractured into two sections. At that moment, the central section began to lift while crew members aboard the rear gondola jumped overboard, causing the stern to rise as well. Additional damage occurred when a bracing cable atop the hull remained taut, inflicting severe harm on several frames as wind shifted the structure. Fortunately, there were no casualties, and the wreckage was returned to its shed later that same day.

A subsequent inquiry determined that responsibility for the accident could not be assigned to any individual, and it was reasonable to conclude that an intense squall was responsible. The wind force was such that similar vessels would likely have suffered significant damage under identical conditions. Commander Masterman reportedly remarked unofficially that "Mayfly was split in two by the handling crew when someone neglected to release the lines securing the ship's bows." Additionally, in an article titled Twenty-One Years of Airship Progress, Lt.Col. W. Lockwood Marsh stated: "Although the ship was clearly fragile, this incident was directly caused by a handling error—one of the parties on a hawser kept hauling without realizing that the aft car had become entangled with a buoy."

Consequences

Captain Sueter recommended repairing No. 1 and utilizing it for mooring trials. He also advocated constructing two additional airships to preserve design and production expertise.

By this time Reginald Bacon had departed from naval service in 1909, and "Jackie" Fisher, a supporter of airship advancement, was no longer serving as First Sea Lord. When Winston Churchill assumed office as First Lord of the Admiralty on 24 October 1911, he generally regarded airships with skepticism, preferring to prioritize heavier-than-air aviation development. Consequently, no efforts were made to restore Mayfly, which was left abandoned inside its hangar.

On 26 March 1913 in the House of Commons, Churchill remarked: "Overall, compared with other navies, our British aeroplane service has made a promising start... However, I must report less favorably on airships. Naval airship progress has been hindered by various factors. The accident that destroyed May-fly, or more aptly named Won't Fly, at Barrow represented a significant setback for Admiralty airship policy." Furthermore, on 31 March 1913 Sir Bolton Eyres-Monsell, who would later become First Lord of the Admiralty himself, commented on Mayfly's fate and Britain's limited airship fleet: "The 'May-fly' broke three years ago and nothing further has been done since. Germany possesses seventeen non-rigid airships; we have only two inferior ones and two more on order—but no active development is ongoing in this area."

Although it never achieved flight, Mayfly's short existence contributed important technical insights to British airship engineering.

References

• Chamberlain, Geoffrey. Airships, Cardington. Lavenham, Suffolk: Terence Dalton Ltd, 1984 ISBN 978-0-86138-025-1
• Higham, R. The British Rigid Airship 1908–1931 London: Foulis, 1961
• Lumsden, Alec (2003). British Piston Engines and their Aircraft. Marlborough, Wiltshire: Airlife Publishing, 2003. ISBN 1-85310-294-6.
• Robinson, Douglas H. Giants in the Sky: History of the Rigid Airship. Henley-on-Thames, UK: Foulis, 1973. ISBN 978-0-85429-145-8.

External links

• The Airship Heritage Trust – Airshipsonline homepage
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