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Operation Black Buck

From Alfawiki
Royal Air Force
Company typeMilitary service branch
IndustryMilitary aviation
FoundedApril 1, 1918; 108 years ago (1918-04-01) in United Kingdom
Headquarters
London
,
United Kingdom
Area served
United Kingdom and worldwide operations
Key people
Air Chief Marshal Sir Michael Beetham (Chief of the Air Staff during Falklands War)
ProductsAircraft operations, aerial refuelling, strategic bombing
Number of employees
Approx. 150,000 (1982)
Websitewww.raf.mod.uk

Operations Black Buck 1 through Black Buck 7 comprised a series of seven exceptionally long-distance air raids executed during the 1982 Falklands War by the Royal Air Force (RAF) using Vulcan bombers from the RAF Waddington Wing. These aircraft originated from Nos. 44, 50, and 101 Squadrons, targeting Argentine military installations on the Falkland Islands. Out of these missions, five successfully carried out their bombing objectives. The primary aim was to strike Port Stanley Airport and its defensive infrastructure. At nearly 6,600 nautical miles (7,600 mi; 12,200 km) in distance and with flight durations around 16 hours for a round trip, these were the longest bombing sorties ever undertaken at that time.

These Black Buck operations were launched from RAF Ascension Island, situated near the Equator. The Vulcan bomber, originally designed for medium-range European missions, required multiple in-flight refuellings to reach the Falklands. The RAF’s tanker fleet mainly consisted of converted Handley Page Victor bombers with limited range themselves, necessitating aerial refuelling for tankers as well. Coordinating eleven tankers to support two Vulcans (one active and one backup) represented a significant logistical challenge, especially as all aircraft operated from the same airstrip.

The Vulcans were equipped internally with twenty-one 1,000-pound (450 kg) bombs or carried externally either two or four Shrike anti-radar missiles. Among the five completed raids, three targeted Stanley Airfield’s runway and operational structures, while two focused on suppressing radar capabilities by launching Shrike missiles against a Westinghouse AN/TPS-43 long-range 3D radar system near Port Stanley. The Shrike attacks damaged two secondary fire control radars, which were less critical and quickly replaced, but inflicted some casualties among Argentine personnel. One Vulcan nearly crashed after its refuelling apparatus failed, forcing an emergency landing in Brazil.

The physical impact on the runway was limited; only a single crater was created, which temporarily prevented fast jet operations. Argentine ground crews restored the runway within a day to a condition suitable for C-130 Hercules transport aircraft. British intelligence remained aware that the airstrip continued to be operational throughout. Some analysts suggest that the RAF initiated these raids partly because defence cuts in the late 1970s had reduced British military capabilities, and the RAF sought to assert its importance in the conflict to avoid further reductions.

Background

In the early 1980s, British defence strategy concentrated primarily on countering the Soviet Union during the Cold War. Nevertheless, biannual assessments by Defence leadership considered potential conflicts worldwide, including those involving the Falkland Islands. The prevailing view was that defending the islands was impractical.[1] The closest usable airfield for operations was located on Ascension Island, a British possession in the South Atlantic near the equator, featuring a single 10,000-foot (3,000 m) runway at Wideawake airfield. This base was about 3,700 nautical miles (4,300 mi; 6,900 km) from the United Kingdom and approximately 3,300 nautical miles (3,800 mi; 6,100 km) from the Falklands.[2] Without aircraft capable of covering such distances, RAF operational involvement in South Atlantic engagements was deemed unfeasible. Consequently, operations in this region were assigned primarily to the Royal Navy and British Army, while RAF contributions were limited to maritime patrols by Hawker Siddeley Nimrod aircraft and logistical support from transport planes such as Vickers VC10 and Lockheed C-130 Hercules.[1][3]

By March 1982, intercepted Argentine communications indicated increasing activity in the South Atlantic.[4][5] This prompted RAF planners to investigate whether long-range operations using aerial refuelling could be achieved with their fleet of Avro Vulcan bombers.[1][3] Notably, in 1961 a Vulcan had completed a non-stop flight from the UK to RAAF Base Richmond near Sydney, Australia—a significantly greater distance—although this involved pre-positioned tanker aircraft along its route, an option unavailable when operating out of Ascension Island.[6] At this stage, planning focused solely on feasibility; no specific targets within Argentina or the Falklands had been identified.[7]

Following Argentina’s invasion of the Falkland Islands on 2 April 1982,[5] Britain committed to retaking control of the territory.[8]

Victor tankers

The RAF's long-distance missions relied exclusively on the fleet of Handley Page Victor K2 tankers. Initially, 34 Victors were constructed as bombers, with 24 later converted into tanker aircraft. Following the loss of one Victor in an accident at RAF Marham on 28 September 1976, the RAF maintained a total of 23 tankers. These were the sole tanker aircraft available to Britain in April 1982; meanwhile, nine VC10s were undergoing conversion to tanker roles, though the first conversion was only finalized on 22 June. Of the Victor tankers, twelve were allocated to No. 55 Squadron and eleven to No. 57 Squadron.

File:RAF Victor in Bermuda.jpg
Victor XM717 (stationed in Bermuda in 1984)

The crews operating these tankers were highly skilled, having peacetime responsibilities that included refuelling fighter jets scrambled to intercept Soviet bombers violating British airspace—typically around five such scrambles weekly. However, conducting extensive flights across the unfamiliar South Atlantic required enhancements to the Victors’ navigation systems, notably fitting the Delco Carousel inertial navigation system and the Omega navigation system. These tankers also possessed in-flight refuelling capabilities themselves, enabling the creation of aircraft relay chains.

The first five Victor tankers arrived at Ascension Island on 18 April, followed by an additional four the next day. By month’s end, six more had deployed, totaling fourteen Victors at Ascension after one returned to Marham on 26 April. Prior to leaving UK airspace, each Victor was refuelled by another Victor tanker. While Victors operated from Ascension, their usual peacetime refuelling duties over British airspace were temporarily carried out by United States Air Force Boeing KC-135 Stratotanker aircraft. The station commander at Marham, Group Captain J. S. B. Price, took on the role of senior RAF officer at Ascension. Command of the Victor detachment initially fell to Wing Commander D. W. Maurice-Jones until 22 April, when Wing Commander A. W. Bowman—commander of No. 57 Squadron—assumed leadership.

Early RAF long-range sorties involved utilizing Victor aircraft for reconnaissance around South Georgia Island, supporting Operation Paraquet, which aimed to retake South Georgia. At 0400Z on 20 April, a Victor flown by Squadron Leader J. G. Elliott departed from Ascension with four accompanying tankers providing fuel for the outbound leg, while another group of four tankers was designated for the return journey’s refuelling. Additional reconnaissance flights over South Georgia took place on 22–23 April and again on 24–25 April. These operations confirmed the effectiveness of the Victor tanker fleet based at Ascension in sustaining missions within the South Atlantic theater.

Vulcan bombers

File:Vulcan Bomb Bay (10024511715).jpg
The bomb bay of Vulcan XM598

The Vulcan represented the final British V bomber still operational for bombing missions, but by March 1982, only three squadrons remained active: Nos. 44, 50, and 101 Squadrons RAF. Plans were in place to disband all three units by 1 July 1982.[9] Stationed at RAF Waddington in the United Kingdom, these squadrons were assigned to North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) nuclear duties; conventional bombing and aerial refuelling had not been practiced for many years.[10] On 11 April, a request from Rear Admiral Sandy Woodward, commander of the British aircraft carrier group en route south, for target recommendations in the Falkland Islands prompted a reassessment of Vulcan strike options. Attacks on Argentine mainland airfields and ports were dismissed as politically sensitive and unlikely to yield significant results. The Chief of the Air Staff, Air Chief Marshal Sir Michael Beetham, contended that deploying Vulcans would compel Argentine forces to keep fighters stationed in northern Argentina.[11]

Consensus developed around a strike on Port Stanley Airport. The value of such an operation was debated extensively. Initially, Beetham proposed a single Vulcan dropping seven 1,000-pound (450 kg) bombs, which would limit refuelling demands. However, trials at the Garvie Island bombing range showed seven bombs were insufficient; a full load of twenty-one bombs offered a 90% chance of creating at least one crater on the runway and a 75% likelihood of two craters. The attack was also expected to damage aircraft dispersal zones and parked planes nearby. To reduce exposure to anti-aircraft guns and surface-to-air missiles, raids were planned for nighttime and preferably under poor weather conditions. Damage extending to surrounding areas, including aircraft on the ground, would justify the mission’s risks. Although the Chiefs of Staff Committee believed the raid was achievable and likely to succeed, officials at the Ministry of Defence remained cautious due to political concerns about using Ascension Island’s base for offensive operations—Wideawake was technically controlled by the USAF. After consulting the United States Department of State, which raised no objections, the War Cabinet authorized Operation Black Buck on 27 April.[12]

File:XM607 SIDE VIEW.JPG
Vulcan XM607, which carried out the first Black Buck raid

A contentious element involved deploying Sea Harriers from Woodward's task force. One rationale for employing Vulcans was to preserve Sea Harrier assets for naval air defence; however, plans required Harriers to perform daylight photo reconnaissance over the target airfield to assess damage. If risking Harriers was necessary, political considerations favored their use in direct attack roles instead. Rear Admiral Derek Reffell suggested Harriers suppress enemy radar before the Vulcan strike and conduct post-raid reconnaissance flights. On 29 April, Woodward received notice that Black Buck would commence at 0700Z and was instructed to schedule photo reconnaissance immediately afterward. Woodward responded that if reconnaissance was essential, he recommended cancelling Black Buck. The following day he was informed that Black Buck had been approved and that reconnaissance was needed not only for damage evaluation but also to counter Argentine claims of indiscriminate bombing.[13]

Selection of Vulcans hinged on their engines; only those equipped with the higher-thrust Bristol Olympus 301 engines qualified.[14] Six aircraft were chosen—two from each of Nos. 44, 50, and 101 Squadrons—but ultimately one was not deployed. Five crews were assigned: one each from Nos. 44 and 101 Squadrons, two from No. 50 Squadron, plus one from the recently disbanded No. 9 Squadron.[9] Each Vulcan crew included an air-to-air instructor from the operational conversion unit responsible for Victor tanker training; this officer supervised aerial refuelling operations during missions.[15]

A major challenge involved reactivating aerial refuelling systems that had been sealed off by replacing 4-inch (100 mm) non-return valves—twenty replacements were found stored at RAF Stafford.[16] The five Vulcans were equipped with Carousel inertial navigation systems. Additionally, AN/ALQ-101 electronic countermeasure pods sourced from Blackburn Buccaneer aircraft at RAF Honington were mounted on makeshift pylons attached at points originally designed for the now-defunct Skybolt missile.[17] The aircraft undersides received Dark Sea Grey paint finishes.[9]

File:Rolls-Royce Bristol Siddeley Olympus Mk.301 Keski-Suomen ilmailumuseo 2.JPG
Bristol Olympus 301 jet engine serial number 650179 in the Aviation Museum of Central Finland. This was the number four (right outermost) engine of Vulcan XM612

Although capable of carrying conventional weapons, Vulcans had not done so in many years prior to these operations. To deploy twenty-one bombs required three bomb carrier sets holding seven bombs each; their release was managed via a control panel at the navigator’s station called a 90-way, which allowed selection among ninety different release sequences for 1,000 pounds (450 kg) bombs. None of the Waddington-based Vulcans possessed bomb racks or 90-way panels initially. A search at Waddington and RAF Scampton uncovered 90-way units that were installed and tested; however, locating enough septuple bomb carriers proved difficult as at least nine were needed. It was recalled that some had been sold to a scrapyard in Newark-on-Trent, from where they were recovered. Finding sufficient bombs also posed problems—only 167 were available—with some featuring cast rather than machined cases that tended to shatter; penetrative bombs suitable for this mission were required.[18] Crew training in conventional bombing techniques and aerial refuelling took place between 14 and 17 April, involving Military Air Traffic Controllers from the Military Area Service (M.A.S.) suite at London Terminal Control Centre in West Drayton, Middlesex, who guided Vulcans and Victor tankers approximately 250 miles off Land's End in the Atlantic Ocean where most refuelling exercises occurred exclusively at night.[9]

The initial pair of Vulcans commanded by Squadron Leader John Reeve and Flight Lieutenant Martin Withers departed Waddington at 0900Z on 29 April, arriving at Wideawake after an uninterrupted nine-hour flight at 1800Z during which they underwent two Victor tanker refuellings en route.[19][9] Two additional Vulcans later arrived at Wideawake: one led by Squadron Leader Alastair Montgomery on 14 May and another under Squadron Leader Neil McDougall on 27 May; this latter aircraft conducted trials with the Martel anti-radar missile before receiving equipment for carrying the AGM-45 Shrike missile.[20][21]

Overview

Operation Objective Date Lead Vulcan Backup Vulcan Remarks
Black Buck 1 Runway at Port Stanley Airport 30 April–1 May XM598 (Reeve) XM607 (Withers) Executed; primary bomber cabin lost pressurisation shortly after departure, replaced by backup aircraft
Black Buck 2 Runway at Port Stanley Airport 3–4 May XM607 (Reeve) XM598 (Montgomery) Completed successfully
Black Buck 3 Runway at Port Stanley Airport 13 May XM607 XM612 Aborted pre-takeoff due to adverse weather conditions
Black Buck 4 Anti-aircraft radar installation 28 May XM597 (McDougall) XM598 (Montgomery) Mission cancelled five hours into flight owing to Victor fleet malfunction
Black Buck 5 Anti-aircraft radar installation 31 May XM597 (McDougall) XM598 (Montgomery) Successfully carried out
Black Buck 6 Anti-aircraft radar installation 3 June XM597 (McDougall) XM598 (Montgomery) Completed; lead bomber diverted to Brazil following refuelling probe failure
Black Buck 7 Port Stanley Airport storage and aircraft facilities 12 June XM607 (Withers) XM598 (Montgomery) Successfully executed

Black Buck One

File:RAF Museum, Cosford - geograph.org.uk - 398691.jpg
XM598 displayed at the Royal Air Force Museum Midlands

The initial surprise offensive against the Falkland Islands, conducted from 30 April to 1 May, marked the first major British strike against Argentine forces in the conflict.[22] The mission targeted the principal runway at Port Stanley Airport. Armed with twenty-one 1,000-pound bombs, the Vulcan bomber was tasked with flying across the runway axis at an angle of approximately 35 degrees. Bomb release was precisely timed to dispense ordnance sequentially from an altitude of 10,000 feet (3,000 m), ensuring that at least one bomb would impact the runway surface.[23]

The Vulcan's fuel capacity consisted of fourteen pressurised bag tanks holding a total of 9,200 imperial gallons (42,000 L; 11,000 US gal) of fuel, weighing around 74,000 pounds (34,000 kg), distributed as five tanks in each wing and four within the fuselage. Based on calculated fuel requirements for the Vulcan, eleven Victor tanker aircraft—including two spares—were allocated to refuel the single bomber both en route to and returning from the Falklands.[24] Two Vulcans were designated for this operation: the lead aircraft under Reeve's command and a backup piloted by Withers, which would return to Ascension Island once Reeve completed his initial aerial refuelling.[9] The plan entailed fifteen Victor sorties and eighteen aerial refuelling procedures.[24] At that time, it represented the longest bombing mission ever undertaken.[25] This record was later exceeded by B-2 Spirit bombers during the 2001 Operation Enduring Freedom.[26]

The eleven Victor tankers and two Vulcans commenced takeoffs from Wideawake airfield starting at 2350Z in one-minute intervals, with Reeve’s Vulcan lifting off eleventh and Withers’s last.[9][27] Fully loaded with bombs and fuel, carrying a sixth crew member and freshly painted, both Vulcans exceeded their maximum certified takeoff weight of 204,000 pounds (93,000 kg). On Ascension Island’s warm runway, Bristol Olympus 301 engines had to be operated at 103 percent thrust to achieve liftoff.[25] Shortly after departure, Reeve experienced a malfunction when a rubber seal on the captain’s direct vision window deteriorated. Unable to close or seal this window and thus unable to pressurise the cabin, he was compelled to return to base. The Vulcan had no fuel dumping capability and was too heavy for an emergency landing immediately after takeoff; consequently, the crew remained airborne in a cold and noisy environment until enough fuel had been expended. Withers then assumed lead status. Twenty minutes later, one Victor tanker returned due to a faulty refuelling hose system and was replaced by the reserve tanker.[28]

File:Refuelling.plan.black.buck.svg
"The attacking Vulcan underwent seven refuellings outbound and one on return; grey lines indicate reserve aircraft substitutions"

During the 34-minute interval between first and second refuellings, Withers's Vulcan consumed approximately 9,200 pounds (4,200 kg) of fuel at a rate of [convert: invalid number] per hour without its weight dropping below the theoretical maximum limit.[29] After completing the second refuelling, two tankers peeled off and returned to base, leaving only three aircraft: Withers's Vulcan and two Victors piloted by Squadron Leader Bob Tuxford and Flight Lieutenant Steve Biglands respectively.[30] Due to high fuel consumption and in-flight refuelling complications, two Victors had to adjust their routes further south than originally planned, reducing their fuel reserves. During the final refuelling phase, severe thunderstorms were encountered causing Biglands’s refuelling probe to fail.[31]

Tuxford was initially scheduled to return after this refuelling carrying [convert: invalid number] of fuel while Biglands continued with the Vulcan; however, Tuxford took over Biglands’s role when it became apparent he lacked adequate fuel for a return flight to Ascension Island.[32] He performed the final aerial refuelling operation but delivered approximately [convert: invalid number] less fuel than anticipated. Consequently, Withers approached his final rendezvous with only about [convert: invalid number] remaining instead of the planned [convert: invalid number].[33]

Flying solo from this point onward, Withers proceeded toward the Falklands. He descended to low altitude for his approach—dropping as low as [convert: invalid number] before climbing back up to [convert: invalid number] for the bombing run approximately [convert: invalid number] from target.[25] To confirm position and reduce civilian risk, H2S radar locked onto Mount Usborne’s peak at [convert: invalid number], located roughly [convert: invalid number] west of Stanley prior to activating automated bombing controls.[34] Approaching at an altitude near [convert: invalid number] with an airspeed of about [convert: invalid number], electronic countermeasures aboard defeated Argentine Skyguard radar-controlled anti-aircraft guns. The twenty-one bombs were successfully released; immediately thereafter Withers banked sharply left at a 60-degree angle subjecting crew members to approximately [convert: invalid number], twice normal gravitational force.[35]

Sea Harriers from 801 Naval Air Squadron aboard aircraft carrier Template:HMS Invincible R05 6 stood ready to defend the Vulcan but were not deployed since no Argentine fighters were present during the strike window.[36] Shortly afterward, Sea Harriers conducted reconnaissance flights over Port Stanley airport photographing bomb damage inflicted by the Vulcan raid.[37]

After departing the target area heading nearly north toward a prearranged Victor tanker rendezvous near Brazil’s coast off Rio de Janeiro, Withers transmitted codeword "superfuse" signaling mission success at 0746Z while passing British Task Force units.[38] The flight continued within range of South America until meeting Squadron Leader Barry Neal’s Victor tanker for refuelling support; one Nimrod maritime patrol aircraft from Wideawake assisted in locating rendezvous points though limited by lack of aerial refuelling capability.[39]

Tuxford maintained radio silence throughout but upon intercepting Withers's "superfuse" message requested assistance from Ascension control.[40] Wing Commander Colin Seymour flew out with a Victor tanker to meet Tuxford enabling his safe return after fourteen hours five minutes airborne while Withers met Neal aided by Nimrod guidance; all three aircraft landed safely back on Ascension Island by 1452Z.[41][38]

"Vulcan bomber arriving at Ascension Island during dusk"

Northwood Headquarters received confirmation of mission success via "superfuse" message by approximately 0830Z followed shortly by Ministry of Defence notification; Beetham was informed an hour later by Deputy Air Vice Marshal Kenneth Hayr.[42] BBC World Service broadcast news of the raid prior to any returning aircraft landing on Ascension Island.[43] The bombing reportedly resulted in three Argentine fatalities among personnel stationed at Port Stanley airport along with multiple injuries. One bomb created a substantial crater on the runway which proved challenging to repair promptly; other bombs inflicted minor damage on parked aircraft and equipment though runway operations continued albeit shortened in length.[44]

Later that day twelve Sea Harriers from 800 Naval Air Squadron, launched from carrier Template:HMS Hermes R12 6, struck targets on East Falkland including Port Stanley airport where nine aircraft dropped twenty-seven bombs damaging airfield defences and igniting stored fuel fires potentially causing slight runway impairment.[45][37] One Sea Harrier sustained damage from a 20 mm anti-aircraft projectile affecting its fin and tailplane but managed safe return for rapid repair aboard Hermes.[46] Argentine air defence command erroneously reported British losses as three aircraft destroyed following these attacks.[37]

Concurrently three other Sea Harriers targeted Goose Green airfield deploying cluster munitions resulting in destruction of one FMA IA 58 Pucará aircraft and severe damage rendering two others unflyable; pilot killed along with five ground crew members during attack casualties.[47][46] No opposition was encountered during these sorties which returned safely to Hermes. Subsequent operations saw continuous combat air patrol missions launched by Sea Harriers from both 800 NAS and four-aircraft patrol maintained east of Port Stanley by 801 NAS throughout campaign duration.[48]

On 8 October 1982 Withers received the Distinguished Flying Cross (United Kingdom) recognizing his role in Black Buck One,[49] while his crew—Flying Officer P.I Taylor (co-pilot), Flight Lieutenants R.D Wright (radar plotter), G.C Graham (navigator), H Prior (air electronics officer), and R.J Russell (air-to-air refuelling instructor)—were Mentioned in Dispatches for their contributions.[50][51][52] Squadron Leader Tuxford was awarded the Air Force Cross (United Kingdom),[53] with his crew earning Queen's Commendation for Valuable Service in the Air.[40]

Black Buck Two

On the night spanning 3–4 May, a Vulcan bomber from No. 50 Squadron, piloted by Squadron Leader John Reeve and his crew, executed a mission closely resembling the initial Black Buck operation. A second Vulcan, under the command of Squadron Leader Alastair Montgomery, served as a standby aircraft but was ultimately not deployed. Similar to Black Buck One, the final approach to Port Stanley involved flying at low altitude for approximately 200 nautical miles before performing a rapid ascent to around 16,000 feet for the bombing run. This tactic aimed to evade the now fully alert Argentine air defenses, particularly the Roland surface-to-air missile systems. Despite these efforts, all bombs failed to strike the runway itself. This outcome remained unknown for several days due to adverse weather conditions that prevented reconnaissance flights. Argentine accounts confirm bomb impacts near the western section of the airstrip and report that two Argentine soldiers sustained minor injuries. The craters formed at the runway’s western end hindered Argentine engineers from extending it sufficiently to support high-performance fighter jets. Nevertheless, the runway continued to be utilized by Hercules transports and lighter aircraft, enabling the Argentines to deliver essential supplies and evacuate casualties.

Black Buck Three

After completing Black Buck Two, Vulcan operations were paused as aerial refueling tankers were reassigned to support Nimrod maritime patrol missions aimed at submarine detection; each Nimrod sortie required as many as 18 tanker flights for support. The two Vulcans returned to RAF Waddington on 7 May, with one redeploying to Wideawake on 15 May to serve as the primary aircraft for Black Buck Three. A second Vulcan arrived from Waddington on 14 May to act as the mission’s reserve aircraft. Although Black Buck Three was planned for 16 May, it was aborted prior to departure due to unfavorable headwind conditions. Subsequently, both Vulcans returned to Waddington on 20 and 23 May respectively.

Black Buck Four

File:VulcanblackbuckefJM.jpg
XM597 preserved at the National Museum of Flight in East Fortune, displaying mission insignia from its two Black Buck operations and Brazilian internment.

The Black Buck Four sortie was intended to be the initial operation deploying American-provided Shrike anti-radar missiles, which were attached to the Vulcans via custom-made underwing pylons. These missiles had not been previously integrated with Vulcan bombers, yet the adaptation and testing process was completed within just ten days. Incorporating Shrike missiles enabled the Vulcan to carry an extra 16,000 pounds (7,300 kg) of fuel in bomb bay tanks,[25] thereby increasing its operational range and cutting down the number of required aerial refuellings en route to the Falklands to four.[54]

The lead aircraft was piloted by Squadron Leader Neil McDougall and his crew from No. 50 Squadron, arriving at Wideawake on 27 May, with Montgomery serving as the reserve aircraft pilot. Although the mission was planned for 28 May, it was aborted approximately five hours after takeoff due to a malfunction in one of the Victor tanker’s hose-and-drogue refuelling systems, necessitating a recall of the flight.[21]

Black Buck Five

McDougall again led Black Buck Five, with Montgomery flying the backup aircraft. This mission marked the first successful anti-radar strike utilizing Shrike missiles. The principal target was a Westinghouse AN/TPS-43 long-range 3D radar installed by the Argentine Air Force in April to monitor Falklands airspace. This radar provided early warning that allowed Argentine forces to conceal mobile Exocet missile launchers and enabled Hercules transports to continue runway operations at Stanley. For the missile attack to be effective, the radar needed to remain active until impact; therefore, a Sea Harrier strike was coordinated simultaneously to compel radar activation. At 0845Z, two Shrikes were launched: the first struck within 10 to 15 yards (9.1 to 13.7 m) of the radar, causing minor blast damage but failing to disable it, while the second missed by a larger margin.[21][55]

Black Buck Six

File:AGM-45 Shrike on cart.jpg
An AGM-45 Shrike anti-radiation missile displayed on a trolley.

On 3 June, McDougall flew Black Buck Six, this time with his Vulcan armed with four Shrike missiles instead of two; Montgomery again operated the reserve aircraft. McDougall circled over the target area for 40 minutes attempting unsuccessfully to engage the AN/TPS-43 radar, which remained powered down. Eventually, two of the four Shrikes were launched and successfully destroyed a Skyguard fire-control radar belonging to Argentina’s 601 Anti-Aircraft Battalion, resulting in four operator fatalities.[56]

During the return journey, McDougall had to divert to Rio de Janeiro after his in-flight refuelling probe failed. To reduce drag, one missile was jettisoned into the ocean; however, another remained stuck on its pylon and could not be released. Classified documents were discarded through the crew hatch into the sea, and a distress signal ("Mayday") was transmitted.[56] Two Northrop F-5E Tiger II fighters from 2° Esquadrão do 1° Grupo de Aviação de Caça of the Brazilian Air Force scrambled from Santa Cruz Airfield intercepted the Vulcan.[57] Brazilian authorities authorized landing at Galeão Airport with under 2,000 pounds (910 kg) of fuel remaining—insufficient for circling maneuvers around the airport.[56]

This incident risked diplomatic embarrassment as it exposed U.S. provision of Shrike missiles to Britain. British diplomats negotiated for release of both crew and aircraft, which were interned at Galeão Air Force Base. On 4 June, an agreement was reached exchanging helicopter spare parts for their freedom.[58] Under Argentine pressure, U.S. officials intervened to safeguard Shrike missile confidentiality. The Vulcan and crew departed for Ascension Island on 10 June; there a new refuelling probe was installed before returning to Waddington on 13 June.[56] The unreleased Shrike missile remained in Brazil.[57][59]

Black Buck Seven

The concluding Black Buck sortie was executed on 12 June by Withers, featuring the same crew as Black Buck One except that Flight Lieutenant Peter Standing assumed the role of Air-to-Air Refuelling Instructor in place of Russell. Montgomery again piloted the backup aircraft. Unlike previous missions, this operation targeted Argentine troop concentrations and facilities near the airport rather than the runway itself. Due to a fusing error, the bombs detonated upon impact; originally, they were intended to air burst to destroy aircraft and supplies without harming the runway, which was planned to be used for RAF Phantom FGR.2 operations after reclaiming the Falklands. Ultimately, all 21 bombs failed to strike their designated targets. Argentine ground forces capitulated two days afterward.

Effect

File:Stanley runway craters.jpg
Aerial reconnaissance image of Port Stanley Airport, showing crater marks from Black Buck One's bombing in the center and those from Black Buck Two more distinctly on the left.

The military impact of Black Buck remains a subject of debate, with some independent analyses describing its effect as "minimal". Despite the raids, Argentine C-130 Hercules transport aircraft continued using the runway until war’s end, although after 1 May only about 70 tons of supplies and 340 troops were delivered, and early flights halted post-4 May due to Black Buck operations occurring during early morning hours. Woodward noted he "fully expected" Hercules flights would persist following Black Buck One but was indifferent since these transports did not pose a direct threat to naval forces unlike fast jets. British forces were aware of ongoing Hercules flights and attempted to disrupt them, resulting in one Hercules being shot down on 1 June. Given that Port Stanley airport had little influence on the campaign’s final outcome, targeting it has been questioned.

The raid was planned to execute a bombing run cutting across the runway at a 35° angle, aiming to place at least one bomb—and possibly two—directly on the runway surface. The primary goal was to render the runway unusable for fast jets; in this regard, the operation succeeded as runway repairs were poorly conducted and several near accidents occurred subsequently. The British ability to penetrate Argentine air defenses and strike the airfield effectively deterred fast jet deployment at Port Stanley since Argentine command could not risk basing jets or related infrastructure there if they faced destruction on the ground irrespective of runway condition. Admiral Woodward considered preventing fast jet operations from Port Stanley essential to diminish air threats against British carriers. From 1 May onward, Royal Navy forces conducted aerial bombardments with Sea Harriers and naval gunfire against Port Stanley to disrupt repair efforts. Argentines attempted daytime repairs by piling earth over damaged areas, which reportedly misled British intelligence into believing repairs were ongoing, obscuring true airfield conditions and raid success.

Commander Nigel (Sharkey) Ward of 801 NAS, who flew Sea Harriers providing fighter cover during Black Buck One, expressed strong criticism of Operation Black Buck. He estimated that Black Buck One consumed approximately 400,000 imperial gallons of fuel at a cost of £3.3 million to drop 21 bombs, whereas Sea Harriers could have flown 785 sorties delivering 2,357 bombs for equivalent fuel expenditure. Ward dismissed RAF claims that the raids caused fear of attacks on mainland Argentina as propaganda: he argued that relocating Mirage III fighters from southern Argentina to Buenos Aires following Vulcan raids was unlikely since lone Vulcans attacking without fighter escort would have been quickly destroyed.

No evidence supports that Mirage IIIs were redeployed from southern Argentina to protect Buenos Aires; rather, on 29 April Argentine radars at Puerto San Julián detected a suspected British strike prompting redeployment of aircraft to Comodoro Rivadavia while maintaining presence in southern Argentina.

British strategy aimed to convince Argentine forces an amphibious landing at Port Stanley was imminent; Admiral Woodward viewed Black Buck One as a significant element alongside naval attacks and deception measures. According to Rowland White’s account in Vulcan 607, Vice Admiral Juan Lombardo believed Black Buck One signaled an impending full-scale British landing and consequently ordered Rear Admiral Gualter Allara, commander of the Argentine Sea Fleet, to launch an immediate counterattack employing a pincer maneuver with light cruiser ARA General Belgrano attacking from the south and aircraft carrier ARA Veinticinco de Mayo from the north. On 2 May, General Belgrano was sunk by submarine HMS Conqueror; thereafter, the Argentine Navy retreated into territorial waters and ceased active engagement.

A study by United States Marine Corps analysts concluded: "The most critical judgment regarding Vulcan use centers on arguments suggesting their deployment was primarily to prove [the air force] had a role rather than meaningfully contributing to combat efforts." This reflects armed services’ tendency to seek involvement during conflicts even when their capabilities or missions are ill-suited for the situation. Using Black Buck as an example illustrates how such practices can yield trivial results disproportionate to effort expended.

Notes

  1. ↑ 1.0 1.1 1.2 White 2012, p. 35.
  2. ↑ Freedman 2005, pp. 62–63.
  3. ↑ 3.0 3.1 Freedman 2005, pp. 274–275.
  4. ↑ Lua error in Module:Citation/CS1/Configuration at line 2123: attempt to index field '?' (a nil value).
  5. ↑ 5.0 5.1 Lebow 2007, pp. 68–70.
  6. ↑ Lua error in Module:Citation/CS1/Configuration at line 2123: attempt to index field '?' (a nil value).
  7. ↑ White 2012, pp. 62–63.
  8. ↑ Freedman 2005, pp. 15–20.
  9. ↑ 9.0 9.1 9.2 9.3 9.4 9.5 9.6 Burden et al. 1986, p. 363.
  10. ↑ White 2012, pp. 89–90, 123–126.
  11. ↑ Freedman 2005, p. 275.
  12. ↑ Freedman 2005, pp. 275–277.
  13. ↑ Freedman 2005, pp. 278–279.
  14. ↑ White 2012, p. 74.
  15. ↑ Brookes 2009, p. 69.
  16. ↑ White 2012, pp. 74–75.
  17. ↑ White 2012, pp. 148–149.
  18. ↑ White 2012, pp. 126–127.
  19. ↑ White 2012, pp. 237–240.
  20. ↑ White 2012, pp. 365–366.
  21. ↑ 21.0 21.1 21.2 Burden et al. 1986, p. 365.
  22. ↑ Freedman 2005, pp. 274–277.
  23. ↑ White 2012, pp. 252–253.
  24. ↑ 24.0 24.1 Burden et al. 1986, p. 394.
  25. ↑ 25.0 25.1 25.2 25.3 Lua error in Module:Citation/CS1/Configuration at line 2123: attempt to index field '?' (a nil value).
  26. ↑ Lua error in Module:Citation/CS1/Configuration at line 2123: attempt to index field '?' (a nil value).
  27. ↑ White 2012, pp. 266–267.
  28. ↑ White 2012, pp. 267–270.
  29. ↑ White 2012, p. 280.
  30. ↑ White 2012, p. 285.
  31. ↑ White 2012, pp. 291–296.
  32. ↑ , White & 2012, pp. 300–302.
  33. ↑ , White & 2012, pp. 306–311.
  34. ↑ , White & 2012, pp. 318–320.
  35. ↑ , White & 2012, pp. 324–328.
  36. ↑ & Burden et al. 1986, p. 210.
  37. ↑ 37.0 37.1 37.2 , Middlebrook & 2009, p. 78.
  38. ↑ 38.0 38.1 & Burden et al. 1986, p. 365.
  39. ↑ , White & 2012, pp. 338–341.
  40. ↑ 40.0 40.1 & Burden et al. 1986, p. 395.
  41. ↑ , White & 2012, pp. 344–348.
  42. ↑ , White & 2012, p. 337.
  43. ↑ , White & 2012, p. 343.
  44. ↑ , Middlebrook & 2009, pp. 77–78.
  45. ↑ & Burden et al. 1986, p. 193.
  46. ↑ 46.0 46.1 & Burden et al. 1986, p. 194.
  47. ↑ , Middlebrook & 2009, p. 79.
  48. ↑ & Burden et al. 1986, pp. 194, 210.
  49. ↑ Template:London Gazette
  50. ↑ Template:London Gazette
  51. ↑ , White & 2012, pp. 367–368.
  52. ↑ & Burden et al. 1986, pp. 365, 367.
  53. ↑ Template:London Gazette
  54. ↑ Brookes 2009, pp. 78–79.
  55. ↑ Freedman 2005, p. 542.
  56. ↑ 56.0 56.1 56.2 56.3 Burden et al. 1986, p. 367.
  57. ↑ 57.0 57.1 Lua error in Module:Citation/CS1/Configuration at line 2123: attempt to index field '?' (a nil value).
  58. ↑ Freedman 2005, pp. 542–543.
  59. ↑ Badsey 2013, pp. 161–162.

References

  • Lua error in Module:Citation/CS1/Configuration at line 2123: attempt to index field '?' (a nil value).
  • Lua error in Module:Citation/CS1/Configuration at line 2123: attempt to index field '?' (a nil value).
  • Lua error in Module:Citation/CS1/Configuration at line 2123: attempt to index field '?' (a nil value).
  • Lua error in Module:Citation/CS1/Configuration at line 2123: attempt to index field '?' (a nil value).
  • Lua error in Module:Citation/CS1/Configuration at line 2123: attempt to index field '?' (a nil value).
  • Lua error in Module:Citation/CS1/Configuration at line 2123: attempt to index field '?' (a nil value).Lua error in Module:Citation/CS1/Configuration at line 2123: attempt to index field '?' (a nil value).
  • Lua error in Module:Citation/CS1/Configuration at line 2123: attempt to index field '?' (a nil value).
  • Lua error in Module:Citation/CS1/Configuration at line 2123: attempt to index field '?' (a nil value).
  • Lua error in Module:Citation/CS1/Configuration at line 2123: attempt to index field '?' (a nil value).
  • Lua error in Module:Citation/CS1/Configuration at line 2123: attempt to index field '?' (a nil value).

Template:Falklands War Lua error in mw.title.lua at line 359: bad argument #2 to 'title.new' (unrecognized namespace name 'Portal').

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