September 11 intelligence before the attacks

Central Intelligence Agency

Company type	Government agency
Industry	Intelligence
Founded	September 18, 1947 (1947-09-18)
Headquarters	Langley, Virginia , United States
Key people	George Tenet (Director in 2001)
Products	Intelligence gathering and analysis

Following the September 11 attacks carried out by the al-Qaeda terrorist network against the United States, inquiries focused on what intelligence was available beforehand and whether officials had failed to act on it.

Clinton administration intelligence

In December 1998, the CIA's Counterterrorist Center alerted President Bill Clinton that al-Qaeda was orchestrating attacks within the U.S., possibly involving hijackings of airplanes.

Massoud's April 2001 address

In April 2001, Ahmad Shah Massoud, leader of the anti-Taliban Northern Alliance, spoke at the European Parliament to request humanitarian support for Afghanistan. He disclosed intelligence suggesting a significant terrorist strike on American soil was imminent. Al-Qaeda assassinated Massoud two days prior to 9/11.

Intelligence from Russia

On September 9, 2001, Russian President Vladimir Putin informed President Bush about Massoud’s killing and indicated that a broader threat was developing.

British intelligence insights

As detailed in MI6: Life and Death in the British Secret Service by Gordon Corera, British intelligence foresaw a major terrorist incident. Former MI6 chief Richard Dearlove remarked that although a large-scale attack was anticipated, it was believed to target U.S. interests abroad rather than on the mainland. Eliza Manningham-Buller recalled summer 2001 intelligence pointing to an al-Qaeda plan for a significant attack, though without specific location details.

During summer 2001, both British and American agencies observed increased communication and signs indicating an impending assault. In June, discussions involved a senior al-Qaeda operative planning car-bomb attacks against U.S. targets in Saudi Arabia, which ultimately did not occur. A July 6 British report highlighted the Gulf States or Middle East as probable targets, while a Joint Intelligence Committee document noted that preparations for attacks were nearing completion.

Intelligence from Israel

On August 23, 2001, the Mossad supplied the CIA with a roster of 19 suspects in the U.S. believed to be plotting an imminent attack. Four individuals on this list—Mohamed Atta, Marwan al-Shehhi, Khalid al-Mihdhar, and Nawaf al-Hazmi—later participated as hijackers in the 9/11 events. Whether this list encompassed all hijackers or if the number 19 was coincidental remains uncertain.

Algerian intelligence contributions

General Mohamed Mediène ('Toufik'), head of Algeria’s intelligence agency (DRS), maintained strong connections with U.S. intelligence services, including visits to the Pentagon and CIA headquarters. Just days before 9/11, he conducted a confidential mission for the U.S., discussing an impending large-scale attack based on a secret memo dated September 6, 2001, from Smaïn Lamari, then deputy chief of DRS.

Following the attacks, only two civilian flights were authorized: one transporting Saudi royals and associates of Bin Laden, and another returning Toufik to Algiers.

May 1, 2001

On May 1, 2001, the CIA informed the White House that a "group currently within the United States" was plotting a terrorist operation.

June 13, 2001

On June 13, 2001, Osama bin Laden issued a videotape referencing a potential assault on the G8 summit held in Genoa, Italy. Intelligence agencies from Egypt and Italy acquired copies and shared them with U.S. authorities. The alleged scheme involved detonating an explosive-laden aircraft at the summit to target President Bush and other dignitaries. In reaction, Italy imposed restrictions on commercial flights, deployed fighter jets, and stationed surface-to-air missile systems around the event location.

June 29, 2001

The President’s Daily Brief dated June 29, 2001, affirmed that "[the United States] is not being subjected to a disinformation campaign by Osama Bin Laden," reinforcing intelligence about an imminent threat. It referenced an interview with a Middle Eastern journalist where aides to Bin Laden indicated an impending attack and highlighted competitive pressures from Islamist recruitment efforts in Chechnya. The CIA stressed that these attacks were anticipated soon and would have "dramatic consequences."

July 10, 2001

In July 2001, CIA counterterrorism chief J. Cofer Black and Director George Tenet provided National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice with intelligence intercepts suggesting a growing probability of an al-Qaeda strike against the U.S. Despite this, Rice remained skeptical due to other pressing matters. Meanwhile, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld questioned the validity of the intelligence, suspecting it might be a ruse designed to gauge U.S. reactions.

Also on this date, FBI Special Agent Kenneth Williams submitted the Phoenix Memo, alerting FBI headquarters to al-Qaeda-linked individuals attending flight schools in Arizona and requesting further investigation.

August 6, 2001

The President's Daily Briefing from August 6, 2001, titled "Bin Ladin Determined To Strike in US", warned that bin Laden intended to exploit his operatives’ presence in the U.S. to carry out a terrorist attack: FBI information... indicates patterns of suspicious activity in this country consistent with preparations for hijackings or other types of attack. Later testimony by Rice before the 9/11 Commission clarified that the brief was "not triggered by any specific threat information" and "did not suggest terrorists might use airplanes as missiles."

See also

• Ali Soufan
• September 11 attacks advance-knowledge conspiracy theories
• Operation Bojinka – a thwarted 1995 conspiracy by Ramzi Yousef and Khalid Shaikh Mohammed involving multiple airliner attacks and crashing a plane into the CIA

Further reading

• Special issue of Intelligence and National Security examining intelligence shortcomings prior to September 11.