The Moral Landscape

The Moral Landscape

Company type	Book
Industry	Publishing
Founded	2010
Founder	Sam Harris
Products	Book on science of morality

The Moral Landscape: How Science Can Determine Human Values is a 2010 publication by Sam Harris that promotes the concept of a science of morality. Harris challenges common misunderstandings surrounding morality, facts, and science, advocating for an approach that bridges the gap between secular moral relativism and religious moral absolutism.

He proposes that moral goodness aligns with enhancements in the "well-being of conscious creatures" and maintains that moral inquiries possess objectively correct or incorrect answers grounded in empirical evidence regarding human flourishing. By contesting the traditional philosophical separation between "is" and "ought," Harris argues that scientific inquiry is capable of uncovering values that foster well-being, calling on scientists to spearhead the development of a normative moral science.

This book was published following Harris's 2009 Ph.D. completion in cognitive neuroscience at UCLA, where his dissertation addressed related issues.

Synopsis

Harris opens with two foundational assumptions: "(1) some individuals experience better lives than others, and (2) these disparities correspond systematically to brain states and environmental conditions." He contends that characterizing lives as better or worse reflects material realities, indicating objective facts about actions that contribute to improved living conditions.

Applying this reasoning to societies, Harris identifies multiple "peaks" representing different routes to collective prosperity, alongside numerous ways societies can falter. He suggests that science can establish a framework for morality based on factual information about well-being, while acknowledging obstacles common to all scientific endeavors. The book further investigates how scientific methods might navigate the complexities involved in enhancing both individual and societal welfare.

Philosophical case

Harris concedes that his proposal for a science of morality is fundamentally philosophical, akin to much scientific investigation which depends on foundational assumptions such as empiricism and physicalism. He observes that science already incorporates certain evaluative principles when addressing questions like "what should I believe, and why," implying that normative ethical sciences would similarly be grounded in basic norms. Harris explains:

His ethical framework draws from ethical realism—the view that moral facts exist—and ethical naturalism, which holds these facts are connected to the physical world. While he suggests that a science of morality may resemble utilitarianism, he emphasizes its openness to an evolving understanding of well-being. He dismisses strict reductive materialism, acknowledging that psychological concepts require ongoing empirical investigation. Such a science must take into account emotions, cognition, behavior, and their outcomes.

For Harris, moral values center on promoting the flourishing of conscious entities within social contexts. He argues social morality functions to uphold cooperative relationships and can be objectively assessed by this criterion. He critiques philosophers who confine morality to private domains as detracting from meaningful ethical discussion.

Additionally, Harris underscores the significance of perspective interchangeability in moral reasoning, illustrating this with an "unpleasant surprise principle" where individuals realize they have endorsed ineffective or harmful moral standards—such as Nazis discovering Jewish ancestry.

Science and moral truths

Harris identifies three distinct scientific endeavors connected to morality: (1) understanding why humans behave morally, such as through evolutionary psychology; (2) establishing which moral frameworks people ought to adopt, known as the science of morality; and (3) encouraging individuals to alter their conduct. He asserts that the prescriptive science of morality, project (2), deserves primary attention. Harris maintains that progress in moral science need not result in an "Orwellian future"; rather, such advancements could be disseminated similarly to medical innovations.

He underscores the importance of separating project (1) from (2) to prevent the moralistic fallacy, and distinguishing (2)—the determination of what is right—from (3)—the process of changing behavior. Harris points out that human motivation is intricate; individuals frequently fail to act as they "should," even when it aligns with their own interests, so identifying optimal societal practices will not automatically transform conduct.

Harris concedes that scientists themselves have made mistakes regarding moral facts due to cognitive biases and constraints, including loss aversion and findings related to Paul Slovic. Although training can mitigate bias, he warns about the Dunning–Kruger effect, where a lack of knowledge fosters unwarranted confidence.

He regards debate and dissent as essential components of the scientific method, demonstrating both the possibility of error and the continuous necessity for exploration in moral science.

Harris's positive beliefs

Harris points out issues he considers morally unequivocal. For instance, he references a survey revealing that 36% of British Muslims endorse the death penalty for apostasy, which he describes as "morally confused." He also argues that conditions such as loneliness, helplessness, and poverty are clearly detrimental, yet acknowledges that positive psychology has not fully tackled these problems.

In his work "The illusion of free will," Harris contends that psychological and neuroscientific evidence undermines the existence of metaphysical free will. He explains that thoughts emerge inevitably, rendering the sensation of free choice illusory. This perspective leads to a form of determinism distinct from fatalism.

One significant implication for business concerns punishment: if free will is absent, retributive justice loses its justification; only strategies focused on modifying behavior and deterrence remain appropriate. Harris illustrates this with a hypothetical scenario involving curing psychopathy—arguing it would be morally indefensible to withhold such treatment as a form of punishment.

He recognizes a moral hierarchy—for example, humans rank above bacteria—and entertains the possibility of species superior to humans, though he doubts such beings exist. Additionally, he advocates for the development of lie detection technologies, viewing them as broadly advantageous for society.

Religion: good or bad?

Harris assesses religion through its effects on contemporary human well-being rather than any historical contributions. He suggests religions endure partly because they resonate with inherent human cognitive patterns like animism. However, he regards religious dogma as a barrier to rational thought, citing Francis Collins as an example.

Critiquing secular figures like Chris Mooney who minimize conflicts between science and religion, Harris perceives these efforts as condescending attempts to placate devout believers. He argues that society can transcend reliance on religion just as it has moved beyond witchcraft—once similarly deeply ingrained.

Promotion

Prior to its release, the book received commendations from four individuals closely connected to the author both personally and professionally: biologist and science communicator Richard Dawkins, novelist Ian McEwan, psycholinguist Steven Pinker, and theoretical physicist Lawrence M. Krauss. Each of these figures serves on the Advisory Board of Harris's Project Reason, and their endorsements were published as blurbs by the publisher, prominently displayed on the book's dust jacket. Dawkins remarked,

McEwan characterized the work as "thrilling" and "audacious," highlighting its ability to inject new vitality into a long-standing debate. Pinker described Harris's perspective as "tremendously appealing" and indispensable for discerning readers. Krauss commended Harris for crafting thought-provoking arguments and anticipated that readers would find their beliefs challenged while developing a deeper appreciation for science and rational inquiry.

Reception

In October 2010, The Moral Landscape attained the 9th position on The New York Times Best Seller list for Hardcover Non-Fiction.

Reviews and criticism

Associate Professors James W. Diller and Andrew E. Nuzzolilli of ECSU delivered a generally positive evaluation, recognizing The Moral Landscape as a valuable contribution to scientific explorations of morality by elucidating how moral conduct is influenced by external environments and neurological conditions.

Troy Jollimore, Associate Professor at Cal State, acknowledged the book’s appeal to readers unfamiliar with moral skepticism but criticized it for lacking depth for well-informed audiences and oversimplifying intricate topics.

Kwame Anthony Appiah lauded Harris’s neuroscience expertise but contended that Harris did not clearly define his principal argument or explain how science uncovers objective human well-being. Appiah suggested that Harris implicitly advocates a form of utilitarianism without confronting its established difficulties; in response, Harris noted that these issues are addressed in the paperback edition’s afterword.

Cognitive anthropologist Scott Atran faulted Harris for overlooking philosophical ethics literature and the challenges involved in scientifically measuring well-being, citing Daniel Kahneman’s research on pleasure and suffering as exemplifying these complexities.

Kenan Malik likened Harris’s methodology to a sociologist disregarding fundamental evolutionary theory, questioning the seriousness of his thesis.

David Sexton of the London Evening Standard described Harris’s assertion of a scientific basis for morality as "overweening" and flawed, emphasizing that moral values cannot be derived solely from science independent of cultural context.

John Horgan, a journalist for Scientific American, expressed skepticism about neuroscience’s ability to resolve ethical disputes, underscoring the field’s limitations in grappling with complex moral issues.

Russell Blackford viewed The Moral Landscape as an ambitious work encouraging secular thinkers but voiced significant doubts about its central claims.

Philosopher Simon Blackburn criticized Harris for dismissing philosophy outright, pointing out that selecting among competing moral frameworks remains fundamentally a moral rather than an empirical issue. H. Allen Orr shared this doubt, asserting that the book does not fulfill its promise to ground human values scientifically.

Steve Isaacson, in his essay Mining The Moral Landscape: Why Science Does Not (and cannot) Determine Human Values, highlighted Harris’s insufficient engagement with Moore's open-question argument.

Novelist Marilynne Robinson observed that Harris fails to propose a positive moral framework and suggested he might find common cause with Unitarians dedicated to promoting global well-being.

At the Moving Naturalism Forward workshop, Nobel laureate Steven Weinberg reflected on his personal rejection of utilitarianism and criticized Harris’s concept of human welfare as vague and ultimately unhelpful for guiding moral decisions.

Harris's Reply to Critics

Several months following the publication of the book, Harris addressed his detractors in an article published on The Huffington Post.

On August 31, 2013, he publicly issued a challenge, inviting anyone to submit an essay of no more than 1,000 words that refuted the book's "main argument." These essays were evaluated by Russell Blackford, with a $2,000 reward for the most compelling submission and a $20,000 prize if the essay succeeded in changing Harris's perspective. The contest attracted 424 entries. On March 11, 2014, Blackford declared philosophy lecturer Ryan Born as the winner.