Able Danger

Able Danger

Company type	Military intelligence program
Industry	Defense, Intelligence
Founded	October 1999
Founder	U.S. Special Operations Command and Defense Intelligence Agency
Fate	Discontinued (date not specified)
Headquarters	United States
Area served	United States, global counterterrorism focus
Key people	Lt. Col. Anthony Shaffer, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Hugh Shelton, Representative Curt Weldon
Products	Intelligence analysis, data mining for counterterrorism

Able Danger was a covert military initiative overseen by the U.S. Special Operations Command (SOCOM) and the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA). Launched in October 1999 following a directive from the Joint Chiefs of Staff under the leadership of Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Hugh Shelton, its mission was to create an information operations campaign plan aimed at combating transnational terrorism.

Statements from Lt. Col. Anthony Shaffer and other sources claimed that Able Danger detected two out of three al-Qaeda cells involved in the September 11 attacks, including the so-called 'Brooklyn cell' associated with "Blind Sheik" Omar Abdel-Rahman, which involved 9/11 ringleader Mohamed Atta along with three additional hijackers.

Nonetheless, a sixteen-month inquiry by the US Senate Intelligence Committee in December 2006 determined that "Able Danger did not identify Mohamed Atta or any other 9/11 hijacker before September 11, 2001," thereby rejecting assertions that had fueled conspiracy theories. An earlier probe by the Senate Judiciary Committee in 2005 encountered difficulties when the Pentagon prohibited five crucial witnesses from providing testimony, prompting allegations of obstruction.

Attorney Mark Zaid, representing Shaffer and other members of Able Danger, emphasized Pentagon-imposed restrictions that prevented his clients from testifying. He also pointed out that the Defense Intelligence Agency suspended Shaffer’s security clearance after he shared information with the 9/11 Commission, describing this revocation as "questionable at best."

A 2006 investigation by the Defense Department Inspector General (IG) uncovered no proof supporting claims that Able Danger had identified the 9/11 terrorists a year prior, that team members were prevented from sharing intelligence with law enforcement agencies, or that DoD officials retaliated against Shaffer for his disclosures. Some individuals involved alleged their statements were misrepresented or omitted in the IG report, and Shaffer asserted he faced retaliation for revealing these matters.

The Senate panel confirmed there was no evidence indicating that DoD attorneys obstructed analysts from communicating findings to the FBI before 9/11. While analysts produced charts including known Al Qaeda operatives, none featured Atta until after the attacks occurred. These conclusions were consistent with the Department of Defense IG report published in September 2006.

Overview

The initiative employed data mining techniques to correlate open source information with classified intelligence, seeking to uncover relationships among members of terrorist organizations as part of its "intelligence preparation of the battlespace." Its objective was to assess whether combining data mining with open source materials could effectively detect terrorist threats and produce actionable operational plans to disrupt, apprehend, or neutralize terrorists or their networks.

According to claims by Lt. Col. Anthony Shaffer and others, Able Danger identified two out of three Al Qaeda cells implicated in the 9/11 attacks: notably the 'Brooklyn cell' tied to Blind Sheik Omar Abdel-Rahman, which included leader Mohamed Atta and three other hijackers connected to the 1993 World Trade Center bombing.

This assertion was examined by Republican Representative Curt Weldon, who served as vice chairman for both the House Armed Services and Homeland Security committees. Despite this, leadership within the Defense Intelligence Agency ordered destruction of mined data, source databases, charts, and related documents on disputed legal grounds and restricted key personnel from testifying before Senate committees—though they later acknowledged the program’s existence.

In December 2006, an investigation conducted by the US Senate Intelligence Committee concluded it could not substantiate these claims due to insufficient evidence supporting significant assertions concerning the September 11 attacks. This conclusion closely paralleled findings contained in the Department of Defense Inspector General’s September 2006 report on Able Danger.

Claim that Able Danger identified 9/11 hijackers

The public first learned about Able Danger and its alleged early detection of the 9/11 terrorists on June 19, 2005, through an article by Keith Phucas in The Times Herald, a daily newspaper based in Norristown, Pennsylvania.

On June 27, 2005, Representative Curt Weldon, who served as vice chairman of both the House Armed Services and Homeland Security committees and was the primary source for Phucas's report, addressed the House with a detailed account of Able Danger:

Mr. Speaker, I have discovered that a Federal agency identified the principal New York cell led by Mohamed Atta prior to 9/11; as early as September 2000, it was ready to involve the FBI to disrupt this New York City cell. Nevertheless, legal concerns regarding Atta’s green card status and apprehensions linked to the Waco Siege halted these efforts.

On February 14, 2006, Rep. Weldon reiterated these assertions at press conferences, claiming that Able Danger had identified Mohamed Atta on thirteen occasions before the attacks and had also detected a potential threat in Yemen two weeks prior to the October 12, 2000 attack on the USS Cole. The Pentagon announced that these matters would be examined during a congressional hearing scheduled for February 15, 2006.

Able Danger and the 9/11 Commission

The claim made by Curt Weldon that Able Danger had identified the hijackers involved in 9/11 attracted nationwide media coverage in August 2005 after being reported in Government Security News. Weldon asserted that intelligence gathered by Able Danger was blocked from reaching the FBI and disregarded by the 9/11 Commission. Nevertheless, commission members Timothy J. Roemer and John F. Lehman denied ever receiving any information related to Able Danger.

In response to these reports, former commission figures such as Lee H. Hamilton and spokesperson Alvin S. Felzenberg refuted any prior awareness of Mohamed Atta’s identification before the attacks. Hamilton remarked that if such intelligence had existed, it would have been a central element of their investigation.

On August 12, 2005, Hamilton along with commission chairman Thomas Kean released a statement confirming that the commission was aware of Able Danger and had requested relevant materials from the Department of Defense (DoD). However, none of these documents indicated identification of Atta or other hijackers. They further noted that a July 2004 claim made by a Navy officer regarding Atta’s identification lacked supporting documentation and credible details, leading the commission to regard it as unsubstantiated.

Congressman Weldon responded by clarifying Able Danger’s objectives, expressing concern over inconsistent statements from the commission, and committing to probe why DoD withheld Able Danger’s findings from the FBI and why the commission did not pursue this intelligence more thoroughly.

Weldon stressed:

The 9/11 Commission has issued several statements within the past week, each differing—from initially denying briefings to later acknowledging being informed about both ABLE DANGER and Mohamed Atta. The information was excluded primarily because it was considered questionable despite briefings by two active-duty military officers. The commission also received DoD documents concerning ABLE DANGER.

He restated these points during his testimony before the Senate Judiciary Committee on September 21, 2005.

Destruction of Able Danger Records

In his publication Countdown to Terror, Weldon asserted that a 1999 Able Danger chart had identified 9/11 hijackers Mohamed Atta, Marwan al-Shehhi, Khalid al-Mihdhar, and Nawaf al-Hazmi and was shown to then-Deputy National Security Advisor Jim Steinberg. Weldon also claimed to have personally presented this chart to Deputy National Security Advisor Stephen Hadley shortly after the attacks in 2001.

Subsequently, Weldon expressed doubt about whether Atta's name was actually on the chart.

At Weldon's request, Congressman Peter Hoekstra, who was chairing the House Intelligence Committee at the time, conducted an inquiry but advised caution until a full investigation could be completed. Pentagon representatives stated they had no knowledge of any Able Danger documents naming Atta and declined to provide additional comments.

On August 14, 2005, Mike Kelly, a columnist for The (Bergen) Record, reported on an interview arranged by Weldon's team with an individual claiming participation in Able Danger. This person alleged that the team had identified Atta and three other hijackers as Al-Qaeda operatives within the United States but was prevented from sharing this information with the FBI due to legal restrictions imposed by government attorneys. He further stated that the 9/11 Commission disregarded his efforts to communicate Able Danger's findings.

On September 15, 2005, Weldon revealed he had discovered an employee who was instructed to delete 2.5 terabytes of Able Danger data two years prior to the 9/11 attacks.

Weldon revises his account

An article published by Time on August 14, 2005, reported that Weldon acknowledged uncertainty about whether Atta’s name appeared on the chart he had shown Hadley, explaining he could not verify it since he had surrendered his only original copy. A recreated version of the chart was utilized in presentations following 9/11. Initially, Weldon displayed a chart at The Heritage Foundation which he claimed was the original dated May 23, 2002; however, he later directed reporters to a reconstructed chart kept in his office that featured a circled photograph of Mohamed Atta.

Lt. Col. Anthony Shaffer

Following challenges to Weldon's assertions, Lt. Col. Anthony Shaffer, a member of the Able Danger team, identified himself as Weldon's source. Shaffer maintained that he alerted the FBI in September 2000 regarding Able Danger’s discoveries but alleged that military legal counsel obstructed three meetings he attempted to arrange with FBI officials. At that time working for the Defense Intelligence Agency, Shaffer claimed he informed the 9/11 Commission that Able Danger had identified two out of three 9/11 cells before the attacks; however, this information was excluded from the final commission report.

Shaffer indicated that in January 2000, Able Danger’s data-mining efforts uncovered a 'Brooklyn' Al-Qaeda cell connected to "Blind Sheik" Omar Abdel-Rahman along with two additional overseas cells. He and Philpott reviewed a chart depicting suspected operatives which included a photograph of Mohammed Atta. Nevertheless, a December 22, 2006 Senate Intelligence Committee investigation concluded that Able Danger "did not identify Mohamed Atta or any other 9/11 hijacker prior to September 11, 2001," a conclusion supported by the Defense Department's inspector general.

Shaffer’s attorney Mark Zaid disclosed that Shaffer was placed on paid administrative leave and had his security clearance suspended in March 2004 amid disputes related to travel expenses and personal cellphone usage. The DIA cited misconduct including false claims for medals and reimbursements during deployment.

Congressman Weldon called for a renewed investigation into attempts to prevent Shaffer from discussing Able Danger’s identification of hijackers, describing it as "a deliberate campaign of character assassination." The Defense Department inspector general found no evidence of retaliation against Shaffer for his disclosures.

Shaffer also recounted resistance from the CIA toward Able Danger prior to 9/11, perceiving it as infringing on CIA jurisdiction. According to Shaffer, a CIA representative indicated they would withhold intelligence because if Able Danger succeeded in targeting Al Qaeda leadership, it would "steal our thunder."

Navy Captain Scott Phillpott

Captain Scott Phillpott lent support to Shaffer's assertions by confirming that he provided briefings to the Department of the Army, Special Operations Command, Undersecretary of Defense for Intelligence Dr. Cambone, and the 9/11 Commission. He asserted that Able Danger identified Atta as early as January or February 2000.

James D. Smith

James D. Smith, a civilian contractor involved with Able Danger, verified that the project’s analysis relied heavily on open-source information and involved between 20 and 30 personnel. He indicated that Atta’s name surfaced during investigations into individuals connected to Omar Abdel Rahman, a principal figure in the initial World Trade Center bombing.

Major Erik Kleinsmith

Major Erik Kleinsmith, who served as the Army intelligence chief for LIWA until February 2001, testified that he was instructed to delete Able Danger’s data. Following directives from Tony Gentry, general counsel for the Army Intelligence and Security Command, Kleinsmith wiped 2.5 terabytes of both classified and unclassified information—including charts generated by the project—in May and June 2000.

Additional witnesses

After conducting a three-week inquiry, the Department of Defense announced on September 1, 2005, that three further witnesses confirmed Able Danger had produced a chart naming or picturing Atta. Four out of five witnesses recalled seeing a photograph; one remembered only the name. Although these witnesses were deemed "credible," the Pentagon stated it was unable to locate the specific document referencing Atta.

The wall

Former chief assistant U.S. attorney Andrew McCarthy and others have argued that intelligence from Able Danger was suppressed because of a policy preventing intelligence sharing between the CIA and FBI, commonly referred to as "the wall." During 9/11 Commission hearings, then-Attorney General John Ashcroft testified that this barrier was reinforced during the Clinton administration by Jamie Gorelick to limit terrorist intelligence exchange within federal agencies.

This interpretation was challenged by former senator Slade Gorton (R-WA), a member of the 9/11 Commission, who stated that Gorelick's memo did not affect the Department of Defense’s capacity or willingness to share intelligence. Gorton explained that "the wall" originated with the Church Committee in the 1970s and only restricts certain information transfers from prosecutors to intelligence agencies, never limiting information flow in reverse.

Two Attas theory

Mickey Kaus of Slate.com cited Tom Maguire’s "Two Attas" hypothesis, which suggests Able Danger may have identified an earlier "Abu Nidal" Atta rather than Mohamed Atta, the hijacker involved in 9/11—potentially clarifying inconsistencies in Able Danger’s data. Snopes.com clarified that widespread claims conflating these two individuals were incorrect.

Another theory points out that Omar Abdel Rahman had an associate named Mohamed El-Amir—sometimes an alias used by Atta—who is distinct from the 9/11 hijacker. However, Lt. Col. Shaffer informed 9/11 Commission staff that Able Danger identified three members from terrorist cells linked to 9/11 attacks, including Mohamed Atta specifically; he did not mention other hijackers by name. Eric Umansky noted that this two-Atta explanation fails to account for three additional hijackers reportedly identified by Able Danger.

The Department of Defense addressed the two Attas issue as a clerical mistake involving immigration records: two entries for Atta dated January 10, 2001, resulted from improper data entry by an inspector, creating duplicate records rather than indicating two separate individuals.

The Inspector General’s report on this subject is contested by Lt. Col. Shaffer and other members of Able Danger, some of whom were not interviewed by either the IG or the 9/11 Commission. Congressman Weldon criticized the investigation as hurried and intended more to close the matter than to uncover truth.

For instance, leads such as Normen Pentolino’s testimony—where store cashiers might have recognized Atta and reports indicating he maintained a BJ's membership card for over two years—were never pursued further.

Timing

Kevin Drum from The Washington Monthly points out that accounts differ regarding when Able Danger supposedly relayed information to the FBI, but it appears improbable that the program recognized "Mohamed Atta" prior to May 2000.

Extensive evidence since 9/11 reveals that Mohamed Atta sent his initial email within the U.S. in March 2000 and obtained his first U.S. visa on May 18, 2000. This date also marks his first use of the name "Mohamed Atta," having previously been known as "Mohamed el-Amir."

Congressional hearings

On September 21, 2005, Senate Judiciary Committee Chairman Arlen Specter convened a hearing to examine the Able Danger program. Nevertheless, the Department of Defense prevented Lt. Col. Shaffer and four other personnel from providing testimony. Despite these restrictions, Senator Specter continued with the proceedings.

Specter questioned whether the Defense Department’s legal counsel cited the Posse Comitatus Act—which restricts military roles in domestic law enforcement—as the reason for barring Able Danger from sharing intelligence with the FBI. Mark Zaid, attorney for Lt. Col. Shaffer, testified that while Able Danger did not collect data on American citizens, it may have gathered information on individuals associated with them.

Zaid clarified:

"Able Danger never identified Mohamed Atta as physically present within U.S. borders.

At that time, no evidence suggested criminal conduct or concrete terrorist schemes. The identification of four hijackers was solely based on connections that might have been innocent or suspicious. The unclassified portion of Able Danger was not intended to assess intent."

He further stated:

"No existing charts bearing Mohamed Atta’s name or image are known today. Army copies were destroyed by March 2001; Lt. Col. Shaffer’s records were eliminated by the DIA around spring 2004. The destruction of these materials combined with Pentagon refusal to permit testimony raises concerns about potential obstruction and warrants additional inquiry."

Erik Kleinsmith, former Army Major and ex-leader of the Pentagon’s Land Warfare Analysis Department, testified that he received orders to destroy Able Danger data in mid-2000. When asked whether such information could have averted 9/11, he refrained from speculation but acknowledged it might have been beneficial.

Subsequent investigations

On February 14, 2006, Congressman Curt Weldon asserted that some Able Danger data had survived destruction, claiming government contacts still accessed data-mining outputs linking Mohamed Atta to 13 hits. Weldon also mentioned that Able Danger materials were discovered in Pentagon archives shortly before his statement and that a general observed their removal. The next day, a joint meeting involving the Subcommittee on Terrorism, Unconventional Threats and Capabilities and the Subcommittee on Strategic Forces addressed the Able Danger program.

On September 21, 2006, The Washington Post reported that a Defense Department inquiry concluded Able Danger did not identify Mohamed Atta or other hijackers before the September 11 attacks. The frequently referenced chart was described as a sample document created post-9/11 to illustrate data structuring.

Inspector General's Report

On September 18, 2006, the Office of the Deputy Inspector General for Investigations announced that Lieutenant Colonel Anthony Shaffer had been placed on administrative leave. An examination of his workspace revealed no Able Danger-related materials that he had asserted to possess. While the Army found no evidence of misconduct on his part, officials from the Defense Intelligence Agency indicated they would have revoked his security clearance regardless of his disclosures to investigators or congressional committees.

The Department of Defense inquiry determined the following:

• Able Danger did not detect Mohamed Atta or any other terrorists involved in the 9/11 attacks before they occurred.
• Members of Able Danger were not prohibited from sharing intelligence with law enforcement agencies; nonetheless, no actionable intelligence emerged.
• The elimination of Able Danger records was consistent with Department of Defense policies.
• The program was not ended prematurely but concluded after fulfilling its goals, with its results contributing to subsequent intelligence operations at USSOCOM.

Claims of Inspector General Cover-Up

Five individuals connected to Able Danger informed investigative journalists that their testimonies to the Defense Department Inspector General were either misrepresented or omitted in the final report. These alleged alterations primarily involved excluding evidence that Able Danger had identified and monitored Atta years prior to 9/11. Witnesses described growing antagonism from IG investigators, who pressured them to retract any assertions about identifying Atta, implying a potential cover-up. They also relayed these concerns to Philip Zelikow, executive director of the 9/11 Commission, who reportedly showed little interest. Lieutenant Colonel Tony Shaffer reported facing retaliation from the Department of Defense after publicly disputing the accuracy of the IG report.

Film

The independent movie Able Danger (2008), penned by Paul Krik, centers on a Brooklyn café owner who discovers a disk linking the CIA to the events of 9/11.

Publication

Operation Dark Heart, authored by Anthony A. Shaffer and published in September 2010, details his experiences in reporting Able Danger’s findings to the 9/11 Commission. The Defense Intelligence Agency identified over 200 sections as potentially classified, including mentions of Shaffer’s meeting with Philip Zelikow. In an extraordinary action, the Department of Defense purchased and destroyed all 10,000 copies at a cost of $47,000 to prevent public distribution.

See also

• 9/11 Commission
• 9/11 Commission Report
• Criticisms of the 9/11 Commission Report
• September 11, 2001 attacks
• Bin Laden Issue Station, CIA unit tracking bin Laden (1996–2005)
• Task Force Stratus Ivy, linked to Able Danger
• War games in progress on September 11, 2001
• Collapse of the World Trade Center
• 9/11 conspiracy theories