9/11 Commission Report
| Company type | Government report |
|---|---|
| Industry | Investigation, terrorism |
| Founded | November 27, 2002 |
| Founder | National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States |
| Headquarters | United States |
| Products | Report on the September 11 attacks |
| Website | 9-11commission |
The 9/11 Commission Report, formally titled the Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, represents the comprehensive inquiry into the circumstances surrounding the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. This report was compiled by the 9/11 Commission, led by former New Jersey governor Thomas Kean, following a directive from President George W. Bush and Congress.
The commission was established on November 27, 2002—442 days post-attacks—and completed a detailed 585-page document initially due on May 27, 2004. After receiving a sixty-day extension authorized by House Speaker Dennis Hastert, the report was published on July 22, 2004, becoming immediately accessible for purchase and free download.
Findings
The investigation involved interviews with more than 1,200 individuals across ten nations and an examination of over two and a half million pages of material, including sensitive classified documents. The commission's work heavily depended on the FBI's PENTTBOM inquiry. Prior to public release, classified content was carefully reviewed and redacted.
Chairman Thomas Kean remarked that intelligence agencies such as the FBI and CIA did not adequately inform either Presidents Bill Clinton or George W. Bush.
Significant conclusions included:
- Surveillance footage from airports tracing hijackers through security checkpoints;
- Portions of the United Airlines Flight 93 cockpit voice recorder revealing hijacker conduct and passenger resistance efforts;
- Testimonies from passengers who communicated their final experiences via airphones and cellphones.
The commission determined that out of the 19 hijackers, 15 originated from Saudi Arabia, yet found no proof implicating the Saudi government or its senior officials in financing or orchestrating the attacks, despite Saudi Arabia's role as a major al-Qaeda financier. The attack coordinator, Mohamed Atta, was Egyptian; two hijackers came from the United Arab Emirates, and one was Lebanese. All were affiliated with al-Qaeda under leader Osama bin Laden. While contacts existed between al-Qaeda operatives and Iraqi officials, no credible evidence linked Saddam Hussein to supporting or executing the attacks.
The report disclosed increased interactions between Iran and al-Qaeda, noting that at least eight hijackers transited Iran without receiving passport stamps. However, it concluded there was no indication Iran had prior knowledge of the plot.
Responsibility for failing to alert military authorities was assigned to the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA). FAA representatives confirmed that military liaisons were actively involved during response operations on September 11.
Beyond these findings, the report proposed substantial reforms aimed at thwarting future terrorist acts, including creating a National Intelligence Director position to oversee both CIA and FBI functions, alongside strengthening border security and immigration controls.
Public diplomacy and War on Terror
The 9/11 Commission Report underscored that combating terrorism demands leveraging all facets of national power: diplomacy, intelligence gathering, covert operations, law enforcement, economic strategies, foreign assistance, public diplomacy, and homeland defense. Achieving success requires fostering an ideology and security framework more compelling than that of adversaries. The document highlighted public diplomacy as a vital complement to military initiatives.
In 2003, U.S. efforts prioritized political and cultural backing for counterinsurgency campaigns in Afghanistan. Afghan leaders called for sustained U.S. involvement to ensure continued progress toward stable governance. The Commission stressed that engaging local populations through public diplomacy was crucial for enduring success and advocated for increased funding in this area.
The envisioned Afghan government would be capable of establishing a national army, coordinating infrastructure projects, and managing essential public services. The report recommended enhanced participation by the U.S. State Department and international partners to reinforce rule of law and combat crime and narcotics trafficking. It also suggested deploying civilian-military teams to effectively connect with local communities.
At that time, unfavorable perceptions of the U.S. within Middle Eastern societies threatened collaboration in the War on Terror. Favorability ratings dropped sharply in key Muslim-majority nations due to misinformation and anti-American rhetoric propagated by regional media outlets. The Commission emphasized counteracting these misleading narratives through strategic public diplomacy to bolster counterinsurgency operations.
Public diplomacy was viewed as instrumental in distinguishing moderate Muslims from violent extremists by promoting American principles as appealing and secure alternatives to radical ideologies. The United States needed to exemplify moral leadership worldwide and serve as a positive influence in Afghanistan, where insurgents relied solely on violence.
The report also stressed humane treatment of detainees as essential for preserving America's ethical standing—critical for securing political and diplomatic support in Afghanistan. Allegations of prisoner mistreatment undermined these objectives and provided propaganda opportunities for adversaries.
Ultimately, the 9/11 Commission advocated for ongoing engagement with Arab populations to cultivate trust—a fundamental prerequisite for effective public diplomacy and successful counterinsurgency efforts. Without establishing long-term relationships grounded in trust, public diplomacy initiatives would lack efficacy.
Criticism
In a 2004 piece for Harper's Magazine, journalist Benjamin DeMott labeled the 9/11 Commission Report as deceptive and fraudulent, contending that it avoided rigorous examination and failed to inform the public about leadership responsibility during emergencies.
Additional analysts faulted the commission for its limited scope. Anthony H. Cordesman from the Center for Strategic and International Studies pointed out that the report focused exclusively on counterterrorism efforts, overlooking wider intelligence challenges, financial considerations, and responses following 9/11.
FAA counterterrorism specialist Bogdan Dzakovic criticized the insufficient attention given to airport security lapses that allowed the hijackers to succeed. He alleged that FAA officials who hindered security enhancements before the attacks were later rewarded with promotions, and asserted that despite reforms, airports remain vulnerable. His covert security assessments, which exposed significant weaknesses, were reportedly suppressed by FAA authorities.
The report has further been reproached for excluding critical intelligence alerts preceding the attacks. Although it acknowledged imminent dangers, it omitted former CIA director George Tenet’s testimony regarding a July 2001 warning delivered to Condoleezza Rice. Initially, commission members denied awareness of this briefing, despite evidence from transcripts and testimonies indicating otherwise.
In July 2024, more than 200 exhibits were made public in federal court, including a 1999 recording featuring Saudi intelligence agent Omar al-Bayoumi, connected to two hijackers. The footage depicted Bayoumi identifying landmarks in Washington D.C., prompting questions about Saudi involvement. Brett Eagleson, president of 9/11 Justice, stated that this evidence had not been reviewed by the commission and declared the report "null and void."
Literary praise
The 9/11 Commission Report was widely praised for its literary merit. In 2004, Richard Posner wrote in The New York Times that it was "exceptionally clear, even gripping," calling it "an unlikely literary achievement." The report achieved bestseller status on numerous lists and became one of the highest-selling government publications ever produced. That same year, it was shortlisted by the National Book Foundation for the National Book Awards in the non-fiction category.
Translations
, father of a September 11 victim , completed a Japanese translation titled "9/11レポート: 2001年米国同時多発テロ調査委員会報告書".<ref> Sumiyama dedicated nearly a decade to this translation effort, which was published by Korocolor Publishers through crowdfunding to cover expenses.
Adaptations
In 2006, The 9/11 Commission Report, a direct-to-DVD film produced by The Asylum, was released incorporating elements from the report alongside fictionalized content. The document also served as inspiration for the contentious miniseries The Path to 9/11, which integrated multiple sources including the commission’s findings. The 9/11 Report: A Graphic Adaptation () by Sid Jacobson and Ernie Colón, published by Hill & Wang, presents a condensed graphic novel interpretation. The documentary On Native Soil, narrated by Kevin Costner and Hilary Swank, conveys the report’s narrative. Director Paul Greengrass adapted sections related to United Airlines Flight 93 into the Academy Award-nominated film United 93. Portions of testimonies were also featured in Hulu’s 2018 miniseries The Looming Tower.
See also
- Related incidents
- Pacific Air Lines Flight 773 – 1964 cockpit assault resulting in 44 deaths
- Federal Express Flight 705 – cockpit attack in 1994
- Operation Bojinka – 1995 uncovered conspiracy by Ramzi Yousef and Khalid Shaikh Mohammed targeting several aircraft and CIA headquarters
- Southwest Airlines Flight 1763 – cockpit intrusion in August 2000
- In media
- 9/11: Press for Truth—documentary released in 2006
- Debt of Honor – Tom Clancy’s 1994 novel depicting a 747 crashing into the U.S. Capitol
- Executive Decision – 1996 motion picture featuring a 747 aimed at Washington, D.C.
External links
- The 9/11 Commission Report available at 9-11commission.gov (7.2 MB PDF)
- XHTML format of the complete 9/11 Commission Report
- Video presenting 9/11 events with excerpts from the Commission Report
- The 9/11 Report: A Graphic Adaptation—published by Slate
- The Shea Memorandum submitted to the 9/11 Commission
- CRS Report: U.S. Public Diplomacy and the Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission
- Kindle edition of the full 9/11 Commission Report