USAir Flight 5050

USAir

Company type	Airline
Industry	Aviation
Fate	Merged into US Airways
Successor	US Airways
Headquarters	United States , United States
Area served	Domestic United States
Products	Air transport services

USAir Flight 5050 experienced a crash during its takeoff roll at LaGuardia Airport in Queens, New York. As the aircraft lifted off from runway 31, it veered to the left. Following a loud noise, the pilots attempted to abort the takeoff but were unable to halt before the runway ended. The plane overshot the runway and plunged into Bowery Bay, resulting in two passenger fatalities.

Background

On September 20, 1989, Flight 5050 operated as an unscheduled USAir service, substituting for the canceled Flight 1846 from LaGuardia to Charlotte Douglas International Airport. The flight utilized a Boeing 737-400 bearing registration N416US, initially delivered to Piedmont Airlines in December 1988 and later incorporated into USAir’s fleet in 1989. At the time of the incident, the aircraft had accumulated 2,235 flight hours and displayed a hybrid Piedmont-USAir paint scheme.

Flight crew

Captain Michael Martin, age 36, who previously served as a C-130 pilot in the United States Air Force and held the rank of Major in the Air Force Reserve, began his career with Piedmont Airlines in 1984. He had logged a total of 2,625 hours on Boeing 737 aircraft, including 140 hours as captain on the 737-400 variant. His captain training was interrupted twice due to military deployment and illness.

First Officer Constantine Kleissas, aged 29 and employed by Piedmont for three months prior, was performing his inaugural unsupervised Boeing 737 takeoff on Flight 5050.

Neither pilot had received formal training in cockpit resource management. Despite challenging conditions—darkness, reduced visibility, and a wet runway—the captain did not review emergency protocols such as rejected takeoff procedures with the first officer before departure.

Accident sequence

Flight 5050 was authorized to depart from LaGuardia’s runway 31, which measures 7,000 feet and terminates on an elevated platform above Bowery Bay.

During the first officer's takeoff roll, the airplane began drifting left. The captain attempted to correct this by using the nosewheel tiller, which caused a loud "bang" and rumbling sound—later determined to be air escaping from the left nose tire damaged by incorrect tiller application. The captain assumed control and initiated an aborted takeoff but was unable to stop before overrunning the runway into Bowery Bay.

The aircraft collided with a wooden approach lighting support structure beyond the runway’s end. Due to excessive stress, the fuselage fractured into three segments; some portions submerged while others rested on the lighting stanchion.

Evacuation

Evacuation utilized all exits except L1 and L2. The L1 door remained jammed and could not be opened; L2 was briefly opened but had to be closed because of water ingress. Flight attendants deployed slides at R1 and disarmed R2 to avoid blocking an exit pathway. All four overwing exits were successfully evacuated through.

Approximately twenty passengers stood on the left wing above water level, gripping a fabric ditching line attached to a wing fitting; among them was a woman accompanied by two young children. A ditching line from the right overwing exit was deployed but not secured; passengers held onto it to maintain buoyancy on that side.

Passengers exiting through floor-level doors entered water affected by a one-knot current; some were carried beneath the runway structure. Crew members threw flotation cushions and life vests; however, certain passengers struggled to remain afloat or clung to pilings and debris. Rescue operations were complicated by fuel floating on water surfaces as well as waves generated by boats and helicopter rotor downwash. One passenger sustained injuries after being run over by a rescue boat moving backward.

The final passengers trapped in seats 21F and 22A were extracted approximately ninety minutes following impact.

Of the 57 passengers aboard, two lost their lives while fifteen sustained injuries, including one critical case.

Accident analysis

The NTSB pinpointed several crew coordination deficiencies that influenced the outcome of Flight 5050:

• Prior to departures from BWI and LGA, as well as during the nine-hour period the crew spent together, the captain failed to conduct an extended or emergency briefing.
• Despite company policies and manufacturer recommendations, the captain initiated takeoff at LGA with the autobrake system disengaged on a wet and short runway.
• The crew did not identify the incorrect rudder trim setting during checklist completion and taxi operations.
• Although ATC instructed the aircraft to hold at taxiway GOLF GOLF, this instruction was not followed; however, this noncompliance did not contribute to the accident.
• The first officer did not properly activate the autothrottle at takeoff, manually advancing throttles with delayed and uneven thrust application, which resulted in a longer ground roll and impaired directional stability.
• Miscommunication during takeoff caused uncertainty about which pilot was controlling the airplane; neither maintained full directional authority.
• The captain omitted speed callouts and failed to confirm airspeed before initiating the rejected takeoff; the abort commenced at a speed exceeding the calculated V1.
• The decision to abort was not communicated using standard terminology, leading to confusion among crew members.
• Execution of the abort was sluggish and lacked assertiveness; differential braking delayed effective deceleration by approximately five and a half seconds. Braking force was below maximum potential for wet conditions, yet the aircraft could have been stopped within runway limits.

Rudder trim issue

Flight recorder data revealed that the rudder trim was positioned at its extreme left limit while the aircraft was parked. Since power to the DFDR was off at that moment, investigators could not definitively determine how this occurred but theorized inadvertent movement by someone resting feet on the trim knob located in the jumpseat behind the control pedestal. As a precaution after this event, all 737s were modified with a rounded rudder trim knob and a raised ridge around the pedestal area to prevent similar incidents.

This mistrimmed rudder setting should have been detected during the Before Takeoff checklist; however, both pilots neglected to confirm that rudder trim was centered. Additionally, the captain overlooked that rudder pedals were displaced by and that nosewheel steering was turned four degrees left during taxiing.

When rudder trim is properly centered at zero degrees, rudder pedals align symmetrically, which prevents nosewheel steering from pulling left during taxi (refer to graphic).

The NTSB questioned why the captain failed to notice this mistrimmed rudder given observable pedal displacement and left-turn tendency during taxi operations.

The investigation report emphasizes critical safety concerns involving Boeing 737-400 rudder trim design and placement, crew communication and coordination during takeoffs, crew pairing practices, and factors affecting crash survivability. Safety recommendations were directed to both the FAA and Port Authority of New York and New Jersey.

Testing of the pilots for drugs and alcohol

The Air Line Pilots Association (ALPA), representing Flight 5050’s two pilots, isolated them and withheld their location, resulting in delays for drug and alcohol testing. This prompted a strong rebuke from the NTSB in its official accident report:

The Safety Board expresses grave concern that federal investigators were unable to interview Flight 5050’s pilots until nearly 40 hours after the accident. Specific requests made approximately ten and twenty hours post-accident to USAir and ALPA for pilot interviews and toxicology samples went unfulfilled. USAir representatives claimed ignorance of pilots’ whereabouts. ALPA initially denied knowledge but later admitted withholding location to prevent media contact. This significantly impeded investigative efforts. Such prolonged sequestering approaches obstruction of a federal investigation and is unacceptable.

The FAA prepared subpoenas to enforce pilot cooperation; nevertheless, both pilots appeared voluntarily about 44 hours following the crash. Subsequently, FAA initiated license suspension proceedings due to their failure to promptly comply with investigative requests. An FAA official noted that although pilots have rights to legal counsel, regulations mandate cooperation after accidents.

Under counsel advice, pilots declined blood tests but submitted urine samples. ALPA refused media comments. Local law enforcement investigated unconfirmed reports alleging erratic behavior by the captain prior to takeoff but found no supporting witnesses.

The FAA proceeded with suspensions of pilot licenses shortly after their appearance.

NTSB probable cause

The National Transportation Safety Board concluded that the primary cause was the captain's failure to promptly assert command authority to abort or adequately manage the takeoff, which was initiated with an incorrectly trimmed rudder. Additionally, the captain did not identify the rudder misalignment prior to departure.

See also

• US Airways Flight 1549, which flew the identical route for USAir's successor, US Airways
• Water landing