War in Afghanistan (2001–2021)

Operation Enduring Freedom / War in Afghanistan (2001–2021)

Company type	Military conflict
Industry	Military operations
Founded	2001
Fate	Ended in 2021 with Taliban takeover and US withdrawal
Area served	Afghanistan
Key people	Mullah Omar (Taliban founder), George W. Bush (US President), Ashraf Ghani (Afghan President)
Products	Military engagement, counterinsurgency, insurgency

The Afghanistan conflict spanning from 2001 to 2021 was an extended military engagement initiated by a US-led coalition under the banner of Operation Enduring Freedom, following the September 11 attacks carried out by al-Qaeda, which had ties with the Taliban. The Taliban regime was removed from key urban areas, ending their control under the Islamic Emirate. In 2004, the US-supported Islamic Republic was established; nonetheless, the Taliban, under the leadership of founder Mullah Omar, reorganized and commenced an insurgency targeting both Afghan and coalition forces. The conflict culminated with the 2021 Taliban offensive, which reinstated Taliban governance, marking the longest military involvement by the US, surpassing even the Vietnam War.

Following the 9/11 attacks, US President George W. Bush demanded that the Taliban extradite al-Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden and dismantle terrorist training camps; however, they declined without proof of bin Laden’s involvement. The US then launched an invasion, expelling the Taliban and establishing the United Nations-authorized International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) aimed at instituting a democratic administration and preventing Taliban resurgence. An interim government was formed alongside international reconstruction initiatives. By 2003, the Taliban began a widespread insurgency utilizing guerrilla warfare and suicide bombings, reclaiming substantial territory by 2007. In response, coalition forces intensified counterinsurgency efforts, reaching a peak deployment of roughly 140,000 troops under ISAF command in 2011.

A secretive US operation eliminated Osama bin Laden in Pakistan in 2011, leading NATO to initiate plans for troop withdrawal. On 28 December 2014, NATO concluded ISAF combat missions, handing over security responsibilities to Afghan forces. Unable to achieve a military victory over the Taliban, coalition and Afghan authorities shifted focus toward diplomatic solutions. This resulted in the February 2020 United States–Taliban deal, which outlined a complete US troop withdrawal by 2021 in exchange for Taliban assurances to prevent attacks on US interests from Afghan territory. The Afghan government rejected this agreement. After troop withdrawals began, the Taliban launched a significant offensive during summer 2021, seizing Kabul on 15 August and causing President Ashraf Ghani to flee. The war officially ended as US forces finalized their evacuation by 30 August.

The conflict caused an estimated death toll ranging from 176,000 to over 212,000 individuals, including more than 46,000 civilians. Additionally, approximately 66,650 fatalities occurred in the related War in North-West Pakistan. Although over 5.7 million refugees returned following the 2001 invasion, by 2021 nearly 2.6 million Afghans remained refugees abroad while another 4 million were displaced internally.

Names

This two-decade military conflict (2001–2021) is commonly referred to as the war in Afghanistan to differentiate it from other conflicts involving Afghanistan, such as the ongoing Afghan conflict and the Soviet–Afghan War. From a Western viewpoint, the war is split into two phases: from 2001 to 2014 (the ISAF mission), when coalition forces conducted most combat operations; and from 2015 to 2021 (the Resolute Support Mission), during which Afghan forces primarily engaged the Taliban. The United States designated it as Operation Enduring Freedom (2001–2014) and later as Operation Freedom's Sentinel (2015–2021). It is also referred to as the US war in Afghanistan. Within Afghanistan itself, it is simply known as the "war in Afghanistan" ( , ).

Emergence of the Taliban

The Taliban originated from a group of religious students known as Talib, who sought to eliminate warlord dominance in Afghanistan by enforcing strict observance of Sharia law. On 27 September 1996, with military assistance from Pakistan and financial support from Saudi Arabia, the Taliban captured Kabul and proclaimed the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan. Their rule was marked by a rigid Deobandi interpretation of Islam, severely limiting women's rights, including prohibitions on employment, education, and movement without a male guardian. Reports by the United Nations indicated that between 1996 and 2001, the Taliban perpetrated systematic massacres targeting civilians, especially Shias and Hazaras.

By 2001, the Taliban had dominion over approximately 90% of Afghanistan, while the Northern Alliance remained confined to the northeastern region. The Taliban's forces included an estimated 28,000 to 30,000 Pakistani fighters (predominantly Pashtun) alongside 2,000 to 3,000 militants affiliated with Al-Qaeda.

Al-Qaeda

The 9/11 Commission concluded that under Taliban governance, Al-Qaeda utilized Afghanistan as a strategic base for training operatives, importing arms, coordinating with other jihadist groups, and orchestrating terrorist activities. Al-Qaeda managed its own training camps and supported others; it is estimated that between 10,000 and 20,000 individuals passed through these camps prior to 9/11, most fighting under the Taliban banner with a smaller contingent joining Al-Qaeda directly.

Following the August 1998 United States embassy bombings linked to Osama bin Laden, President Bill Clinton authorized missile strikes against militant locations in Afghanistan. The US demanded that the Taliban surrender bin Laden; however, they refused. Throughout the 1990s, CIA paramilitary units conducted covert missions aimed at locating or capturing bin Laden and cultivated critical alliances with Afghan leaders that later facilitated the 2001 invasion.

September 11 attacks

On September 11, 2001, nineteen hijackers affiliated with Al-Qaeda executed four simultaneous attacks within the United States. They commandeered four commercial airplanes; two were deliberately flown into the Twin Towers of the World Trade Center in New York City, resulting in their collapse and causing over 2,000 fatalities inside. A third aircraft struck the Pentagon near Washington, D.C., while the fourth crashed in Pennsylvania after passengers attempted to retake control. There were no survivors aboard any of these flights. As of 2009, responder fatalities numbered 836; total deaths reached 2,996 including the hijackers.

These attacks were planned and coordinated by Osama bin Laden, prompting a direct US military response. Historian Carter Malkasian observes that bin Laden uniquely provoked a prolonged conflict by drawing the United States into a war reminiscent of its previous engagement against Soviet forces. Although the Taliban publicly condemned these attacks, they misjudged American determination and overestimated their alliance with Al-Qaeda—an organization with separate objectives and leadership.

US ultimatum to the Taliban

Immediately following the events of 9/11, the United States National Security Council concurred that military intervention would likely be necessary against both Al-Qaeda and the Taliban. President Bush initially issued an ultimatum demanding that the Taliban surrender Osama bin Laden: "close all terrorist training camps, hand over all terrorists and their supporters, and grant full US access for inspections." Despite advice from religious scholars in Kabul recommending bin Laden’s surrender, Mullah Omar declined citing Pashtun codes of hospitality and asserting bin Laden’s innocence. The Taliban rejected this ultimatum on grounds that relinquishing bin Laden would violate Islamic principles.

As US and NATO forces readied for invasion, the Taliban requested evidence proving bin Laden’s guilt but proposed transferring him to a third country if bombing campaigns ceased and proof was provided. The Bush administration dismissed these conditions as unacceptable and maintained its demands were non-negotiable, insisting it was time for decisive Taliban action. Shortly afterward, covert US military operations commenced with formal hostilities beginning on 7 October 2001.

Tactical overview

The conflict featured two primary factions: the Coalition, comprising the United States and its allies backing the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, and the Taliban alongside its militia forces. The situation was further complicated by Taliban offshoots and extremist groups such as al-Qaeda and later the Islamic State, which occasionally cooperated with or opposed both parties.

Afghanistan's predominantly rural demographic—around 80% of its 33 million population in 2020—shaped the nature of the warfare, favoring guerrilla tactics in rural areas and seasonal campaigns constrained by severe winters. With a population that is 99.7% Muslim, religious beliefs heavily influenced both Taliban and government ideologies. Historically, Islam served as a unifying force among Afghans resisting foreign occupation, embedding resistance within their national identity. Local religious figures (mullahs) wielded considerable influence, often rallying fighters through calls for jihad.

Tribal affiliations played a crucial role in Afghanistan’s political and social landscape. The largest ethnic community, the Pashtuns, represent between 38% and 50% of the population and adhere to Pashtunwali, their customary code of conduct. Tribal loyalties frequently outweighed allegiance to the central government, causing various tribes to side with either the Taliban or government forces depending on strategic interests.

The disparity in technology between Coalition troops and Taliban insurgents resulted in an asymmetric conflict. Drawing from anti-Soviet Mujahideen experience, the Taliban operated in small units equipped with a combination of outdated arms and captured modern weaponry. By 2009, their tactics prominently featured guerrilla warfare methods such as suicide bombings, vehicle-borne explosives, roadside improvised explosive devices (IEDs), and targeted killings. Insider attacks increased as Taliban agents infiltrated Afghan military and police units to disrupt Coalition operations.

2001: Invasion and early operations

The United States officially launched its invasion of Afghanistan on 7 October 2001 under Operation Enduring Freedom; however, CIA Special Activities Division operatives had entered weeks prior to coordinate with the Northern Alliance in the Panjshir Valley. In October, twelve-member Special Forces teams arrived to reinforce CIA efforts alongside Northern Alliance fighters, facilitating the capture of critical urban centers from Taliban control by November. The Taliban withdrew from most areas except Kunduz Province, where they were outmatched by US air power.

The US-led coalition encompassed the United Kingdom and more than a dozen additional nations. They succeeded in toppling the Taliban regime and establishing military installations near major cities. Most al-Qaeda and Taliban commanders escaped into Pakistan or remote regions. On 20 December 2001, the United Nations authorized the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) to maintain security within Kabul initially; by February 2002, eighteen countries contributed troops to this mission.

Early in the conflict, the CIA developed Counter-terrorism Pursuit Teams composed primarily of Afghan personnel. These units expanded to over 3,000 members by 2010 and were regarded as some of Afghanistan’s most effective fighting forces. Their operations targeted Taliban and al-Qaeda elements within Afghanistan and extended into Pakistan.

During the December 2001 Bonn Conference, Hamid Karzai was appointed head of the Afghan Interim Administration, which transitioned into the Afghan Transitional Administration following a 2002 loya jirga, initiating Afghanistan’s path toward democratic governance.

Soon after Karzai’s appointment, reports emerged suggesting that the Taliban sought conditional surrender terms—potentially including immunity or handing over Kandahar—but US leadership rejected negotiations. This decision allowed senior Taliban figures such as Mullah Omar to disappear into Pakistan or rural Afghan regions. Many fighters either surrendered or fled; thousands of commanders relocated to Pakistan. It remains unclear whether this marked a strategic shift toward insurgency for the Taliban. Fighters continued to operate covertly in southern provinces including Kandahar, Zabul, Helmand, and Uruzgan.

By late November 2001, Osama bin Laden was believed to be hiding in a fortified complex at Tora Bora. The Battle of Tora Bora commenced on 30 November with CIA teams coordinating airstrikes alongside tribal militias and special forces units. Despite requests for reinforcements from US Army Rangers and Marines, additional troops were denied. Bin Laden ultimately escaped into Pakistan during December.

The initial invasion was a military triumph for Coalition forces: fewer than a dozen American fatalities occurred between October and March compared to approximately 15,000 Taliban killed or captured. The majority of combat operations were conducted by special forces in conjunction with Afghan allies. Karzai emerged as a prominent leader during this period; however, failure to apprehend bin Laden or negotiate with the Taliban laid groundwork for an extended conflict.

Though initially regarded as an ally, Pakistan was later revealed to have provided substantial support—including funding, safe havens, and political backing—to the Taliban while publicly cooperating with US efforts against al-Qaeda leaders such as Khalid Sheikh Mohammed. Pakistani public sentiment largely favored the Taliban; consequently, Pakistan permitted them sanctuary to regroup while avoiding direct internal confrontation.

Coalition Errors and Taliban Reorganization

After initial victories, the United States lacked a definitive long-term strategy in Afghanistan beyond counter-terrorism efforts. Although the Bush administration initially rejected nation-building, it later embraced initiatives aimed at aid distribution, institution development, education, healthcare, and community strengthening. Early in 2002, the US supported forming an Afghan national army; however, progress was hindered by conflicting agendas and an underestimation of the Taliban threat. The preference for relying on the Northern Alliance and local warlords rather than investing in a new military force resulted in inadequate training and equipment, which facilitated the Taliban's resurgence.

In April 2002, former mid-ranking Taliban members established a shura near the Helmand border to coordinate insurgent activities across Kandahar, Helmand, Zabul, and Uruzgan provinces. Concurrently, Jalaluddin Haqqani revitalized his network in Pakistan, amassing approximately 1,400 fighters by 2002, many of whom were joined by Al-Qaeda operatives. Counterinsurgency missions such as Operations Jacana and Condor sought to dislodge Taliban elements but achieved limited success.

Between 2002 and 2004, despite several attempts by Taliban factions to initiate negotiations with Karzai’s government, US policy prohibited engagement by placing senior leaders on blacklists. Analysts suggest that these missed diplomatic opportunities stemmed from US overconfidence and contributed significantly to the Taliban's capacity to reorganize.

From 2002 through 2005, Coalition counter-terrorism measures frequently caused civilian casualties and alienated local communities, thereby aiding Taliban recruitment efforts. Many former Taliban commanders who had surrendered were subjected to harassment despite amnesty assurances. By 2004, most senior Taliban figures had retreated into Pakistan. The US focus on avenging the 9/11 attacks inadvertently empowered insurgent leaders such as Mullah Omar and Jalaluddin Haqqani.

Taliban propaganda promoting jihad surfaced in early 2003 as US attention shifted toward invading Iraq. By May of that year, Taliban commanders declared their readiness to engage in guerrilla warfare. Attacks escalated through summer 2003, inflicting heavy losses on Afghan government forces and civilians particularly in Zabul Province. NATO assumed command of ISAF operations in August 2003.

In 2003, Mullah Omar officially initiated an insurgency against Afghan government forces and ISAF troops. Hostilities intensified throughout 2004 with kidnappings, targeted assassinations of officials and collaborators, and destruction of schools and health facilities. Around this time, Mullah Dadullah orchestrated a significant offensive that introduced suicide bombings—previously rare among the Taliban but adopted from Al-Qaeda tactics—supported by madrassas in Pakistan providing recruits.

During summer 2004’s Operation Asbury Park, Coalition forces cleared Taliban fighters from Dey Chopan District. Later that year, Mullah Omar pledged to restore Afghanistan’s sovereignty. Despite Taliban attempts to disrupt elections, the 2004 presidential vote proceeded with Karzai elected as president of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan.

US drone strikes targeting Taliban and Al-Qaeda militants began in Pakistan’s tribal regions in 2004. In mid-2005, Navy SEALs launched Operation Red Wings in Kunar Province aiming to disrupt local Taliban ahead of parliamentary elections; although it resulted in substantial Coalition casualties, it was followed by Operation Whalers which successfully diminished insurgent activity.

By late 2005, due to government neglect and insufficient security forces, the Taliban regained control over multiple southern villages. The Afghan police were under-resourced with limited operational capacity; militias had been disbanded under international pressure while the national army remained weak. These factors combined with ongoing tribal conflicts enabled the Taliban’s resurgence after years of strategic regrouping.

2006–2007: Intensifying Conflict

Between 2002 and 2006, insurgent assaults reportedly increased fourfold, and by late 2007, Afghanistan faced a critical risk of Taliban takeover despite the presence of 40,000 ISAF troops.

Starting in January 2006, a multinational ISAF contingent led by the United Kingdom, alongside Australia, Canada, the Netherlands, and Estonia, began relieving US forces in southern Afghanistan. NATO prioritized the formation of Provincial Reconstruction Teams. Canada was assigned to Kandahar, while the UK assumed responsibility for Helmand province—a major center for poppy cultivation and longstanding local resistance rooted in historical disputes.

Intelligence from local sources indicated an impending harsh Taliban offensive during summer 2006; however, strategic efforts remained constrained due to US preoccupation with Iraq and Afghan security forces being underprepared—with only 26,000 active personnel out of a planned 70,000.

Coalition operations throughout 2006 included missions such as Operation Mountain Thrust and Operation Medusa. Although these campaigns yielded tactical gains, they fell short of decisively defeating the Taliban. A convoy accident in Kabul in May 2006 triggered riots that reflected growing animosity toward foreign military presence.

Early 2007 saw an increase in British troop deployments through operations like Volcano and Achilles, with plans to expand British forces to 7,700 personnel. In March 2007, the United States added 3,500 troops despite delays caused by commitments in Iraq. By mid-2008, US troop levels had surged by more than 80%, reaching approximately 48,250 personnel.

In March 2007, US Marines were responsible for killing at least 12 civilians in the Shinwar district during a reaction to an ambush—an event known as the "Shinwar massacre"—which resulted in the withdrawal of the involved unit.

NATO achieved tactical victories at the Battle of Chora and recaptured Musa Qala in December with Afghan forces supported by British troops.

By 2007, Taliban strength was estimated at around 10,000 fighters, with only 2,000 to 3,000 being full-time insurgents. The number of foreign fighters rose to between 100 and 300, enhancing capabilities but also increasing unpredictability. By 2010, Taliban numbers had grown to an estimated 25,000 committed combatants.

General McChrystal observed that the Taliban had gained ground by extending their influence into northern and western regions of Afghanistan and intensifying attacks ahead of presidential elections. The US strategy aimed at halting Taliban advances while safeguarding civilians—a difficult endeavor described as "hard work."

2008–2009: NATO Reinforcements, Border Clashes with Pakistan, and Karzai's Re-election

On June 13, 2008, Taliban forces liberated approximately 1,200 inmates—including around 400 Taliban members—from Kandahar prison, representing a major blow to NATO efforts. By late 2008, reports suggested that the Taliban had formally distanced themselves from al-Qaeda; US intelligence estimated fewer than 100 al-Qaeda operatives remained within Afghanistan.

During summer 2008, President Bush authorized cross-border raids targeting militants in Pakistan; however, Pakistan rejected foreign military incursions and warned it would "open fire" on any US troops crossing its borders. In September of that year, Bush announced plans to withdraw over 8,000 troops from Iraq while reinforcing Afghan deployments by up to 4,500 personnel. The United Kingdom suffered its 100th military casualty that year.

US special forces executed a contentious helicopter strike inside Pakistan in September 2008. This incident prompted Pakistan to indefinitely close NATO supply routes and engage NATO aircraft crossing its territory with gunfire. Despite these tensions, US drone strikes along Pakistan’s border regions increased by approximately 183% compared to levels recorded in 2006.

By 2009, there was broad Afghan consensus favoring an end to the conflict; however, presidential candidates differed on approaches. Karzai secured re-election and advocated for reconciliation with the Taliban despite escalated US troop deployments under President Obama’s administration. He proposed convening a loya jirga alongside outreach initiatives toward the insurgents—a stance cautiously endorsed by Secretary of State Hillary Clinton.

In January 2009, President Obama initiated troop surges deploying reinforcements to Logar, Wardak, and Kunar provinces as part of an escalation originally ordered by Bush. By mid-February, approval was granted for an additional deployment of 17,000 US troops—including two brigades: the 2nd Marine Expeditionary Brigade and a Stryker brigade—although ISAF commander General McKiernan requested up to another 30,000 soldiers. A classified evaluation later indicated that successful counterinsurgency operations might require up to half a million troops over five years.

Under Obama’s tenure, Pakistani drone strikes intensified targeting Taliban and al-Qaeda militants; notably, Baitullah Mehsud—the leader of Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan—was killed in August 2009.

In June of that year, Operation Strike of the Sword unfolded in Helmand Province following the British-led Operation Panther's Claw aimed at securing strategic terrain for ISAF forces.

On September 4, 2009, a NATO airstrike near Kunduz resulted in as many as 179 fatalities—including over one hundred civilians.

Karzai’s reelection in 2009 was marred by controversy after more than 400,000 votes were invalidated amid fraud allegations; some international observers described the election as "free but not fair." The Taliban attempted to disrupt voting yet also offered pardons during Ramadan. Both Karzai and his opponent Abdullah Abdullah claimed victory amid low voter turnout in Taliban-controlled zones. Karzai publicly called for direct negotiations with the Taliban despite opposition from US officials.

In December 2009, a suicide attack on CIA Forward Operating Base Chapman killed eight operatives involved in coordinating drone strikes against Taliban leaders.

On December 1st, President Obama announced plans to deploy an additional 30,000 troops to Afghanistan—a decision that sparked widespread protests across American cities with critics drawing parallels to troop escalations during the Vietnam War under President Johnson.

2010–2011: Key agreements and the death of Bin Laden

At the start of 2010, the United States had deployed 9,000 of the planned 30,000 additional troops by March, with an expected increase of 18,000 more by June. This troop surge facilitated a sixfold expansion in Special Forces missions, which concluded by September 2012. Airstrike frequency escalated dramatically, reaching 700 in September 2010 alone, compared to only 257 throughout all of 2009. The insurgents' intensified use of improvised explosive devices led to a significant rise in Coalition casualties. By March 2011, US forces reported having captured or killed over 900 Taliban commanders at low to mid-level ranks. Despite these intensified efforts, insurgent attacks peaked in 2010, marking the highest number since the conflict began, with over 1,500 incidents recorded in September.

In February 2010, Afghan and Coalition troops initiated Operation Moshtarak, aimed at dismantling a Taliban stronghold near Marjah. The Afghan Peace Jirga convened in June 2010 with around 1,600 participants; however, representatives from the Taliban and Hezb-i Islami Gulbuddin were absent. Abdul Ghani Baradar, a co-founder of the Taliban who supported negotiation efforts, was apprehended in Pakistan in February, further straining relations between Afghanistan and Pakistan. Meanwhile, Karzai began peace negotiations with groups linked to the Haqqani network in March.

During 2010, the Obama administration adjusted its approach to include potential political dialogue with the Taliban—who had previously rejected talks with the Afghan government. Reports emerged indicating that Taliban commanders from the Quetta Shura were escorted to Kabul for discussions under NATO's assurance; nonetheless, it was later revealed that the delegation leader was an impostor.

On 25 July 2010, WikiLeaks published 91,731 classified US military documents spanning 2004 to 2009. These documents exposed sanitized reports concerning civilian casualties and highlighted Pakistan’s intelligence agency’s cooperation with the Taliban. Der Spiegel identified Pakistan's ISI as a principal external supporter of the Taliban.

On 2 May 2011, US Navy SEALs conducted a raid in Abbottabad, Pakistan, resulting in the death of Al-Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden. This operation intensified scrutiny on Pakistan despite its denials of harboring bin Laden and assertions of intelligence cooperation.

Following a Taliban spring offensive declaration on 30 April, the 2011 Battle of Kandahar unfolded. On 7 May, Taliban forces launched significant assaults on government facilities—characterized by the BBC as "the worst attack in Kandahar province since the fall of the Taliban regime."

Karzai acknowledged secret US-Taliban peace negotiations in June 2011; however, these talks collapsed by August. On 22 June, President Obama announced plans to withdraw 10,000 US troops by year-end and an additional 23,000 by summer 2012; this reduction left approximately 80,000 troops remaining. Canada withdrew its combat units in 2011 to concentrate on training missions; other NATO allies also scaled back their forces. Despite these changes, Taliban attacks continued at rates comparable to previous years.

Relations between Pakistan and the United States deteriorated after a US airstrike killed several Pakistan Frontier Corps personnel near the Afghan-Pakistan border in September 2011. In response, Pakistan closed the Torkham border crossing to NATO supply convoys while Pakistan Taliban forces targeted convoys thereafter. In November, clashes between ISAF and Pakistani troops resulted in the deaths of 24 Pakistani soldiers; subsequently, Pakistan blocked NATO supply routes and ordered US forces to vacate Shamsi Airfield.

2012–2013: Incidents involving U.S. troops and Obama-Karzai discussions

Starting in January 2012, a series of events involving U.S. military personnel—including photographs with insurgent remains and a disputed helicopter strike video—deteriorated the partnership between the United States and Afghanistan, raising questions about troop conduct. These incidents damaged the reputation of foreign forces amid pre-existing Afghan grievances related to civilian casualties and cultural misunderstandings, thereby intensifying tensions in Afghanistan–United States relations. Further controversies included protests sparked by Quran burnings and the Panjwai shooting incident.

In January 2012, Karzai traveled to the United States, where officials indicated a willingness to withdraw all troops by the conclusion of 2014. On 11 January 2012, Karzai and President Obama reached an agreement to expedite the handover of combat duties from NATO forces to Afghan security units by spring 2013, advancing from an initial summer timeline. Obama highlighted that ISAF’s role would transition primarily to training and advising Afghan forces, citing successful operations against al-Qaeda as grounds for planned troop reductions.

During the 2012 NATO Summit, member states endorsed a withdrawal plan whereby ISAF would transfer combat command responsibilities to Afghan forces by mid-2013, focusing thereafter on capacity building for Afghan security personnel. The majority of the approximately 130,000 ISAF troops were scheduled to depart by December 2014, with a subsequent NATO mission assuming advisory and support functions.

Efforts toward peace negotiations encountered obstacles: attempts to restart talks were aborted in March 2012 and June 2013 due to disagreements over the Taliban’s political office in Qatar, which Karzai condemned for presenting the Taliban as a government-in-exile.

On 2 May 2012, during an unannounced visit to Kabul, Presidents Karzai and Obama signed a strategic partnership accord. Later, on 7 July, the United States designated Afghanistan as a major non-NATO ally. Both leaders concurred on transferring control over Afghan detainees and prison facilities to Afghan authorities and agreed that U.S. forces would withdraw from village-level deployments by spring 2013.

By 18 June 2013, NATO had completed handing over security responsibilities to Afghan forces, with ISAF planning to conclude its mission by late 2014. At that point, roughly 100,000 ISAF troops remained deployed in Afghanistan.

2014–2015: Troop withdrawal and insurgency escalation

Combat operations conducted by UK and US forces officially ended on 26 October 2014, marked by the transfer of their final bases—Camp Bastion and Camp Leatherneck—to Afghan control. Approximately 500 British troops stayed behind in advisory capacities. On 28 December, NATO formally ceased combat missions in Kabul. Subsequent U.S. military activities proceeded under Operation Freedom's Sentinel, while NATO initiated Operation Resolute Support aimed at training Afghan security personnel.

The drawdown of U.S. troops was partially compensated by private security firms staffed largely by former Coalition members, allowing continued Western involvement without direct troop deployment.

The Taliban experienced a resurgence driven by diminished foreign military pressure, an influx of militants displaced by Pakistan's Operation Zarb-e-Azb, and reduced international attention due to other global crises. Afghan forces struggled with limited air support and political instability, conditions which the Taliban exploited by expanding governance structures and gaining local legitimacy through provision of less corrupt judicial systems.

Intense combat occurred in Kunduz Province—a strategically important northern city with ongoing conflict since 2009. In May 2015, hostilities forced suspension of flights into Kunduz. The government mobilized local militias to counter insurgent advances. By June, Taliban offensives intensified around Kunduz, displacing tens of thousands before government forces regained control over key districts.

In late September, the Taliban launched a significant assault on Kunduz city itself, capturing nearby villages and penetrating the urban center. They targeted critical infrastructure including the regional hospital and university while obstructing civilian evacuation pathways.

In January 2015, the Islamic State established its Khorasan Province (ISKP) affiliate in Afghanistan, recruiting fighters and engaging in clashes with the Taliban after pledging loyalty to Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi. Afghan security forces eliminated ISKP’s deputy leader Hafiz Wahidi in March.

Throughout 2015, Taliban offensives expanded within Helmand Province, seizing districts such as Dishu, Baghran, Nawzad, and Musa Qala, inflicting heavy casualties on Afghan security units. Attempts to capture Lashkar Gah were thwarted by Afghan special forces supported by U.S. airstrikes; nevertheless, Taliban fighters entrenched themselves in surrounding suburban areas.

On 22 June 2015, the Taliban carried out a high-profile attack on Kabul’s National Assembly building utilizing a car bomb followed by armed assault. This attack highlighted internal Taliban divisions concerning peace negotiations.

Pakistan hosted initial peace talks between Taliban delegates and Afghan government representatives in July 2015 with U.S. and Chinese observers present. Subsequent negotiations proceeded without Taliban participation; informal discussions occurred later in 2016. China’s engagement aimed at addressing regional security issues impacting its interests.

In November 2015, factional fighting erupted within the Taliban between supporters of leader Mullah Akhtar Mansoor and a pro-ISIL splinter group led by Mullah Mansoor Dadullah in Zabul Province. Mansoor’s faction ultimately prevailed despite ISIL backing for Dadullah’s faction. This infighting impeded progress toward peace.

To unify leadership amid these disputes, Sirajuddin Haqqani of the Haqqani Network was appointed deputy leader in mid-2015. The network increasingly took charge of Taliban military operations and fundraising while integrating closely into top leadership tiers. This alliance heightened tensions with Pakistan due to allegations that Haqqani sanctuaries received Pakistani support.

In December 2015, the Taliban renewed their offensive in Helmand’s Sangin district, capturing it after fierce fighting that resulted in over ninety soldier fatalities within two days. British SAS and U.S. special forces joined Afghan troops in counterattacks. Despite these efforts, Afghan forces faced challenges including leadership shortages, inadequate equipment, low morale, and elevated desertion rates.

Alongside military developments between 2015 and 2018, several Afghan peace movements emerged—including the Tabassum movement, Enlightenment Movement, Uprising for Change, and People's Peace Movement—reflecting increasing domestic demands for stability.

2016–2017: Breakdown of peace negotiations and rise of Islamic State

In January 2016, the United States expanded military authorization to strike ISIL-KP fighters operating in Afghanistan and Pakistan, officially designating ISIS as a foreign terrorist entity. Initially comprising approximately 60 to 70 militants, mainly former members of the Afghan and Pakistani Taliban, their numbers surged to between 1,000 and 3,000, predominantly concentrated in Nangarhar and Kunar provinces.

Following intensified Taliban offensives on Sangin in February 2016, the US deployed troops from the 87th Infantry Regiment, 10th Mountain Division, to bolster Afghan forces in Helmand province. Despite Afghan counterattacks, districts such as Khanneshin fell under Taliban control by March, forcing government troops to withdraw into urban areas. In April, Afghan forces launched a significant operation aiming to retake Sangin territories but encountered strong Taliban resistance and experienced desertions.

Afghan defenders in Lashkar Gah received air support from US strikes as the Taliban maintained control over vital access routes. The insurgents introduced an elite commando group named "Sara Khitta," enhancing their combat effectiveness. Afghan special forces engaged heavily armed Taliban fighters equipped with advanced weaponry and night vision devices.

Clashes between rival Taliban factions in Herat during March 2016 resulted in substantial militant losses. By April, President Ashraf Ghani terminated ineffective peace talks with the Taliban, complicated by the Haqqani Network’s integration into Taliban leadership. Taliban commander Haibatullah Akhundzada indicated that peace might be achievable if Kabul severed relations with foreign allies.

On 23 July 2016, Afghan and US forces initiated "Wrath of the Storm," a large-scale offensive against ISIL-KP in Nangarhar province shortly after the Kabul bombing. ISIL-KP strength declined from an estimated 3,000 in January to roughly 1,000–1,500 by July. According to Time magazine, by mid-2016 at least one-fifth of Afghanistan was under Taliban control, with Helmand serving as a key stronghold. Afghan military fatalities increased by 20% compared to the previous year. In August, more than 100 US troops were temporarily deployed to Lashkar Gah to support Afghan police.

In September 2016, the Afghan government signed a preliminary peace agreement with Hezb-i-Islami. By the end of the year, Taliban attacks escalated in Helmand districts including Sangin and Marjah; some assessments suggested they controlled over 80% of Helmand province.

Entering early 2017, Afghan forces were rebuilding after heavy combat; insurgents held sway over 33 districts across 16 provinces while nearly 120 districts remained contested. The Afghan army numbered approximately 169,000 soldiers but endured a 33% attrition rate during 2016.

Operation Hamza was launched by American and Afghan forces in March 2017 targeting ISIS-K strongholds in eastern Afghanistan. By April, NATO reported a two-thirds reduction in ISIS-K territory and elimination of half its fighters over two years; drone strikes alone accounted for over 200 militant deaths.

On 23 March 2017, after fierce battles that had previously inflicted heavy British and Afghan casualties, the Taliban seized control of Sangin district. During April and May, the US augmented its presence by deploying an additional 5,000 Marines to southern Helmand province.

The Taliban executed a major attack on Camp Shaheen near Mazar-e-Sharif on 21 April 2017, resulting in over 140 Afghan soldier fatalities.

In September 2017, reports surfaced that the CIA sought authority for independent drone strike operations in Afghanistan as part of a revised strategy. Later that month, President Trump authorized the deployment of an extra 3,000 US troops to Afghanistan, raising total American forces to at least 14,000. In October, Defense Secretary Jim Mattis approved eased rules of engagement permitting US troops to engage without requiring direct enemy contact.

On 20 November 2017, General John Nicholson announced US airstrikes targeting Taliban-controlled drug production sites aimed at disrupting funding streams estimated at $200 million annually. President Ghani supported this initiative targeting narcotics facilities under Taliban control.

2018–2019: Initiatives Toward Peace

At the start of 2018, the Taliban maintained a presence across approximately 70% of Afghanistan, exercising control over 14 districts and operating in an additional 263. Concurrently, ISIL's activities reached their highest intensity. After violent incidents such as the Kabul ambulance bombing, both President Trump and Afghan authorities dismissed the possibility of negotiations with the Taliban. Nevertheless, on 27 February, Afghan President Ashraf Ghani extended an unprecedented invitation for unconditional peace discussions, proposing political recognition for the Taliban alongside prisoner exchanges—marking a significant shift following months of widespread national support for dialogue. Notably, the Taliban had expressed interest in talks with the United States two days prior. Subsequently, on 27 March, a multinational conference held in Tashkent, Uzbekistan, involving representatives from 20 countries, endorsed Ghani’s peace proposal; however, the Taliban refrained from issuing any public response.

During 2018, a notable peace movement gained momentum, particularly highlighted by the People's Peace Movement’s "Helmand Peace Convoy," which traversed hundreds of kilometers from Helmand Province through territories under Taliban control en route to Kabul. This initiative organized demonstrations outside UN offices and foreign embassies, inspiring similar efforts throughout the country. Following these developments, both Ghani’s administration and the Taliban consented to an extraordinary mutual ceasefire coinciding with the Eid al-Fitr festivities in June. During this interval, Taliban members entered Kabul to interact with residents and security personnel, eliciting a mix of optimism and unease among civilians. Despite appeals for a lasting ceasefire, the Taliban declined to prolong the truce and recommenced hostilities on 18 June; in response, the Afghan government terminated its ceasefire agreement one week later.

In July 2018, confidential meetings took place between American officials and Taliban political delegates in Qatar. Later that year in September, President Trump appointed Zalmay Khalilzad as special envoy tasked with advancing intra-Afghan peace negotiations. Under Khalilzad’s leadership, further US-Taliban discussions occurred in Qatar during October. Russia facilitated separate talks between the Taliban and Afghanistan’s High Peace Council in November. Although negotiations resumed in Qatar by December, these excluded the Afghan government due to Taliban perceptions of it as a US proxy. In February 2019, the Taliban engaged with Afghan figures including former President Karzai in Moscow, again without government representation.

From a military perspective, July witnessed the Taliban’s capture of Darzab District following ISIL-K’s surrender to Afghan forces. In August’s Ghazni offensive, Taliban fighters briefly occupied Ghazni city before withdrawing. By January 2019, President Ghani disclosed that over 45,000 members of Afghan security forces had been killed since 2014 compared to fewer than 72 international fatalities. A US assessment estimated that government control or influence extended over 53.8% of districts nationally, with 33.9% contested and insurgents controlling approximately 12.3%.

On 30 April 2019, Afghan security forces initiated operations targeting clashes between ISIS-K and Taliban militants involved in unauthorized talc mining activities within Nangarhar Province; reports indicated substantial militant casualties alongside allegations from both parties concerning civilian harm. On 28 July, a suicide bombing struck the Kabul office of Ghani’s running mate Amrullah Saleh, resulting in at least 20 fatalities and injuries to Saleh.

By August 2019, Taliban territorial dominance reached its highest level since 2001. Attempts to negotiate peace between the US and Taliban faltered in September. However, talks resumed on 25 February 2019 in Qatar with participation from Taliban co-founder Abdul Ghani Baradar; these discussions culminated in a seven-day partial ceasefire commencing on 22 February 2020.

2020: US–Taliban Agreement and Initiation of US Troop Withdrawal

On 29 February 2020, the United States and the Taliban reached a conditional peace agreement in Doha, Qatar, which stipulated a prisoner exchange within ten days and a complete withdrawal of US forces within 14 months. The Afghan government was notably excluded from these negotiations, prompting President Ghani to denounce the accord as "signed behind closed doors" and decline to release 5,000 Taliban detainees as demanded.

Despite the agreement, the Taliban resumed assaults on Afghan security forces starting 3 March, targeting regions such as Kunduz and Helmand provinces. In retaliation, the US conducted airstrikes against Taliban combatants. Insurgent attacks escalated sharply; between 1 March and 15 April, Taliban offensives surged by approximately 70% compared to the previous year, resulting in over 900 casualties among Afghan security personnel, nearly doubling the prior figure of around 520. The reduction in Afghan and US military operations during this timeframe contributed to fewer Taliban casualties. Meanwhile, ISIS-K maintained its presence with lethal attacks in Kabul throughout March and May.

Diplomatic engagement included a Taliban delegation visiting Kabul on 31 March to negotiate prisoner releases—the first such visit since 2001. However, talks collapsed by 7 April when the Taliban withdrew after failing to secure the release of key commanders. Disagreements delayed prisoner exchanges; by August, the Afghan government had freed approximately 5,100 prisoners while the Taliban released about 1,000. Nonetheless, Kabul refused to release 400 prisoners accused of serious offenses. To address this deadlock, President Ghani convened a loya jirga from 7 to 9 August, which approved releasing these detainees. Subsequently, formal negotiations between Kabul and the Taliban commenced in Doha on 12 September.

On 22 June, Afghanistan suffered its deadliest week in nearly two decades, with 291 members of the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF) killed and 550 wounded amid 422 Taliban attacks. Civilian casualties included at least 42 deaths and over 100 injuries. During this period, the Taliban also abducted 60 civilians in Daykundi Province.

2021: Completion of US Withdrawal and Final Taliban Offensive

In 2021, as US and allied forces withdrew from Afghanistan, the Taliban insurgency intensified significantly. Notably, female casualties increased by nearly 40% during the first quarter.

On March 6, President Ghani announced intentions to engage in peace negotiations with the Taliban focused on elections and establishing a democratic government. Subsequently, on April 13, the Biden administration confirmed plans to withdraw all remaining US troops—approximately 2,500—by September 11, coinciding with the twentieth anniversary of the attacks. The US reaffirmed its support for the Afghan government despite ongoing Taliban threats.

The Taliban launched their decisive offensive on May 1, culminating in Kabul’s fall and effectively ending active conflict. Within three months, districts under Taliban control expanded dramatically from 73 to 223.

By July 5, the Taliban planned to submit a written peace proposal to Kabul in August; however, this did not materialize by mid-month. Meanwhile, Abdullah Abdullah presented a "joint government" proposal named "exiting the crisis." On August 15, following swift advances by the Taliban and Kabul’s capture, President Ghani fled to Tajikistan as insurgents seized the Presidential Palace. NATO forces maintained a presence at Kabul airport during ongoing evacuation efforts.

Throughout June and July, the Taliban captured multiple towns; on August 6 they took Zaranj—their first provincial capital seizure. Over ten days they secured several additional provincial capitals including Mazar-i-Sharif and Jalalabad, severing critical supply lines. By August 15, Taliban forces entered Kabul unopposed; Ghani departed via helicopter and hostilities were declared concluded that day.

With control firmly established by the Taliban, urgent evacuations commenced for vulnerable groups such as coalition interpreters, ethnic minorities, and women. Over two weeks, international personnel alongside Afghan civilians were airlifted from Hamid Karzai International Airport. The US military concentrated efforts on securing airport operations throughout evacuations. The final American military flight departed on August 30, marking an end to the longest conflict in US history.

Casualties

The Costs of War Project at Brown University reports that approximately 46,319 Afghan civilians lost their lives during the conflict. This figure may underestimate the true number, as indirect consequences such as disease and infrastructure breakdown also contributed to fatalities. A joint analysis by Physicians for Social Responsibility, Physicians for Global Survival, and International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War (IPPNW) estimated civilian deaths from all warring factions to range between 106,000 and 170,000. The Taliban suffered over 80,000 combatant deaths.

The majority of civilian casualties—averaging around 75%—were inflicted by anti-government groups, predominantly the Taliban. The United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA), which began monitoring civilian harm in 2008, initially attributed about 41% of casualties to pro-government forces; this proportion declined to roughly 18% by 2015.

Civilian fatalities caused by non-Afghan Coalition troops dropped markedly following foreign military withdrawals and a strategic shift toward air operations. In 2015, pro-government forces were responsible for 17% of civilian deaths, while U.S. and NATO personnel accounted for only 2%. Comparable statistics were observed in 2016, a year marked by record civilian mortality.

Research published in BMJ Open revealed that injuries caused by anti-personnel improvised explosive devices (IEDs) were more severe than those from landmines, frequently resulting in multiple limb amputations and extensive damage to the lower body. The BMJ described these IED-inflicted wounds as causing "unnecessary suffering and superfluous injury," constituting violations under international humanitarian law.

Refugees

Prolonged conflict has led to the displacement of millions of Afghans, both internally and as refugees abroad. Between 2002 and 2012, over 5.7 million former refugees returned to Afghanistan, boosting the population by approximately 25%. By 2021, when the Taliban regained power, about 2.6 million Afghans remained refugees overseas, with an additional 4 million displaced within the country. Following the Taliban’s resurgence, more than 122,000 individuals—including Afghan citizens and foreign nationals—were evacuated from Kabul via airlift operations.

War crimes

All involved parties have been implicated in war crimes including massacres, civilian bombings, torture, and prisoner executions. The Taliban engaged in mass killings, suicide bombings, deployment of IEDs, acts of terrorism, and deliberate targeting of civilians—sometimes employing human shields. Reports estimate that roughly three-quarters of civilian fatalities during the conflict are attributable to the Taliban and other insurgent groups. Other grave violations include widespread sexual violence and execution of captured soldiers.

Coalition forces, Afghan security personnel, and the Northern Alliance have also been accused of war crimes such as massacres and prisoner mistreatment. Amnesty International has alleged Pentagon involvement in concealing evidence related to torture and unlawful killings. Significant incidents include the Dasht-i-Leili massacre, abuses at Bagram detention facilities, and the Kandahar massacre.

In 2020, the International Criminal Court initiated an official investigation into war crimes and crimes against humanity committed by all sides since May 2013. Subsequently, in March 2023, the UK government launched a public inquiry into allegations of unlawful killings by UK Special Forces during the Afghanistan conflict; this inquiry is being led by Judge Charles Haddon-Cave.

Illicit drug market

In the year 2000, Afghanistan was responsible for producing approximately 75% of the global opium supply, which served as the Taliban’s primary income source through levies imposed on opium exports. In 2001, Mullah Omar prohibited the cultivation of opium, reportedly aiming to secure international legitimacy, elevate opium prices, and capitalize on existing reserves. Following the 2001 military intervention, opium production escalated dramatically, accounting for 90% of worldwide output by 2005. According to a 2018 SIGAR report, the United States invested $8.6 billion from 2002 onwards to combat Afghanistan’s drug trade. A SIGAR report from May 2021 estimated that the Taliban derived around 60% of their financial resources from narcotics trafficking. UN officials assessed that between 2018 and 2019, the Taliban earned in excess of $400 million from this trade, although some experts suggest annual income figures closer to $40 million.

NATO’s challenges in stabilizing Afghanistan

The NATO mission encountered numerous obstacles such as ambiguous goals, inadequate funding, deficient coordination, an excessive reliance on the central government instead of empowering local authorities, and a limited concentration on Afghanistan without considering the wider regional context.

Environmental factors and narcotics trade

Cara Korte emphasizes that climate change has substantially aggravated instability within Afghanistan, ultimately benefiting the Taliban. With over 60% of the population dependent on agriculture for their livelihood, Afghanistan ranks sixth globally in terms of climate vulnerability according to assessments by the UN Environment Program and Afghanistan’s National Environmental Protection Agency. The Taliban exploited widespread public dissatisfaction toward governmental failures in addressing droughts and floods, thereby gaining support as many individuals found it more profitable to assist the Taliban than to continue farming.

Despite ongoing eradication initiatives, Afghanistan remained the foremost global producer of illicit opiates by the conclusion of the conflict. By 2018, the Taliban were generating tens of millions annually from opium and heroin trafficking.

Initial errors and America’s secondary conflict

Journalist Jason Burke attributes the prolonged nature of the conflict partly to “strategic errors committed by the US and its allies following the 2001 invasion,” including missed opportunities to establish a durable political framework.

Steve Coll contends that NATO’s inability to stabilize Afghanistan was connected to President George W. Bush’s decision in 2003 to initiate the Iraq invasion. The Taliban’s resurgence, initial neglect by US forces, and its appeal through Islamic resistance ideology are intricately linked with repercussions stemming from the Iraq war. Coll highlights that both Bush and Obama administrations struggled to reach agreement on key priorities such as nation-building versus counterterrorism efforts, focusing on stability in Afghanistan compared to Pakistan, and tackling narcotics trafficking. He identifies unresolved covert interference by Pakistan’s ISI in Afghanistan as the most significant strategic failure in America’s campaign.

Internal corruption and political dynamics

In 2009, Afghanistan was identified as the second most corrupt nation worldwide. Reports from SIGAR and other sources indicated that corruption intensified throughout the 2000s despite American intervention, with numerous high-ranking individuals turning into kleptocrats while the general population faced hardship.

There are perspectives suggesting that reinstating the Afghan monarchy might have offered greater stability, although this proposal was ultimately rejected.

Impact of non-NATO participants

Pakistan played a crucial role in the conflict. According to a 2010 study by the London School of Economics, Pakistan’s ISI upheld an official stance supporting the Taliban, characterizing Pakistan’s role as a large-scale "double-game." Leaked documents from the Afghan War confirmed ISI as the Taliban’s principal external supporter. Former head of Afghan intelligence Amrullah Saleh described Pakistan’s military as the "master of proxies," aiming to expand its regional influence.

Pakistan’s involvement dates back to the Soviet-Afghan war, with its enduring objective being to secure a friendly government in Afghanistan that provides "geopolitical depth" against India.

Iran also pursued influence by aligning with both the Taliban and Russia to counter U.S. presence, sparking a proxy conflict within Afghanistan. Economic assistance to the Taliban came from Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, and Gulf nations such as Dubai and Bahrain. Pakistan actively encouraged stronger Iran-Taliban connections.

Since 2010, China has discreetly increased its presence by signing mining agreements with Kabul and establishing a military base in Badakhshan province to combat regional terrorism (ETIM). With billions in aid contributions, China has strategically integrated Afghanistan into its Belt and Road Initiative. Following 2011, Pakistan expanded economic and military cooperation with China to lessen reliance on the United States. Analyst Steve Coll observes that this conflict ultimately granted China considerable freedom in Central Asia without incurring direct costs in lives or finances.

Deception of the American public

In December 2019, The Washington Post released approximately 2,000 pages of government documents—primarily transcripts from interviews with more than 400 key individuals involved in managing the Afghanistan war. Known as the Afghanistan Papers, these records exposed that U.S. officials repeatedly and intentionally misled Americans about the impossibility of winning the war. Several experts likened this revelation to the impact of the Pentagon Papers.

Pakistan

The triumph of the Taliban was heavily supported by Pakistani assistance. Although Pakistan was a significant U.S. ally before and after the 2001 invasion of Afghanistan, segments within its government—including military and intelligence agencies—maintained deep logistical and operational connections with Taliban forces, strengthening their insurgency efforts. The Haqqani Network, a Taliban-linked group headquartered in Pakistan, benefited extensively from support provided by Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI). Taliban commanders operated securely on Pakistani soil, managing finances, conducting operations, and receiving medical care. Certain groups within Pakistan endorsed Taliban ideology and regarded the organization as a strategic tool against India. Bruce Riedel highlighted that "The Pakistan Army believes Afghanistan provides strategic depth against India, which is their obsession."

Russia and Iran

In the aftermath of the September 11, 2001 attacks, Iranian forces led by Revolutionary Guard Commander Qassem Suleimani initially engaged in secret cooperation with American officials targeting Al-Qaeda and the Taliban. This partnership ended following the Axis of Evil address on January 29, 2002, which identified Iran as a key state sponsor of terrorism. Afterward, Iranian forces adopted a more antagonistic stance toward the US military presence in the region.

Antonio Giustozzi, a senior research fellow at the Royal United Services Institute, highlighted that both Russia and Iran played significant roles in facilitating the Taliban’s swift resurgence in mid-2021 by providing funding, arms, and negotiating with local stakeholders. The Revolutionary Guards notably contributed to Taliban advances in western Afghanistan by convincing Iran-linked militias not to oppose them.

Domestic reactions

Following the Taliban’s retreat in November 2001, CNN reported a widespread sense of relief across Kabul, accompanied by visible social shifts such as men shaving their beards and women discarding burqas. Nevertheless, BBC correspondent Kate Clark noted that most women continued to wear veils but expressed optimism regarding improved security and better access to food after the Taliban’s fall.

A 2006 poll by WPO revealed strong local approval for the US military presence: 83% of Afghans held favorable views of US forces, and across ethnic lines, 82% supported the removal of the Taliban. Sentiment toward Pakistan was largely negative, as many Afghans believed its government permitted Taliban operations from its soil.

Research conducted in 2015 by Langer Research Associates found that 80% of Afghans endorsed the US-led overthrow of the Taliban. A majority (53%) attributed violence primarily to the Taliban or al-Qaeda rather than to US forces (12%). According to a 2019 report from The Asia Foundation, only 13.4% of Afghans expressed sympathy for the Taliban; urban dwellers showed even lower sympathy (11.4%) compared to rural populations (16.1%).

International public opinion

At the onset of military intervention in October 2001, approximately 88% of Americans and 65% of Britons supported the campaign. An Ipsos-Reid survey conducted late that year showed majority approval for US airstrikes in Canada (66%), France (60%), Germany (60%), Italy (58%), and the UK (65%), while countries such as Argentina (77%), China (52%), South Korea (50%), Spain (52%), and Turkey (70%) opposed them.

By 2008, opposition to the conflict had intensified in 21 out of 24 surveyed nations. Only in the United States and Great Britain did roughly half of respondents continue backing the war effort; Australia recorded 60% support. Among seven NATO member states surveyed, none held a majority favoring ongoing troop deployment; only the US approached a split view at 50%, while five others advocated for rapid withdrawal of NATO forces. A Pew poll from April 2011 indicated that American support remained relatively stable, with around half viewing the mission positively and just 44% endorsing NATO’s continued military presence in Afghanistan.

Protests, demonstrations and rallies

Global opposition to the war emerged strongly even before the invasion began, with many perceiving the bombing and subsequent military actions as unwarranted aggression. Various groups coordinated a nationwide peace march held in Washington, D.C., on 20 March 2010 to express their dissent.

Establishment of the Taliban government and global acknowledgment

On 7 September 2021, the Taliban announced an interim administration, appointing Mohammad Hassan Akhund as Prime Minister.

Ongoing conflict

Although the Taliban assumed full control, hostilities continue into 2025. Armed republican factions alongside terrorist organizations opposing Taliban rule persist in challenging the regime’s authority and national stability. The existence of additional terrorist entities—either acting independently or in alliance with the Taliban—heightens the possibility of foreign military interventions aimed at these groups or the Taliban leadership for harboring them.

Republican insurgency

The final Republican stronghold in Panjshir Valley fell by mid-September 2021, with opposition leaders escaping to Tajikistan. Nevertheless, confrontations between Taliban forces and pro-republican militants persist across multiple provinces. By early 2022, a guerrilla warfare campaign had taken shape in several regions. As of October 2022, at least fourteen armed anti-Taliban resistance factions remain active, including the National Resistance Front of Afghanistan, Afghanistan Freedom Front, Supreme Resistance Council, and Freedom Uprising.

Terrorist groups and attacks against the Taliban administration

Despite commitments made in the 2020 Doha Agreement to cut ties with Al-Qaeda and deny terrorist safe havens, numerous designated armed organizations—including al-Qaeda—continue operating within Afghanistan. The nature of their relationship with the Taliban varies; some actively oppose Taliban governance through armed resistance.

Islamic State activity

By October 2024, Islamic State – Khorasan Province (ISKP) stands as Afghanistan’s most formidable terror organization and is considered by the Taliban as their chief adversary. Following ISKP’s deadly 2021 Kabul airport attack, the United States signaled potential collaboration with the Taliban to combat ISIS threats under the framework of the International military intervention against ISIL.

Other active armed factions

In addition to ISKP and republican insurgents, several armed groups are active in Afghanistan—some aligned with the Taliban and integrated into the Islamic Emirate’s structure:

• Haqqani Network
  A highly organized faction incorporated within the Taliban responsible for security operations in Kabul and other areas.
• Al-Qaeda in the Indian subcontinent (AQIS)
  The regional branch of al-Qaeda allied with Taliban forces.
• Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP)
  A loosely structured group operating along the Afghan-Pakistan border opposing Pakistan’s government. Its leader declared allegiance to the Taliban (which was publicly denied), while certain elements affiliate with IS. The group has undergone multiple splits and reconfigurations, complicating loyalty assertions.
  • Jundullah
    Formerly linked to TTP, now pledged allegiance to IS.
  • Tehreek-e-Jihad Pakistan (TJP)
    Claims autonomy but is suspected as a TTP front designed to continue attacks while shielding the Taliban from Pakistani accusations.
• Turkistan Islamic Party (TIP)
  Aims to establish an Islamic state across East-Central Asia and Xinjiang; maintains friendly relations with the Taliban who have facilitated their relocation away from China’s border area to reduce diplomatic friction.
• Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU)
  Following integration into ISKP in 2015, a faction resurfaced pledging loyalty to al-Qaeda and the Taliban while opposing IS.
• Jamaat Ansarullah (JA)
  An Islamist-nationalist organization resisting Tajikistan’s government; tasked with border security along the Afghan-Tajik frontier.

Taliban measures against internal threats

The Taliban have employed harsh tactics to eliminate opposition groups and enforce obedience, including collective punishment, profiling based on ethnicity and religion, arbitrary arrests, torture, and extrajudicial executions. Acknowledging that such methods undermined both stability and their legitimacy, they transitioned toward more strategic measures. These included disarmament initiatives, reconciliation efforts, reassigning personnel to avoid internal conflicts, releasing detainees in collaboration with tribal elders, and engaging religious authorities to dissuade violent opposition.

Additionally, the Taliban extended amnesty offers to combatants who laid down arms and pursued cooperation with former adversaries to assist in reconstructing governmental institutions and security apparatuses.

Neglect of Afghan partners

After the US military withdrawal, around 150,000 Afghan nationals who aided American forces remained within Afghanistan, including those closely associated with US military operations. Hundreds of ex-members of Afghan special forces who served alongside British troops have been refused resettlement in the UK. A former officer from UK Special Forces disclosed that during ongoing inquiries into British conduct in Afghanistan, military headquarters obstructed resettlement requests from Afghan colleagues who could provide testimony.

Humanitarian emergency

Following the Taliban's return to power, Western countries halted humanitarian assistance programs, while the World Bank and IMF ceased financial transfers to Afghanistan. The United States froze approximately $9 billion of Afghan central bank reserves, denying the Taliban access to these funds. By October 2021, the United Nations reported that more than half of Afghanistan's 39 million residents were experiencing severe food insecurity. Human Rights Watch emphasized the widespread risk of famine driven by economic collapse and banking system failures. In response, international leaders committed $1.2 billion in humanitarian relief.

In December 2021, the UN Security Council unanimously passed a resolution designed to facilitate aid delivery while limiting Taliban control over financial resources. By August 2022, the UN warned that six million Afghans faced famine risks amid ongoing conflict, poverty, environmental shocks, and suspended development assistance following the Taliban’s takeover.

See also

• Afghan War documents leak
• Criticism of the war on terror
• Environmental impacts of war in Afghanistan
• List of Afghanistan War (2001–2021) documentaries
• List of aviation accidents and incidents in the war in Afghanistan
• List of conflicts in Asia
• List of military operations in the war in Afghanistan (2001–2021)
• NATO logistics in the Afghan War
• The American War in Afghanistan: A History by Carter Malkasian (2021)
• U.S. government response to the September 11 attacks

Sources

• Auerswald, David P. & Stephen M. Saideman, eds. NATO in Afghanistan: Fighting Together, Fighting Alone (Princeton U.P. 2014) – comprehensive analysis by deployed commanders.
• Mikulaschek, Christoph and Jacob Shapiro. (2018). Lessons on Political Violence from America's Post-9/11 Wars. Journal of Conflict Resolution 62(1): 174–202.
• Münch, Philipp. "Creating common sense: getting NATO to Afghanistan." Journal of Transatlantic Studies (2021): 1–29 [1].

External links

• Archive of 75,000 documents hosted on Wikileaks
• America and the Taliban – PBS Frontline documentary, April 4, 2023