Jump to content

Computer-Assisted Passenger Prescreening System

From Alfawiki
Computer-Assisted Passenger Prescreening System (CAPPS)
Company typeGovernment program
IndustryAviation security, Counterterrorism
FoundedLate 1990s
FounderFBI and FAA (joint oversight initially)
FateReplaced by Secure Flight program
Headquarters
United States
Area served
United States
Key people
Transportation Security Administration (TSA)
ProductsPassenger prescreening and risk assessment system
ParentTransportation Security Administration (from 2001)

The Computer-Assisted Passenger Prescreening System (CAPPS) was a U.S.-based counter-terrorism initiative within the commercial aviation sector designed to compare passenger information against multiple data sources. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) maintains a watchlist under 49 USC § 114 (h)(2), identifying individuals deemed threats to flight or passenger security. This list serves to proactively detect potential terrorists attempting to buy tickets or board flights within the United States. These responsibilities have since transitioned to the Secure Flight program.

Overview

CAPPS operated by utilizing the passenger name record (PNR) data collected at ticket purchase—including details such as full name, date of birth, and residence—to verify against various databases like the TSA No Fly List, the FBI Ten Most Wanted Fugitives roster, among others. Each traveler received a terrorism-related "risk score," with those assessed as high risk subjected to intensified screening of their luggage or person, and possibly flagged for law enforcement intervention.

CAPPS I

CAPPS I was introduced in the late 1990s amid heightened fears of domestic and international terrorism following incidents including the 1995 Oklahoma City bombing, the 1996 Olympic Games bombing, and the 1998 East African embassy bombings. Jointly overseen by the FBI and the FAA, CAPPS I focused on screening checked baggage for explosives but did not require additional passenger checkpoint screening.

September 11, 2001 attacks

During the events of 9/11, several hijackers were flagged by CAPPS. For example, Wail al-Shehri and Satam al-Suqami underwent enhanced checked-baggage inspections before boarding American Airlines Flight 11 at Boston’s Logan International Airport. Although Waleed al-Shehri was also selected, he did not have checked luggage, so CAPPS procedures did not apply. Mohamed Atta was identified at the Portland International Jetport.

All five hijackers aboard American Airlines Flight 77 were designated CAPPS selectees: three (Hani Hanjour, Khalid al-Mihdhar, and Majed Moqed) met selection criteria, while two others (Nawaf al-Hazmi and Salem al-Hazmi) were selected due to insufficient identification, resulting in their baggage being held until boarding.

On United Airlines Flight 93, only Ahmed al-Haznawi was a CAPPS selectee, whereas none of the hijackers on United Airlines Flight 175 were selected.

After 9/11

In response to the attacks on September 11, the U.S. government created the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) to oversee airport security functions previously managed by private firms. Established by legislation signed by President George W. Bush on November 19, 2001, TSA initially operated under the United States Department of Transportation, later transferring to the Department of Homeland Security in 2003. By November 2001, TSA assumed control over CAPPS, which subsequently expanded significantly as intelligence agencies and the Office of Homeland Security requested additions to its watchlists.

CAPPS II

The Computer Assisted Passenger Prescreening System II (CAPPS II) was an initiative by the TSA, created in collaboration with Lockheed Martin, intended to improve the evaluation of passenger risk through the analysis of both government and commercial data sources. Legislation required that the system be managed by the government rather than airlines, ensuring that every ticketed traveler was screened across all carriers and airports.

CAPPS II enhanced the Passenger Name Record (PNR) by incorporating comprehensive personal details such as complete address and birthdate, which were then cross-checked against multiple databases to confirm passenger identities. Law enforcement agencies would be notified if an individual appeared on terrorist watchlists, most-wanted lists, or had active warrants related to violent offenses.

Passengers were assigned a "risk score" reflected on their boarding passes using a color-coded scheme: green indicated no threat, yellow signified a potential threat warranting additional screening, and red denoted high risk resulting in denial of boarding and referral to law enforcement. The methodology behind calculating these risk scores was not publicly disclosed and lacked independent review.

The program encountered criticism due to false positives impacting innocent travelers, including Senator Ted Kennedy in 2004. A report by the United States General Accounting Office early that year identified several problems. Civil liberties organizations such as the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), Electronic Frontier Foundation, and EPIC voiced concerns about privacy infringements and constitutional issues. Some argued that CAPPS II might undermine security by allowing terrorists to manipulate the system.

Cancellation

In the summer of 2004, TSA discontinued CAPPS II amid privacy-related objections and announced intentions to develop a replacement system. Shortly thereafter, TSA introduced Secure Flight as its successor, designed with similar operational goals. TSA planned to pilot Secure Flight with two airlines in August 2005; however, Congress imposed a hold until the system satisfied ten specific requirements aimed at ensuring both accuracy and privacy safeguards:

  1. Establishment of a redress mechanism for passengers incorrectly identified as threats to appeal and rectify errors.
  2. Maintenance of highly accurate databases to reduce false positives and prevent mistaken identity.
  3. Rigorous stress testing demonstrating reliable threat prediction capabilities.
  4. Formation of an internal oversight board appointed by the Secretary of Homeland Security.
  5. Implementation of operational controls to prevent misuse.
  6. Enforcement of robust security protocols against unauthorized access.
  7. Development of policies ensuring effective program governance.
  8. Assurance that the system’s design raises no substantial privacy issues.
  9. Adaptations for states with distinctive intrastate air travel conditions.
  10. Detailed life-cycle cost projections and budgetary plans.

The Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act (IRTPA) of 2004 directed the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to assume responsibility for pre-flight passenger data screening against federal watchlists for all flights. The TSA issued the Secure Flight Final Rule on October 28, 2008, which took effect on December 29, 2008, officially launching the Secure Flight program.

See also

External links

CAPPS II