Criticism of the 9/11 Commission
| Company type | Independent commission |
|---|---|
| Industry | Government investigation |
| Founded | November 27, 2002 |
| Founder | United States Congress |
| Fate | Completed investigation |
| Headquarters | United States |
Key people | Thomas Kean (Chair), Lee H. Hamilton (Co-chair), Philip Zelikow (Executive Director) |
| Products | 9/11 Commission Report |
The 9/11 Commission was created by the U.S. Congress on November 27, 2002, and signed into law by President George W. Bush to examine the events surrounding the September 11 attacks. Led by former New Jersey Governor Thomas Kean, the commission encountered criticism from various quarters, including politicians, government officials, and families of the victims such as the 9/11 Family Steering Committee and the Jersey Girls, who were instrumental in its establishment.
Although appointed by both Congress and President Bush, questions were raised about the commission’s independence. Its final report emphasized that assigning individual culpability was not its purpose, a stance that some interpreted as weakening accountability. Additionally, families of those lost in the attacks expressed concerns over potential conflicts of interest within the commission’s membership.
Conflicts of interest
Allegations emerged regarding conflicts of interest involving commission members, with particular focus on executive director Philip Zelikow. In his 2008 book The Commission: The Uncensored History of the 9/11 Investigation, Philip Shenon revealed that Zelikow maintained undisclosed close connections to the White House and reportedly aimed to shape the report in a way that would minimize responsibility attributed to the Bush administration while supporting its rationale for the Iraq War.
Zelikow is said to have engaged in numerous private discussions with former White House political director Karl Rove and maintained frequent telephone contact with other White House officials. Efforts were allegedly made to prevent call logs documenting these interactions from being disclosed. Despite commitments to avoid communication with Rove and National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice during the investigation, evidence indicates otherwise. Some commission staff members accused Zelikow of suppressing drafts critical of Rice’s and Bush’s actions; however, he denied these claims.
According to Shenon, Rove was concerned that a report implicating President Bush could threaten his 2004 re-election campaign, and White House legal counsel attempted to impede the commission’s progress. When terrorism "czar" Richard A. Clarke testified about warnings given to Rice prior to 9/11, White House counsel Alberto Gonzales prepared aggressive questioning designed to discredit Clarke—a tactic possibly coordinated by Zelikow.
Zelikow also sought to bolster the administration’s contested assertion linking al-Qaeda with Iraq by attempting to modify staff analyses indicating ongoing contacts between al-Qaeda operatives and Saddam Hussein’s regime; these efforts were ultimately rejected by commission personnel.
Other members faced scrutiny over conflicts as well. For instance, Jamie Gorelick, author of the Justice Department “wall memo” that limited FBI-CIA information sharing during the Clinton era, served on United Technologies’ board and represented interests connected to Prince Mohammed al Faisal in litigation brought by 9/11 families alleging his legal liability for the attacks.
Henry Kissinger
The White House insisted on selecting the commission’s chairperson, which raised doubts about its independence. The original chair, Henry Kissinger, attracted criticism due to his alleged involvement in prior government cover-ups in South America, including the toppling of Salvador Allende’s government in Chile, as well as reported business relationships with members of the Bin Laden family based in Saudi Arabia.
Following Kissinger’s resignation, accusations frequently surfaced claiming that the White House obstructed information access for the 9/11 Commission and limited interview opportunities, leading to threats of subpoenas. The Bush Administration also allocated one of the smallest budgets ever granted to an independent commission ($3 million) and imposed a stringent deadline, despite asserting it provided “unprecedented cooperation.”
President Bush and Vice President Dick Cheney ultimately consented to testify under restrictive conditions:
- Testimony conducted jointly;
- No oath administered;
- No electronic recording or transcription; only handwritten notes taken by commission staff;
- Notes kept confidential.
The commission agreed to these terms, with their joint testimony delivered on April 29.
Obstruction of inquiry
Commission chairman Thomas Kean and co-chairman Lee H. Hamilton accused the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) of intentionally hindering the commission’s investigation following a memorandum authored by Philip D. Zelikow, the panel’s former executive director. This memo was drafted after reviewing thousands of classified records, prompted by the CIA’s November 2005 admission that it had destroyed videotapes documenting interrogations of two al-Qaeda detainees. The analysis revealed that during 2003 and 2004, the commission repeatedly submitted detailed requests for documents concerning al-Qaeda interrogations and was assured by a senior CIA official that all requested materials had been delivered. The memorandum concluded that "additional inquiry is necessary" to determine whether the destruction of the tapes violated federal statutes.
Former Deputy Director of Central Intelligence John E. McLaughlin maintained that the CIA was transparent with the commission, asserting no information was withheld and emphasizing that CIA data formed a core part of their investigation. A CIA spokesperson added that the agency was prepared to supply interrogation videotapes, but commission personnel never made a direct request for them.
Interrogations involving torture
In January 2008, NBC News reported on the 9/11 Commission’s dependence on intelligence obtained through torture.[1] Senior U.S. intelligence officials confirmed that individuals referenced by the Commission were subjected to the CIA’s harshest methods, known as "enhanced interrogation techniques", which were later classified as torture by U.S., United Nations, and European Union authorities. Over one quarter of all citations in the 9/11 Commission Report relate to CIA interrogations conducted under these severe conditions.
Commission staff admitted they only "speculated" about the use of harsh methods and expressed concerns regarding how such techniques might compromise detainee reliability. At least four operatives cited in the report stated they provided crucial information solely to end their suffering from torture.
Michael Ratner, president of the Center for Constitutional Rights, condemned the Commission for failing to investigate extreme interrogation practices, warning that this omission undermines trust in the 9/11 Commission Report as a credible historical record.
Philip Zelikow, executive director of the Commission, acknowledged reliance on data derived from these interrogations while maintaining skepticism, conceding that "quite a bit, if not most" of its official 9/11 account originated from such sources.[1]
FAA and NORAD response
For more than two years following the attacks, officials from North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) and the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) provided inaccurate narratives regarding their reaction to the hijackings. They asserted that U.S. air defenses responded promptly, jets were scrambled during the final two hijackings, and fighters were prepared to shoot down United Airlines Flight 93 if it posed a threat to Washington, D.C..
The 9/11 Commission later disclosed that NORAD never tracked any of the hijacked planes and even pursued a non-existent aircraft, American Airlines Flight 11, after it had crashed into the World Trade Center. Maj. Gen. Larry Arnold and Col. Alan Scott testified that NORAD began tracking United Flight 93 at 9:16 a.m.; however, the Commission found that this flight was not hijacked until 12 minutes later and was unknown to military personnel until after it crashed in Pennsylvania.
To obtain audiotapes and other evidence, the Commission had to subpoena FAA and NORAD records. The agencies’ reluctance to cooperate, combined with misleading public statements, led some Commission members to suspect deliberate deception regarding the events of September 11 attacks. John Farmer, who led the staff investigation, expressed shock at how significantly reality diverged from official accounts.
Restricted mandate
In April 2002, President Bush maintained that the inquiry into the September 11 attacks should remain under the jurisdiction of the Congress due to the involvement of classified intelligence. Nevertheless, following persistent demands from victims’ relatives, he consented to form an "independent" 9/11 Commission by September of that year. A significant number of families believed the Commission’s remit was too limited, notably excluding examination of intelligence shortcomings.
The National Security Whistleblowers Coalition, which includes former professionals from the FBI, NSA, and intelligence community, condemned the 9/11 Commission Report as deeply flawed. They contended that the Commission either ignored or censored testimonies concerning warnings provided to the FBI and intelligence agencies prior to September 11. According to these whistleblowers, essential FBI evidence about the plot was overlooked by the Commission in an effort to evade responsibility.
Able Danger
In August 2005, Lt. Col. Anthony Shaffer asserted that he had briefed 9/11 Commission executive director Philip D. Zelikow regarding a classified data-mining initiative called Able Danger, which had identified two out of three terrorist cells involved in the September 11 attacks. Shaffer reported that Zelikow initially expressed interest but later declined to pursue further details. The Commission responded by labeling Shaffer as "not sufficiently reliable" and deemed the information lacking "historical significance," thus not warranting additional inquiry. Following this, four other credible witnesses corroborated Shaffer’s statements.
U.S. Representative Curt Weldon (R-PA) indicated that staff members of the Commission received briefings about Able Danger in both 2003 and 2004. Conversely, former Senator Slade Gorton (R-WA), who served on the Commission, rejected these claims outright, stating: "Bluntly, it just didn't happen." Efforts to locate relevant documents proved largely unsuccessful, prompting Weldon to express frustration and suggest potential concealment.
An investigation conducted by the Pentagon uncovered no documentary proof supporting these allegations. Army Maj. Paul Swiergosz reported that despite interviewing approximately 80 personnel and reviewing a substantial volume of documents and emails, no evidence was found confirming Mohamed Atta’s identification through Able Danger. Weldon accused the Pentagon of ordering the destruction of numerous Able Danger records; however, the Pentagon explained that such records were destroyed in compliance with regulations governing data collection on foreign visitors within the United States.
FBI director's assessment
Former FBI director Louis Freeh criticized the 9/11 Commission for disregarding important evidence related to Able Danger, asserting this omission resulted in inaccurate statements within the final 9/11 Commission Report. For example, the report concluded that "American intelligence agencies were unaware of Mr. Atta until the day of the attacks," a claim Freeh challenged by stating that Able Danger had identified Mohamed Atta, considered the alleged ringleader, as an al-Qaeda operative operating within the U.S., and had monitored him for several months.
Freeh further accused the Commission of permitting the Pentagon to withhold vital Able Danger evidence, casting serious doubt on the report’s overall reliability.
"Set up" to fail
Co-chairs Thomas Kean and Lee Hamilton argue that the government intentionally designed the 9/11 Commission to be unsuccessful. In their book, Without Precedent: The Inside Story of the 9/11 Commission, they highlight several challenges, such as the Commission’s delayed establishment, stringent time constraints, inadequate initial budget ($3 million), political resistance, opposition from entities like the U.S. Department of Defense, NORAD, and Federal Aviation Administration, as well as restricted access to critical documents and witnesses. Hamilton characterized these barriers as purposeful measures to ensure the Commission’s failure.
Denying support from Saudi Arabia
The 9/11 Commission Report determined that although 15 of the 19 hijackers were Saudi citizens, there was no proof that the Saudi government directly financed the attacks. Nevertheless, it pointed to private Saudi individuals and groups as key financial supporters of al-Qaeda.
Former Senator Bob Graham, who co-led an earlier congressional investigation into 9/11, has advocated for reopening probes into Saudi financial involvement and for releasing classified documents related to this matter, including the so-called "28 pages" from that report. These pages were eventually declassified on July 15, 2016.